

Postwar Population
Transfers in Europe
1945-1955

by

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Introduction

The author's book *European Population Transfers*, published in the fall of 1946 by the Oxford University Press under the auspices of the Institute of World Affairs, dealt extensively with wartime transfers of population for the period from September, 1939, up to August, 1945. The book was favorably received by leading American, British, and French reviewers. Some of the reviewers disagreed with the author's ultimate conclusions, but all unreservedly praised the study's objectivity, the abundant documentation, and the handling of the material.

At least two authoritative reviewers have expressed the "hope that the author will find it possible to complete the picture by describing the results after 1945" (Joseph S. Roucek in *The American Journal of International Law*, January 1947, p. 356), and that he "is preparing a second volume on the transfers which have taken place since V E Day" (Harold Butler, in a letter to the Institute of World Affairs).

These suggestions fully corresponded to the author's own inclinations. He felt that the tremendous population shifts effected after the end of the war, shifts having the general purpose of sorting out ethnic groups, deserved close and extensive study. He accordingly sought adequate and reliable material as a basis for such a study. He made a study trip to Czechoslovakia (in January, 1947), and another to Poland (in August, 1947) and succeeded in obtaining firsthand material on the population transfers from, to, and within these countries; he also received full documentation from Hungarian official bodies. Extensive use was made of the material published by German and pro-German organizations and groups in the United States and elsewhere, as well as by the United States, British, and French military occupation authorities in Germany. Soviet sources of information were very scarce.

The redistribution of ethnic groups which followed the end of World War II was unprecedented in scope. In Europe alone it affected over eighteen million people.

The most spectacular result of this momentous population movement has been the almost complete elimination of German minorities in European countries; in one way or another over twelve million Germans

have been removed from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. These vast population transfers are described in detail in Part II (Chapter 5), Part III (Chapter 9), and Part IV. Chapter 12 deals extensively with the successful resettlement of the millions of transferees in Germany.

The compulsory transfer of the German population from the Sudetenland (renamed "Border Regions") and from the former eastern provinces of Germany (now called by the Poles "Recovered Territories" or "Western Territories") created the urgent problem of the repopulation of these areas. Chapter 6 of Part II and Chapter 10 of Part III are devoted to the resettlement of these areas by the Czechs, Slovaks and Poles.

A different set of population transfers—different in background, legal nature, and implications—were the Polish-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet exchanges of population. Though very unequal in scope, they were both based on bilateral interstate agreements resulting from cession of territory by one state to another; both provided for the right of option. These transfers involved over 2.5 million people and resulted in uniting all Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian minorities with their main bodies, the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian Soviet Republics. On the other hand, Poland became a territory inhabited almost entirely by Poles. Chapters dealing with these operations (Chapters 5 and 8) must be read within the framework of the general transfer policy of Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The problem of the large Hungarian minority groups in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia remains unsolved. The abortive attempt at finding a constructive, mutually acceptable solution for the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia through a Czechoslovak-Hungarian exchange of population is dealt with in Part II (Chapter 7) of the study.

The compulsory transfer of the Turks from Bulgaria stands somewhat isolated (Chapter 13). This operation fits only partly into the general framework of the study devoted to *European* population transfers. Geographically, it constitutes a border case, involving two continents; transferred from a European country (Bulgaria), the 154,000 Turks have been mostly resettled in Turkey's Asiatic provinces.

The period covered by the study is the postwar decade 1945-1955. But, whenever advisable, more recent developments are considered.

The introductory chapters of Part I outline the basic features of the European minorities problem and summarize the lessons of past transfers


dealt with in the author's earlier study. A concluding chapter (Chapter 14) discusses fundamental ideological problems arising from, and connected with, the transfer of population in the light of postwar developments. It is supplemented by an Annex "Pro and Contra Population Transfers," which gives a concise review of the ideological discussion of the transfer idea.

Extensive use had been made in this study of statistical data supplied by official and semiofficial sources. It must, however, be stressed that figures on shifting of populations, especially during a period of war and its aftermath, are rarely precise. They often indicate only the trend and magnitude of movement.

On the whole, the author is in favor of the transfer of ethnic groups as a solution to those nationality problems which have proved to be insoluble in any other way. He thinks, however, that not all population transfers dealt with in this study can be considered equally justifiable, and that some of them were hardly justifiable at all. He also stresses that the tremendous amount of hardship and suffering accompanying the early stages of some of the transfers could have been averted by proper organization, and that the implementation of the Potsdam decisions considerably "humanized" the carrying out of the major transfers covered by these decisions.

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The author's wife, Rachel, and daughter, Miriam, have been eminently helpful in various stages of the preparatory work.



PART I

ONE

The European Minorities Problem

I.

One of the basic elements of the ethno-territorial settlement after World War I was the introduction of the system of international protection of ethnic minorities under the control of the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice. This system was created by special minorities provisions, which the defeated states—with the notable exception of Germany—were compelled to sign. Moreover, the new states which emerged out of the war, as well as those enlarged or reconstituted by the inclusion of new territories with minority population—with the exception of Italy, France, Belgium and Denmark—had to sign separate minorities treaties. On September 21, 1922, the Assembly of the League of Nations adopted a *veu* that states not bound by minorities treaties should observe the same standards as those bound by such treaties. This *veu* did not prevent measures openly hostile to minorities in Fascist Italy or in Nazi Germany, though it was reiterated by the Assembly of the League in 1933.

The minorities system of the League of Nations was designed mainly to safeguard the rights of ethnic groups in East and Southeast European countries. Its aim was to protect not only the individual rights of the members of minorities by guaranteeing them full equality in law and in fact, but also their group rights to exist as cultural, religious, and linguistic entities. Minorities were thus as a matter of principle to be safeguarded against attempts at their assimilation.

Events of the last four decades have demonstrated the inadequacy of the League of Nations' system of international protection of minorities as a solution to the minorities problem in Europe. It has become commonplace to assert that the minorities treaties devised after World War I were a failure. Some students find explanations and extenuating circumstances for the ineffectual operation of these treaties; nobody, however, has tried to challenge the very fact of failure.¹

With the end of World War II, we found ourselves faced with an intense resurgence of nationalism throughout the world. In all discussions of postwar territorial settlement, considerations of ethnic status and

interests played a prominent, often disproportionate part, sometimes at the expense of economic and strategic considerations. After this war, just as after World War I, the peacemakers did not—and apparently could not—succeed in creating such a territorial settlement in Europe that would eliminate, or at least reduce, the scope and the intensity of the minorities problem.

Actually, very few truly “new” elements were introduced by the five peace treaties—with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland—signed at Paris on February 10, 1947.² The boundaries drawn at Versailles on June 28, 1919, proved to possess surprising vitality. No extensive changes, no major redrawing of Europe’s political map in stricter accordance with the ethnic principle, proved to be feasible. In 1946-47, as in 1919-20, the almost inextricable intermingling of nationalities, ethnic groups, and national splinter elements, coupled with the presence of nationality enclaves and long-established minority settlements, made it impossible to draw a map along purely ethnographic lines. Minorities remained as unavoidable a phenomenon as they were after World War I.

In this respect, the bitter controversy with regard to the Transylvanian problem was highly instructive. John C. Campbell, Secretary of the U.S. Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, has frankly admitted that “study of the Transylvanian problem in Washington during the war led to the conclusion that it was insoluble so long as extreme nationalism guided the conduct of governments and national minorities in the Danubian area.” No boundary change would help matters much, since the largest Hungarian bloc, some 450,000 Szeklers, lived in the eastern corner of Transylvania, far from the Hungarian border. A territorial change might have divided the respective minorities more evenly between Hungary and Rumania. That had already been tried under Hitler’s Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, which had returned almost a million Magyars to Hungary but had transferred an even greater number of Rumanians along with them; it had proved anything but a fair and stable solution. Accordingly, without pretending to offer a fundamental solution of the Transylvanian problem, the United States took the position that comparatively modest changes in the prewar boundary, returning to Hungary some solidly Magyar-populated cities and districts, might provide a basis for better relations between the two countries. At the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London (September, 1945) James F. Byrnes, then U.S. Secretary of State, suggested that this possibility be studied. Neither the Soviets nor the British showed any en-

thusiasm. The latter felt that a change in the frontier would only exasperate Rumania without really satisfying Hungary and would harm rather than benefit Britain's position in Eastern Europe. Since the population statistics indicated that a line drawn with the purpose of transferring a maximum of Magyars and a minimum of Rumanians to Hungary, without regard to geographic and economic considerations, would not reduce the number under alien rule by more than 150,000, it was decided to accept the old boundary if the treaty contained a further provision pledging the signatories "to recognize any rectification which might subsequently be mutually agreed between Hungary and Rumania and which would substantially reduce the number of persons living under alien rule."³

A similar situation was created with regard to the much-disputed Yugoslav-Italian frontier in Venezia Giulia. The Allied Council of Foreign Ministers decided in September, 1945, that the frontier should follow the ethnic line "in the main." But Yugoslavia, supported by the Soviet Union, found an ethnic line which would have left 460,000 Italians in Yugoslavia and no Yugoslavs in Italy. The Americans drew their ethnic line in such a way that east of it the Yugoslavs would outnumber the Italians 300,000 to 52,000 (including those in Fiume and Zara), and west of it the Italians would outnumber the Yugoslavs 383,000 to 191,000. Population figures compiled by the Allied Military Government in 1945 indicated an even higher proportion of Italians west of the line; 492,000 to 143,000. The "ethnic lines" proposed by the British and the French "divided the two minorities more evenly without changing substantially the number which would be left under alien rule."⁴ Finally, consideration for ethnic minorities was quietly dropped. Mr. Vyacheslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, put forward the thesis that Venezia Giulia was an indivisible body which could not be cut in two; since its general ethnic character was Yugoslav, it should go in its entirety to the heroic ally, Yugoslavia, and not to the defeated enemy, Italy. The American suggestion for a plebiscite in the area between the American and Soviet lines—the one occasion when this Wilsonian device was proposed by one of the Big Four in connection with the European ethno-political settlement—was received with scepticism and was dropped. Ultimately, 86 per cent of the disputed territory, including many predominantly Italian coastal towns, went to Yugoslavia, and Trieste, although overwhelmingly Italian, was detached from Italy and became a Free Territory under administration of the United Nations. In 1953, the Territory's northern


part returned to Italy, the southern part having already been absorbed by Yugoslavia.

2.

There is no lack of explosive problems posed by ethno-territorial minorities in post-World War II Europe. Some are "old" danger spots; others are of more recent origin.

The 230,000 Austro-Germans in the Italian province of Alto Adige (former Austrian South Tyrol) are the sole sizable German minority in present-day Europe which still presents an issue of international scope and significance.

Disregarding Austria's solid ethnic claim for the recovery of pre-



Christian Science Monitor

Map I The Division of the Tyrol

dominantly German parts of South Tyrol, the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers decided, on June 24, 1946, to leave to Italy the entire South Tyrol territory, thus galvanizing the almost three-decade-old controversy over this province. At the same time, the Council and the Paris Peace Conference did nothing about securing minority rights for the German-speaking inhabitants of South Tyrol. The British and American governments manifested, however, great satisfaction when the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Karl Gruber, and the Italian Premier, Alcide de Gasperi, on September 5, 1946, negotiated in Paris a bilateral treaty to the effect that Austria would surrender her claim to South Tyrol and accept its remaining in Italy; the Italian government would, in turn, guarantee to the German-speaking population of Bolzano province and of the neighboring bilingual communes of Trento province not only complete equality of rights with the Italian-speaking inhabitants but also preservation of their ethnic character and cultural and economic identity. Under the treaty, the language of instruction in elementary and secondary schools was to be German; German and Italian were recognized as official languages on equal footing; the Italianized Germans' names had to be re-Germanized; the number of German-speaking public employees was to be substantially increased; a measure of legislative and executive autonomy had to be granted to the province; and finally, the Hitler-Mussolini accord of October 21, 1939, regarding the transfer of population⁶ was to be revised in a liberal spirit.⁶

This Austro-Italian accord was hailed by Anglo-American statesmen as a great act of statemanship—"perhaps," soberly remarks John C. Campbell, "because they had a bad conscience over their own failure to meet the problem in drafting the Italian treaty."⁷ There was a tendency to consider the Gruber-Gasperi agreement as a promising beginning of a new era in the approach to, and solution of, territorial and ethnic conflicts, as a constructive step in overcoming narrow nationalism and creating a healthier climate in international relationships.

Later developments did not vindicate these optimistic expectations. Bitterly attacked in Vienna for having surrendered Austria's claim to the Bolzano and Trento provinces, Dr. Gruber asserted that "he had not entered into any binding agreement and that only Italy had made binding promises."⁸ This meant that South Tyrol Irredentism had not been refuted by the Austrian Government. The Italians, on the other hand, insisted that the German-speaking minority had "received promise of equal rights, not special privileges, and that this [ethnic] faction cannot

create a state within a state."⁹ South Tyrolese Austro-Germans were outspoken in their refusal to become once again a minority group within the Italian state. "It is hard to avoid the impression," reported Albion Ross, in April, 1947, "that the entire German-speaking population, which is now about two-thirds of South Tyrol, is supporting the plan for annexation to Austria. . . . Groups and individuals declare quite openly that they had signed the supposedly secret petition, in which they asked for help to rid the country of Italian rule."¹⁰ This petition was signed by 123,777 Tyrolese residents, and 30,000 more signatures were obtained from South Tyrolese transferred to Austria under the 1939 Hitler-Mussolini agreement. Asked why they wanted to join up with a country as poor as Austria and with so uncertain a future, a German resident in the town of Brunnek, in the Puster Valley, answered: "You can get used to poverty, but you cannot get used to Italians." Erich Ammon, President of the Tyrolese People's Party, told John MacCormac of the *New York Times*: "Of one thing you may be sure . . . there will never be peace between us and the Italians or between Austria and Italy, for the Italians do not know how to treat minorities." The Italians, on the other hand, were openly accusing the German-speaking South Tyrolese of nurturing Irredentist and separatist intentions, asserting that they "do not think and act as members of the Italian state but speak even in their official documents of Italians as if they were aliens."¹¹

All this did not augur well for the future of South Tyrol's minority problem. An additional irritant was the problem of South Tyroleans who, under the Hitler-Mussolini Pact of 1939, had opted for the Reich. In Paragraph 3a of the Paris Agreement, Italy pledged "to revise in the spirit of equity and broadmindedness the question of the options for [Italian] citizenship" resulting from this pact. On the basis of the Legislative Decree of December 31, 1948, a total of 201,305 South Tyroleans had regained Italian nationality by August 31, 1956. Among them were 40,808 who had in 1939 opted for and acquired German nationality but had not emigrated, and 44,684 German-naturalized optants who had immigrated. Only 4,106 applications for restoration of Italian nationality were rejected on the grounds that the applicant was responsible for political or common crimes; by the end of 1958, 355 more were renaturalized.¹²

By the beginning of 1948, the tension appeared to have subsided. The crucial test came in February of that year when the Italian Constituent

Assembly (the first postwar Parliament had not yet been elected) voted to merge the province of Bolzano, two-thirds of whose inhabitants were German-speaking, with the almost 100 per cent Italian province of Trento. The two provinces became the region of Trentino and Upper Adige, with powers to manage its affairs. Bolzano was given separate autonomous legislative and administrative powers in provincial matters. This legislative measure, which later became the main target of Austro-German nationalist criticism, was enacted after consultation with the representatives of the German-speaking population. It was promulgated on February 2, 1948. Earlier, on January 28, Erich Ammon, President of the dominant South Tyrol People's Party, in a letter to Signor Perassi, chairman of the Assembly's Committee for the Autonomous Region, expressed his "satisfaction, as well as that of the group I represent, for the sympathetic understanding shown in your study of our recommendations and for your acceptance of the greatest part of our principal demands." Anton Foglietti, Secretary of the *Sozialdemokratische Partei Südtirol*, wrote in the same vein.¹³

It was not until some years later that the leadership of South Tyrol's German-speaking population started voicing dissatisfaction. They complained that the regional autonomy granted to combined Trentino and Upper Adige province was, as far as its German ethnic group was concerned, no autonomy at all: comprising but one-third of the total population, they constituted a hopeless minority of 15 out of 48 in the regional Diet, and 2 out of 7 in the region's administrative council. Their minority status, they insisted, was being perpetuated and intensified by constant, government-sponsored Italian immigration from other parts of the country so that the southern part of Upper Adige up to and including the two main cities of Bolzano (German Bozen) and Merano (German Meran) had become more than 50 per cent Italian. According to Austrian sources, in 1959 only 227,000 German-speaking people lived in the South Tyrol area, as compared with 235,000 in 1910, while during the same period the number of Italians increased from 7,000 to 115,000.¹⁴ Italian officials countered this argument by establishing that between November, 1948, and May, 1958, the Italian-speaking population increased by 12.84 per cent (from 108,287 to 122,878), while the German-speaking sector increased by 14.49 per cent (from 199,200 to 228,065). They also pointed out that the influx to Upper Adige was but a part of the steady internal Italian migration from the impoverished, predominantly agricultural south to the more prosperous industrial

north, and there could be no restrictions on individual movement of Italian citizens from one province to another; since the rate of unemployment in the province of Bolzano was one of the lowest in the country, it was but natural that many Italians were seeking and obtaining work in that area.¹⁵

Another frequently voiced German grievance has been that, aside from the schools, 90 per cent of all public offices are occupied by Italians. To this, the Italian authorities reply that the number of Germans holding public posts is constantly increasing, and that 600 German-speaking elementary school teachers are being recruited locally. They proudly claim that illiteracy in the Upper Adige is almost nonexistent. The children of German-speaking families go to 445 schools where classes are conducted in German and where Italian is taught as a secondary, though obligatory, language. A German newspaper *Die Dolomiten*, with a circulation of 23,000, is published in Bolzano and is displayed by all news vendors alongside the Italian newspapers. Some motion-picture theaters give exclusively German programs, others show exclusively Italian films; local advertising flashed on the screen is usually in both languages, and so are street signs. The Bolzano Radio Station devotes 28 out of its 33 weekly program hours to broadcasting in German. In the center of Bolzano, German is spoken almost exclusively, and business in the central shops, cafés, and bars is carried on in German; Italian is predominantly heard in the suburbs only, though the Italians form a majority in the city, and the Mayor is an Italian.¹⁶

Nor could the German-speaking South Tyroleans complain of economic discrimination. Over 95 per cent of all the landed property is in German hands. In the northern part of Upper Adige, which is virtually 100 per cent German, the people are moderately prosperous farmers (producing mostly fruit and wine), woodsmen, and mountaineers. Their per capita income for the year 1958 was about 305,000 lire, or twelfth in the national scale of provinces, and they have little or no unemployment (1.25 per cent of the working population).¹⁷ In the urban localities, the Germans practically monopolize trade. On the other hand, almost all industry that has sprung up in the last thirty years is manned by Italians. In the city of Bolzano alone, more than 12,000 Italians are employed in plants turning out steel, aluminum, trucks, chemicals, and magnesium. The Upper Adige as a whole produces about 10 per cent of the total Italian hydroelectric power. Observers of the local scene believe that at least one of the factors generating tension between the German-speaking

and Italian-speaking elements of the population is of an economic nature: the animosity between farmers and industrial workers.¹⁸

Another bone of contention is the respective share of the German and Italian population of the area in the allocation of new dwellings in the government's low-cost housing scheme. The Italian government strongly denies any discrimination in this field. "It would be well to bear in mind," declared Premier Antonio Segni on March 6, 1959, that, "compared with the 230 families in the foreign-language group in need of housing there are 2,300 families of the Italian ethnic group who are just as much in need of shelter. Despite the proportion of one to ten in application for dwellings filed by foreign-language families and those in the Italian ethnic group, the Presidential decree of February 14, 1959, allocated 30 per cent of the new INA-CASA dwelling units to foreign-language families and only 70 per cent to families in the Italian ethnic group." The INA-CASA units are to provide 80 per cent of the low-cost housing scheme; the remaining 20 per cent are allocated to the Institute of Popular Dwellings, and the aforementioned Presidential decree has transferred the entire administration of this program to the province of Bolzano. Austrian sources argue that the 30 per cent of allocations refer to a five-year period and that so far the Germans have received but 6 to 7 per cent of the new dwellings. The Italian answer is that as early as 1957, i.e. prior to the transfer of authority, nearly 27 per cent were allocated to German-speaking families.¹⁹ The Italians insist that "they have behaved handsomely, even generously," to the German ethnic group, which "is being treated better than any other minority in any country at any time in the history of the world." The South Tyrolese Germans themselves admitted to Arnaldo Cortesi of the *New York Times* that "they are not being persecuted . . . and that the Italians are not tyrannical." Their grievances, however real, are relatively minor.²⁰

Under these circumstances, Arnaldo Cortesi reported in the spring of 1959, "no one, either on the Italian or the German side," expected Upper Adige "to develop into a second Cyprus or a second Algeria. . . . The excesses and episodes of violence have been few. In more than ten years of agitation, one Italian has been killed."²¹ It is true that when the Congress of the South Tyrolean People's Party convened at Bolzano on November 7, 1959, the independent Rome daily *Il Messaggero* grimly warned that "everything is ready to transform the Upper Adige into a second Algeria," that "arms are not lacking," and that the whole area was ready to rise up as soon as "the order to attack" was given. Yet the

paper itself hinted that "bombs, dynamite, fuses, and movements of guerrillas" would be discussed not at Bolzano but at Innsbruck, on the Austrian side of the Italo-Austrian frontier, and that no one at the Congress would mention "such things." And in fact, the political report presented to the Congress by the party president, Dr. Silvio Magnago, was described as "sober, moderate, and factual." He insisted that extremism was "dangerous and sterile of results, whereas respect for legality would help the cause of the German-speaking people." In the ensuing, sometimes violent, discussion, extremist speakers, who advocated an all-out campaign against the *status quo* and who probably constituted a clear majority, accused the leadership of being too conciliatory. However, the motion approved by the Congress, though intransigent in substance, was moderate in form. It boiled down to the demand that the province of Bolzano be separated from the province of Trento and set up on its own as a semi-autonomous region: only such a solution would "satisfy the German-speaking people of the Upper Adige." The Congress pointedly declared that "the suggestion made in Italy" that autonomy should be granted to a new province of Bressanone (the German Brixen), carved out of the province of Bolzano and comprising all the prevalently German-speaking municipalities of the Upper Adige, was "completely unacceptable" because it would leave the cities of Bolzano and Merano, "the heart of our territory," in Italian hands.²²

There is little doubt that the situation in Upper Adige became considerably tenser after Austria, considering herself the natural protector of the German minority in Italy, started intervening in favor of her former subjects. "The German-speaking people in Bolzano felt encouraged in their agitation by the Austrian support," the *New York Times* correspondent testified in March, 1959. The Italians, on the other hand, deeply resented what they regarded as unwarranted interference in their internal affairs.²³

On October 8, 1956, the Vienna Government dispatched a note to Rome charging that Italy had failed to live up to either the letter or the spirit of the Gruber-De Gasperi understanding. The note proposed a joint investigation of these charges. The then Italian Prime Minister Antonio Segni denied the Austrian allegations and rejected the proposal.²⁴ It can hardly be considered sheer coincidence that in the same year, 1956, the mood of South Tyrolean Germans was reported increasingly restive. "They are dissatisfied with the Italian rule [and] agitating for a greater degree of autonomy . . . Such loud and angry shouts rose from a scene

of their agitation that many persons feared a second Cyprus was in the making. . . . There is no sign of it at present . . . [but] it may develop into something like that because racial antagonisms have a way of snow-balling. . . . Propaganda is continuing apace and a certain amount of pressure is unquestionably beginning to be built up."²⁵

In December, 1959, Dr. Bruno Kreisky, the Socialist Foreign Minister in the Austrian coalition government, told the Vienna Parliament that Austria intended to appeal to the United Nations Assembly or to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. He insisted that South Tyrol was the crucial problem for Austrian foreign policy: "South Tyrol is of international political importance because the handling of this question will determine whether the method of friendly negotiations must be condemned to failure." In this, the government was assured of unanimous support from all Austrian parties, which competed in urging it to end the "fruitless negotiations" with Italy and place the problem before the United Nations. Most speakers showed a distinct preference for an appeal to the United Nations rather than a hearing at the World Court. Their contention was that as a political rather than a legal issue the South Tyrol controversy merited a full-dress United Nations airing, which, they felt, would be able to bring sufficient pressure to bear to bring the Italian government to a settlement. This approach was obviously coordinated with the position taken four weeks earlier by the Bolzano Congress of the South Tyrolean People's Party, which pointedly stated that Austria was right to pose the problem of the Upper Adige to the United Nations and should raise it again if the negotiations then in progress between Italy and Austria did not bring speedy results.²⁶

High Rome officials took the stand that Italy had nothing to fear from a South Tyrol debate at the United Nations, but made it plain that they preferred to have the issue examined by the International Court. "We want friendly relations with Austria," an Italian diplomat explained, "and are convinced that nobody in the free world would benefit from an acrimonious United Nations discussion on the Alto Adige. Our dispute with Vienna is over the interpretation of a legal instrument, the de Gasperi-Gruber accord, and the appropriate place to seek decision is The Hague." In line with this reasoning, Gastone Guibotti, the Italian Ambassador in Vienna, delivered to the Austrian government a note suggesting that the controversy over South Tyrol be submitted to the International Court of Justice. As an alternative solution, the new Italian Premier Fernando Tambroni sent a personal message to Chancellor

Julius Rabb reiterating the earlier Italian offer to meet the Chancellor personally in an effort to find an "amicable settlement" of the dispute.²⁷

Austria was, however, determined to appeal to the United Nations. On July 7, 1960, Dr. Kreisky officially requested that "the problem of the Austrian minority in Italy" be included on the agenda of the September, 1960, session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Austrian memorandum explained that Austria resorted to this procedure "in view of the fruitless efforts to solve the problem bilaterally and considering the strained relations in South Tyrol itself."²⁸

The Austrian request came before the 21-nation Steering Committee on September 22. Dr. Gaetano Martino, Italy's representative, declared that his nation preferred to take the matter to the International Court of Justice, but would be willing to see it discussed by the United Nations if the wording of the item were changed from "The Problem of the Austrian Minority in Italy" to "The Implementation of the Agreement Between Austria and Italy of 5 September 1946." After two days of patient behind-the-scenes mediation by the Canadian delegation, it was agreed that "The Status of the German-speaking Element in Bolzano (Bozen); Implementation of the Paris Agreement of September 5, 1946" be put as item 68 on the agenda of the Assembly. At a press conference, Dr. Martino firmly denied that any "Austrian minority" existed in Italy, arguing that minorities can be distinguished only by religion, language, or race. "Is there such a thing as an Austrian religion? An Austrian language? An Austrian race?" he asked. "The Austrian Empire once ruled over Lombardy, but can anyone claim that Lombardy is today an Austrian minority in Italy?"²⁹

From the Steering Committee the South Tyrolean issue was transferred, on October 19, to the 99-nation Special Political Committee, which had to decide whether it should be placed for debate on the agenda of the General Assembly. Frances E. Willis of the United States and Mario Amadeo of Argentina refused to accede to the Austrian demand. The latter stressed that not only was the Austrian case based on the assumption that there was an "obligation" to grant autonomy to a region where a minority lived, but it also specified that the autonomous region should be one where the minority "outnumbered" the other inhabitants. Both nations' delegates emphasized the difficult and delicate nature of minority problems, and both expressed the opinion that the issue could be solved better by talks or legal adjudication than by debate. They were, the next day, joined by Pierre Milet of France as well as by

spokesmen for Colombia, Sweden, Paraguay, and Greece. The great majority of the U.N. delegation took the position that the General Assembly could not possibly pass judgment on the issue without first ascertaining the facts, and that the issue involved an interpretation of a treaty, which was precisely what the World Court had been created for. To avoid the virtual certainty of defeat, the Austrian delegation expressed willingness to replace its original draft resolution with one more moderate, which would invoke the good offices of the U.N. Secretary General as mediator and ask U.N. backing for the resumption of Austrian-Italian negotiations. This revised offer was also unacceptable to the Italian delegation, which insisted that the South Tyrol problem must not be allowed to recur yearly as an item before the United Nations with the concomitant inflammatory effect on public opinion in both nations.

After intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations, a compromise formula was agreed upon. Austria and Italy pledged to resume bilateral talks to try to resolve "all differences" between them. If such talks failed to produce satisfactory results within a "reasonable period" of time, they should then consider recourse to the International Court of Justice or "any other peaceful means of their own choice." Both sides also agreed to refrain from any action that might impair their friendly relations.

The new formula was endorsed unanimously by the Special Political Committee and was praised by some delegates as a success in United Nations diplomacy. However, while the resolution carefully avoided defining what might be a "reasonable" period for negotiations, Austria made no secret of her determination to raise the issue again in the United Nations if talks with Italy had produced no satisfactory solution by the following year.³⁰

A new ethno-territorial danger spot arose in the Austrian province of Carinthia claimed by the Belgrade regime, which asserted that about 120,000 of its 190,000 inhabitants were of Slovene ethnic origin and were eager to join Yugoslavia. The area became a hotbed of Slovene-German antagonism and of militant Yugoslav Irredentism. James Reston, who visited Carinthia in August, 1946, reported that "even the most superficial look at the facts of this area and the tactics of Marshal Tito in trying to get it indicate how deeply the poison of nationalism has penetrated into European life." The organ of the Yugoslav *Osvoboditelna Fronta*, *Slovenski Vestnik*, "stirs up the racial issue at every opportunity. All the old techniques for arranging border revision are employed even here. The organizers come over the range from Yugoslavia. Every incident between

a Slovene and an Austrian farmer is played up and the cries of the outraged Slovene organizers are raised to Marshal Tito for help. It is all faintly reminiscent of the Sudeten German technique in Czechoslovakia before World War II."³¹ On the other hand, according to Albion Ross, "the agitation for the annexation by Yugoslavia is stirring up Germanic racial fanaticism of which those who are still Nazi-minded are taking advantage. . . . These radically German elements are playing into the hands of the equally radical Slavic agitators."³² Old squabbles between the two ethnic elements were thus not only being maintained but extended and intensified.

In all the instances so far mentioned, the Wilsonian principle of self-determination of ethnic groups has been disregarded by the peacemakers and refuted or distorted by the interested parties. It has been put forward when it suited certain purposes and has been ignored or rejected when it involved possible disadvantages. In the Italian-Yugoslav conflict over the Venezia Giulia, the Italian Premier de Gasperi insisted on a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the population in the area between the frontier line suggested by the Americans and that proposed by the Soviet Union.³³ The same de Gasperi had, however, flatly rejected the idea of a plebiscite among the population of South Tyrol. "It is unthinkable," he stated, "for a frontier question affecting an entire nation to be left to the decision of the fraction of the population that lives in the neighborhood."³⁴ Nor was Yugoslavia ready to consent to a plebiscite in Carinthia. Asked by the *New York Times* correspondent whether he would accept a plebiscite under neutral four-power auspices, including Soviet Russia (or under the auspices of the United Nations), to determine the desires of the Carinthian people, Karl Prusnik, the secretary of the pro-Yugoslav *Osvoboditelna Fronta*, answered: "No, we do not want a plebiscite. . . . We could accept a plebiscite only after fifty years of Yugoslav rule to correct the results of a long period of Germanization."³⁵

3.

The peace treaties written by the Paris Peace Conference made no such extensive frontier changes as did the peace treaties voted at Versailles, Neuilly, and St. Germain after World War I. The issue of securing minority rights, did not, therefore, bulk so large in the debates that preceded them. But what little was said and done in this field

showed a far-reaching change of opinion on the subject since the previous war. Those mostly responsible for Europe's post-World War II political climate proved themselves significantly reluctant to encourage any international provisions designed to establish collective minority claims.

Very instructive in this respect is the fate of the motion introduced on August 29, 1946, by the Yugoslav representative in the Hungarian Treaty Commission to insert into the draft peace treaty with Hungary an amendment guaranteeing the right of the Yugoslav minority in Hungary "to be educated in their native tongue."³⁶ This, said the Yugoslav delegate, was very important if good relations between national minorities and the country of their citizenship were to be maintained. The representative of White Russia warmly supported the proposal.³⁷

The spokesman of the British delegation immediately grasped the far-reaching implications of the Yugoslav motion and insisted that it should not be acted upon immediately since it "opens up important issues and more time should be taken to study it." If adopted, the motion would have set an important precedent: it would have been the first time that the principle of collective minority rights was recognized in the peace treaties of World War II, and this would inevitably have led to further amplification of the principle. Indeed, the Hungarian delegation in Paris hastened to inform the Commission that the Hungarian Government had no objection to Yugoslavia's request, but asked that a similar provision be inserted into the Rumanian peace treaty in favor of the large Hungarian minority in Rumania.³⁸ Ten days later, János Gyöngyösi, Foreign Minister of Hungary, in an address before a plenary session of the Conference of Paris, made a strong plea for "justice for Hungarian minorities in Rumania and Czechoslovakia"; he suggested the creation of a commission to inquire into the Hungarian minority problem in Czechoslovakia, and another commission to investigate "on the spot" the situation of the Hungarian minority in Rumania and to "draft a proposed solution for the consideration of the Conference."³⁹

The reaction of the leading powers to this resurgence of minority nationalism was a frankly negative one. United States and British delegates insisted that the peace treaties should seek the assimilation rather than the perpetuation of ethnic minorities. "It is difficult for a citizen of the United States to understand the desire to perpetuate racial minorities rather than absorb them," said Lt. Gen. W. Bedell Smith of the United States, thereby sounding a note which would have echoed strangely in Paris conference halls twenty-seven years earlier. "If you are going to

provide for a minority in one state, you should do so in all of them," he added. This American statement was echoed by the British delegate, Lord Hood, who declared: "I agree that our aim should be to assimilate racial minorities in the countries where they live rather than to perpetuate them." The Yugoslav delegate, Admiral Srečko Manola, defended the viewpoint of his government, arguing that "absorption of racial minorities would be a grave error. For European countries to try to do so would start international difficulties and disputes." He nevertheless agreed to withdraw his amendment, apparently realizing the improbability of its adoption.⁴⁰ No other attempts were made in the course of the Paris Conference to introduce into the peace treaties special provisions guaranteeing specific rights to minorities as collective units.

Since the new peace treaties did not specifically abolish the minority rights guaranteed after the First World War, the question arose whether or not the League of Nations clauses concerning the protection of minorities were still valid. Drawing the attention of the United Nations Economic and Social Council to document C.L. 110, 1927 (Annex) of the League of Nations, which contained "a large number of texts of treaties and declarations relating to international obligations undertaken to combat discrimination and to protect minorities," the United Nations Human Rights Commission at its December, 1947, session in Geneva requested the Council "to consider the question whether, and to what extent, these treaties should be regarded as being still in force, at least insofar as they would entail between contracting States rights and obligations, the existence of which would be independent of their guarantee by the League of Nations." The sixth session of the Economic and Social Council, held in New York, resolved in March, 1948, to charge the Secretariat with preparing a study on this subject (116 C(VI)). Submitted on April 7, 1950, to the sixth session of the Commission on Human Rights, this "Study on the Legal Validity of the Undertakings Concerning Minorities" (E/C n.4/367) unequivocally stated that "reviewing the situation as a whole, one is led to conclude that between 1939 and 1947 circumstances as a whole changed to such an extent that, generally speaking, the [League of Nations] system [of international protection of minorities] should be considered as having ceased to exist."

4-

While the principle of international protection of collective minority rights was increasingly losing ground, the idea of international protection of human rights of the individual was attracting increasing attention and sympathy.

What the peace treaties written in Paris sought to do was not to perpetuate the existence of the ethnic minorities by granting them collective rights, but to guarantee that individuals who differed from the majority in race, language, or religion should enjoy equal rights with their fellow citizens belonging to the majority population. The countries affected were required to secure to all under their jurisdiction, "without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting" (Article 3 of Peace Treaty with Rumania). The belief was gaining ground that a universal, as opposed to a regional or group, approach to the protection of the rights of the individual would remove the causes of irritation on the part of the states bound by the minorities treaties; with the implied stigma of inferiority removed, states were expected to be more ready to assume equal responsibilities towards their own citizens. It was argued that under the old system a privileged position was granted to ethnic minorities by providing them with a right of recourse to an international forum; political dissidents, it was said, even when they constituted majorities, might be overwhelmed by militant Fascist minorities but enjoyed no such international protection. The establishment of a universal bill of rights would remove any such discrepancy at a single stroke, and so eliminate another source of resentment: the resentment of majorities in regard to minorities.⁴¹

Postwar international policy has been strongly influenced by the trend of thought just described. The two basic tendencies of this policy are the protection of the rights and fundamental freedoms of the individual and the establishment and preservation of democracy. The United Nations proclaimed that protection of human rights—including the rights of political as well as religious, racial, and ethnic minorities—was a matter of international concern. Article 6 of the Atlantic Charter, the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, the Declaration regarding Italy by the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, and the

Declaration concerning Germany by the Potsdam Conference—all emphasized the universalization of equal rights and liberty of persons, in marked contrast to the specific provisions for ethnic minority groups prevalent during the interwar era.

International protection of collective minority rights, so popular after the First World War, is now obviously on the decline. The powers mostly instrumental in determining the United Nations' political climate are strongly reluctant to sponsor any move tending to perpetuate the group existence of ethnic minorities within the boundaries of single states or to impose or sanction any provisions for the protection of their group rights and interests.⁴²

NOTES

¹ For an appraisal of the League system of protection of minorities from the viewpoint of the minorities states see Joseph Sulkowski, *The Protection of National Minorities: Past Experience as a Basis for Future Solution*, in the *Bulletin of the (New York) Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America*, Vols. II (1943) and III (1944). The attitude of the dissatisfied minorities is expressed in Gustave Koeber's trilogy: *Non, Genève ne protège pas les minorités nationales*, 1938; *Histoire d'une trahison, Le calvaire des minorités nationales et la Société des Nations*, 1939; *L'erreur initiale de la Société des Nations, Documents pour servir à l'histoire de la question minoritaire*, 1940.

² For the official text of the peace treaties see *Treaties of Peace with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Finland*, Department of State, Publication 2743, European Series 21, 1947. A penetrating analysis of the treaties and a valuable survey of the negotiations leading to their formulation is given in Winifred N. Hadsel, "The Five Axis Satellite Peace Treaties," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XXIII, April 15, 1947, pp. 22-32.

³ John C. Campbell, "The European Territorial Settlement," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, pp. 211-212.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 207-209.

⁵ On December 31, 1939, 186,365 German-speaking Italian citizens in the South Tyrol area (69.5 per cent of the 266,985 eligible for option) voted for transfer to the Reich. Actually, however, only 72-75 thousand left Italy (Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*, New York, 1946, pp. 48-65).

⁶ Full text of the agreement in Maurice Czikkann-Zichy, *Turmoil in South Tyrol*, New York, 1960, pp. 46-47. For the background of the events leading to the agreement see Karl Gruber, *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit*, Vienna, 1953, and Nicolo Garandini, *La Verità sull'Alto Adige*, Rome, 1957.

⁷ John C. Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-207.

⁸ *New York Times*, October 3, 1946.

⁹ *Ibid.*, August 22, 1947.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, April 29, 1947.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, April 23 and 30, May 6, August 22, 1947.

¹² The Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *The De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement on the Alto Adige*, Rome, 1960, pp. 89-92.

¹³ Full text in Von Vernhard Schloh, "Die Südtiroler-Frage in Jahre 1959," *Europa Archiv*, Folge 15-16/1959, p. 503.

¹⁴ Letter by Hans Kronhuber, Director, Austrian Information Service, in *New York Times*, May 2, 1959.

¹² Renato Cajoli, *The Alto Adige "Question,"* Giugno, 1960, pp. 65-71. Also *Statement on the Question Regarding the German-Speaking Inhabitants of Alto Adige* by the Italian Permanent Mission to the United Nations, New York, September 23, 1960.

¹³ Renato Cajoli, *op. cit.*, p. 82; *New York Times*, May 23, March 20, 1959.

¹⁴ Italian Delegation to the Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, *Memorandum on Item 68 of the Agenda*, New York, October 12, 1960, p. 58.

¹⁵ *New York Times*, March 24, 1959; *The De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement on the Alto Adige*, pp. 128, 131.

¹⁶ Letter by Gabriele Paresce, Press Counselor, Italian Embassy, in the *New York Times*, May 5, 1959.

¹⁷ *New York Times*, March 18, November 9, March 17, 1959.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, March 18, 1959.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, November 8, 1959.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, March 18, 1959.

²¹ *Ibid.*, October 7, 1956.

²² *Ibid.*, October 6, 1956; March 6, 1957.

²³ *Ibid.*, December 5, November 9, 1959.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, June 25, 1960.

²⁵ *Austrian Information*, published by the Austrian Information Service, New York, July 16, 1960.

²⁶ *New York Times*, September 23 and 24, 1960.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, October 20, 21, 26, 28, 1960.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, August 11, 1947.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, March 24, 1947.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1947. See also Jean Martin-Chauffier, *Triest: Son Statut, Passé et Présent. Libération de la Marche Julienne, Conférences de Londres et de Paris, le problème de l'Internationalisation*, Paris, 1947.

³¹ *New York Times*, February 5, 1947.

³² *Ibid.*, March 24, 1947; *Soviet News*, April 22, 1947. See also *The Question of 200,000 Yugoslavs in Austria, The Slavene Carinthia and the Burgenland Croats*, Belgrade, 1947.

³³ The Yugoslav delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow also demanded "a special autonomous status guaranteeing national minority rights" for the some 70,000 Croats in the Austrian Burgenland, which territorially does not directly border on Yugoslavia. *Soviet News*, April 22, 1947.

³⁴ *New York Times*, August 30, 1946.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, September 5, 1946; also C.P. (Rou/P) Doc. 11, September 5, 1946.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1946.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, September 5, 1946.

³⁸ See "Minorities After this War," *Jewish Affairs*, Vol. I, Nos. 9-10, April-May 1942; also Jacob Robinson, *From Protection of Minorities to Promotion of Human Rights*, Jerusalem, 1949, pp. 136-137.

³⁹ See Joseph B. Schechtman, "Decline of the International Protection of Human Rights," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. IV, No. 1, March 1951.

TWO

Lessons of Past Transfers

1.

Dr. Eduard Beneš, who took an active part in the shaping of the European state frontiers after World War II, put his finger on the crux of the whole minorities problem when he wrote in 1942 that it was not possible "to create states which were linguistically and nationally homogeneous, except by extensive transfers of population." Such a course had actually been proposed in 1939 by the French sociologist Bernard Lavergne, but had been rejected, "apparently on the grounds that it ran counter to the idealistic tendencies governing the 1919 plans for the new Europe."¹ Nevertheless, during the interwar period three population transfers did take place, and a number of transfers of entire minority groups were effected during the war years 1939-1945.

The first interstate treaty on the exchange of populations in modern history was the Convention of Adrianople, concluded between Bulgaria and Turkey in November, 1913, as a sequel to the peace treaty of Constantinople. The two countries "agreed to facilitate the voluntary exchange of Bulgarians and Moslems as well as of their property within a 15-kilometer zone maximum along the entire common frontier."² The exchange involved more than 93,000 persons: 44,764 Bulgarians from Turkish Thrace and 48,570 Moslems from Bulgarian territory.³

On November 27, 1920, a convention for the voluntary exchange of population between Greece and Bulgaria was signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine. Under the provisions of this convention, 30,000 Greeks left Bulgarian soil, 75 per cent of the entire Greek minority of the country; at the end of 1926, there were only 10,564 Greeks left in Bulgaria. In Greece, however, only some 40 per cent of the Bulgarian minority were transferred, and the Greek census of 1928 still numbered 82,000 Bulgarians.

Much larger in scope and best known of all prewar population transfers was the compulsory exchange effected by Greece and Turkey between 1923 and 1933 under the Convention of Lausanne (January 30, 1923). The Convention was concluded after over a million Greek refugees from Turkish Asia Minor had already poured into Greece to escape annihilation following the debacle of the Greek invasion in September, 1922. In

the main, it merely sanctioned a *fait accompli*; under the provisions of the Lausanne Convention not more than 189,916 Greeks were compulsorily transferred from Turkish territory in addition to the million already in Greece. As a counterpart to the transfer of the Greeks from Turkey and as the only means of arranging for their settlement in Greece, 355,635 Turks were transferred from Greek Macedonia and Epirus.

This author devoted an extensive study to the population transfers effected during World War II.⁴ Most of these operations were conducted by the Third Reich in implementation of the policy announced by Hitler in a speech delivered to the German Reichstag on October 6, 1939. Its gist was that "splinters of German nationality, whose existence cannot be maintained" and in whose "very existence lies the reason and cause for continual international disturbances," had to be resettled "so as to remove at least part of the material for the European conflict." In pursuance of this program, twelve German minority groups were transferred from their homelands in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe during the period between October, 1939, and December, 1943. According to an official German document published in *Trials of War Criminals before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals* (Washington, D.C., 1949-53, IV, p. 941) a total of 770,585 *Volksdeutsche* were transferred by January, 1944, from the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), from different parts of Poland (General Government, Eastern Poland), Rumanian provinces (Bessarabia, Northern and Southern Bukovina, Rumania proper), Russia, Yugoslav provinces (Bosnia, Gottschee and Ljubljana, Serbia proper), Bulgaria, etc. Of this number, states the document, 403,733 were settled in the "East" (mostly in the German-incorporated Polish western provinces), 73,750 were settled in the Old Reich, 278,800 remained still unsettled (at least a part of them were kept in the former Polish provinces), and 18,032 were classified as "not to be settled." Following the retreat of German armies, the transferred *Volksdeutsche* were evacuated or fled to Germany. By October 29, 1946, 534,000 German refugees and expellees from pre-1939 Polish territories had registered in the British, U.S., and French Zones of occupation.⁵

Among the transfers of non-German population the most important were the following: the compulsory exchange of 61,000 Bulgarians from North Dobrudja for 100,000 Rumanians from South Dobrudja; the unorganized exchange of 218,000 Rumanians from North Transylvania for some 160,000 Hungarians from South Transylvania; and the voluntary transfer of 400,000 Finns from Soviet-incorporated Karelia to Finland.

All these transfers (and also several other minor or less characteristic ones), their background and actual carrying out, have been described in great detail in the aforementioned study, to which the reader is referred.

The rest of this chapter will summarize the results of the experience gathered in European population transfers during the interwar period and the war years 1939-1945, to serve as a background for study of the widespread application of the transfer policy in the postwar decade.

2.

Transfer of population is an immensely difficult and intricate undertaking. It involves a complex of sometimes oddly interwoven political, economic, psychological, transportation, hygienic, and resettlement problems. A mistake committed in any one of these fields may have the gravest consequences for the affected populations as well as for the success of the whole transfer operation. The most careful planning is, therefore, of decisive importance. But we are no longer apprentices in this field. Valuable experience has been accumulated through various population transfers carried out before and during the last war. The record must be closely studied, both in its positive and negative aspects.

Experience has proved that it is possible to carry out wholesale transfers of entire minority groups on the basis of interstate agreements, and that such operations can be effected without direct administrative pressure. The decisive role is usually played by motives of a psychological nature, the most powerful of which is fear of impending political or economic changes. As a rule, longing for "the country of the national flag" plays a secondary role. Evidence also refutes the popular belief that only townfolk are receptive to a call for mass transplantation, and that "the great majority of peasants do not choose to give up home and community ties for the country of the national flag."⁶ This proverbial inertia of rural groups proved to be far less than generally assumed. In all known cases, the peasants actually were that part of the population subject to transfer who were most willing and eager to move. Almost a hundred per cent of the farmers, when given the opportunity, expressed readiness to go, while the comparatively few instances of reluctance or opposition occurred only in the towns. To be sure, the decisions to leave were not altogether spontaneous; but no less pressure and propaganda

had to be applied in the urban than in the rural areas. Perhaps one reason for this attitude is that the peasant outlook, particularly in the more backward countries of Eastern and Southeastern Europe, is usually purely local. The peasant belongs to his farm, his village. Consequently, if he is promised a good piece of land, and if his village neighbors are being moved with him, he can be happy; no extreme hardship is involved in exchanging one farm for another. The simpler the form of civilization, the easier the exchange. Viscount Cranborne, British Secretary of State for Dominions, rightly stressed in the House of Lords that while "rural populations are the most conservative and deeply rooted populations which exist", they are at the same time, "on the whole, in themselves the easiest to move, for the very obvious reason that the problems of agriculture do not, broadly speaking, differ fundamentally from one area to another."⁷ In towns, where the degree of civilization is higher, the reluctance to leave familiar haunts, superior facilities, and a distinctive way of life appears to be much greater. On the other hand, for the state initiating the transfer, highly skilled workers, professional men, technicians, and so on, would be most difficult to spare, if a territory were not to be faced with an immediate problem of dislocation and unemployment.

The results of past transfers also suggest that speed is essential. This conclusion is entirely contrary to the common belief that to render population transfers successful and less painful for the persons concerned, the operation should be spread over a period of years.⁸ Actually, only those transfers that were effected within the limits of a few weeks or months were fully realized. The two transfers to which no blitz tempo was applied—the Greco-Bulgarian exchange of 1919-30 and the transfer of South Tyrol Germans scheduled for a three-year period—failed to achieve their objective. Such undertakings can be effected only with one swift stroke. Complicated and painful as the process may be, it becomes no less so when prolonged for months or years. The majority of the German-organized transfers, which, on the whole, functioned the most smoothly, were executed in the course of a few weeks, and were completed far in advance of the stipulated deadlines. Experience has shown that a speedy migration is technically feasible, and that, when properly organized, it imposes no excessive physical hardship and even tempers psychological and moral distress.

In this connection, the extremely careful organization of the transfer of the German minorities, which contrasts so strongly with the far less

orderly character of transfers conducted prior to 1939, is worth noting. The early evacuations from Estonia and Latvia were entrusted to local German bodies, but for almost all later major transfers specially trained resettlement squads were sent by the Reich to conduct operations. In Northern Bukovina, where the German minority included a strong intelligentsia, local elements worked in close collaboration with the resettlement squad. This experience indicates that a reasonable and elastic combination of a small but highly trained evacuation personnel with certain qualified elements among the prospective transferees possesses considerable advantages.

Although railroads and ships offer the obvious means of moving masses of people easily and with dispatch, the wartime population transfers proved that these transportation methods are far from the only practicable ones. Truck and horse- or oxen-drawn carts were successfully utilized for the speedy evacuation of hundreds of thousands of persons. A major problem of organization was the synchronized timing of trains and of the truck and cart convoys, and the establishment of properly spaced and equipped feeding centers for men and cattle.

Proper hygienic and medical care constituted an essential that need hardly be emphasized. Careful provisions of this kind greatly contributed to mitigating the hardships of transfer and checking the spread of epidemic diseases, so common in mass displacements. In the vast German-organized projects, sickness and mortality rates were amazingly low.

Settlement of the property interests of the transferred persons is probably the most difficult and thankless task associated with these operations. In the prewar and wartime transfers the export by the evacuees of their cash and movable property was limited by either necessary or arbitrary restrictions imposed by the governments of the countries they were leaving, and by the capacity of the available transportation facilities. Wherever the country of departure attempted to compensate every resettler for the property left behind, on the basis of an evaluation of each individual property by a mixed commission representing both countries, the effort invariably failed. The procedure for such evaluation and for the subsequent compensation, made directly to individuals or through the medium of the government of the receiving country, proved to be exceedingly prolonged, highly complicated, and controversial, and it was obviously unsatisfactory to all the interested parties. The transferees themselves were the most affected by the inherent shortcomings of

this system which were frequently accentuated by the lack of good will on the part of the authorities in the country of departure.

An advance wholesale evaluation of the property left behind by the group subject to transfer is likely to provide the best basis for property settlements. This method was stipulated in the Soviet-German agreement of January 10, 1941, with regard to the property of the German folk groups transferred from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The outbreak of the Soviet-German war barred the effectuation of the financial aspects of the accord. The principle is nevertheless sound. The amount of the total evaluation and the payment schedule could be agreed on by the states that were party to the transfer treaty and could be stipulated in the treaty. This amount could be paid by the country of departure to the country of reception in cash or goods or any other acceptable medium. The government of the receiving country could then assume full responsibility for adequate compensation of the transferees, independent of the payments made by the other contracting country. Just compensation for each individual could be established by the authorities of the country of reception, on the basis of data presented by the settlers themselves and verified by the authorities. This compensation could be made in kind or in cash. But since such an undertaking obviously exceeds the financial capacity of any single state, international loans would seem to be prerequisite to the successful application of this system.

No definite conclusions can be formed as to the effect of the departure of sizable minorities on the economy of the country from which they are removed. Available evidence is scarce. The consequences of the evacuation of German folk groups to the economy of the Soviet-incorporated Baltic and Polish provinces can hardly be gauged in view of wartime conditions and the simultaneous introduction of far-reaching changes in the economic structure of these provinces. In independent Latvia and Estonia, the sudden departure of so active and economically important a group as the Germans undoubtedly resulted in serious perturbations of economic life; yet, owing to the impact of the war and the incorporation of these states into the Soviet Union, it is not possible to judge to what extent these difficulties were overcome. In Italy, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, the local population profited to a limited degree from the transfer, simply because the Germans relinquished a number of farms, houses, and advantageous economic positions.

Where the transfer of population can take the form of an interstate exchange of ethnic groups, rather than a unilateral transfer of a single

group from one state to another, the chances of success seem to be better. The reciprocal character of such an operation prevents suspicion of discrimination against the affected minorities and facilitates the settlement of property interests by opening the way to a mutual adjustment of claims, thus reducing to a minimum direct payments for the property abandoned by the transferees. And finally, it aids the resettlement of the transferees in their new homelands by providing them land, houses, and employment opportunities vacated by the evacuees. It is true that there is usually no numerical equality between the exchanged population groups. Furthermore, the exchanged groups are likely to be largely disparate in their occupational structure, and it is clearly not possible to replace evacuated merchants, skilled workers, or artisans with repatriated peasants or professionally trained persons. But even with a generous allowance for such obstacles, the exchange of populations offers considerably greater possibility for success than a unilateral transfer.

3.

The resettlement of the transferred minority groups presents a very diversified picture. A considered judgment, however, of the success or failure of any resettlement scheme can be rendered mostly with regard to those transfers that occurred sufficiently long ago to be seen in proper perspective. The Greco-Turkish exchange of population offers the most conclusive evidence for appraising the relative benefits and disadvantages of the transfer for the two countries involved.

The prevalent opinion is that Greece greatly profited from the resettlement of her transferred co-nationals. The cadastral, hydrographic, and geological surveys which preceded the settlement operations resulted in the reclamation of barren, poorly developed land; the introduction of modern farming methods greatly improved the country's agriculture.

From 1924 to 1928, the increase in wheat production was more than threefold, thanks to the labor of the transferees. Agricultural production, on the whole, followed the same evolution.⁹ The establishment of co-operative marketing and credit schemes, the influx of new capital, and a large supply of cheap labor facilitated industrialization. By the end of 1925, some 400 new industrial undertakings had been created, and production of silk had doubled.¹⁰ Each year the resettlers paid, in indirect taxes, amounts that more than offset the cost of loans subscribed by the

Treasury for their installation.¹¹ And, by no means least in importance, Greece attained through the transfer an ethnic homogeneity that could have been achieved in no other way. In 1920 the Greeks comprised 80.5 per cent of the entire population of the kingdom; by 1928 the proportion had risen to 93.7 per cent, while the percentage of Turks decreased from 13.9 to 1.7.¹² Macedonia became truly Greek: whereas in 1914 the Greek element constituted only 42.6 per cent of the total population, in 1926 it had risen to 88.8 per cent.¹³

As for Turkey, the results of the exchange have been judged favorable from the political point of view but economically unfortunate. It has even been claimed that the transfer paralyzed Turkey's economic and financial life.¹⁴ The 336,000 Turkish repatriates from Greece could in no way fill the places of the Greeks driven from Asia Minor, not only because they were insufficient in number (1.2 million Greeks left Turkey), but also because they were almost exclusively peasants. Their contribution to the commercial, industrial, and cultural life of Turkey was completely at variance with that made by the transferred Greek population.

In the field of foreign policy the Greco-Turkish population exchange resulted in the elimination of the age-old bitter conflict between the two countries. Greece abandoned her ancient dream of expansion in Asia Minor and conquest of Constantinople, and, as Donald Everest Webster put it, this was "a primary step in initiating an era of progressively intensive cooperation between peoples long at odds."¹⁵

The resettlement of the transferred German folk groups, which was the main large-scale project during the war years, was based on a specific combination of artificially created circumstances. The German resettlers were brought to a region not ravaged by war and from which large sections of the native population had been deported in order to "make room" for them. The personal possessions, real estate, dwellings, and business enterprises of the deportees were given to the newcomers. The results achieved in this way can hardly be considered indicative of what may be called normal resettlement conditions; within these rather fundamental limitations, certain conclusions can nevertheless be drawn from the Reich's experience in colonizing transferred German minorities in the incorporated Polish areas.

Despite the carefully scheduled mass deportations of the local Polish and Jewish population, the installation of the incoming Germans proved to be a very difficult and, above all, a protracted undertaking. The only

group among the resettlers who were established quickly and easily were the urban dwellers, and this was rendered possible by the special circumstance that more of the local population had been ousted from the liberal professions and from business than there were Germans to replace them. Only the Balts included a high percentage of professional people and businessmen; all other transferred groups were largely agricultural. It was therefore relatively simple to set up the urban group in the vacancies created by the deportations. The settlement of peasants—even with all the careful planning, the tremendous number of confiscated Polish farms, the abundance and high quality of agricultural implements, and constant supervision by qualified agricultural consultants—met with serious difficulties. Soil and climatic conditions were strange to the newcomers, and the trustee system for managing the allotted farms proved to be of questionable value; cases of mismanagement appear to have been frequent, and the economy of the appointed administrators of the small farms was conservative, not to say backward.

The resettlement of 61,000 transferred Bulgarians in Southern Dobruja, on farms and houses which had belonged to the 100,000 transferred Rumanians, was carried out without difficulty and within a short period. But the resettlement of the 100,000 transferred Rumanians in Northern Dobruja, whence only 61,000 Bulgarians had departed, was far more complicated, and some 25,000 Dobruja repatriates were still unsettled at the end of 1944. The disparity between Bulgaria and Rumania in the success of their respective resettlement projects may also be attributed in part to the greater competence and honesty of the Bulgarian resettlement authorities.

In Finland, it was found difficult to resettle the transferred Karelians and Ingermanlanders because their installation had to be effected with only the country's own limited means. Furthermore, the attitude of the local population, especially the Swedish part of it, was not always friendly and cooperative. Some 70 per cent of the Ingermanlanders therefore preferred to return to their former homelands in the Soviet Union, but the 400,000 Karelians, efficiently aided by the government, have successfully continued their efforts to integrate themselves into the Finnish economy.

NOTES

- ¹ Eduard Benes, "The Organization of Post-War Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1942, p. 235.
- ² Stelio Sfériades, "L'échange des populations," in *Académie de Droit International, Recueil des cours*, 1928, Vol. IV, pp. 353-353.
- ³ Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, New York, 1932, p. 20.
- ⁴ *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*.
- ⁵ Office of Military Government for Germany, *Statistical Annex*, Issue No. XXIV; *Report of the Military Government*, April 1949, No. 44, p. 27.
- ⁶ W. Friedman, "Multi-National States," *The Fortnightly*, May 1944, p. 288. Miss S. Wambaugh, who made an excellent study of postwar plebiscites, also speaks of the "passionate attachment of the peasant to his field, the villager to the home of fathers" (*Plebiscites Since the War*, Washington, D.C., 1933, p. xii.)
- ⁷ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords*, March 8, 1944.
- ⁸ Bernard Newman, *The New Europe*, New York, 1943, p. 25.
- ⁹ Nicolas Politis, "Le transfert des populations," *Politique Étrangère*, April 1940, p. 91.
- ¹⁰ G. Streit, *Der Lausanner Vertrag und der Griechisch-Türkische Bevölkerungsaustausch*, Berlin, 1929, pp. 55-57.
- ¹¹ Politis, *op. cit.*, p. 91.
- ¹² A. A. Pallis, "The Greek Census of 1928," *Geographical Journal*, June 1939, pp. 543 ff.
- ¹³ André Rodoconachi, *Les finances de la Grèce et l'établissement des réfugiés*, Paris, 1934, pp. 13-14.
- ¹⁴ C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, London, 1934, p. 448.
- ¹⁵ Donald Everest Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, Philadelphia, 1939, p. 114.

THREE

The Potsdam Decisions

1.

In the pre-World War II era the Germans comprised the largest and most widely distributed ethnic minority in Central, Eastern, and South-eastern Europe. This geo-political phenomenon can be attributed only in part to the ethno-political arrangements of the peace treaties of 1919. Its roots go back much further than that, to the early conquests and the two great waves of German migration of the eleventh to fourteenth and sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. Geographically, these two major migrations moved in three principal directions: to the northeast toward the Baltic Sea; to the east toward the Warthe region and the middle course to the Vistula, toward the Sudetes and the Carpathians; and to the southeast toward the Danube basin and the Balkan mountain country. Both colonization waves left tangible traces in the form of numerous German minority groups in the areas now known as Poland, the Baltic countries, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, southern Ukraine, and the Volga region.¹

Prior to its union in 1871 and the formation of the Second Reich, Germany showed little interest in *Auslandsdeutschum* (Germans abroad). Similarly, the Germany of the post-Bismarck period directed all its efforts toward consolidation of national unity, and during the first decades of its existence the Second Reich considered the terms *Deutsche* (German) and *Reichsdeutsche* (Reich German) virtually synonymous. The *Verein für das Deutschum im Ausland* (League for Germanism in Foreign Countries), created in 1908, largely limited its activities to the cultural field.

World War I, however, placed before the Reich the problem of German minorities abroad as a national and political consideration of primary importance. German sources estimated at 9,130,000 the number of Germans (in twelve countries) who had acquired minority status as a result of the treaties of Versailles and St. Germain and of the events that followed the conclusion of the peace.² The Weimar Republic showed particular concern for the German minority groups living in countries bound by international accords on the protection of minorities—in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Lithuania,

Latvia, and Estonia, as well as in the Italian South Tyrol, in Danzig and Memel. An intensive campaign on behalf of these German groups was conducted in the League of Nations and in a half a dozen other international forums open to Germany.

The true goal of this campaign in the international arena was to insure that the painful problem of "lost Germans" would not be forgotten; to stir it up again and again, to keep it in the foreground of international attention. Defeated and disarmed, post-World War I Germany was fully aware that for some time it would be impossible to bring about a revision of the Versailles frontiers by force. The official representatives of the Weimar Republic therefore repeatedly stressed their acceptance of the European ethno-territorial *status quo* and their indifference to any Irredentist aims or plans. But it is a matter of public record that for twenty years between the First and Second World War the then existing Polish frontier was described by German political literature as the *Brennende Grenze* (the burning frontier) and was commonly considered to be "unbearable." At different times, German Irredentism assumed various, sometimes openly militant, sometimes milder and disguised forms; but it was ever present, and directed eastwards.

Germany never ceased to hope that some favorable juncture might result in reunion with the German brethren abroad who had been separated from the mother country after the defeat of 1918. To this end German policy busily encouraged and dramatized all conflicts and complications arising between the German minorities and the countries of their residence. Of the approximately 500 petitions presented by 18 minorities to the League of Nations between 1920 and 1938, 131 originated in German minority groups.³

There were undoubtedly sound reasons for part of the dissatisfaction of both German and non-German minorities in most of the states of postwar Europe, which repeatedly sinned heavily against the letter and the spirit of the international treaties for the protection of minorities. It is, however, beyond any doubt that influential German groups often deliberately stirred up particular conflicts, fanning the flames of old animosities and encouraging the disgruntled minorities to reject any overtures for a working compromise.

This policy tended to foster resentment among German minority groups and to make them feel that all attempts to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary legal channels—be it in the countries of their residence or in the international arena—were doomed in advance. The

Third Reich found a fertile field for its policies among German minorities in neighboring countries who were tuned in this fashion.

2.

The first article of the program of the National Socialist Party proclaimed: "We demand the union of all Germans in order to form a greater Germany on the basis of the right of self-determination enjoyed by nations."⁴ When Adolf Hitler became Chancellor on January 30, 1933, this program, with its frank encouragement of Irredentist tendencies, became the official policy of the Third Reich. The gigantic propaganda machinery of Hitler Germany operated in every country where German minorities were to be found, and became an active and immediate political force in Europe. The colonies of Germans abroad were indoctrinated as missionaries for the expansion of Germany. No pains were spared to teach Germans in foreign countries, whether they had acquired another citizenship or not, to regard themselves as primarily German, owing allegiance first and foremost to their fatherland. The significance of this careful groundwork manifested itself all too clearly in the swift succession of political and military *coups* which Germany initiated in 1938.

On March 12, 1938, Austria with a population of 6,754,000 was occupied by the German armies and incorporated into the Reich. Under the Third Reich's threat of armed intervention, the tripartite conference at Munich turned over to Germany on September 28 the Sudeten regions of Czechoslovakia with a population of 3,576,779, among whom Germans numbered 2,822,899. The year 1939 witnessed further achievements of the same nature. On March 15 the armies of the Reich occupied the remaining part of Czechoslovakia with its 377,830 Germans and a week later, on March 22, they seized Memel and the 70,000 to 80,000 Germans there. A total of about ten million Germans were thus without a single shot incorporated into or "returned" to the Reich.

Next on the agenda was Danzig and the Polish Corridor. On September 1, 1939, German troops crossed the western Polish border; the armies of the Soviet Union, with whom the Reich had signed a nonaggression pact a week before the invasion, did so from the east sixteen days later. On September 28 the two powers concluded an agreement delineating the frontier of "mutual imperial interests." The part assigned to the

Reich included 72,000 square miles with a German population of about 700,000. At this point, the Reich had "recovered" about eleven million "lost Germans."

More than two million Germans still remained beyond the borders of the Third Reich as minority groups in a number of states of Northeastern and Southeastern Europe. Some 770,000 were transferred from their countries of residence in accordance with Hitler's scheme, and about 400,000 were resettled in the German-incorporated Polish provinces.

3.

During the second half of 1944, with the Axis' military doom and the end of the war in sight, the pattern of wholesale transfers of German populations which had been so firmly established and widely implemented by the Third Reich became a matter of immediate practical concern for the governments of states comprising sizable and manifestly disloyal German ethnic minorities.

After having carefully prepared the ground for a friendly attitude on the part of the Allied statesmen, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile on November 23, 1944, presented to the British, Soviet, American, and French governments identical notes informing them of a plan for the transfer of over two million Germans from Czechoslovak territory (see Chapter 5). A spokesman of the Polish government-in-exile declared in London as early as August, 1944, that "bitter experience had proved that Germany's neighbors could not afford to harbor German minorities" and that in the case of incorporation by Poland of German Silesia and East Prussia those German populations that had not fled with the retreating German armies would have to be "evacuated to Germany, under Allied control."⁵ Similarly, the Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee for National Liberation, in a broadcast on September 28, 1944, stated that "there can be no question of the Germans remaining in Poland after the war." The postliberation governments of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, remembering the sinister role played by their respective German minorities before and during the war years, immediately after the collapse of Germany began the mass removal of their respective German folk groups. In Czechoslovak Sudetenland and in the Polish-incorporated eastern German provinces the compulsory transfer of German populations assumed large proportions, leaving not the slightest doubt about the

determination of the Czechoslovak and Polish governments to eliminate any trace of what they considered a deadly danger to the very existence of their countries.

The western Allied Powers in principle accepted and approved the Czechoslovak and Polish schemes for the organized mass transfer of the respective German minorities (see Chapters 5 and 9). However, they repeatedly drew the attention of the interested governments to the fact that such a tremendous movement of population was closely connected with other major European problems and could not be effected by unilateral decision and action of Poland or Czechoslovakia; it would have to be settled by international accord, in harmony with other questions connected therewith.

The Czechoslovak and Polish governments accordingly approached the Tripartite Conference held at Potsdam from July 17 to August 2, 1945, with a request to authorize the transfer of their respective German folk groups to Germany. This request was granted by the Big Three (the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain), with Hungary rather unexpectedly added to the list. The "Report on the Tripartite Conference," published on August 2, contained special provisions on "orderly transfers of German populations." Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement reads as follows:

The three Governments having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the control council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government, and the control council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of

the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the control council.⁶

A well-balanced account of the motives which induced the western Allies to vote for Article XIII is given by the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, which in September, 1949, studied the German expellee problem in western Germany and in Austria. In its report the Subcommittee stated that documents as well as testimony presented "provide sufficient proof to the effect that a very large proportion of the Germans had already been expelled from eastern Europe by August, 1945, when the Potsdam agreement was signed. . . . They were expelled from their residences as far back as September, 1944, herded into camps and threatened with deportation to Siberia if no dumping ground was found for them. . . . Although there are no statistics revealing precisely how many Germans had been expelled prior to the Potsdam Conference, there is positive proof that millions had already left." Testifying before the Subcommittee, Mr. Georg Weisz, a staff member of the Office of the U.S. Military Governor for Germany, stated that by November, 1945, there were already in the U.S. and British zones of occupation approximately 2.5 or 3 million expellees, and 2 million in the Soviet zone.⁷

It is against this background that the Potsdam decisions must be viewed. The aforementioned Subcommittee, which had access to the records of the Potsdam Conference and subjected them to "meticulous checking," stressed that the United States delegation was faced with "the accomplished fact of large-scale expulsions" and, realizing that "nothing could be done to stop the expulsions altogether" . . . was anxious to do everything possible to improve the situation. . . . The U.S. delegation agreed to the wording of Article XIII solely because it wanted (1) to make more orderly and humane the inevitable expulsion of those Germans who still remained in Eastern Europe, and (2) to open occupied Germany to those who were faced with deportation to remote sub-Arctic territories of Soviet Russia, an equivalent to annihilation." The Subcommittee also expressed its conviction that Article XIII of the Potsdam agreement "constituted, besides its humanitarian aspects, one more international effort to find a solution for the problem of national minorities, the problem which is ever-pressing in heterogeneous states."

The Potsdam decisions provided the legal basis for the compulsory

transfer of German populations from Czechoslovakia, from the Polish-incorporated German eastern provinces, and from Hungary. Removals of Germans from these territories previous to the Potsdam Conference, considerable in numbers as they were, were *de facto*, rather than legally based, operations. There was no interstate agreement between the governments of the countries from which these German groups were being removed and the then still inexistent German government. The removals, involving as they did, millions of people, were carried out by unilateral decisions of the respective governments, without consideration for the effects they were bound to produce on Europe's economic and political development. On the other hand, the Big Three, irrespective of the attitude taken by each of them towards the merits of the transfer idea, felt that at least some of these unilateral actions originated in deeply rooted and irresistible needs of the countries involved, and that the only possible course was to give them international sanction so as to secure their further implementation "in an orderly and humane manner." Since the Potsdam protocol spoke of wholesale "transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary," it implicitly sanctioned, in retrospect, if not the manner then at least the very principle of the removals which had preceded the Tripartite Conference. It also entrusted an international body—the Allied Control Council in Germany—with the preparation of a timetable for further transfers, thus converting the entire transfer operation into a major international undertaking.

The governments of Rumania and Yugoslavia, while actively and often ruthlessly removing their respective German minorities, did not officially ask the Potsdam Conference for an approval of their action. Insofar as the Conference took notice of these movements, it ruled that transports of German expellees from Rumania and Yugoslavia be held up en route pending their eventual inclusion into the Potsdam transfer scheme. This ruling was not heeded. A large section of Rumania's German minority fled or was deported long before August of 1945; Yugoslavia expelled all but 110,000 of her German minority and only after that asked (in January and May, 1946) the Allied Control Council in Berlin for "inclusion of the German minority in Yugoslavia within the general plan of transfer of Germans": she received no answer (see Chapter 11).

NOTES

¹ Walter Vogel, "Deutsche und Entdeutsche Städte in Ost- und Südeuropa," *Volk unter Völkern, Bücher des Deutschland*, Vol. I, Breslau, 1925.

² Hans Winkler, *Statistisches Handbuch für das gesamte Deutschland*, Berlin, 1927; Karl Christian von Loesh and Max Hildebert Boehm, eds. *Grenzdeutschum seit Versailles*, Berlin, 1930.

³ Herbert von Truhart, "Schlussbilanz der deutschen Beschwerden in Genf," *Nation und Staat*, July-August 1938, p. 611.

⁴ Gottfried Feder, *The Program of the Party of Hitler*, Munich, 1932, p. 18.

⁵ *New York Times*, August 10, 1944.

⁶ Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress*, Washington, D.C., 1947, p. 151. The French government recognized the Potsdam decisions by notes delivered on August 4, 1945, in London, Moscow, and Washington (*Agency France Press*, August 4, 1945).

⁷ *Expellees and Refugees of German Ethnic Origin*, Report of a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 81st Congress, 2nd Session (Report No. 1841, Washington, D.C., March 24, 1950), pp. 5-8.

⁸ During the meeting of July 25, 1945, Soviet Premier Stalin emphasized that "nothing could be done to stop these expulsions. He felt that not only the Big Three but the Polish and Czech governments themselves were powerless to prevent the process, which was occurring because of deep-rooted and bitter feelings of the people against the Germans." *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

PART II

FOUR

The Czechoslovak-Soviet Exchange of Population

I.

By a treaty signed in Moscow on June 29, 1945, Czechoslovakia ceded to the Soviet Union her easternmost province of Carpatho-Ukraine, an area of 5,500 square miles with a population of 850,000. The protocol appended to the treaty contained detailed provisions for an exchange of minority populations between the two countries. For the first time in the history of Soviet population transfers, these terms were published in full.¹

Persons of Ukrainian and Russian ethnic nationality living in Czechoslovak territory were given the right to opt for Soviet citizenship until January 1, 1946, while ethnic Czechs and Slovaks residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine had the right to opt for Czechoslovak citizenship within the same period. The option procedure was to be in accordance with existing laws of the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, respectively, and to become valid on receipt of the agreement of authorities of the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, respectively. Persons entitled to option were to move into the state whose nationality they intended to acquire within twelve months of gaining the consent of the relevant government. The transferees were permitted to take with them their movable goods free of customs duties, and were to be compensated for the value of their non-movable goods. Compensation was also to be accorded to persons of Slovak or Czech ethnic nationality who had been forced to leave the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine through enemy occupation. In this group were included also juridical persons who should be considered Czechs or Slovaks from a point of view of legal rights existing before the occupation. Representatives of both contracting parties were to decide on reimbursement of the transferees for the property they abandoned, and liquidation of all reimbursement and repayment of divergencies was to be completed within the eighteen months after the ratification of the treaty.

The number of persons affected by the projected population exchange totaled approximately 50,000. According to the Czechoslovak population census of 1930, there were 33,961 persons of Czech and Slovak

ethnic nationality in Carpatho-Ukraine.² The number of Carpatho-Ukrainians on Czechoslovak soil was estimated in June, 1945, at some 14,000.

According to data put at the disposal of the author by Czechoslovak authorities at the beginning of 1947, about 20,000 Czechs and Slovaks from Carpatho-Ukraine who had opted for Czechoslovak citizenship had already been transferred to Czechoslovak territory, and 7,000 more were reported waiting for permission to immigrate and settle there. The number of persons of Ukrainian and Russian ethnic nationality living in Czechoslovakia who had opted for Soviet citizenship is known only to the Soviet authorities, to whom they sent their petitions. Apparently, very few Ukrainians living in Czechoslovakia took advantage of the opportunity to be transferred to Soviet Ukraine. On the contrary, even Ukrainian residents of the Carpatho-Ukraine were reported infiltrating in thousands into Czechoslovakia.³

A mixed Soviet-Czechoslovak Committee was constituted in Prague to discuss and solve all questions pertaining to the exchange of population resulting from the treaty of June 29, 1945; it was also charged with making the final accounting of mutual claims for compensation to be paid by each state to its respective transferred co-nationals.

The wording of the treaty resulted in considerable confusion and hardship for the remnants of some hundred thousand Jews who had lived before the war in Carpatho-Ukraine. Unlike the Polish-Soviet agreements on exchange of population concluded in Moscow on September 9 and 23, 1944, and on July 6, 1945, which specifically mentioned "persons of Polish and Jewish nationality" as entitled to opt for Polish citizenship and return to Poland (see Chapter 8), the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of June 29 conferred the right of option for Czechoslovak nationality only upon "Czech and Slovak nationals residing or having their permanent domicile in the territory of the Carpatho-Ukraine." Jews as such were not mentioned at all in the treaty. Soviet authorities insisted that the 15,000 Jews who had returned to their former homes in Carpatho-Ukraine had no right to opt for Czechoslovak citizenship since in the 1930 census, when the Jews of Czechoslovakia were permitted to declare themselves to be of Jewish ethnic nationality, 95,008 of the 102,524 Jews in the area had availed themselves of this privilege, and the right of option for persons of Jewish nationality was not provided for by the treaty. The Czechoslovak government commission which was sent to Carpatho-Ukraine to act on applications of residents desiring to choose Czecho-

slovak citizenship refused to accept applications from Jews who were not previously registered as of Czech or Slovak ethnic nationality. The Council of Jewish Communities in Czechoslovakia intervened before the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior, asking that all Carpathian Jews who had attended Czech or Slovak schools or participated in Czech or Slovak cultural activities be considered Czechs or Slovaks in the meaning of the pact, and that their application be acted upon favorably.⁴

The situation of about 10,000 Carpatho-Ukrainian Jewish survivors who had left this area of Czechoslovakia in the main before June 29, with the intention of retaining their former Czechoslovak citizenship, proved very complicated. Many of them spoke Czech or Slovak and had fought with the Partisans; some obtained jobs and homes in the former Sudetenland, from which the Germans had been expelled. The Czechoslovak authorities, however, accepted the Soviet contention that these Jews were refugees from Carpatho-Ukraine, and tried to force them to return.⁵ As a result of many interventions, three Czechoslovak-Soviet Commissions were established to investigate each case upon its individual merits in accordance with the following guiding principles: Jews from Carpatho-Ukraine who had had their permanent residence in Bohemia, Moravia, or Slovakia before May, 1938, were to be recognized as Czechoslovak citizens; all others were to provide proof that they had attended Czech or Slovak schools, as a prerequisite to their recognition as Czechoslovak citizens. Jews who were unable to meet these conditions would be considered Soviet citizens and forcibly repatriated to Carpatho-Ukraine.⁶ Some 2,000 Carpatho-Ukrainian Jews were granted Czechoslovak citizenship in recognition of their own, or their relatives' participation in the Czechoslovak armed forces. A considerable group left for France and the D.P. camps in Germany. However, a few thousand were slated for deportation.⁷

2.

On July 10, 1946, a Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement was signed providing for repatriation of the Czech minority in Soviet Volhynia,⁸ descendants of emigrants who settled in that province in the 1870's. Some of them came not from Czech lands directly, but via Saxony, Prussia, Silesia, and Central Poland; however, the main stream originated in Bohemia, where overpopulation in the rural districts and German

competition in industry produced considerable urge for emigration. Political motives—Austrian repression of the Czech struggle for autonomy—also played an important role. Shortage of manpower caused by the abolition of serfdom in 1861, together with the Russian government program of colonization of underpopulated regions, made the Czech immigrants welcome. By 1874 there already were about 15,000 Czechs in the province of Volhynia. Originally, they were mostly peasants (hop producers), but later on they founded breweries, sugar factories, and hostelrys; some practiced all kinds of professions and trades (barbers, bakers, blacksmiths, tailors, saddlers, etc.). By provision of the Polish-Soviet Riga Treaty of March 18, 1921, the western part of this province went to Poland. The Polish census of 1921 counted 25,405 persons of Czech ethnic nationality in the voyevodship of Volhynia, domiciled in 567 rural and urban centers and constituting 1.47 per cent of the voyevodship's total population.

The Volhynian Czechs fully preserved their nationality. Under Polish rule, their cultural life was largely concentrated in the Czech Schools Association (*Czeska Macierz Szkolna*) which had 67 branches; much good work was being done by the *Beseda* Cultural Education Association, the *Sokol* Gymnastic Association, numerous agricultural societies and volunteer fire brigades. In 1933-34 the Czech minority in Polish Volhynia had 60 public and private elementary schools, in which the Czech language was either the medium of instruction or included in the school curricula. Out of some 4,400 Czech children of school age, 3,021 or over 70 per cent attended these schools. The remainder could not receive national instruction because they represented the aggregate of widely scattered smaller groups, each containing but a few children, attending various schools at several hundred localities in the whole of the voyevodship.⁹

With the incorporation, on November 3, 1939, of Polish Volhynia into the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, the Czech colonists became Soviet citizens. Their number was then estimated at about 35,000. Nearly three-quarters of them were of Greek Orthodox faith. Twelve thousand Volhynian Czechs volunteered for service in the Czechoslovak Brigade led by General Svoboda, which, together with the Soviet armies, penetrated through the Dukla Pass into Slovakia in the winter of 1944-45. The survivors of these volunteers received farms in the hop district of Zatec. According to John MacCormac, Prague correspondent of the *New York Times* (May 12, 1947), "a personal appeal to Marshal Stalin

by President Eduard Beneš brought permission for their comrades in Ukraine to join them."

The July 10 Agreement provided for the release by the Soviet government from Soviet citizenship of all persons of Czech ethnic nationality in Volhynia, who had expressed their wish to be transferred to Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak government undertook to grant them Czechoslovak citizenship immediately. The transferees were allowed to carry with them a ton of personal property to each family unit of city dwellers and two tons of household goods, personal, effects and farm implements to each peasant family unit. Certain articles were, however, barred from export, such as precious stones, precious metals, antiques, and masterpieces of art, as far as they were not family property. The transferees had the right to take with them 1,000 rubles in Soviet money.

The July 10 Agreement was based on reciprocity. Czechoslovak citizens of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic nationality were entitled to opt for Soviet citizenship and to be transferred to the Soviet Union under the same conditions which were provided for the Volhynian Czechs. A supplementary Soviet-Czechoslovak Agreement, concluded in October, 1946, prolonged the time limit for applications by persons desiring to opt for either Soviet citizenship or Czechoslovak citizenship until November 15, 1946, and the time limit for actual resettlement until March 15, 1947.¹⁰

According to Prague Radio (May 13, 1947), the actual exchange of population was carried through between January 29 and May 13, 1947. It involved 33,101 persons. Of the approximately 35,000 Volhynian Czechs, 28,600 registered for repatriation to Czechoslovakia.¹¹ Of the 91,079 ethnic Ukrainians and Russians counted by the 1930 Czechoslovak Nationality Census,¹² apparently not more than 4,500 (33,100 minus 28,600) opted for transfer to the Soviet Union.

NOTES

¹ *New York Times*, June 30, 1945.

² *Annuaire Statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque*, Prague, 1938, p. 7.

³ *New York Times*, April 13 and June 6, 1946. Gregory Frumkin (*Population Changes in Europe Since 1939*, London, 1951, p. 52) gives no authority for his estimate that the number of persons affected by the provisions of the June 1945 Treaty "amounted to approximately 125,000."

⁴ *Jewish Telegraphic Agency News*, February 2, 1947.

⁵ *New York Times*, April 13 and June 6, 1946.

⁶ *Jewish Morning Journal* (New York), September 22, 1946.

⁷ Zorach Warhaftig, *Uprooted*, New York, 1946, p. 64.


⁸ Memorandum on *Transfer and Re-Emigration* put at the disposal of the author by Ing. Odon Para, Chief of the Fifth Section of Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry (later referred to as "Memorandum").

⁹ *Minority Affairs and Poland*, ed. S. J. Paprocki, Nationality Research Institute, Warsaw, 1935, pp. 178-181; Zofja Cichocka, "Kolonye Czeskie na Wolyniu," *Wyzsza Szkola Handlowa*, in *Rocznik*, Warsaw, 1928, pp. 101-176.

¹⁰ *Soviet News*, October 26, 1946.

¹¹ "Memorandum," p. 3.

¹² *Annuaire Statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque*, p. 7.



Map II Distribution of the German Minority in Bohemia, Moravia and Slovakia

FIVE

Transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia

1.

On October 28, 1918, a Czech National Committee in Prague proclaimed the independence of the Czechoslovak State; two days later, a Slovak National Council made the same decision. The Germans of Bohemia had from the very beginning violently opposed the inclusion of the districts they inhabited into the new Czechoslovak Republic. They demanded that they should not be separated from Austria to which they belonged ethnically and, for many centuries, politically. A considerable section of Bohemian Germans insisted that a ribbon of territory, right round the Bohemian frontiers, be added to Austria.¹

This solution proved to be manifestly impracticable. The Germans inside the Bohemian frontier did not form a continuous ribbon. They constituted eight territorial districts separated from each other by gulfs of Czech lingual districts. There could be no question of an "Austrian solution" of the Sudeten problem along merely ethnic lines. At the Peace Conference in Paris, in 1919, Dr. Eduard Beneš, at that time Foreign Minister of the Czechoslovak Republic, suggested that, in return for certain German concessions (inclusion of the Glatz district with a Czech population of 20,000 to 30,000), Czechoslovakia should cede to the Reich several northwest and northeast districts of Bohemia which were inhabited by a German-speaking population. This would have reduced the German minority in Czechoslovakia by about 800,000.² This arrangement would probably have considerably simplified the German problem in the CSR, although it would not, of course, have been disposed of entirely. But this Czechoslovak offer was turned down by the Allies on the grounds that Bohemia constituted an economic and historic entity, and that the Germans of Bohemia had never been part of Germany.

The Czechoslovak State was recognized in its present boundaries, with all of Bohemia included and with a German minority of 3,231,688 souls (1930 census). About 500,000 lived scattered all over the country, but in 63 administrative districts, forming a continuous belt along the German-Czechoslovak frontier, the 2,574,600 Germans constituted the overwhelming majority of the population, mingled with 407,600 Czechs and

Slovaks. The rights and interests of the German ethnic group were protected by an international minorities treaty signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10, 1919, and guaranteeing to all minority groups in Czechoslovakia political status, education, and equal treatment under the law.

The German folk group, however, refused to accept this minority status. They insisted that it was created exclusively by their artificial attachment to the Czechoslovak State, which they never recognized as theirs. As early as June 1, 1920, the parliamentary representatives of the German-speaking bourgeois parties in Czechoslovakia instructed their representative, Dr. R. Lodgman, to table the following declaration in the Prague House of Deputies, elected on a general franchise:

The Germans of Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and the Germans of Slovakia never desired to unite with the Czechs, and to league themselves with them for the formation of a Czechoslovakian Republic. On the contrary, the Deputies of the Austrian Reich's Council elected in the Sudeten-German districts in 1911, as the qualified representatives of their land appointed by the general will of the people as it was expressed beyond a doubt in innumerable public meetings and decisions of municipal bodies, expressly declared their wish, after the break-up of Austria, to join German-Austria, and to join her as German-Bohemia, Sudetenland, German South Moravia and the Bohemian Forest Gau.³

In accordance with this attitude, the Germans refused to cooperate in the Constituent Assembly and the first Parliament, and to participate in the government. Their eyes were directed abroad. In the early days, their leaders often traveled to Vienna for advice and support. When, however, they realized that Austria could exert no pressure on Prague on behalf of her former citizens, Sudeten German leaders shifted their allegiance and began to seek guidance and aid from Berlin. It was not till 1926, when Stresemann's Germany joined the League of Nations, that two so-called "activist" German parties in Czechoslovakia, the Agrarian and the Christian Socialist, consented to accept seats in the Prague government; they joined the coalition and had two seats in the Cabinet. In 1936, the German Social Democratic Party also received a seat.

The decision to cooperate in government, however, did not mitigate the basic German negation of their minority status within the Czechoslovak State. Sudeten German representatives also repeatedly voiced their Irredentist tendencies at sessions of the Congress of European

Minorities. In 1929, Dr. Jesser, a Sudeten German senator, declared: "The Germans of Czechoslovakia are not an ethnological minority in the territory occupied by the Czechs, but a part of the totality of the area of the German people, thrust beyond the present state frontiers."⁴ Two years later, Dr. Peters, the Sudeten German deputy, was still more outspoken: "We are *de jure* . . . a minority . . . but we must state that we do not believe that we can . . . manage with the stinting provisions of the minorities protection."⁵ The representatives of the German minority in Czechoslovakia fully shared the views of Dr. Jaross, Hungarian deputy to the Prague Parliament, who complained that the Congress was still attempting to protect the rights of minorities within the present state frontiers. "There were always minorities in Europe," Dr. Jaross stated, "who did not agree to this principle, and the number of minorities taking a more radical stand . . . will increase." He praised the attitude "of those who watch the collapse [of the *status quo*] because they see in these ruins not merely the evil of the present, but the promise of the future."⁶

Swayed by such convictions, the German minority was not interested in the creation of a truly multinational state within the framework of which it could easily find an honorable place. Czechoslovakia's statesmen made a determined effort to live up to the letter and spirit of the international treaties for protection of minority rights and to implement the idea of a *Nationalitätenstaat* (multinational state), wherein all ethnic groups would be equal and enjoy integral protection of their civic, cultural, economic, and political rights and interests. Ethnic minority groups in the Czechoslovak Republic were given every opportunity to live a dignified, full, and happy life, on the basis of the *status quo*, as free of want as their Czech and Slovak fellow citizens.⁷ There were, of course, flaws in Czechoslovak minority policy, some awkward mistakes—mostly psychological—in dealing with single aspects of the minority problem, some technical defects in the administration of the minority regions. But no state policy conceived and applied by human beings can be one hundred per cent perfect; and, measured not by absolute but by relative standards, the Czechoslovak treatment of minorities approached perfection within human limits. Elisabeth Wiskemann, who, on the very eve of World War II, made a thorough on-the-spot survey of the "struggle in the historic provinces of Bohemia and Moravia" and who painstakingly registered even the slightest shortcomings of the Czechoslovak minority policy, stated in a study prepared for the Royal Institute of International Affairs: "It would be difficult for anyone with real knowledge of general

minority conditions in Central and Eastern Europe to question" the Czech contention that "the Democratic Czechoslovak Republic has given its minorities more equitable treatment and greater opportunities to express their views and win consideration for them than the political system in Italy, Germany, Poland or elsewhere allows."⁸ She summarized the position of *Volksdeutsche* in Czechoslovakia as follows:

A German citizen of Czechoslovakia who accepts the political principles of the State is no more aware of the police or the censorship than a Czech; in any court of law he will be just as well looked after. When he ceases to regard himself as an individual and becomes active as a member of a racial group which pays extensive homage to a neighboring and—is it too much to say?—unfriendly state, he becomes suspicious in the eyes of the State authorities and is subjected to annoyance, interference, and severity."⁹

But even in this latter respect, the Czechoslovak administration proved to be rather unusually lenient: "It is really remarkable to find that Sudeten Germans who have consistently preached treason against the Republic in many cases live free and unmolested in its midst."¹⁰

This lenient treatment of German separatists not only failed to appease German anti-State tendencies, but rather encouraged their spreading. Czechoslovak Germans persistently and openly disregarded the duties of their citizenship and looked to their powerful co-national State over the border, developing eventually into what has come to be known as an Irredentist fifth column. Czechoslovak *Volksdeutsche* functioned actively in the service of German revisionism against the vital interests of the country of which they were citizens. As Elisabeth Wiskemann put it: "From the very beginning they [Sudeten Germans] had rejected even the most generous Czech suggestions of cooperation, because it was a matter of principle with them to insist upon their right of self-determination."¹¹ In the language of political realities, "self-determination" for Sudeten Germans meant separation of the Sudeten province from the Czechoslovak State and its unification with Germany. This goal constituted the very essence of Konrad Henlein's Sudeten German Party and secured its amazing success among Czechoslovakia's German population. The so-called "activist parties" (German Social Democrats, German Agrarians and German Christian Socialists), which advocated collaboration with the Czechoslovak state on the basis of far-reaching autonomy, were decisively defeated by Henlein's radical nationalist party. In the parliamentary elections held on May 19, 1935, these three parties had the

support of only one-third of the German electorate and obtained together 605,112 votes as against 1,249,530 votes secured by the Henlein party. Their position, however, collapsed almost completely during the three years to follow. The German Agrarian Party dispersed on March 16, 1938, and its members and electors went over to the Henlein camp. The Agrarians were trailed by the German Traders, and on March 24 the German Christian Socialists followed suit. Only the German Social Democrats held their ground as an independent party. That their voters, too, were submerged by Henlein's landslide was demonstrated in part by the municipal elections of June, 1938, when the Henlein movement secured approximately 88 to 90 per cent of all German votes. In the months following these elections and prior to the fateful autumn of 1938, Henlein had no counterbalance in the German camp. The slogan *Heim ins Reich* (Home to Germany) became the universal article of faith for all Sudeten Germans.¹²

This nationalistic slogan—and not the National-Socialist ideology and phraseology of the Henlein party—constituted the most powerful emotional appeal of Henlein's propaganda. He won the almost unanimous support of the German minority of Czechoslovakia, and not because all Sudeten Germans had learned to admire the political philosophy of Nazism and actually joined his party. The historian of the Sudeten-German movement, Professor Pfitzner of the German University in Prague, relates that it was not a single organization, but the whole nationally minded population of the German-Sudeten districts that found their leader in Henlein.¹³ They did so primarily because they saw in his policy the surest and speediest way of coming "home to Germany" by detaching the Sudeten territory from Czechoslovakia, and uniting it with the Reich. Before the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia, Henlein himself wisely denied this anti-state purpose of his policy and professed loyalty to the Czechoslovak Republic. But in April, 1938, after Hitler's attack on Austria, he declared at the Party Congress at Karlsbad:

Regardless of frontiers, the Germans of Sudetenland could not and would not, as part of the German nation with whom they are and always have been indissolubly united, remain apart from a belief which all the Germans in the world are joyfully professing today. We, above all, as a threatened German group fighting for its very existence, can only profess a belief whose supreme law is the law of the community. But even if the Germans of Sudetenland were not yet completely and by inner conviction ready for the National

Socialist doctrine, the victory of this idea and the incredible successes of National Socialism would sweep the hearts of all Sudeten Germans with elemental force.¹⁴

After this goal had been achieved, Henlein openly admitted that the true aim of his movement was dismemberment of the Czechoslovak state. When Hitler arrived in the West-Bohemian town of Eger with his heavily armored escort, Henlein greeted him with the words: "For twenty years now we have been compelled to live in a state which was none of our choosing."¹⁵ And in a lecture given in March, 1941, at the Academy for Administrative Science (*Verwaltungsakademie*) in Vienna on "The Sudeten Germans' Fight for Freedom," Henlein acknowledged that his activities had been from the very beginning directed towards the detachment of the Sudeten territory from the Czechoslovak Republic, and that he was merely preparing the ground for the occupation of the Czech lands by the Reich. In a report of this lecture, which appeared in the *Völkischer Beobachter* on March 5, 1941, we read: "The speaker . . . pointed out that the only possibility before the Sudeten Germans was to carry on, under a mask of complete legality, their struggle for their self-preservation as Sudeten Germans and their return to the Reich. In the course of a few years the Sudeten Germans had succeeded in undermining the inner stability of Czechoslovakia so fundamentally and causing such confusion in internal affairs that she was ripe for liquidation."

2.

The sinister role played by the overwhelming majority of the German folk group in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was firmly established in the minds of Czechoslovak statesmen and in world public opinion. The behavior of the Czechoslovak Germans during the Nazi occupation had certainly not improved their record. Nevertheless, in the early stages of the war, Czechoslovak leaders apparently still wanted to believe in the possibility of a peaceful and constructive coexistence of the Czechs and Slovaks with the German minority within a restored Czechoslovak Republic. "I am firmly convinced," wrote Dr. Beneš on November 10, 1939, in reply to a message of Sudeten refugees in Scotland, "that the Nazi regime will be defeated in this war and the Czechs as well as the Germans will regain their liberty. In Czechoslovakia I expect a new and

fruitful cooperation between Germans and Czechs." In a second message to Sudeten refugees (February 2, 1940) Dr. Beneš repeated that "amicable cooperation of our two peoples in our fatherland on a basis of social and racial justice, equality and freedom is the only way towards welfare and happiness of Czechs and Germans in our beloved homeland."¹⁶

There was, thus, at that time no entrenched enmity or prejudice against the German minority as such on the part of Czechoslovak statesmen. Despite the dismal experience of two decades, they still hoped for an understanding with the Germans; no plans for a forcible removal were as yet entertained.

Very soon, however, this confident attitude began to undergo essential changes. Czechoslovak leaders were reluctantly coming to the conclusion that Czechoslovakia's German problem could not be solved on the traditional lines of democratic government, even by the most elaborate protection of minority rights. Elisabeth Wiskemann had stressed as early as 1939 that "in the circumstances of Europe today, the problem of the Historic Provinces (Bohemia and Moravia) cannot be satisfactorily solved; a wise Government can greatly reduce friction, but, whatever the Government, friction there will be, so long as racialist nationalism is regarded as an absolute standard of good."¹⁷ What was anticipated on the eve of the war, has ripened into certainty in the light of the experience of the war years. Sudeten Germans after Munich—and Germans of rump-Czechoslovakia after March, 1939—became, both legally and in fact, the *Herrenvolk* (master race) of the country. More than ever they came to regard their "racialist nationalism as an absolute standard of good." Both psychologically and politically, it became inconceivable for them to be returned to their previous minority status within the restored Czechoslovak Republic.

Speaking of Turkish minorities in the Balkan countries, the Turkish Minister of Interior, Sukru Kaya Bey, once boastfully told the Turkish National Assembly that "the basic trend of the Turkish character is not to be able to live as slave where the Turk previously was the master."¹⁸ This master mentality, always inherent in the German national character to an even higher degree than in the Turkish, was immensely intensified by the master status obtained after 1938-39. It appeared self-evident that, deprived of this status, the Czechoslovak Germans would hardly be prepared to forget the "lost paradise" and to reconcile themselves to a prospect of minority existence which they had been persistently refusing to accept since the very inception of Czechoslovakia. More than ever

they would regard Germany as the lost mother country. Nourishing re-kindled Irredentist hopes, they would constitute a permanent menace to the security and integrity of Czechoslovakia and to the peace of Central Europe.

There was thus an inherent incompatibility between the restoration of the prewar boundaries of the Czechoslovak Republic and the national aspirations of the Sudeten German minority. It was, of course, possible to contemplate eventual separation of the Sudeten districts from Czechoslovakia by giving the German Sudeten population the right of "self-determination," as demanded by Henlein and recommended by Lord Runciman before Munich. But Czechoslovak leaders obviously never considered such a prospect; neither, as a matter of fact, did Allied statesmen. The restoration of Czechoslovakia's prewar territory was one of the few axioms never questioned by anybody. But the return of the Sudeten area with its Irredentist prewar German population would have made Czechoslovakia one of the most explosive danger spots in postwar Europe. The twenty-year experiment of integrating the German minority into a multinational Czechoslovak state had proved to be a manifest failure. And there was no indication of any noticeable change of mind among the Czechoslovak Germans, either at home or abroad.

Not only the extreme German nationalistic groups of Czechoslovakia, which had actively participated in the separatist Henlein movement and enthusiastically greeted the Nazi conquest of Czechoslovakia,¹⁹ but also some left-wing anti-Nazi Sudeten German leaders, who were most energetically opposed to Henlein tendencies and had to flee Czechoslovakia in order to escape Nazi persecution, practically yielded to the nationalistic ideology of their former opponents. They firmly refused to consider the Sudeten question as an internal problem of the Czechoslovak state and to accept for the Sudeten German population a minority status within the Czechoslovak Republic. Wenzel Jäksch, the most outstanding leader of the German Sudeten Socialist emigrés, virtually endorsed Henlein's pre-Munich separatist program. In a pamphlet *What Will Come after Hitler*, published in London in 1939, Jäksch insisted that it was for Sudeten Germans themselves to decide whether they were to remain an autonomous group inside Bohemia and Moravia, or to become a province of the German Reich. In a memorandum, dated 1943, he proposed that the Sudeten German area be occupied by Allied troops as territory of debatable ownership, and that the Sudeten German population send their own delegates to the Peace Conference. In August, 1944, the

"Democratic Sudeten Committee" headed by Jäksch issued a declaration calling upon the governments and parliaments of the United Nations to treat the Sudeten Germans not as a minority group within Czechoslovakia, but as an independent unit in the Central European family of nations and, accordingly, to grant them the status of a partner in all decisions concerning them. The "American Friends of Democratic Sudetens," an organization created by Jäksch in the United States, also demanded "self-determination" for the Sudeten Germans: "Let the Sudetens decide their own future in accordance with the Atlantic Charter."²⁰ The implications of this demand which closely followed the classic German nationalist line, were candidly formulated in a letter published in the *New York Times* of September 14, 1945, by H. F. March (its contents were fully endorsed by the Jäksch group). The letter suggested that the Sudetenland should follow the pattern of the Carpatho-Ukraine which was separated by Soviet Russia from Czechoslovakia; "after the separation, the Sudetenland should be given the option of reuniting with Austria."

The views and tendencies of the Jäksch group were, it is true, opposed by another sector of the German Czechoslovak emigration, known under the name of "Representation of Democratic Germans from Czechoslovakia." This formation included three factions: (1) German Communists led by Karl Kreibich; (2) the German Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia headed by Joseph Zinner, Franz Koehler, and Irene Kirpal; and (3) the German Democratic Freedom Party led by Franz Peres. All these factions were, however, very small and hardly representative of the predominant tendencies among the German emigrés. The Jäksch group was considerably more energetic and vocal. There was no evidence of a new, positive German approach to the fundamentals of Czechoslovakia's statchood.

3.

Under these circumstances, the idea of a radical solution of the Czechoslovak minority problem through a wholesale transfer of the country's minority groups began gradually to take shape in the minds of Czechoslovak statesmen. Dr. Prokop Drtina, head of President Beneš' Chancellery, revealed in a broadcast from Prague after the Potsdam decision that as early as 1940, Dr. Beneš "set out to convince

the Allied statesmen and British public opinion of the need to remove the German minority from Czechoslovakia."²¹ But not until the autumn of 1941 did Dr. Beneš inaugurate a campaign for the principle of transferring European minority groups as a means of solving age-old ethnic and territorial problems. His article "The New Order in Europe" in the September, 1941, issue of the London monthly *The Nineteenth Century and After* strongly argued the necessity of such a solution. It was followed by an article "Czechoslovakia's Struggle for Freedom" in the *Dalhousie Review*. In January, 1942, the influential American quarterly *Foreign Affairs* published Dr. Beneš' article "The Organization of Postwar Europe." On April 28, 1942, Dr. Beneš told the members of the Foreign Press Association in London that "if a minority problem is likely to be intractable," he was "prepared for the grim necessity of population transfers."²² In a lecture delivered at the Manchester University on December 5, 1942, he again stressed that, although he did not know an "ideal solution" for the "vexed and yet pressing" minority problem, the possibility of "certain population transfers as a condition for establishing the equilibrium of a permanent peace" could not be altogether ruled out.²³ In an interview given the *New York Times* (February 19, 1943) Dr. Beneš outlined his version of a "wholesome exchange of minority populations."

This public campaign was, however, conducted along rather tentative and general lines, without putting definite emphasis on Czechoslovakia or offering a specific, clear-cut scheme for a wholesale transfer of Sudeten Germans. We know from Dr. Beneš himself that the Czechoslovak government-in-exile had "already in 1942 prepared in London a plan for the systematic, organized, and really humane transfer of Germans into the Reich."²⁴ But at that time Dr. Beneš abstained from committing his government to any explicit plan of this kind. In a message to the inaugural meeting of the third session of the Czechoslovak State Council in London (November 12, 1942) he insisted that it would be premature "to examine any concrete solution of our nationality problem at home after the war. . . . What will finally be done by us in respect to minority questions after the war," he said, "will be dictated partly by the general conditions at home and the psychology of our people at the moment of liberation, partly by the action of our Germans themselves here in exile and at home, previous to and during the war, and finally by the condition and the power of the Allies at the time when Germany falls."²⁵ A few weeks earlier, on October 7, a similar view had been expressed by

Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovak Minister of State, in a speech delivered at the British-Czechoslovak Friendship Club: "The problem of nationalities in a free Czechoslovakia can only be settled by competent factors of the liberated nation after the defeat of Germany and her satellites, including Hungary. None of us abroad is entitled to prejudice the nation's decision."²⁶

In the meantime, however, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile was quietly preparing the ground for a positive attitude on the part of the Allied statesmen toward the idea of transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia. A Czechoslovak Research Institute in London, headed by Dr. Cisar, worked out a detailed transfer scheme. Dr. Beneš relates in his *Memoirs* that in the summer of 1942, Mr. Nichols, who had been appointed British Minister to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, "informed us that the British government had given careful consideration to our attitude in the matter of the transfer from our Republic of minority populations, which had conspired against us, and had reached the conclusion, in view of what had happened in 1938 and during the war, that at the time of the final solution of our minority problem after the victorious end of the war, the British government did not intend to oppose the principle to transfer the minority population from Czechoslovakia in an endeavor to make Czechoslovakia as homogeneous a country as possible from the standpoint of nationality." The attitude of the Soviet government was at the beginning noncommittal. Approached in March, 1943, through the Soviet Ambassador in London, Alexander J. Bogomolow, it stated that no definitive plans in regard to its future policy towards Germany had been as yet worked out and that further consultations with the British and U.S. governments would have to be conducted. Dr. Beneš' *Memoirs* reveal a skillful diplomatic game he successfully played with the view of securing both American and Soviet endorsement of his transfer scheme. Discussing it with President Roosevelt in Washington on May 12, 1943, he intimated that it was acceptable to Moscow. Seventeen days later, on May 29, Dr. Ripka told Bogomolow in London that the U.S. government had already endorsed the transfer plan and that in these circumstances the Czechoslovak government expected the official consent of the Kremlin. On June 6, Dr. Ripka telephoned Dr. Beneš to say that the Russian consent had just arrived. The next day, Dr. Beneš reported to the Czechoslovak government-in-exile that President Roosevelt "agrees to the transfer of the minority populations from Eastern Prussia, Transylvania, and Czechoslovakia," and added:

"I asked again expressly whether the United States would agree to the transfer of our Germans. He declared plainly that they would. I repeated that Great Britain and the Soviets had already given us their views to the same effect."²⁷ In December, 1943, Dr. Beneš visited Moscow and submitted a memorandum on the transfer scheme. This time, he encountered no difficulties. His secretary, Eduard Taborsky, relates that "both Molotov and Stalin promised full help. 'That's a trifle, that's easy!' was Molotov's reaction when Beneš explained his proposal of having something like two million Sudeten Germans moved into the Reich."²⁸

Having carefully prepared the ground, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, on November 23, 1944, submitted to the British, Soviet, American, and French governments identical notes notifying them of a plan for the removal of over two million Germans from Czechoslovak territory. A detailed transfer scheme was submitted to the Allied European Advisory Commission. The approximately one million Sudeten Germans who, according to the scheme, would have been allowed to remain in Czechoslovakia, would no longer be treated as a distinctive national minority with special rights; German would no longer be recognized as the language of any section of the country's population; and German schools or German-speaking law courts would not be tolerated.

This early transfer scheme, however, had but a vague and superficial resemblance with the genuine concept of solving Czechoslovakia's minority problem by a wholesale transference of the country's ethnic minorities. Its underlying intention was that of depriving of Czechoslovak citizenship and deporting all Germans who were supposed to have been guilty of disloyalty towards the Czechoslovak Republic and of helping the Nazi regime; on the other hand, all those Germans who had proved themselves good democrats and Czechoslovak citizens should be allowed to stay. The respective numbers of persons in each of those groups varied in accordance with the criterion applied. The citizenship decree drafted in 1944 by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile barred from Czechoslovak citizenship and made liable for expulsion the following categories: (a) those persons who had been in the service of an enemy government, army, or police force; (b) those who had played a leading role in business enterprises supporting the enemy; (c) those who had sought to profit economically or financially from situations resulting from the occupation of Czechoslovakia; (d) persons who had been "on Czechoslovak territory or elsewhere members of a party,

movement, political group, association, society, or formation which was organized by the enemy before September 29, 1938"; (f) persons who had written or taught in a spirit of enmity toward the Czechoslovak State; and (g) those who had "left the territory of the Republic after the effective date of the armistice with the enemy, without the knowledge of the appropriate officials, or if they had left before, did not return, despite official notification, within the prescribed period" (Art. 3).

The wording of this decree would have barred from Czechoslovakia an estimated 700,000 persons who had joined the NSDAP, some 400,000 to 500,000 who had served in the German army or Nazi formations, 300,000 civil servants, and many others to whom the stipulation "helped the enemy actively" could be applied, or who were in sympathy with "Henleinism, Nazism, and Pan-German ideas in general." The total number of persons in this undesirable category was estimated by Czechoslovak government circles at about 1,600,000 to 2,000,000 or about 55 to 60 per cent of all Germans in Czechoslovakia. Allowed to stay were "Germans [and Magyars] who had remained consistently faithful to the Czechoslovak Republic and participated actively in the fight for its liberation" (Art. 2). The number of Germans who were to be permitted to remain in Czechoslovakia under the provisions of the decree was estimated at about 800,000 to 1,000,000. The basic prerequisite for their staying would be that they forego all claim to minority rights and show their willingness to become loyal citizens of the state.

This early concept of a solution for the Czechoslovak minority problem suffered from inherent inconsistency, which obscured and vitiated the true meaning and purpose of the transfer idea. It presented the entire transfer scheme as a mere retaliatory measure, a well-deserved punishment of Czechoslovak minorities for their pro-Nazi record, for the part they had played in dismembering the Czechoslovak state, and for their treacherous and cruel behavior during the enemy occupation of the country. Dr. Beneš indignantly spoke in November, 1942, of the "horrible fact that the Germans, who in our country went over to Nazism and became traitors even before Munich, and who, during the war, have participated, directly or indirectly, in the murdering and plundering by the Gestapo, in the violent terror and in the anticultural domination of our people, amount to many hundreds of thousands." While stressing that he did not want vengeance, but justice only, Dr. Beneš nevertheless stated: "Our experience with our Nazi Germans is so bad that if every guilty German receives what is in justice due to him, there can be satisfied

the most justly and deeply wounded feelings of every Czechoslovak patriot."²⁹

The true meaning and justification of the idea of population transfer, however, has nothing in common with the notions of "guilt" and "retaliation." Fundamentally, it is not a matter of "justice" but of expediency. Its objective is not punishment for the past, but prevention of impending dangers in the future. By not making this preventive aspect the very basis of the transfer scheme, by concentrating instead on questions of responsibility for Nazi ideology and disloyal conduct of specific, although large, sections of the German minority group, the 1944 transfer concept offered by the Czechoslovak government-in-exile had considerably watered down the intrinsic meaning of the transfer idea. It was also manifestly unable to solve the German minority problem in its entirety. To leave a German minority of 800,000 to 1,000,000 within the Czechoslovak state would not have disposed of the problem. It would have reduced its scope, but would not have eliminated the issue as such. It would have involved all the disadvantages organically connected with a compulsory transfer of some two million people, without possessing the decisive advantage of a complete and final solution.

Further developments, however, brought about essential changes in the Czechoslovak government's transfer scheme. With military doom approaching the Third Reich and with the gradual liberation of Czechoslovak territory (Carpatho-Ukraine was liberated in 1944, Slovakia in March-April, 1945,¹ and early in May the Soviet Third Army was already moving into Bohemia), the government on January 30, 1945, decided to leave London and to establish temporary headquarters in the Slovak town of Košice.³⁰ Throughout the war, and in particular during pre-liberation months, the government had been in close touch with the Czech and Slovak underground movement, and it was well conversant with the situation in the country and the wishes of the population. At the farewell reception to newspapermen in London before his return to the liberated part of his country, President Beneš stressed: "I am determined that the Germans must go. Where they will go I cannot say at present, but as long as these people, some of whom have participated in the repression of the Czech people, remain in my country, there must be a danger of civil war."³¹ Dr. Beneš and his colleagues in the government came to the conclusion that the very presence of organized German [and Hungarian] minority groups constituted a perpetual danger for the state; even if these groups were willing at the moment to forget about

autonomy and special rights, their very numbers would be a constant argument in favor of special treatment; and once any such claim was put forward, there was no saying whether it would not be backed by foreign powers—and then it would be 1938 all over again. Wholesale transfer appeared, therefore, as the only means of assuring domestic peace and removing what might be called a standing invitation for outside intervention.³²

After the return to the homeland, the Czechoslovak government, in a note addressed on July 3, 1945, to the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union, asked that the question of transfer be placed upon the agenda of the forthcoming Conference of the Big Three at Potsdam. The submitted plan provided for the transfer of 2.5 million Germans within ten to twelve months.

Explaining this far-reaching official move, President Beneš declared that nothing less than such a wholesale transfer "can assure to the [Czechoslovak] nation a reasonably secure future. . . . Czechoslovakia is determined never again to try unworkable compromises with German minorities, as it did in 1939, when the Germans showed that their allegiance lay across the border." However, he insisted that "the whole project of cleansing Czechoslovakia in this radical manner can be undertaken only with wholehearted Big Three approval and cooperation." This approval being the first prerequisite for implementation of the transfer scheme, Dr. Beneš strongly emphasized two more essential points in obvious anticipation of not only the content, but even the wording of the forthcoming Potsdam decisions: that the transfer must be "well organized" and carried out with the least possible friction; and that the operation must be conducted "as humanely as possible." He did not want, said President Beneš, any "repetition of the wartime refugee spectacle, with suffering thousands cluttering the highways."³³

4-

Prior to Czechoslovakia's liberation it had been generally expected that a considerable part of the German minority in the country, in particular those who had been actively collaborating with the Nazi regime of oppression, would flee before the advance of Soviet and Czech armies and thus simplify the situation. Czechoslovak government circles believed that of the 3,250,000 Sudeten Germans, about 500,000 who had

joined the *Reichswehr* or Nazi formations, plus their dependents, and another 500,000 compromised by their behavior during the German occupation, would fear to remain in Czechoslovakia.³⁴ Hubert Ripka wrote in November, 1944: "In any case, hundreds of thousand of guilty Germans will seek to save themselves from well-merited punishment by fleeing to Germany at the moment of defeat; this will considerably reduce the number of those who will have to migrate."³⁵

These expectations did not materialize. Mass flight of the German inhabitants of the Czechoslovak Republic was precluded by the American thrust into Bavaria and the Bohemian Forest. The overwhelming majority of the "native" Germans stayed, and only a fraction of the Reich Germans who had intruded into Czechoslovakia were able to leave. Gregory Frumkin estimates the number of Germans who moved westwards with the retreating German armies at 370,000.³⁶ In addition, during the last few weeks preceding liberation about 1.6 million Reich German refugees from Upper Silesia, who were fleeing before the Red Army's advance, "invaded" Czechoslovak territory. As late as June 7, 1945, the London *Times* reported that there were still 100,000 Reich Germans in Czechoslovakia.

Liberated Czechoslovakia found within her postwar boundaries millions of Germans whose mentality remained unchanged. "They regret their *military* defeat only, and nothing more," Prof. Friedrich Bednar, Dean of the Hus Theological Faculty in Prague, stated in March, 1946.³⁷ "The mood of the Sudeten Germans is sullen and dangerous," Guy A. Bettany, Reuter's correspondent in Czechoslovakia, reported in November, 1945; on July 31, a series of explosions, which the Czechs attributed to the German militant werewolf organization, wrecked a group of factory buildings in Usti (Aussig).³⁸ Simultaneously, a German short-wave transmitter was reported operating in the frontier town of Dečín; Czech officers were repeatedly shot at, and a werewolf band attempted to free German prisoners from internment.³⁹ The Czech Youth Association's paper *Mlada Fronta* indignantly described continued German arrogance in Mariánské Lázně (Marienbad) where considerable German population still remained at that time: "Notices in Mariánské Lázně are printed in German: even the branch office of the Nazi paper *Die Zeit* still has its nameplate; road signs are in German. . . . What is worse," complained *Mlada Fronta*, "is the insolent and arrogant behavior of the Germans in the town. They wear no distinguishing marks; on the contrary, disregarding the official prohibition, they still wear provocatively

their Tyrolean outfits. They refuse to talk to and pass information to Czechs. A large number of Reich citizens who were evacuated to the town during the war are still living there. There is no progress in the handing over of German firms, and what is incredible, German employers force Czech employees to learn German."⁴⁰ In the infirmary at Pilsen where several German patients were attended by Czech physicians just as carefully as the Czechs, the Germans never answered any question about their opinion on Hitler.⁴¹

The liberated Czechoslovak population was incensed by the presence of this mass of hostile and arrogant Germans. The *Review of the Foreign Press*, issued by the Research Department of the British Foreign Office (June 19, 1945), formulated as follows the attitude of Czechoslovak public opinion towards the minorities: "There is a universal and burning hatred of the Germans and Magyars, and a demand that they should go, and go quickly. . . . The Czechs remain uncompromising." The Catholic daily *Lidová Demokracie* (June 11, 1945), commenting on the meeting held to commemorate the Lidice massacre, wrote: "We continue to regard them [the Germans] with the same intense suspicion as dangerous, hostile, and morally warped. We do not want any Germans in our country, and when we hear German spoken we 'see red.' Therefore, in spite of humanitarianism—or just because of it—the Germans must go, and that as quickly as possible." Dorothy Thompson, who visited Czechoslovakia in the summer of 1945, reported in the *Washington Evening Star* (June 22, 1945): "The six years of German occupation, following the treachery of the German minority in Sudeten, followed by the Munich agreement and afterwards, by the breach by the Germans of even the Munich agreement, has burned with corrosive fire into the Czechoslovak soul and turned, perhaps as a transitional reaction, their European patriotism into flaming nationalism. . . . The people's hatred of all Germans, including those native to Prague, is 100 per cent and, indiscriminately, they wish to expel from the country everyone whose native tongue is German." The testimony of Guy A. Bettany is also unequivocal in this respect: "Public opinion in Czechoslovakia is unrelenting in its demand for the expulsion of the disloyal German and Hungarian minorities. If there is one thing upon which the overwhelming majority of this country is united, it is upon the demand that these Germans and Hungarians shall no longer be allowed to remain in the republic. So bitter is the hatred of all things German after the country's sufferings during the six years of occupation that there is no talk of toleration or compromise."

A series of measures by the Czechoslovak government met this demand of the country's public opinion for liquidation of the wartime German status and prepared the ground for their evacuation from Czechoslovakia. By decree of January 17, 1945, all German privileges were abolished. Their privileged ration cards marked "D," were exchanged for "J" cards—those reserved by the Nazis for the Jews.⁴² In May, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Interior forbade the use of the term "Sudeten" or any of its derivatives and similar expressions, customary during the period of German occupation; to describe the areas formerly called "Sudeten" the term "Border Regions" (*Pohraniční Území*) had to be used.⁴³ The German schools were closed early in June. On June 26, by a decree of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Transport, Germans were excluded from riding public transport; accordingly, the management of the Prague Municipal Public Services banned Germans from using tramcars, buses, or trolley buses. In the winter, Germans were subject to a curfew and were not allowed to be out later than 8 P.M. They were obliged to wear "the badge of defeat," a white armband, to distinguish them from the Czechs and Slovaks—unless they had been certified as anti-Fascists, Communists, Social Democrats, possessing anti-Hitler records or having been in concentration camps. They were not allowed radios or newspapers in the German language, though no restriction was put on free use of the German language in the streets. Germans were forbidden to take any part whatever in public life or to enter restaurants, cafés, or cinemas. All public signs, placards, and notices in German were removed.⁴⁴ All post offices in the border regions were ordered to discontinue the payment of rents due to Germans from the insurance companies.⁴⁵

The most far-reaching legislative anti-minorities measure was the decree No. 33, signed by President Beneš on August 2, 1945, adjusting the citizenship of persons of German and Hungarian ethnic nationality. The fundamental provision of the decree laid down that Czechoslovak subjects of German or Hungarian ethnic nationality who had acquired German or Hungarian citizenship during the alien occupation of the country, forfeited their Czechoslovak citizenship on the day on which they acquired that other citizenship. Article 2 of the decree provided, however, that loss of citizenship did not apply to "persons of German and Hungarian [ethnic] nationality, who remained faithful to the Czechoslovak Republic and never committed any offense against the Czech or Slovak nation and either actively took part in the fight for liberation or suffered under Nazi or Fascist terror." Such persons were allowed to

submit, within six months of the day when this decree came into force, an application for a certificate confirming their Czechoslovak citizenship. Application had to be filed with the district National Committee or, by applicants living abroad, with Czechoslovak diplomatic authorities. Decision on such applications was to be made by the Ministry of the Interior on suggestion of the Ministry of National Defense. Up to the day of the official decision, the applicants were to be considered as Czechoslovak citizens.

The special correspondent of the *London Times* (August 6, 1945), who toured Bohemia in the summer of 1945, gave a well-balanced picture of the working of the provisions of the citizenship decree in practice in the Sudeten town of Usti. In this important center ten local Germans, Communists and Social Democrats, who had been in active opposition to Henlein before Munich, were permitted to organize an anti-Fascist investigating commission, with the right to issue identification cards to Germans worthy of being considered as potentially loyal Czechoslovak citizens. "In theory," reported the *Times* correspondent, "the possession of this card should protect the owner from summary expulsion or loss of personal property." But practically, until the Czechoslovak authorities had completed their inquiries, such cards did not provide their possessors with complete civic equality. They were still obliged to wear white armbands, and were debarred from entry into most public places. A much larger group of Germans were granted a form of identification which classed them as essential workers, to be kept in Usti until those of them who were considered disloyal were superseded by Czech resettlers. In the whole district about 24,000 Germans were so classified. They continued to work under "normal" conditions in the factories and in transport enterprises, received pay and rations equal to those of the Czechs, and were in general unmolested. Another group consisted of a small number of prisoners who were put to work under guard while awaiting trial by people's courts. While stressing that "on paper the scheme is probably as humane as circumstances allow," the correspondent did not conceal that "excesses occur and that the younger elements among the Czech population are not inclined to discriminate between loyal and disloyal Germans." However, he testified that "the Germans themselves appear to be largely to blame for their dilemma. The Usti anti-Fascist committee, for example, has aroused Czech suspicion by issuing nearly three times as many identification cards as there were anti-Henlein votes in 1938, when the last elections were held. . . . At Podmokly

(Bodenbach) we were shown cleverly forged Communist Party membership cards with which some of the German inhabitants had provided themselves."

Germans who were not eligible as either future optants or essential workers had to leave the country. Many thousands of them were rounded up as early as June-July, 1945, and put into concentration camps awaiting expulsion; other camp inmates were Germans under police investigation and eventually expecting trial for some war crime. In autumn, 1945, a hundred thousand Germans were kept in such camps. Evidence as to their living conditions differs greatly. Writing on October 9, 1945, in the London *Daily Herald*, official organ of the British Labor Party, G. E. R. Gedye described one of the camps for Germans he visited as a "horror camp", although its inmates told him it was "a 'good camp' compared with others they had been in." The detainees "were crowded together in huts regardless of age or sex; they slept in double-tiered wooden bunks, each containing a straw sack—as did the 'half Jews' whom the Nazis held in the same camp during the war . . . everyone looked starved." The inmates tearfully told Gedye that they had been held in the camp for five months, "nobody knows why." None of them acknowledged any guilt.

In striking contradiction to this utterly dark picture is the detailed evidence of Guy A. Bettany, Reuter's correspondent in Prague, who had at that time paid several visits to the Border Regions. Bettany testified that "in the main, the Czech authorities acted with discrimination; they chose for internment in concentration camps the local leaders of the Nazi party and members of the SS black shirts and SA brown shirts, together with prominent local officials." He admitted that "originally, the camps were improvised affairs, which were filled with prisoners without sufficient preparation having been made for their lodging, feeding, and general welfare, and several camps got bad names, including one near Prague, where sanitary provisions hardly existed at all." But by the beginning of November, 1945, the worst camps had been closed and drastic measures had been taken to improve the remainder: "By the late autumn the Prague government, inspired by their own humanitarian sentiments and encouraged by foreign interest, had produced good conditions in almost all the camps under its jurisdiction. Representatives of the International Red Cross are now given the fullest facilities to inspect them and to make suggestions, and in the main they have been satisfied with what they have seen." After

having visited several camps, Bettany formulated his judgment as follows:

Generally speaking, unless the camps are overcrowded, the living and sleeping conditions are roughly comparable with those provided for the army. The rooms are reasonably airy and there are medical quarters, in charge generally of German doctors, with orderlies and trained or semi-trained nurses. Mothers are not separated from their children, unless by their wish. The food at the outset gave only a low standard of diet and was approximately the same as that which the Germans considered good enough for Jews. Those doing heavy work in the mines and factories received extra rations, including meat. In the workers' camps visited by me I heard no complaints of ill-treatment but some of overwork. However, there never was any justification in comparing the Czech concentration camps with the charnel houses of Oswiencim, Buchenwald, and Belsen. One foreign journalist who had spent several years in German labor battalions in Russia as well as in a concentration camp said that the Czech camps were convalescent homes by comparison. No one could maintain that such concentration camps provide ideal living conditions for human beings or that they might not be improved. The point to be remembered by people abroad is that the shortage of food, clothing, and, in fact, everything in Czechoslovakia, is extremely acute; and that the authorities are unable to do everything they would like. The food provided in these workers' camps is wholesome and adequate, although lacking in proteins and fats. These shortages, however, affect almost everyone living in the Republic, and the Czechs cannot be expected to provide the Sudeten Germans with better food than they have themselves.

5.

Detention camps were, as a rule, only a transitory stage for expulsion. First to be deported were those Germans (and Magyars) who came to Czechoslovakia under the enemy regime of occupation. As early as June, 1945, a British governmental source reported that both the Czech and Slovak authorities were "pressing for, and actually proceeding with, the expulsion of Reich Germans and Magyars who settled in Slovakia after the Vienna Award of November, 1938."⁴⁶ Almost simultaneously, however, there began, with the active cooperation of the American and Soviet occupation authorities, the removal of "native" Sudeten Germans. On June 1 and 2, 1945, a "repatriation conference" was held at Pilsen between representatives of the Repatriation Department of the

Czechoslovak Ministry for the Protection of Labor and Social Welfare and representatives of the U.S. Third Army. It was agreed that a maximum of 2,500 Czech and Slovak repatriates a day would be brought to Pilsen from Germany and Austria by American Army transport; on their return journey, Army trucks would carry German expellees. The Prague correspondent of the *Washington Post* reported on June 17, 1945, that Sudeten Germans "are in large numbers being herded into the custody of the United States Third Army which occupies the eastern fringe of Czechoslovakia, including Pilsen and most of the Sudetenland. Since they came here, troops of the Fifth Corps have moved an average of more than 1,000 Germans a day out of Czechoslovakia in trucks. The Germans are hauled away to points beyond the Danube and the trucks come back loaded with Czechs, Russians, and Poles eager for repatriation. Last week the Russians informed the American command that they could handle the flow eastward through Pilsen of 3,000 liberated Russian war prisoners and slave laborers daily. This probably means that the expulsion of Germans will be raised to that rate."

Very soon, however, western Allied powers intervened. On June 16, 1945, the British government addressed a note to Prague stating that it did not give its consent to the policy of mass deportation of the German minority and that His British Majesty's Government considered this a matter concerning not Czechoslovakia alone but one to be referred to the Big Four.⁴⁷ Premier Ždeněk Fierlinger denied "sensational reports by some foreign 'agencies'" to the effect that this British move represented a reversal of the British positive stand toward the Czechoslovak transfer scheme. These reports, he stated, "do not correspond with the official policy of the British government which has always showed an affirmative attitude to this our burning problem." The British note, Fierlinger explained, was dictated by the military occupation authorities in Germany who "did not wish that the transfer of such a considerable number of our Germans should increase their tasks in their zone of occupation which are considerable in any case."⁴⁸ Simultaneously, the Command of the American Third Army also voiced its opposition to the mass expulsion, claiming that it would block roads needed for military traffic and complicate the tasks of the U.S. Military Government, already heavily taxed by the difficulties of caring for the Germans in the American zone of occupation.

Yielding to the Anglo-American pressure, the Czechoslovak government on June 18 expressed its willingness to refrain from further uni-

lateral action and promised that "the transfer program will be implemented in full accord with the Allies as soon as technical conditions for such an operation are created."⁴⁸ President Beneš' appeal to his people in a speech on June 15 at Pilsen, to be considerate, cautious, and calm, and his statement that "the German question will be solved in agreement with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States" was interpreted as a result of the British-American *démarche*.⁵⁰ At the same time, however, Premier Zdenek Fierlinger and Foreign Undersecretary of State Vlado Clementis announced that Czechoslovakia would forthwith proceed, with Russian support, to expel her Germans.⁵¹ Their removal to the frontier was regulated by the Czechoslovak army, which, by arrangement with the Soviet military authorities in Germany, had to provide escort for the first stage of the journey into the Reich.⁵² On July 10, Fierlinger reported that "at present regular trains are leaving for the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany." Similarly, in the part of the Sudetenland not occupied by the American Third Army, deportation for a certain time continued unabated, and on September 6, Fierlinger was in a position to state that before the Potsdam Conference brought a temporary halt to the expulsions, about 1,200,000 Germans had already been expelled or left voluntarily. He added, however, that only about two hundred thousand out of this number had been native to Czechoslovakia; the remaining million were Reich Germans who had fled into Czechoslovakia before the advance of the Red Army in Upper Silesia.⁵³ According to Guy A. Bettany, between a quarter of a million and 300,000 Sudeten Germans were expelled in the first few months.

Reports published in a pamphlet *Deportation Drama in Czechoslovakia*, issued in October, 1946, in London, by Wenzel Jäksch's "Sudeten German Social Democratic Party," described these early transfers as a "death-march." The pamphlet quoted an anonymous "Dutch citizen" who on July 17, in a report to the Allied Military Government in Lübeck, had written on the situation of Sudeten deportees in Saxony and Middle Germany: "I have seen a large proportion of these people numbering nearly a million, who are literally starving on the road." A "Czech Trade Unionist," J. Belina, after a visit to Czechoslovakia, reported in the September issue of his London paper *Listy Pratelum*: "The [Sudeten] Germans themselves believe that roughly 800,000 of them have been transferred and 20 per cent of these people died." A third testimony was attributed to a "delegation of the Sudeten clergy" who left Czechoslovakia for Berlin on August 25: "The number of

Sudeten German refugees in the Russian-occupied zone alone amounts today to 1.5 million. This figure does not include those released from the Wehrmacht who are still in Germany, refugees in American-occupied Austria, and Germans interned or drafted for forced labor in Czechoslovakia." One more testimony was published in a pamphlet by "American Friends of Democratic Sudetens," which referred to a report of an unnamed "Sudeten clergyman now in Berlin": "By the end of August a transport of Sudeten Germans arrived in Berlin. It came from Troppau in Czech Silesia, and was 18 days on the way. 4,200 women, children, and aged people were counted before the transport departed from Troppau. 1,350 were left when the transport arrived in Berlin."⁶⁴

Responsible Czechoslovak circles did not attempt to deny that in the early months following the military collapse of Germany the newly liberated frontier areas lacked a firm hand of authority, directed by the central government in Prague. The quickly crumbling power of the Nazi officials gave place abruptly to government by local revolutionary district committees appointed by the Prague government but largely independent in their activities; they were assisted by the Corps of National Safety, a sort of mobile police force recruited from the Partisans. In the early post-liberation months, some of these committees undoubtedly displayed great ruthlessness in dealing with the Germans, and some of them made abortive attempts at a precipitous liquidation of the local German population by wholesale and planless evacuation. "If the National Liberation Committees that are running local affairs in most parts of Czechoslovakia today had their way, they would simply bundle their former German compatriots neck and crop back into the Reich," the *New York Times* Prague correspondent wrote on July 7, 1945. But they were gradually brought under control by the Prague government and some of them were replaced. By November, 1945, they were, according to Guy A. Bettany, "paying more attention to the central government and not taking the law so much into their own hands as they did in the early months after liberation." Bettany admitted that

the same cannot be said about some formations of the Corps of National Safety. At the end of October there were still substantiated reports reaching Prague of arbitrary acts committed by them in certain areas, and of open defiance not only of the orders of the Prague government but even of the instructions of the district committees. . . . Many of the members of this force are young lads with little education or discipline and influenced by

the violence they saw all around them during the German occupation. They appear to be determined to show their former masters how tough they can be now they are given the chance. This corps is undergoing remodelling and purging; not before it was necessary, for although in one sense its members performed valuable services in keeping order in the frontier districts, too often they have not tempered their vigor either by justice or wisdom.

While conceding that "the expulsions carried out in the months immediately after liberation were neither orderly nor in many cases humane," Bettany insisted that "allowance must be made for the exaltation of public opinion in the border zones after the collapse of German power."⁵⁶ Professor R. R. Betts, editor of the authoritative study *Central and South East Europe 1945-1948* published in 1950 by the London Royal Institute of International Affairs, also states (p. 176): "Undoubtedly in the first month or two there was some hasty improvisation and rough handling of the eviction, but it was gradually reduced to as much order and justice as is consistent with so radical an operation."

The actual working of the transfer machinery during the pre-Potsdam period is described by Bettany as follows:

The general procedure was to order them [the Germans] to leave their homes at the shortest notice and to proceed only with light hand luggage to the station or point of assembly. From thence they were conveyed to the town nearest the frontier and told to march over the frontier at a dozen or more different points. The highway leading from Prague over the mountains to Dresden saw many thousands of German fugitives wearily trudging along the steep, endless, winding road from Teplice to the frontier. . . . In two months (June-July, 1945) over twenty thousand Germans had passed along this route and crossed the frontier at Cinvald. Those able to walk proceeded afoot from Teplice to Gneising, the first German town over the border, carrying their baggage. This was theoretically about twice the weight allowed to air passengers proceeding from England, namely, about 120 pounds, but in practice to carry such a weight was beyond the strength of all but the most hardy. In many cases they stowed it in perambulators or light hand carts, but even so it was no light task for elderly men and women to cover the distance of thirteen miles, mostly up the mountainside. The chaotic state of the railways for some months after liberation was the main reason why such primitive methods were resorted to as requiring the Germans to cross the frontier on foot. Invalids, old people, and young children in general were able to travel to the border in buses where they were received

by members of the German Red Cross, under Russian direction. From Gneising the Germans were taken by rail to Pirna, near Dresden, where they were assembled and in due course forwarded to their destinations. Most of the fugitives chose German towns and villages where they had relations or friends.

6.

On August 2, 1945, the Big Three agreed, at a conference at Potsdam, that "the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary will have to be undertaken." They instructed their respective representatives on the Inter-Allied Control Council to submit as soon as possible an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out and requested the Czechoslovak government, as well as the Polish provisional government and the Allied Control Council in Hungary, "meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council."¹⁸

The Czechoslovak government, though reluctantly, abided by this request. Further transfers to the American zone in Germany were deferred. This unexpected standstill created considerable confusion. Prospective expellees were for several months "living in suspense, not knowing what their precise fate [would] be and unable to make any provision for the future of themselves and their families" (Bettany). Their situation was steadily deteriorating. The influx of Czech settlers, who were supposed to take their vacated farms, businesses, jobs, and dwellings, continued for some time according to schedule, before the Prague government was able to revise its original plans, and the Germans were gradually removed from their positions and reduced to an extremely uncomfortable and precarious mode of living. The Potsdam decisions also brought no relief to the some one hundred thousand Germans in concentration camps, a considerable part of whom were awaiting transfer to Germany. The sudden suspension of the transfer operation resulted in considerable congestion and an extremely strained atmosphere, which lasted for several months.

The procedure prescribed by the Potsdam decisions proved to be a very slow one. It was not before October 5, two months after these

decisions had been published, that Laurence A. Steinhardt, the United States Ambassador in Czechoslovakia, addressed to the Prague government a note in which he asked for information (to be submitted to the Inter-Allied Control Council in Berlin) on the number of Germans to be transferred out of Czechoslovakia, their age (showing the persons over sixty and under twelve), sex, and occupation. In a reply dated October 24, Mr. Jan Masaryk, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, stressed that "exact and absolutely indisputable information could only be provided by a regular census" which "could not be carried out under the present circumstances." However, he supplied the following data based on "various administrative inquiries made under complicated postwar conditions."

Some 2,500,000 Germans were slated for transfer. Their classification as to sex and age was given as follows:

Boys under 12 years of age	322,000
Girls under 12 years of age	314,000
Men from 13 to 60 years of age	541,500
Women from 13 to 60 years of age	1,010,000
Men over 60 years of age	140,500
Women over 60 years of age	172,000
	<hr/>
	2,500,000

The classification as to occupation (including employed persons and the members of their families) was given in the following table:

Occupations	In per cent	Number of inhabitants
Agriculture	22.0	550,000
Forestry	1.6	40,000
Mines and forges	1.2	30,000
Other industry	43.0	1,075,000
Commerce and finances	8.5	212,000
Transport	4.0	100,000
Public services and free professions	4.5	110,000
Household and personnel	2.9	75,500
Other occupations	12.3	307,500
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	100.0	2,500,000

On November 20, 1945, the Inter-Allied Control Council decided to authorize the transfer from Czechoslovakia of 2,500,000 Germans—the number which the Czechoslovak government asked for: 1,750,000 were to be transferred to the American zone of occupation and 750,000 to the Soviet zone. The transfer was to begin in December, 1945, and to be carried out in such a manner that the entire operation be finished by July, 1946.

This schedule, however, could not be maintained. The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately requested the Czechoslovak military authorities to begin negotiations with the representatives of the Soviet and American military occupation administration in Germany, for the purpose of organizing the transfer machinery. But negotiations with the United States occupation authorities did not begin before the early half of January, 1946, and negotiations with the Soviets did not start until the end of May, 1946. Accordingly, the first transport for the American zone (a train of 40 carriages carrying 1,200 Germans) left on January 25, 1946, while the first organized transport to the Soviet zone was dispatched only on June 10.

The five-month lull was utilized by the Czechoslovak government for thorough administrative and technical preparations for the transfer.⁵⁷ The details of the operation were worked out by the Ministry of the Interior, with the cooperation of the Ministries of Transport and National Defense, specifying how many transports, from which districts, on what date and at what hour were to be dispatched every month. The central management of the transfer was concentrated in a special department of the Ministry of the Interior; the head of that department, Dr. Antonín Kučera, was appointed Government Plenipotentiary for the transfer of Germans. Dr. Patočky and Dr. Rašky, leading officials of the State Institute of Health, were entrusted with the central management and supervision of the measures of health and hygiene.

In pursuance of the government's scheme, the District National Committees compiled lists of all Germans slated for transfer. In accordance with the number of transports scheduled to leave from individual districts, they determined the number of Germans to be sent to the assembly centers from single communities. Thirteen Special Regional Commissioners were appointed to supervise the technical arrangements of the transfer in each administrative district. To each Commissioner was assigned one officer of the National Security Corps and one Army officer. Local National Committees were entrusted with the selection of persons

designated for each forthcoming transport. The first on the list were the remaining Reich Germans who had come to Czechoslovak territory after Munich and especially after March 15, 1939, as well as the remaining German refugees and evacuees. The second category comprised officials of various Nazi organizations. Next came unemployed persons, then officials and teachers; and finally, tradesmen and artisans, farmers and workers. The transfer of all these groups was organized so as not to split up families: women and children were transferred together with their husbands and fathers, respectively. If single members of the same family belonged to different categories, such a family was to be transferred in accordance with regulations applying to the most favored member of the family. Should some family members be missing, the authorities were to postpone evacuation and issue a convocation to missing persons to join their families. The transfer authorities were also instructed to ascertain whether among the families awaiting transfer were any persons of Czech origin, or belonging to mixed families, i.e. persons not subject to transfer; such persons had to be returned to their domicile.

Those designated for each transfer had to be notified in time. Their transport to the assembly centers was assured by the Local National Committees. Every transferee was obliged to carry with him all personal documents (birth and domicile certificates) as well as the registration and civil identification card (*Kennkarte*) on which was marked the means of his evacuation and his group classification. One hundred and four assembly centers were established in Bohemia and Moravia, and three in Slovakia. Each center was to accommodate at least 1,200 persons—the number required for a full contingent for a transfer train. The Czech personnel of the centers were few, consisting usually of the commandant, his deputy, and two or three more Czech officials. The bulk of the work was in the hands of an autonomous German personnel selected by the prospective transferees themselves and entrusted with the maintenance of order, the supervision of the food and sanitary arrangements, and with all matters pertaining to the dispatch of the transports. Czech officials were exercising only a general control over the proper application of basic rules and over the policing of the assembly centers.

The health service was organized on similar lines. A total of 86 Czech medical officers were appointed for supervision of the 104 assembly centers in Bohemia and Moravia. They were responsible for proper medical surveillance and for the hygienic conditions of the centers, as well as for medical inspection of the transferees before their transport.

Actual medical service in the centers and on the transfer trains was assured by some 300 to 350 German physicians and 500 to 650 German nurses, of whom one-third were registered nurses. Usually there were two, sometimes three or four German doctors and as many as five to eight nurses in each center, according to its size and scope of activity. They were paid by the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior, and their work was supervised by the Czech medical officer who, together with the commandant of the center, signed the certificate of health of every transferee. Every person arriving at an assembly center was first examined by a physician. Those unable to stand the strain and fatigue of the normal transports, in particular ailing and old people, as well as pregnant women in the sixth month, were assigned for transport by hospital trains or by hospital ambulances; similar procedure was used in regard to mental cases. Those suspected of infectious diseases were immediately isolated and their transfer was effected only with the consent of the competent official physician. All persons designated for transport were deloused by spraying with DDT powder; this procedure was repeated shortly before the departure. Those who had passed the medical examination were at once registered, assigned to their quarters, and eventually to a coach for their forthcoming transport. Special quarantine centers were organized in anticipation of serious epidemics. Fortunately, they were never used, although the menace of epidemics was very serious, particularly in the Terezin camp, which was a hotbed of typhus. Special care was taken in the winter months to prevent the spread of typhus, and in the summer months to prevent intestinal epidemics.

7.

As stated above, negotiations on the organization of the actual transfer operations had begun first with U.S. military occupation authorities. On January 8, 9, and 10, 1946, a conference was held in Prague between Czechoslovak and United States authorities, and an agreement was reached regarding the technical transfer arrangements. Confirming these arrangements, General Lucius D. Clay, head of the Office of Military Government, United States zone of occupation, informed the Czechoslovak government on February 2 that the actual transfer "can begin as soon as suitable transportation is available." It was stressed that heated rolling stock must be used for these movements up to March 15;

since heated rolling stock was scarce, it could not be expected that the maximum reception capacity would be reached until after March 15, 1946. General Clay demanded that Czechoslovak authorities submit to the combined Czecho-American repatriation executive one week in advance a weekly schedule of proposed shipments and that they daily notify the U.S. authorities at the reception points of the expected time of arrival of each train, the number of persons it carried, the train number, and the number of cars. All transportation equipment from Czechoslovakia to the reception points in the U.S. zone was to be furnished by Czechoslovak authorities, while transportation, redistribution, and resettlement of the transferees was to be the responsibility of German authorities under the supervision of the Office of Military Government, Bavaria and Greater Hesse. General Clay's memorandum further formulated the following "conditions to be complied with," stressing that "failure to do so will be authority for United States authorities at the reception points to either return the train or stop further movements":

a. Documentation—each expellee must have individual identification cards; nominal rolls in triplicate showing age, sex, nationality, permanent place of residence, and occupation shall accompany each shipment. One copy of this nominal roll can be signed by the receiving officer and will serve as a receipt to be returned by the Czech escort to Czech authorities.

b. A medical certification signed by a Czech medical officer and a doctor must be attached to each nominal roll certifying that each person has been examined and is free from contagious disease and is fit for travel. Pregnant women must not be transferred within six weeks before or after childbirth. No insane or hospital cases will be shipped until statistics have been furnished by Czech authorities and permit is granted by United States authorities. Families will not be separated.

c. Each expellee shall have adequate winter clothing including underwear, suitable outer garments, overcoats, and shoes.

d. Baggage will be permitted up to fifty kilos per person to allow for bedding, cooking utensils, and at least the bare necessities of living.

e. Adequate Czech escort personnel must accompany each train to its destination. Czech trains and personnel will be promptly returned from the exchange points.

f. Food must be provided by the Czechs for the length of the journey plus three days.

General Clay also insisted that Czechoslovak authorities furnish to the combined repatriation executive fortnightly reports containing

precise data on numbers of Germans shipped to both the U.S. and Soviet zones and ascertaining the "balance of shipments between the two zones so that the U.S. zone shall receive 70 per cent and the Soviets 30 per cent."

The first official departure to the American zone occurred on January 25, 1946, from Mariánské Lázně. The first trainload consisted of 1,209 Sudeten Germans: 295 men, 700 women, and 214 children. From that date to February 24, one train a day was dispatched; then, from February 25 to the end of March, two trains a day; afterward, during the month of April, four trains a day, with the exception of Sundays. By that time the conditions of transport had improved considerably. Early in March a correspondent of the *London Times* (March 11, 1946) witnessed the departure from Prague of 1,200 Germans, each of whom was allowed to take with him 100 kilograms of luggage (instead of the statutory 50 kilograms) and 2,000 marks (instead of the statutory 1,000); moreover, those who were penniless were given 200 marks by the Czech authorities. Up to July 15, 741,625 Germans arrived in the American zone. From the middle of July to the end of October, 1946, the number of trains dispatched was four a day, and in November, 1946, three transports a week were sent until November 30, when the transfers were interrupted. They were resumed in April, 1947, until, by the end of that summer, the American occupation authorities informed the Czechoslovak government that, as their occupation zone was overcrowded, and economic conditions were precarious, they could not admit any more Germans until conditions changed for the better.⁵⁸ During the period when transfers were still going on, facilities were augmented when Polish repatriation trains and UNRRA railway cars became available. Several transports of Germans were also sent by boat or automobiles. The increase, or decrease in the number of daily trains was always made after consultation with the American occupation authorities, and on these occasions any complaints, wishes, etc., which might crop up were discussed. On the whole, the transfer passed off smoothly from both the administrative and technical angles, and especially as regards the health service, a fact emphasized by General Clay when he received the Czechoslovak government delegation in Berlin on September 16, 1946.⁵⁹

Owing to technical reasons, negotiations with the Soviet authorities did not open until the end of May, 1946. An agreement was signed on June 15, providing for the organized transfer of 600,000 Germans to the

Soviet zone of occupation—150,000 less than the 750,000 provided for by the decision of the Allied Control Council of November 20, 1945. This discrepancy probably finds its explanation in the fact that a very considerable number of Germans had been dispatched to the Soviet zone before the conclusion of the agreement. According to figures supplied by the American Information Service in Prague, through April 30, 1946, the Soviet zone accepted 106,000 Germans from Czechoslovakia;⁸⁰ by June 15, their number reached 257,222,⁸¹ although organized transfer started only on June 10. It is evident that substantial transports of Germans had been continually sent to the Soviet zone of occupation during the previous months so that the actual number of Germans dispatched to that zone was higher than the 750,000 figure decided upon by the Allied Control Council. The German census of October 29, 1946, established the presence of 841,000 Sudeten Germans in the Soviet zone (see Chapter 12).

The first organized transport left on June 10—five days before the official conclusion of the agreement. Between June 10 and 20 two trains a day were dispatched; from June 21 till July 1, three trains; and from July 1 until September 18, six trains daily, except Sundays. Each train consisted of 42 or 43 carriages (forty covered coaches, two cars for sick people and sanitary personnel, and one car for the luggage) and carried approximately 1,200 persons. On September 18, the transport was temporarily suspended. The remaining Germans scheduled for deportation were sent to the Soviet zone between October 5 and October 15, when the transfer to the Soviet zone was terminated.

The operation was carried out smoothly; no complaints were forthcoming from the Soviet organs throughout the period of transfer. General Leljushenko, when he received the Czechoslovak government delegation on September 16, 1946, expressed his thanks for the splendid organization of the transfer, which, he stressed, "enabled the Soviet military authorities to carry out speedily and without any complication the task which had been entrusted to them." On November 14, 1946, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic decorated with Czechoslovak orders of distinction, the Soviet officers who gained special merits in facilitating the transfer.

8.

Article 2 of the Czechoslovak citizenship decree of August 2, 1945, exempted from the loss of citizenship and, accordingly, from the compulsory transfer several categories of Germans who were able to prove their loyalty towards the Czechoslovak state. These exemptions applied mostly to those German Social Democrats and Communists who had remained faithful to their anti-Nazi convictions; some had been persecuted during the German occupation of the country. Persons belonging to these categories were allowed to stay as full-fledged citizens of the Czechoslovak Republic, although without any collective minority rights.

The Czechoslovak government policy toward the German minority was, in principle, endorsed by a considerable sector of the German political émigrés. While Wenzel Jäksch's "Sudeten German Social Democratic Party" violently opposed it, the "German Social Democratic Party of Czechoslovakia" and the Communists unreservedly supported the government's position. A resolution to this effect was adopted by a conference of some two hundred Socialist and Communist émigrés from Czechoslovakia held in London on January 27-28, 1945.⁶² A faction of the German Social Democratic émigrés in Sweden, organized in the "Union of Czechoslovak Socialists," also unanimously voted to uphold the governmental policy.⁶³

Unexpected was the reaction of those German Socialists inside Czechoslovakia who were allowed to stay on the basis of their loyalty record: many showed no inclination to take advantage of this privilege. A special edition of *Der Sozialdemokrat*, issued in London by Wenzel Jäksch, published several letters by leading German Socialists from the Sudeten area, stating that they did not intend to make use of the governmental offer and wanted to be given the opportunity to emigrate.⁶⁴

A letter dated July 21, 1945, reported that although Comrades M. and E. had obtained permission to wear, in addition to the white armlets obligatory for all Germans, a red armlet with the inscription "Under the protection of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats," they had "given up every hope of living here; they demand only that our people be allowed to take their property with them. . . . Our people," continued the letter, "have one hope left, that is help to emigrate. It is true, they are trying to find a platform for remaining because most of our comrades are elderly people. But I was told to ask you earnestly to do something

immediately. If they said here officially that they wish to emigrate, they would lose every possibility, even the very old ones, of staying on. . . . What is the age limit for emigration?" Another letter, dated Trautenau, June 17, 1945, also stressed that "we [anti-Fascist Germans] must reconcile ourselves with the idea of going away from here," although Socialists "are not the first ones to have to go." A German Socialist, a former Party functionary, who had survived internment in the notorious concentration camp of Buchenwald, reported that "we Social Democrats have finally decided to give way voluntarily, though we might stay, and to build a new home somewhere abroad . . . where we can take our possessions; then we will go with good grace and part as friends. . . . In our thought we look to Canada or New Zealand. . . . Could you tell me whether there would be a chance of establishing settlements and of finding new homes as farmers? Even at the price of heaviest pioneer work?" Similar evidence can be gathered from a dispatch by the London *Times* correspondent who visited Bohemia in August, 1945:

Few politically active Germans believe they have any future in Czechoslovakia unless they receive minority rights far more liberal than Czech opinion is ever likely to grant them. The realization that membership in the Communist or Social-Democratic parties is not in itself a basis on which international confidence can be built has convinced many that their real home is a Germany struggling towards a new life. But one sees few instances of that civic courage which causes men to face the present chaos in Germany and leave their homes in the Sudeten country with the spirit of crusaders. . . . They have learnt of the catastrophic state of the Dresden region, to which most expelled Sudeten Germans are directed, and of the chill welcome given to them by some compatriots, who are said to be accusing them of being the originators of the war. . . . There are some who look towards Austria. Others entertain hopes of emigrating to Canada or Argentina.⁶⁸

Early hopes for emigration to some overseas countries vanished very quickly. No country showed inclination to admit German immigrants even as pioneers. German Sudeten Socialists and Communists then shifted their hopes to the Reich as the only alternative. The Czechoslovak government recognized that it would not be fair to remove these anti-Fascist Germans together with and under the same conditions as all other German transferees. They were given the opportunity to opt for a voluntary expatriation to Germany, to be carried out in a different manner: it was organized autonomously by the Secretariat of the

Communist and Socialist parties, with the collaboration of state officials, and was scheduled in such a way as to enable most of the anti-Fascist expatriates to arrive at their destination before winter and to occupy positions in the German de-Nazification machinery which were reserved for them; they were not obliged to wait for their turn within the general transfer timetable.

According to authoritative German sources, 82,000 anti-Fascists, most of them Social Democrats, voluntarily left Czechoslovakia for West Germany.⁶⁶ Official Czechoslovak data, put at the disposal of this author, state that 42,986 Communist anti-Fascists chose the Soviet zone of occupation. These voluntary transferees were allowed to take with them all their personal movable property; it was stipulated that the houses and farms they left behind would be paid for later.

Czechoslovak Jews who had professed German or Hungarian nationality in the census of 1930—three years before Hitler's coming to power—found themselves in a peculiar position. They were placed in the same category with "Germans, Hungarians, traitors, and collaborators," and in the first months after the liberation were treated accordingly. They had to wear German badges; received "German" food rations (equal to those which the Nazis in their time had allotted to the Jews); some were interned in detention camps for Germans, and some were designated for deportation to Germany. It was not before September 10, 1946, a year and a half after the liberation, that—yielding to a world-wide protest—the Ministry of the Interior prohibited the deportation of Czechoslovak Jews to Germany in Sudeten-German transports. Three days later, it issued a "General Ruling on the Treatment of Jews," which restored Czechoslovak citizenship even to those Jews who had professed German or Hungarian nationality, provided they filed application for renewal of citizenship. They were allowed to emigrate individually, without losing their properties.⁶⁷ Many took advantage of this opportunity. Palestinian statistics (incomplete) listed 770 Czechoslovak immigrants in 1946 and 2,064 in 1947; in 1948, 500 Jews left Czechoslovakia for Israel, and 3,000 for other countries. But the great exodus came in 1949, when 15,689 Czechoslovak-born Jews arrived in Israel. In July, 1950, Czechoslovak authorities virtually stopped further legal emigration.⁶⁸

This description is confirmed by a most authoritative source—the *Monthly Report* of the Military Governor of the U.S. zone, to which two-thirds of the German expellees were directed: "A survey made of expellee redistribution centers revealed that expellees entering from Czechoslovakia are in reasonably good physical condition, fairly well clothed, and in possession of the 500 Reichsmarks to be furnished under existing agreements. Some of the Sudetens brought working tools and household goods. The amount of food they received en route was also adequate."⁷⁰

10.

The policy of the Czechoslovak government underwent substantial evolution in regard to property belonging to the Germans subject to transfer. Originally, no sweeping confiscation was contemplated. In November, 1944, Hubert Ripka, Minister of State in the Czechoslovak government-in-exile, gave assurance that the government did not intend "to confiscate the property of the Germans who will have to leave Czechoslovakia, with the exception of those, however, who by the loss of property will also be punished under the terms of the law for the crimes which they committed against the Republic and its faithful citizens. Apart from them, the remainder will be given appropriate compensation for the property which they leave behind in Czechoslovakia; and this will be paid appropriately adjusting the financial and economic claims which Czechoslovakia will have against Germany."⁷¹ Such a settlement apparently constituted part of a scheme providing for reparations to be paid by Germany for 335,000,000,000 Czech crowns (about \$11,500,000,000) worth of damage inflicted on Czechoslovakia during the German occupation. It was suggested that as compensation for personal property abandoned by the transferred Germans, the transferees would receive certificates describing what they had left behind in Czechoslovakia, to enable them to recover similar values from the German state.⁷²

This original scheme was abandoned when the Czechoslovak government returned from exile. On June 21, 1945, President Beneš signed a decree stating:

Following the demand of the landless Czechs and Slovaks for an effective

implementation of the land reform, and led by the desire once and for all to take Czech and Slovak soil out of the hands of the foreign—German and Magyar—landowners, as well as out of the hands of the traitors of the Republic, and to give it into the hands of the Czech and Slovak farmers and persons without land, I decree, upon proposition of the government, as follows:

With immediate effect and without compensation is confiscated, for purposes of the land reform, agricultural property owned by all persons of German and Hungarian [ethnic] nationality, irrespective of their citizenship, or traitors and enemies of the Republic of whatever nationality and citizenship.

Exempt from confiscations were only "those who took an active part in the struggle for the integrity and the liberation of the Republic."⁷³ The decree applied to 3.75 million acres of German-owned agricultural land (i.e. arable land, pastures and meadows) and 2.47 million acres of forest and woodland. Of these, only 247,000 acres of agricultural land and 740,000 acres of forests were situated in the interior; the rest was in the border districts, where it constituted 70 per cent of the total available agricultural and woodland area.⁷⁴

Not less radical was the nationalization of industry carried out by a series of decrees signed by President Beneš on October 25, 1945, and given blanket approval by the Provisional Assembly on February 28, 1946. It applied to twenty-seven types of industrial undertakings and affected more than 270,000 firms and corporations.⁷⁵ In some branches nationalization was contingent on the number of employees. As a rule, the decrees provided for compensation for nationalized property, but stated expressly that "no compensation will be granted for nationalized property which at the actual time of termination of the occupation and of the Nazi or Fascist regime belonged to (a) the German Reich, the Kingdom of Hungary, public persons as defined by the German or Hungarian law, the German Nazi party, and Hungarian political parties and other formations, organizations, enterprises, undertakings, as well as other German and Hungarian legal persons, and (b) physical persons of German or Hungarian [ethnic] nationality, with the exception of those able to prove that they were loyal to the Czechoslovak Republic, never acted against the Czech or Slovak nations, and either actively participated in the fight for the liberation of the country or suffered under Nazi and fascist terror."⁷⁶ The presidential decree on the nationalization of banks similarly stated that shareholders of nationalized joint-stock

9.

Methods applied by the Czechoslovak authorities in carrying out the transfer of Germans have been decried by some journalists and politicians as contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Potsdam decisions. Upon her return from five months in Europe, Anne O'Hare McCormic wrote in the *New York Times* of February 4, 1946, about both the Czech and the Polish transfer of the Germans: "It was agreed at Potsdam that the forced migration should be carried out in a 'humane and orderly fashion.' Actually, as everyone knows who has seen the awful sights at the reception centers, the exodus takes place under nightmarish conditions, without any international supervision or any pretense of humane treatment. We share responsibility for horrors only comparable to Nazi cruelties." Similarly, the February 1, 1946, *Bulletin of the International Rescue and Relief Committee* charged the Prague government with "deportation in the best Hitler style." In a pamphlet *Tragedy of a People: Racism in Czechoslovakia* (pp. 3-6), a group of progressive American scholars and labor leaders also accused the Beneš government of "gruesome" proceedings in carrying out the transfer.

Available evidence does not corroborate these accusations in regard to the post-Potsdam transfer operation. The *Report on Czechoslovakia* presented by the British all-party parliamentary delegation which visited Czechoslovakia in July, 1946, states (p. 22): "We had all heard accounts of these transfers before we came. We have no doubt that in the early months there was much discomfort and suffering. Today we believe that the work is carried out humanely. The whole transaction is full of sadness, but looking back a little in time, we could not help comparing what we saw with the brutality imposed upon conquered peoples by the Nazis." The delegation inspected a trainload of German expellees near Mariánské Lázně: "There were some 1,200 men, women, and children on the train, in covered trucks, 30 in each truck. Each person was allowed 150 pounds of luggage and was given 500 marks in money. Rations for five days were on the train, although the journey was of one hour only. The rations were provided in order that there should be no unnecessary hardship while the emigrants were settling into their camps across the border." An equally positive report was given of conditions at a transit camp near Mariánské Lázně to which the delegation had paid "a surprise visit": "Here the accommodation was in huts. Beds

were provided, and the Germans stayed about one week while medical examination and disinfestation was effected. The German doctor told one of us that the children were well cared for and well provided. For adults, the rations afforded 1,200 calories a day. In seven months there had been eight deaths, and the doctor thought that this was no higher than the normal death rate outside. His surgery was excellently equipped, with drugs and instruments and vitamin extracts supplied by UNRRA."

The actual working of the transfer procedure is described in some detail by a Paris journalist Jean Danés, who went to Mariánské Lázně to witness the departure on January 25, 1946, of the first transport of Germans to the American zone of occupation.⁶⁹ When his group, consisting of himself, a British and a Czech colleague, arrived at the assembly camp formed of ten or twelve large wooden huts, he found the huts "well lit and heated."

German men and women were playing cards, talking, and eating slices of bread spread thickly with butter. . . . All these people were well dressed, fat, and happy looking; the children had cheeks which we have not seen on our children for the last six years. The Czech officer in charge of the camp, which contained 1,200 prospective transferees, explained that the Germans from the town and its surroundings had been summoned several days before the date of departure. They had all answered the summons, in fact more had come than were sent for. They had all brought quantities of luggage, though in principle they had only a right to 50 kilos (in fact 70 kilos were allowed) a head. It was being winked at. "Tomorrow," said the Czech officer, "the men would walk to the station carrying their hand luggage; the old men and children would be driven in cars or ambulances. The luggage would go in carts. The station was four kilometers away. Each individual had been given a number corresponding to the railway carriage which he or she was to occupy."

The next morning, the journalists witnessed the departure of the transport. In every railway carriage each of the thirty compartments had a stove and a stock of wood. The heavy luggage could be put in special vans and there were two coaches with supplies of food and a Red Cross coach with the medical staff and dispensary. The food supplies consisted of the normal Czech rations for seven days plus the International Red Cross prisoner-of-war rations for three days, while the journey was to take three days. Among the articles of food were white bread, butter, and honey.

companies engaged in banking and financial activities were to be compensated, with the exception of German and Hungarian legal and physical persons.⁷⁷

Enumerating the reasons for so sweeping a nationalization of Czechoslovakia's industry, President Beneš in a broadcast beamed to the United States had particularly stressed the role played by the "German motive" in the government's nationalization policy.⁷⁸ The "first great reason" was the situation created by the years of German political and economic control over Czechoslovakia, when the main Czech industries and all banks had been transferred to big German concerns. If they were not officially nationalized, they were "thoroughly Germanized," and their former owners dispossessed. The Czechoslovak government came to the conclusion that restitution to former individual owners, especially in the case of "big property," would be an act of compensating one group at the expense of all other classes of the population. It was therefore decided to leave these industries in public ownership, "for which the Hitler regime itself had, to such a large measure, prepared." The second reason advanced by President Beneš was again connected with the Germans. Since Czechoslovakia was determined to remove "all Fascist Germans," their property, as belonging to traitors to the Czechoslovak state, had been confiscated. "What is to happen to this property, and particularly the German-owned industrial and banking enterprises? Are we now to divide it among Czech capitalists and industrialists . . . or is it not better to give it to the state and nation . . . also as a partial reparation for the enormous war damages caused to us by Germany?"

As far as movable property was concerned, every German subject to transfer was allowed to take with him personal belongings only up to a weight of 70 kilograms, including nonperishable foodstuffs for seven days. Governmental instructions specifically stressed that the weight of the property permitted to be carried along "must be judged benevolently if transport facilities allow it." Export of securities and jewelry was forbidden; the same applied to cash in Czechoslovak crowns and other currencies (with the exception of 500 Reichsmarks for each person, maximum 1,000 Reichsmarks per family), savings bank-books, valuable watches, cameras, radios and typewriters, valuable rugs and furs. Wedding rings as well as objects of sentimental value could be taken, provided their export was not forbidden for cultural or other reasons. Every prospective transferee had to be fully clad and shod and carry a "blanket or covering appropriate to the year's season." Czechoslovak

authorities in the assembly centers carefully checked the luggage of the prospective transferees to insure that it contained no forbidden objects; the transferees also underwent personal examination. When found, objects which they were trying to export illegally, were registered and confiscated.

With the exception of the 70 kilograms permitted to be taken along, all the movable and nonmovable property of the transferred Germans fell to the Czechoslovak state. A memorandum prepared by a group of "experts on the Sudeten German economic situation" and submitted in 1947 to the Bavarian Minister President Dr. Erhard by the Association for the Protection of Sudeten German Interests estimated the value of property left behind by the Sudeten expellees at \$13.44 billion as of September 30, 1938 (one day before the annexation of the Sudeten area by the Reich) and at \$19.44 billion as of May 8, 1945 (the day of Germany's capitulation). The difference between the two evaluations was based on the "higher value of landed property in Germany, the intensification of production, and increased output as a result of higher wages." The dollar value was based on the exchange rate of the Reichsmark in 1938.

The single items of this over-all estimate, as specified by the memorandum, were as follows:

Property	Value in Millions of Dollars	
	Sept. 30, 1938	May 8, 1945
Agriculture (1,650,000 ha. of farm land) and Forestry (1,150,000 ha. of forest)	3,220.73	4,822.00
Industry	2,393.38	3,824.10
Commerce	308.58	308.58
Handicraft	600.00	600.00
Hotels, Inns, Restaurants, Health Resorts and Spas	624.84	734.00
Banks	640.00	3,600.00
Insurance Companies	297.64	3,323.00
Cinemas	16.00	16.00
Free Professions	6.76	8.80
Private Real Property	3,956.00	3,956.00
Public Property (State and Provincial Government)	3,363.60	1,243.20

The memorandum pointed out that "the figures given above represent a minimum, not a maximum: they are a mere inventory of the properties available and do not take into account the incalculable values of tradition, of a centuries-old culture, of education, the world-wide reputation of firms or business branches." When submitting this account, the authors of the memorandum claimed that "by surrendering their property these Germans, who had been expelled from their former homeland, had paid in advance a considerable part of the German war-reparations."⁷⁹ But the Czechoslovak government refused to consider the confiscated German property as advance payment on account of the compensation which Czechoslovakia was to receive from the German Reich under the title of reparations. The Czechoslovak contention was that it was the duty of the German government to compensate the Germans from Czechoslovakia for the property which they had been compelled to leave, and to insure them a new livelihood in the Reich, just as it was the government's obligation to make good the damage caused by the war to the property of Reich citizens, and see to their starting a new life if their old one had been ruined by the war. The damage caused in Czechoslovak territory by the German-instigated war, by devastation and plundering by the German armies, authorities, and others, could not be made good by confiscation of German property in Czechoslovakia; these damages constituted the subject of Czechoslovak reparation claims against the Reich.⁸⁰

Special provisions were made for the temporary safekeeping of property left by transferred Germans. District National Committees were instructed to notify local authorities entrusted with the safekeeping of this property about the time and place of the next forthcoming transfer as soon as it was fixed. Local National Committees were to appoint caretakers for the livestock of the evacuated German community (horses, cattle, hogs, rabbits, chickens, etc.) which had to be registered and assembled in larger stables or pens.

II.

The Allied Control Council had authorized the transfer of 2.5 million Germans from Czechoslovakia. The actual number of Czechoslovak *Volksdeutsche* in Germany, registered by the census of October 29, 1946, was considerably higher: 2,386,000 were counted in the U.S. zone of

occupation, and 841,000 in the Soviet zone—a total of 3,220,000.⁸¹ By the end of 1946, it was estimated that only about 300,000 persons of German ethnic nationality were still living on Czechoslovak territory. Most of them were workers employed in industry and mining; other categories comprised Germans married to spouses of either Czech or Slovak ethnic nationality, persons who, on account of their anti-Nazi attitude and loyalty to the Republic, were eligible for Czechoslovak citizenship, and, finally, individuals who were exempt from the transfer by way of an act of grace on humanitarian grounds.

On December 19, 1946, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic received officials of the five Ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs, Health, National Defense, and Transport) that had a share in preparing and carrying out the transfer. The Minister of the Interior handed to the President a memorial paper setting out the data relative to the transfer and accompanied by comprehensive maps showing the number of Germans still remaining in specific areas. In his reply, the President emphasized the historical task thus fulfilled.

Just as Thomáš Masaryk, the first President of Czechoslovakia, has gone down in history as the man who created a multinational Czechoslovak state, so Eduard Beneš, her second President, will go down in history as the man who ended the 800-year sojourn of Germans in Bohemia. On the second anniversary of Czechoslovakia's liberation President Beneš told the world that his country had transferred its Sudeten Germans for good: "If someone should get the idea that this question has not been finally settled," he added, "we should resolutely call the whole nation to arms."⁸²

By the beginning of 1947 there were 240,712 Germans in the whole of Czechoslovakia. Of these, 114,931 were classified as skilled workers or as anti-Fascists or their families.⁸³ It is difficult to estimate on the basis of these statistics the exact number of skilled workers with their families. Indicative of the size of this category, however, is the figure given by Dr. R. Luža for November 1, 1946: 85,640 without families, predominantly skilled miners, glass and textile workers.⁸⁴ In the three winter months November, 1946, through January, 1947, 23,366 more Germans left Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia; about 25,000 followed them between January 27 and October 12, 1947, when the transfer was declared complete. The number of Germans remaining by that time in Czechoslovakia was officially stated as 192,000. Of these, apart from their families, about 40,000 were industrial workers.⁸⁵ As late

as 1955, official Czechoslovak statistics listed 175,790 Germans in the country.⁸⁶

Compulsory transfer was terminated in 1947. But the influx of Czechoslovak Germans to Western Germany continued unabated. In the two-year period 1948-1949, Bavaria alone received 34,985 German immigrants from Czechoslovakia who crossed the border illegally.⁸⁷ At the turn of the year 1949, Allied military governments in Western Germany announced that Sudetenlanders with relatives or friends in Germany would be considered eligible for entry permits. This announcement precipitated a strong rush among the Germans still in Czechoslovakia. "They jammed two flights of stairs leading to the military permits office from dawn to dusk for a week," reported the *New York Times* correspondent in Prague in July, 1949. When the office gave notice that it would accept applications by mail only, it received more than a thousand daily during the ensuing months. Between January 1 and July, 1949, some 55,000 Czechoslovak Germans applied to the joint British and French military permits office in Prague for authorization to emigrate to Germany. By the end of July the office had processed 30,000 applications, and of these about one-half had been approved by the military governments of the Western zones.⁸⁸ However, up to the end of the year 1949, only five to six thousand succeeded in obtaining final clearance from Czechoslovak authorities.

On January 31, 1950, the Czechoslovak government and the Allied High Commission for Western Germany signed in Prague an agreement providing for the transfer of 20,000 ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia to homes of relatives in the Western zones of Germany. The West German government was to certify in each case that the transferee had relatives to whom he could go, but gave no guarantee of employment. The agreement came about as a result of mediation stretching over six months by the International Red Cross. Red Cross officials undertook to help the emigrants fill out the documents they would need in Germany. The departing Germans were subject to existing Czechoslovak customs regulations for emigrants which provided for the export of 200 kilograms (494 pounds) of an individual's personal belongings and tools of his trade.⁸⁹ The transfer started on March 17, 1950, and was discontinued by the Czechoslovak authorities on April 28, 1951: 49 transports brought to West Germany, 16,832 ethnic Germans. Afterwards, only few were permitted to leave: in the years 1952-1955 but 521 arrived, making a total of 17,353 for the six-year period.⁹⁰ On the whole, between 1948 and 1955

about sixty thousand Czechoslovak Germans voluntarily left the country for West Germany.

In August, 1956, Dr. Heinrich Weitz, President of the West German Red Cross, announced that he had negotiated an agreement with the Czechoslovak Red Cross providing for the voluntary emigration of "up to 160,000" ethnic Germans, most of whom lived in the Sudeten area. German inmates of Czechoslovak prisons and former prisoners were included in the agreement.⁹¹ Dr. Weitz could not estimate how many of the 160,000 permitted to leave would take advantage of the opportunity. But it was apparent that the once large and powerful German folk group in Czechoslovakia was well on the way to extinction. What had started in 1945 as compulsory removal, was continuing as self-evacuation. Though imposed by circumstances—as had been every migration in history—it became both in essence and form a voluntary act.

The tiny German minority which remained in Czechoslovakia was restored to full citizenship. The decree of April 24, 1953, automatically granted Czechoslovak citizenship to all ethnic Germans. In 1948, German children were admitted to Czech schools, and afterwards German was made the language of education in several schools; their attendance was estimated at 15,000. The use of the German language was again permitted in public life and in government institutions. German workers were invited to join the May Day celebrations in 1951, and a German-language weekly *Aufbau und Frieden*, published by the central trade union organization in Prague, appeared in the spring of the same year. By 1953 it had become a bi-weekly and was joined by two publications for children, *Das Rote Tuch* for the younger ones, and *Freundschaft* for those aged between eleven and fourteen. The Communist editors of *Aufbau und Frieden* proudly stressed that the former "reactionary and chauvinistic" concept of wholesale condemnation of all Germans, which had found its expression in the formula *Němec jako Němec* (a German is like any other German), had been replaced by a different one, coined by Clement Gottwald: *Není Němec jako Němec* (no German is like any other German).⁹²

NOTES

⁹¹ It is significant that at that time no section of the Bohemian Germans demanded union with Germany. The Germans of Bohemia were never Germans politically; they had never drawn their culture from Berlin and for many centuries had looked to Vienna as their capital.

⁹² Dr. Hubert Ripka, *Munich: Before and After*, London, 1944, pp. 411-412.

⁹³ Quoted in Franz Koegler, *Oppressed Minorities*, London, 1943, p. 21.

⁴ *Sitzungsbericht des Fünften Congresses der organisierten nationalen Gruppen in den Staaten Europas*, Vienna, 1929, p. 73.

⁵ *Sitzungsbericht des Siebenten Congresses . . .* 1931, p. 60.

⁶ *Sitzungsbericht des Achten Congresses . . .* 1932, p. 141.

⁷ See E. Sobota, *Das Tschechoslowakische Nationalitätenrecht—Nationality Policy in Czechoslovakia*, Collection of speeches made by Premier Hodža and Ministers Franke, Nečas, and Dérer, Prague, 1931; K. Krofta, *The Germans in the Czechoslovak Republic*, Prague, 1937.

⁸ Elisabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London-New York-Toronto, 1938, p. 277.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 272.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

¹² A pamphlet *Tragedy of a People*, published in June 1946 by the American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, stresses (p. 7) that the high percentage of the Henlein votes can be partly explained by the fact that official Czechoslovak statistics completely omitted the Sudeten German Communists from the total of the Sudeten German vote, for the Sudeten Communist Party was part of the Czech Communist Party and was not separately listed. This observation, if true, does not substantially change the picture, since not more than some 20,000 votes were cast for the four Communist deputies (Wiskemann, p. 200).

¹³ Quoted in Koegler, *Oppressed Minorities*, p. 80.

¹⁴ Quoted in *German Minorities—Spearhead of Nazism*, London, 1943, pp. 9-10.

¹⁵ Quoted in Koegler, *Oppressed Minorities*, p. 54.

¹⁶ Quoted in *Deportation Drama in Czechoslovakia*, Special Edition of *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, 1945, p. 12.

¹⁷ *Czechs and Germans*, p. 283.

¹⁸ *Ankara*, November 17, 1934.

¹⁹ As late as the beginning of May, 1945, when almost all of Czechoslovakia was in the hands of Allied troops, Konrad Henlein, then Gauleiter of Sudetenland, had the effrontery to broadcast an appeal to the United Nations "to guarantee continued German possession of the Sudeten Area." *The New International Yearbook*, Events of 1945, p. 153.

²⁰ *Sudeten Bulletin*, February 1, 1946. Elisabeth Wiskemann, one of the most thorough students of the Czechoslovak political scene, observes in her book, *Germany's Eastern Neighbors* (London-New York-Toronto, 1956), pp. 63, 67, that Jäksch "had never been without the strongly racial feeling of the typical Sudeten German" and that he "felt more German than Marxist."

²¹ Quoted in *Deportation Drama in Czechoslovakia*, p. 12.

²² L. W. Holborn, ed., *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, Boston, 1943, pp. 427-428.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 446.

²⁴ Speech delivered by President Beneš at Melnik in October, 1945. Quoted in Guy A. Bettany, "The German and Hungarian Minorities in Czechoslovakia," *The London Quarterly of World Affairs*, January 1946, p. 293.

²⁵ Eduard Beneš, *The Way to Victory*, London, 1942, p. 26.

²⁶ Louise W. Holborn, ed., *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, 2 vols, Boston, 1943-48, p. 439.

²⁷ *Memoirs of Dr. Eduard Beneš—From Munich to New War and New Victory*, London, 1954, pp. 206, 242, 195.

²⁸ Edward Taborský, "Beneš and Stalin—Moscow 1943 and 1945," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, Vol. XIII (1953-54). After his second visit to Moscow, in March of 1945, President Beneš reported that Marshal Stalin had fully endorsed the Czechoslovak government's proposal for the postwar transfer of Germans living within the pre-Munich borders of Czechoslovakia, and of some two-thirds of the 600,000 Hungarians, to their respective countries. Both Stalin and Molotov promised full help in the carrying out of the transfer. (Premier Zdeněk Fierlinger's speech on July 10, 1945, Czechoslovak Home Service broadcast, July 11, 1945.) The Prague Socialist paper *Svobodné Slovo*—although very critical of the native Czechoslovak Communist Party—especially stressed "the moral and political support given to Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and personally by Stalin" and significantly added: "We know that without Stalin's support we would never have been able to deport the Germans and we will never forget the fatherly care of Stalin who last year in Moscow advised our statesmen to

deport the Germans and thus insure once and for all the national character of our state. We know that Stalin again discussed the matter with Minister Hubert Ripka and promised to intervene so that technical and transport difficulties which until now had prevented larger deportations of Germans into the Russian zone, might be overcome." Quoted in the New York Czechoslovak daily *New Yorkske Listy*, June 13, 1946.

²⁹ Quoted in *War and Peace Aims of the United Nations*, p. 443.

³⁰ *New York Times*, January 31, 1945.

³¹ *Ibid.*, February 23, 1945.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*, July 15, 1945.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, August 9, 1944.

³⁵ Hubert Ripka, *The Future of the Czechoslovak Germans*, London, 1944, p. 20.

³⁶ Gregory Frumkin, *Population Changes in Europe Since 1939*, London, 1951, p. 51.

³⁷ *The Central European Observer*, London, March 29, 1946.

³⁸ Guy A. Bettany, "The German and Hungarian Minorities in Czechoslovakia," *The London Quarterly of World Affairs*, January 1946, p. 294.

³⁹ *The Times*, London, August 7, 1945.

⁴⁰ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, June 23, 1945.

⁴¹ Prof. Friedrich Bednar, "Czechoslovakia's Struggle for a New Life," *Central European Observer*, March 29, 1946.

⁴² *Radio Prague*, June 14, 1945.

⁴³ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, May 23, 1945.

⁴⁴ *The Sunday Times*, October 7, 1945.

⁴⁵ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, July 2, 1945.

⁴⁶ *Review of the Foreign Press*, Research Department, Foreign Office, June 19, 1945.

⁴⁷ Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, *Les Transferts Internationaux de Populations*, Paris, 1946, p. 19.

⁴⁸ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, Broadcast, July 11, 1945.

⁴⁹ *Les Transferts Internationaux de Populations*, p. 20.

⁵⁰ *New York Times*, June 17, 1945.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² *The Times*, London, August 7, 1945.

⁵³ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, July 10, September 6, 1945.

⁵⁴ *Tragedy of a People: Racism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946, p. 4.

⁵⁵ Guy A. Bettany, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-296.

⁵⁶ Department of State, *Occupation of Germany: Policy and Progress*, p. 76.

⁵⁷ The description of the transfer machinery created by the Czechoslovak government, and of the actual carrying out of the transfer, is based on material put at the disposal of the author by Czechoslovak governmental bodies during his study trip to Czechoslovakia in January, 1947.

⁵⁸ *The Central European Observer*, December 12, 1947.

⁵⁹ Following the proposal of the Czechoslovak government that the officers of the American occupation army who gained special merit in facilitating the transfer operation become recipients of Czechoslovak orders of distinction, the President of the Republic on December 16, 1946, decorated these officers in a solemn ceremony.

⁶⁰ *New Yorkske Listy*, June 13, 1946.

⁶¹ *Denni Hlasatel*, August 25, 1946.

⁶² *The Central European Observer*, February 9, 1945.

⁶³ *Czechoslovak Press Bureau*, January 28, 1945.

⁶⁴ "Evidence of the Reign of Racism in Czechoslovakia," Special Edition of *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, July 1945, pp. 4-6.

⁶⁵ *The Times*, August 7, 1945. The New York *Neue Volkszeitung*, a weekly published by German Social Democrats in the United States, declared editorially on July 29, 1945, that the United States had a "moral obligation" to open its door to millions of Germans who would become homeless if the "so-called population transfer" took place in eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia. The *Volkszeitung* said that such a transfer "can only occur with the consent of the U.S. Government," and that "the American people would, therefore, have to bear the

responsibility for the future of those unjustly persecuted people." The editorial concluded with the statement that "the German immigration quota should be held as wide open as possible for the victims of persecution by Polish and Czech Nazis."

⁶⁶ *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa*, Band IV/1, *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei*, Berlin, 1957, p. 131.

⁶⁷ *Veštník náboženské obce židovské* (Bulletin of the Jewish Religious Community of Prague) IX/23, p. 327.

⁶⁸ *American Jewish Yearbook*, Philadelphia, 1950, p. 408; *Aufbau* (New York), March 28, 1949; *American Jewish Yearbook*, 1951, p. 399.

⁶⁹ Jean Danés, Paris, "What Three Hundred Journalists Saw," *Central European Observer*, March 15, 1946.

⁷⁰ *Monthly Report* No. 13, August 20, 1946.

⁷¹ Hubert Ripka, *The Future of the Czechoslovak Germans*, p. 22.

⁷² *Washington Post*, October 10, 1944.

⁷³ *Compilation of Statutes and Enactments*, No. 12.

⁷⁴ Dr. J. Kolatko, *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, Prague, 1948, pp. 22-24.

⁷⁵ *New York Times*, June 23, 1945.

⁷⁶ Full text of the decree in Samuel L. Sharp, *Nationalization of Key Industries in Eastern Europe*, Washington, D.C., 1946, pp. 57-72.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁷⁸ *Czechoslovak News Bulletin* No. 106, Prague, November 10, 1945. See also article by Dr. Bencš, "Postwar Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1946, pp. 397 ff.

⁷⁹ *Documents of the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans*, Appendix XIV, pp. 293-294. The Paris Peace Conference agreed on four sources for reparations (in addition to captured gold): surplus capital equipment, foreign assets, captured supplies and ships; a hotly debated fifth source was deliveries from current production.

⁸⁰ Karel Sedivy, *Why Do We Want to Transfer the Germans?*, Prague, 1947, p. 75.

⁸¹ In addition, 151,000 Czechoslovak German expellees were counted in Austria on October 31, 1951. Alfred Bohman, *Das Sudetendeutschtum in Zahlen*, Munich, 1959, p. 231.

⁸² *New York Times*, May 11, 1947. In June 1950, Walter Ulbricht, Deputy Premier of the Soviet-dominated East German Republic, together with Antonin Zapotocky, Czechoslovak Premier, signed in Prague a joint declaration recognizing as "permanent and just" the transfer of the Sudeten Germans to Germany. Renouncing all claims for the Sudeten Germans to return to the Sudetenland, Mr. Ulbricht said: "The resettlement of Germans in Germany was carried through in accordance with the Agreement of the Allied Powers at Yalta and Potsdam, and was a final solution." This statement aroused violent opposition in Western Germany. *New York Times*, June 22 and 24, 1950.

⁸³ *Svobodná Noviny*, May 30, 1947.

⁸⁴ R. Luža, *Odsun*, Vienna, 1953, p. 27.

⁸⁵ Elisabeth Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

⁸⁶ *Statistický Obzor*, May 24, 1950.

⁸⁷ *4 Jahre Vertriebenenbetreuung in Bayern*, p. 33.

⁸⁸ *New York Times*, July 24, 1949.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, February 1950.

⁹⁰ *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa*, Band IV/1, *Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevölkerung aus der Tschechoslowakei*, p. 127. Also Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, *Care and Help*, Bonn, 1957, p. 25.

⁹¹ *New York Times*, August 14, 1946.

⁹² Heinrich Kuhn, *Die kulturelle Situation der Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei (Zur gegenwärtigen Lage der Deutschen in der Tschechoslowakei)*, pp. 41, 46, 26, 36. Elisabeth Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, p. 280.

SIX

Resettlement of the Border Regions

I.

When, in 1944, the Czechoslovak government—then in exile—officially announced its intention to transfer to the Reich the bulk of Czechoslovakia's German minority, this plan was much criticized on moral and political grounds. The main and most common criticism, however, was directed not against the ideological, but against practical, predominantly demographic and economic aspects of the Czechoslovak transfer scheme. The scheme was attacked not only because its opponents considered it unjust, but first and foremost because they insisted on its impracticability. They predicted that, deprived of her German population, Czechoslovakia would not have sufficient manpower to colonize the confiscated German lands and to man at the same time the highly specialized Sudeten industries.

The German occupation had left terrible marks on the life of the country. Particularly heavy were the losses in population. Figures released by the State Statistical Office in Prague established that 212,000 Czechs and Slovaks had perished during the war, of whom 66,256 had died in concentration camps. Thus, of the 1939 Czech and Slovak population one of every fifty people was a direct victim of war and Nazi persecution. In addition, 169,000 suffered great injuries to health. Another 100,000 deaths represented the war increase in civilian mortality. To these grave "direct" losses were added the decline of the birth rate and the high mortality rate among infants. In 1945, the birth rate was almost 15 per cent lower than in 1944; it was the lowest birth rate in Europe. Diseases took a heavy toll among infants. In one Bohemian district, every fourth child died during its first year of life. The statistics for the whole country showed 110 deaths in every thousand newborn.¹

This critical demographic situation provided a powerful argument for the opponents of wholesale transfer of the German population as advocated by the Czechoslovak government. It was argued that Czechoslovakia simply could not afford to lose over three million of her German population since she had no prospect of replacing the deported millions in two or three generations: already in 1936 the birth rate in western

provinces of Czechoslovakia (Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia) was 14.51²—lower than the notoriously low birth rate of France (15.3 per 1,000 inhabitants in 1936);³ if the over-all birth rate of Czechoslovakia was a little better than that of France (17.4), it was only due to the higher fertility in the eastern provinces of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ukraine (the latter was ceded to the Soviet Union in June, 1945). Under these circumstances, repopulating the deserted Sudeten territories by an influx of Czechs and Slovaks from the interior and providing this area with sufficient manpower was described as practically impossible.

The demographic situation in the liberated border regions was particularly unfavorable for the Czechs. Immediately after the German occupation, 120,000 Czechs fled from the Sudetenland to rump Czechoslovakia; among them were 50,000 workers, 20,000 employees who had lost their jobs, 20,000 small businessmen, 3,000 farmers, 10,000 professionals, 10,000 teachers, and so on.⁴ By the end of 1938, owing to mass expulsion by the German authorities, less than 500,000 Czechs were left in the so-called *Sudetengau*. This figure remained roughly at this level until February, 1945. While the native Czech inhabitants of the *Gau* continued to leave the area whenever they were able to do so, and fled to the so-called "Czech Protectorate," the Germans, in pursuance of their scheme for putting every available person to war work, constantly transferred Czech workers from the Protectorate to the *Sudetengau*. As the defeat of Nazi Germany drew nearer, the majority of these Czech newcomers fled into the interior of Bohemia, so that the actual number of Czechs in the border regions at the moment of the uprising in Prague (May 5, 1945) could be estimated at some 300,000. When Czech authorities took over administration of the Karlsbad (Karlovy Vary) district on June 12, only 215 Czechs were found in the town of Karlsbad and 55 in the surrounding district (as against 3,970 Czechs in 1938 in the Karlsbad district). Other districts had no Slavonic population whatever left.⁵

The economic argument appeared even weightier. By a curious freak of nature, the richest industrial areas in Czechoslovakia are situated along her frontiers. They early attracted German immigrants from surrounding countries, who converted the Sudetenland into a highly industrialized province. The industrial capacity of the Sudeten population, with 683,000 persons in the group of wage earners (official census of 1930), equaled that of Switzerland with her four million inhabitants (692,000 wage earners). The percentage was even higher than in Germany proper, with 43.9

against 41.5 per cent industrial population. In the Sudeten territory, as handed over to Hitler, was concentrated 95 per cent of Czechoslovakia's lignite mining (production in 1937: 18 million tons), 95 per cent of her light export industries (Gablonz glass, musical instruments, toys), 88 per cent of her linen industry, 85 per cent of her china industry, 78 per cent of her glass industry, 70 per cent of her wool industry, 55 per cent of her cotton industry, and so forth. Mention must also be made of the paper mills, the well-known watering places of Karlsbad, Marienbad, and Franzensbad, and the typical home industries of the poor Sudeten mountain regions.⁶

The basis of this thriving industrial life was the coal and lignite deposits, stretching roughly from Falkenau in the Southwest to Moravska Ostrava and Teschen in the Northeast. Depending upon the coal fields in the frontier zones were iron and steel works, the synthetic petrol and chemical industries, and heavy engineering such as the Skoda works in Pilsen and those in the Moravska Ostrava region. The major industries of finished consumer goods, which played a large part in the country's prewar foreign trade, were likewise situated in the frontier areas, namely glass, porcelain, toys, and jewelry. Eighty-four per cent of all industrial enterprises were in German hands.⁷ The ownership was mostly German, the management and technical direction was usually German, as were the overwhelming majority of the workers, including men of great skill, whose craft was largely the result of special aptitude handed down for generations. The problem of replacing transferred Germans thus had to be met not only quantitatively but also professionally and qualitatively.

The German minority occupied an exceptional place in Czechoslovakia's economy. While the over-all numerical relation between Czechs and Slovaks on the one hand, and Germans on the other was 3 to 1 in 1930, comparatively more Germans were gainfully occupied than Czechs and Slovaks: of every 1,000 Czechoslovak citizens 343.8 Czechs and 458.8 Germans were gainfully occupied in industry and trade, and 68.2 and 88.6 respectively in commerce and finance. Of 1,000 Czechs 434.5 were gainfully occupied in industry and trade; of 1,000 Germans, 566.3. In the vitally important textile industry 152,644 Czechs and Slovaks and 187,063 Germans were employed. Accordingly, the German-populated Sudeten area played a decisive role in Czechoslovakia's export and secured the active trade balance of the country. In 1937, the area inhabited by Czechs and Slovaks (later known as "post-Munich terri-

tory") imported goods for 7,447 million crowns and exported for 6,848 million crowns, showing a passive trade balance of 599 million crowns; on the other hand, the Sudeten territory's import did not exceed 3,533 million crowns, while export amounted to 5,124 million crowns—an active trade balance of 1,591 million crowns, which largely made up for the deficit economy of the inner parts of Bohemia and Moravia. In a memorandum privately circulated among Czechoslovak leaders in London and some British members of Parliament, a Sudeten German Social Democrat, Dr. Bruegel, insisted that the transfer idea was simply suicidal for Czechoslovakia: "No state of Czechs and Slovaks can exist without a non-Czech and non-Slovak [meaning of course, 'without German'] population. . . . The removal of a large number of Germans from the country without the faintest possibility of replacing them would be a tremendous economic catastrophe for the country, from which no recovery in a near or later future seems to be possible." The Czechoslovak objection that they would rather be poorer and "tighten their belts" in return for a feeling of greater national security was ridiculed by opponents of the transfer who stressed that Czechoslovakia was already a state with a comparatively low standard of life; the average annual income of a gainfully employed person in Czechoslovakia before the war was 455 international units (gold dollars), in Austria 511, in Germany 646, in the United Kingdom 1,069, and in the United States 1,383.⁸

This analysis of the situation and the belief in the irreplaceability of the German group in Czechoslovakia's economy were widely shared by political leaders and economists other than those immediately concerned. Even many of those who were otherwise willing to accept the justice and necessity of a wholesale removal of the German minority did not conceal their apprehensions as to the disastrous economic implications of the scheme.

As against this pessimistic prognosis, the advocates of the transfer pointed out that Czechoslovakia, as it emerged in May, 1945, from six and a half years of German occupation, had undergone fewer fundamental changes in the course of the war than any of her neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe. Economically, she emerged as by far the strongest unit in this area. Her economy, though considerably distorted, was not destroyed, and the economic potential of the country was not even considerably weakened. On the contrary, the Germans built up many of the main Czech industries and, since the Bohemian stronghold was largely immune from attack by air or land, not only did these

industries survive intact, but as the war progressed, they were constantly strengthened by the Germans themselves.

2.

German occupation of Czechoslovakia came to an end in May, 1945. Within two years, the former Sudeten territory, renamed "Border Regions," became virtually *Germanrein* (German free). More than one-fifth of Czechoslovakia's total population and 43.9 per cent of her industrial labor force were forcibly removed.

This was, no doubt, a radical and painful operation. But it did not cripple the country's economy. Czechoslovakia's 1946 trade-balance achieved an \$80 million export surplus. At an early stage, no irreparable "population vacuum" arose in the former Sudetenland. Almost simultaneously with the removal of the Germans, the Border Regions were being settled with Czechs and Slovaks. Neither did the region become an economic vacuum. The harvests of 1946 and 1947—though with a tremendous effort—were gathered in without loss. Coal production in October, 1946, reached about 85 per cent of the prewar level. According to data put at the disposal of this author by Dr. Miroslav Kreysa, chairman of the Czechoslovak Resettlement Office, the number of employees of Czech and Slovak nationality in the confiscated German industrial concerns, which on August 1, 1945, comprised 122,491, reached 306,210 on December 1, 1946, while the number of German workers was reduced from 196,370 in September, 1945, to 55,582 (mostly specialists) at the end of 1946. Only 12 per cent of the 5,000 former German concerns left in operation were in the red; the remainder showed profit or were breaking even. In the spring of 1947 impartial observers were in agreement that, with the exception of Belgium, no formerly occupied country had so quickly reached a status so close to normal as had Czechoslovakia.⁹ Some did not hesitate to speak of the "miracle of Czechoslovakia's recovery."

This "miracle" was achieved by carefully planned, hard, persistent national effort. It seems worth-while to recapitulate the main features and stages of this effort on the basis of data collected by the author during his visit to Czechoslovakia in January, 1947, of additional documentation submitted by Czechoslovak government bodies, and of information published in the American and European press.

The first task of the Czechoslovak government after its reinstalment in Prague was to set up a completely new Czech administration in the liberated former Sudeten territory. It was impossible to consider any linking up with, or continuity of, the existing German administrative apparatus, which was out-and-out Nazi in character and deeply hostile to the Czechoslovak republic. Therefore, the Czech National Council in Prague had, as early as May 5, 1945, while the Prague uprising was still going on, sent instructions to the frontier districts of the so-called "Protectorate" for immediate dispatch of a nucleus staff of their officials to the neighboring districts of the former *Sudetengau*. These officials had to take over and insure possession of the premises of the local and district administrative authorities, as well as those of the public security organs, and commence activities in the name of the Czechoslovak republic and in accord with its laws. In such towns and districts in which at least a small Czech minority population remained, local revolutionary Czech National Committees were formed and took up the administration.

After the return of the Czechoslovak government to Prague the Ministry of the Interior proceeded to introduce order and system into this improvised administrative structure. Administrative commissions were appointed for single districts. Members of these commissions were chosen from the ranks of trustworthy officials who had played an active role in the revolt against the Germans. Their duty was to complete the recruiting of a full administrative staff and to organize a local Czech administration in smaller communities and townships. Local administrative commissioners (or commissions) were appointed in single localities. By the end of May, 1945, the Czech administrative machinery in the former Sudetenland was fairly well established.

Next it was time to plan and begin settlement. On July 10, 1945, Premier Ždeněk Fierlinger announced that in order to establish a unified policy and insure proper coordination between internal settlement and the resettlement of the Border Regions, a Settlement Office in Prague for Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia, and a Settlement Office in Bratislava for Slovakia, would be set up; their activities were to be conducted under the guidance of the Commission for Internal Settlement. "The government intends," said the Premier, "to equip the settlement offices with all the necessary means and with an expert administrative staff, so that they should be able to fulfil their tasks successfully and as quickly as possible."¹⁰ A presidential decree (No. 27) to this effect was promulgated

on July 17, 1945. It established a special Commission for Internal Settlement within the Ministry of the Interior, composed of representatives of the immediately involved departments, and headed by the Minister of the Interior; the Secretary General of the Commission acted as representative of the Ministerial Cabinet. By a later decree (No. 108, October 25, 1945), the Settlement Office under the chairmanship of Dr. Miroslav Kreysa was given larger competence in the field of confiscation and distribution of property "belonging to Germans, Hungarians, and other traitors and enemies of the Czech and Slovak nation." This decree also established a National Recovery Fund under the chairmanship of Dr. Karel Mudry for the interim administration of the aforementioned property and subsequent settlement of accounts in connection therewith.¹¹ The Settlement Office had to see to it that new settlers were distributed evenly throughout the entire area of the Border Regions. The legal basis for the activities of the Office was provided by two legislative measures: (a) by Decree No. 12 of June 21, 1945, providing for confiscation and speediest distribution of the agricultural property belonging to German, Hungarian, and other enemies of the Republic; and (b) by Decree No. 28 of July 20, 1945, concerning colonization of this confiscated property by Czech, Slovak, and other Slav agricultural workers.¹²

Actually, the stream of Czech and Slovak settlers to the Border Regions began much earlier than the organized activities of the Settlement Office. On May 28, 1945, six weeks before the official establishment of the Office, national revolutionary Czechoslovak bodies (the Provincial National Committee in Prague and the Commission for the Settlement in the Border Regions) broadcast an appeal to Czech workers, private employees, public employees, artisans, and businessmen to settle in the former Sudeten territory and to report immediately in writing. It was specified that applications had to contain the name, address, activity carried on from 1938 to 1945, and indication of the district where the applicant would prefer to settle; a certificate of national reliability issued by local National Committees was to be enclosed. The applicants were promised they would be called when needed.¹³

This appeal resulted in a rather chaotic rush to the Border Regions by persons who for the most part were not prompted by patriotic or even sound economic motives. Some of those early settlers proved to be completely unsuited to the positions they had applied for; they had moved into the Border Regions exclusively in the hope of quick and easy

enrichment. The Czechs themselves coined the term *zlatokopci* ("gold-diggers") to describe this category of "patriots" who swarmed over the former Sudeten territory like locusts. The Karlsbad *Narodné Noviny* on July 2, 1945, published an article under the heading "The Best People for the Best Jobs," sharply criticizing the kind of people who had flooded the whole Karlsbad district in their quest of a good life. "It is not always people possessing the requisite professional and moral qualifications who apply for well-remunerated positions in the liberated Czech Border Regions," stated the article, and continued: "The Czech Border Regions are beautiful districts, but in order to prosper they need to be colonized by people who are able and willing to work. There is no room here for an unorganized influx of people prompted by ulterior and dishonest motives. We need only the best people here, and these will get the best jobs. Any mistake made now will one day cost us dearly and may cause the whole nation irreparable damage." Mr. Otokar Javornický, speaking on July 14 over Radio Prague on behalf of the Karlsbad Administrative Commission for Western Bohemia, also frankly admitted that "not all our experiences with people who have applied for positions as national administrators or workers in the reconstruction of Czech life in Karlsbad have been pleasant." A Radio Prague broadcast of August 30 acknowledged that "in the beginning, many doubtful elements volunteered to go to the Border Regions."

In time the dangers of this unorganized and indiscriminate rush were realized by those responsible for the resettlement of the area. Looking back to the first stages of the process, Prof. Friedrich Bednar, Dean of the Hus Theological Faculty in Prague, stressed that this tremendous task "requires men of high moral qualities who must know their duties and the limits of their rights; not every applicant for the post of manager is capable of carrying out all the duties which are waiting for him; there must be selection and reselection."¹⁴ As soon as the preliminary conditions for planned and properly directed settlement had been created, the Settlement Offices launched a large-scale, country-wide recruiting campaign inviting volunteers to occupy vacancies in the Border Regions' industry, trades, and agriculture. At every district office of the Ministry of Labor—the official Czechoslovak labor exchanges—the public were acquainted with lists of vacant farms, jobs, and posts in the border areas and with detailed information on the possibilities of securing accommodation for new settlers and their families. Anxious to attach prospective settlers to the new residences, Czech resettlement authorities put

special emphasis on attracting entire family units. "We want applicants with families and children," a Prague governmental broadcast insisted on July 17, 1945, "and we wish to inform them that the educational authorities are already actively dealing with the problem of schools for Karlsbad and its district. We will have elementary, secondary, technical, and commercial schools, capable of providing full educational facilities for Czech children. We have sufficient school buildings. . . . Those who volunteer to work in our Border Regions under difficult circumstances ought to be assured of conditions for satisfactory and economically well-organized life." Information given to the public included data on wage conditions and potential earnings, on health and social institutions available to the new settlers in the locality in which they worked or in the nearest vicinity.

The Czechoslovak government did not attempt to make settlement in the liberated former Sudetenland compulsory. With the exception of a few members of the first administrative staff hurriedly dispatched to the area in early post-liberation days, no one was ordered or compelled to move there. Instead, the authorities were doing all in their power to make the resettlement attractive and to offer prospective settlers a maximum of advantages.

First and foremost among the inducements were the housing advantages. Law No. 163 of the year 1945 gave the National Committees power to supervise and remedy housing conditions; it also instructed economic concerns and local authorities, in collaboration with the Settlement Office, to secure in advance the necessary number of dwellings for the prospective settlers. In many cases, furnished houses were made available. Faced with the acute postwar shortage of housing accommodation in the former so-called Protectorate, many families were tempted by the prospect of suitable housing in the Border Regions. No. 1214 of the Settlement Office Order (April 30, 1946) fixed the rent of confiscated German houses in the Border Regions approximately 25 per cent lower than corresponding rentals in the interior; not only workers and officials, but also older persons, living on pensions, were induced to move to the nonindustrial districts of the area by the offer of cheap homes. With the view of stimulating a higher birth rate, order No. 1402 of June 7, 1946, stipulated that families with many children were entitled to a proportionately larger house or flat; that the rent paid must not exceed 18 per cent of the net income of all persons living permanently in the apartment; families with dependent children were eligible for

further reduction of 1 per cent for each child, provided that the actual rent should not be less than 15 per cent of the family's income.¹⁵ New settlers were offered the opportunity of acquiring, either immediately or at a later date, and at a relatively low price, the ownership of furniture, of a house, farm, fields, or a small trade undertaking they were using or administering. Industrial and agricultural workers, persons employed in public administration, teachers, post office clerks, and so on were entitled to a lump-sum grant to cover the expenses connected with their moving to and installation in their new homes. The Czechoslovak Parliament had made 1,000,000 crowns available for this purpose. Young physicians who graduated in 1946 and 1947 were induced to settle in the Border Regions by priority offers for automobiles. The results of this recruiting campaign during the first 15 months are shown in the following table giving the number of Czechs and Germans in the former Sudetenland:¹⁶

Year	Czechs	Germans
1930 (census)	964,928	2,902,670
1940.	564,423	3,008,068
1945 (June 30) (approx.)	400,000	3,200,000
1945 (August 19)	1,243,117	2,206,146*
1946 (January 1)	1,827,621	1,884,699
1946 (March 1)	1,887,513	1,832,366†
1946 (October 1) (approx.)	2,220,000	330,000‡

* At the close of the Potsdam Conference.

† At the inception of the organized transfer, especially to the American zone.

‡ At the close of the organized transfer in 1946.

We see that until the first of March, 1946, the departure of Germans (1,368,000) was more than made up for by the influx of Czechs and Slovaks (1,487,000). Further removal of the Germans, however, was only partly compensated by new waves of Czech and Slovak resettlers. By October 1, 1946, only 1,800,000 Czechs and Slovaks had arrived to replace the 2,870,000 Sudeten Germans who by that time had been evacuated.¹⁷ A net population deficit of over one million was thus created. By May 1, 1947, the Czech and Slovak population of the Border Regions approached the 2,000,000 mark—still more than one million short of the area's prewar population and more than 500,000 short of the

government's resettlement scheme which provided for a total of 2,500,000 inhabitants of Czech and Slovak ethnic nationality.¹⁸

Czechs and Slovaks who heeded the call of the government to settle in the Border Regions did not become the owners of German property and undertakings they had taken over: they were merely appointed "national administrators" (trustees) of former German businesses, farms, real property, or industrial concerns. In this function, they were accorded legal protection *sui generis*. The profits and earnings of undertakings or concerns, with the management of which the settlers had been entrusted, were to be booked to the credit of the undertaking (later to the credit of the National Recovery Fund), but the "national administrator" was entitled to remuneration in accordance with the size of the undertaking, the success of its management, the amount of turnover, and the like. His duties, however, were not limited merely to conducting the undertaking with the due care of an honest manager. Instructions issued by the Settlement Office made the "national administrator" also responsible for replacing, as quickly as possible, German labor by Czech workers and employees, and for retraining them in their new spheres of work. Only persons of Czech, Slovak or other Slavonic ethnic nationality, reliable in the eyes of the state, of good moral character, who had never been punished by a court of justice, and possessing certain qualifications and experience, were eligible for positions as national administrators. Local and district national committees were instructed to act as trustworthy advisors to the appointees, helping them to adjust themselves to the new economic conditions.¹⁹

Experience proved that not all those appointed as national administrators were qualified for this responsible assignment and fulfilled their duties faithfully. In some cases the choice proved to be wrong and the results highly disappointing. It seems, however, that on the whole the great majority of the appointees managed fairly satisfactorily. Extensive investigation concluded in March, 1946, established that 88 per cent of the national administrators had been suitably chosen and that only 12 per cent proved to be incompetent or dishonest.²⁰ On the basis of this survey the Ministry of Agriculture in April and May, 1946, started the final allocation of farms to the new settlers—who had been for the most part recruited from the ranks of former smallholders or agricultural workers—and to their cooperative societies, institutions, and corporations. Similarly, progress was made in the final settlement of laborers under working contracts with the national administrators of agricultural,

industrial, and trade undertakings. After having settled all debts and obligations attached to the former German property, the National Recovery Fund passed the net yield of the distributed property to the Czechoslovak state, to be utilized primarily for the rehabilitation of the Czechoslovak currency deeply shaken by the wartime economy of the German occupants.²¹

The price demanded for the property was determined by the requirements of the resettlement. Special consideration, however, was given to the economic situation of the applicant. In cases where the state had a special interest in the colonization of the land, the compensation price was usually lower than the common value of the property. Ten per cent of the amount due to the state was to be paid when the property was handed over to the new owner, and the rest either within 12 months from that date or in instalments within 15 years. In certain cases the Settlement Office and the National Recovery Fund were entitled to recommend that the applicant should become owner of the property he held without any compensation.

3.

The wholesale transfer of Germans decisively influenced in more than one respect the character and development of the Czechoslovak economy. The empirical needs of the resettlement process caused deep structural changes in both agriculture and industry in the Border Regions.

The problem of agricultural resettlement proved to be exceedingly hard from the very beginning. Prior to the transfer, 800,000 to 1,000,000 Germans (26 to 33 per cent of the German population of Sudetenland) lived from agriculture, and those who were transferred vacated about 270,000 farms and agricultural small holdings. But the response to the government's appeal to Czech and Slovak peasants to come and take over German farms was far below the requirements. In July, 1945, Radio Prague complained that in the Karlovy Vary (Karlsbad) district, 26,000 applications for business had been received and not a single application for agricultural holdings. "This is not surprising," continued the broadcast. "Peasants, by virtue of their work and character, are more cautious, less mobile and less adventurous than townsmen. . . . The government nevertheless sincerely and honestly appeals to all agricultural workers to send in applications at once for the allocation of good

land. . . . The government is anxious for you to become owners of former German land in time for autumn land work. By the autumn, it will be Czech and not German peasants who will sow the land." As a means of prompting Czech peasants from the interior of the country to settle in the Border Regions, the Administrative Commission in charge of resettlement activities in Northern Bohemia even suggested that the implementation of the agrarian reform in other parts of Czechoslovakia be postponed. "If we who live in the Border Regions had any say in the allotment of land," said Mr. Otokar Javornicky on July 14 over the Radio Prague on behalf of the Commission, "we would advise that no land in the interior of the country should be allotted before the agricultural problems in the Border Regions have been solved. Everybody likes to receive land near his home. If the land in the interior of the country is allotted first, nobody will want to come to the Border Regions; and yet living conditions here are as good as anywhere else. The present situation in the Karlsbad district is that the villages are still almost entirely German, and it cannot be foretold who will remain on this land after the carrying out of the government's decrees." Javornicky complained that there was "little demand for the allotment of agricultural land; there seems to be more interest in poultry breeding."

Faced with an acute and apparently lasting shortage of candidates for agricultural resettlement of the Border Regions, Czechoslovak resettlement authorities had recourse to drastic reforms.²²

When 800,000 to 1,000,000 German peasants left the Border Regions, over 2,500,000 acres of agricultural land became vacant. It was not the best land of Bohemia and Moravia. Owing to considerable agricultural overpopulation of the border districts, the borderline of intensive farming had moved far up the mountains, to regions where the soil and climatic conditions were not well suited to this type of agricultural economy. Some of the rural holdings in the former Egerland, in the Sudeten Mountains, and on the slopes of the Sumava in southwestern Bohemia were of poor quality, and a good number of the German peasants suffered considerable hardship. On the other hand, it was obvious that Czechoslovakia would not be in a position to find some 250,000 families of Czech and Slovak peasants to replace the departed German farmers, without risk of depleting other agricultural districts.

Czechoslovak resettlement authorities therefore devised a scheme providing for three different agricultural zones:

a. Zone of intensive farming where Czech settlers were to receive individual medium-sized farms (the Ministry of Agriculture had calculated that the optimum for a family holding in this zone would be from 25 acres of arable land to 32 acres of mixed agricultural land). For this purpose, former German big estates were parceled; on the other hand, dwarf farms and small holdings formerly held by the Germans had to disappear.

b. Areas of mountain pasture land, where cultivation of grain on farms had to be considerably reduced and partly abandoned. In such areas, individually run pasture farms were to be encouraged, but, at the same time, efforts had to be made to establish cooperative pasture farms for settlers from the interior of Bohemia. Ninety-three such cooperative societies were created in 1946, farming a total area of 150,000 hectares (some 370,000 acres).

c. Upland areas of extensive forests along the frontier, most of which were turned over to the state.

Under this scheme, less land was to be cultivated than before the war and more turned over to pasture. It was calculated that by increased mechanization and a greater use of manure and fertilizers the smaller acreage would both demand fewer hands and secure a bigger yield.

Agricultural holdings were assigned on a basis of priority to applicants who could lay claim to the national gratitude—members of the armed forces, partisans, political internees, especially those of peasant origin—and who could give guarantees of technical competence. They were housed in those of the already existing buildings, which were best suited to the working of their holdings, and they were given a share of the live and dead stock left behind by the German peasants.

Notwithstanding this far-reaching reform, the difficulties of the agricultural economy proved to be exceedingly heavy. On November 30, 1946, 65,589 farms were being worked in the Border Regions, but 15,725 farms were still unoccupied.²² Moreover, many of the new Czech and Slovak settlers were lacking in experience. As most of them were former agricultural laborers, the farms in need of farmhands were understaffed. In the autumn of 1946, the actual shortage of manpower in agriculture was estimated at some 50,000. Particularly needed were 5,000 in forestry, 9,000 in pastures, and 26,000 farmhands. By 1948, 1.04 million acres were handed over to 122,000 families of Czech and Slovak settlers.

Of this total, over 100,000 families were from the agrarian regions of Bohemia, some 8,000 were Czech and Slovak repatriates from other countries, and the rest were those of soldiers either in active service or demobilized. The rest of the land was distributed among various public bodies, cooperatives, and quasi-public associations, e.g. 62,000 acres for training camps, 32,000 acres to water boards, 25,000 acres to research institutes, and so on. Of the 2.47 million acres of forests, 2,045,000 acres were taken over by the state and 395,000 distributed to the villages; individuals obtained allocation of forest land only in a few exceptional cases. Later in 1948, the number of Czech and Slovak peasant families reached 127,500, totaling about 500,000 persons.²⁴ The rural population of the area had thus been cut down by about half.

For some time, Czechoslovak officials claimed that they were not worried by this deficit in rural population or by the sight of numerous derelict villages in the Border Regions, and that they had no intention of trying to repopulate all the abandoned houses of the removed German peasants. As late as August, 1949, a government spokesman told a *New York Times* correspondent that in fact the former Sudetenland had been agriculturally overpopulated. He contended that on poor soil, with equipment and methods that dated back to the eighteenth century, the Sudeten Germans as a group had been poor and managed to eke out a living only by supplementing agriculture with cottage industries: "In the future, Czechoslovaks hope to make a better living for a smaller number of people by gathering poor farmland into cooperatives." Czechoslovakia's Communist regime took recourse to the device of letting less productive land go out of cultivation with the idea that the state farms and cooperatives, organized on a big scale, and the new tractors coupled with the best technical equipment, would provide adequate food factories—while employing less labor—to nourish the industrial population.²⁵

This attempt at making a virtue of necessity failed. Far from all of the new Czech and Slovak settlers stayed in their farms in the Border Regions; to the pressure to join a cooperative many reacted by going off into industry, which was chronically short of manpower and where they earned more than in the cooperatives; it was even difficult to keep labor on the state farms. "The result," relates Elisabeth Wiskemann, "was that by 1953 the frontier regions were largely reduced to a state of decay."²⁶

The stark reality of agricultural underpopulation, of hundreds of

thousands of acres of land which remained untilled or unharvested because of lack of farmers and farmhands, became a major worry for the Prague regime. In 1955, German sources claimed that only two to three peasant families were available for every 250 acres of cultivable land, instead of 22 to 23 families before the expulsion: in the districts of Böhmerwald and Northwest Bohemia, 40 to 50 thousand persons were working the land instead of a former 230,000.²⁷ *Rudé Právo* (March 2, 1955) admitted that one cooperative worker in the Border Regions was responsible for the cultivation of over 50 acres, whereas for the whole Republic the average was only 15 acres. As early as August, 1953, Radio Prague complained: "We have too few agricultural workers. Everywhere in the fields mowed corn can be seen, which is at the mercy of the rains." At the Tenth Communist Party Congress (June, 1954), Prime Minister Viliam Siroky spoke of 1.5 million more acres having been under cultivation before the war.

The government made frantic attempts to remedy this dismal situation. It launched an intensive campaign to impel Czech and Slovak youth from the interior of the country to volunteer for agricultural work in the Border Regions. The plan for 1954 provided for 105,000 such volunteers, but by the end of the year only 17,000 were enrolled.²⁸ For the year 1955, the official scheme called for 30,000 industrial workers and 42,000 people from the countryside, including 27,000 women, to be transferred to the frontier areas to work in agriculture. In addition, 1,000 bookkeepers from industrial enterprises were to be sent to agricultural cooperatives.²⁹ The government was doing its very best to make resettlement attractive. Conditions for farmers, both members of cooperatives and independent farmers, were eased by a sizable reduction of compulsory delivery of pork to the state, and a little later some prices paid by the state to the farmer were raised. New settlers were promised a low-priced house to be paid for within ten years, 32 acres of land, and a milk cow. Technicians and mechanics willing to work in tractor stations were to receive 3,000 Czech crowns as initial bonuses, while trained agriculturists were offered 1,500 crowns.³⁰ A special appeal was launched to the 40,000 soldiers scheduled to finish their military service in 1955: according to *Zemědělské Noviny*, by November, 1955, only 240 had registered.³¹ As late as August, 1959, a *New York Times* correspondent reported after a visit to the Most district:

There are villages near Most that are in a state of disrepair, in striking con-

trast to the spic-and-span quality of most of Czechoslovakia. There are broken windows, peeling paint, and a feeling of life at half-steam.

The reason is that the increasing population of Czechoslovakia has not yet caught up with what it was before the ouster of the Germans. . . .

Many Sudeten villages were almost emptied by the German exodus. And the Czechs say that the country-to-town migration that has been taking place in many parts of Europe also contributes to the problem and to the look of neglect.³²

The crucial problem of manning the rural economy of the Border Regions is still far from being solved. As a result, Czechoslovakia's agricultural production in 1958 increased by only 3.4 per cent, while industrial output had risen more than 11 per cent.

4.

The removal of the German minority was one of the main early reasons for the nationalization of about 70 per cent of Czechoslovakia's industrial concerns. The overwhelming majority of them were undertakings formerly owned or managed by Germans. With the removal of German proprietors, plant directors, scientists, and technicians, they became practically ownerless. Czechoslovakia did not possess either the capital or the necessary qualified personnel to stage the revival of these often very big concerns under private initiative. The only possible alternative seemed to be nationalization.

Another conspicuous trend of Czechoslovakia's postwar economy was its marked tendency towards heavy rather than light industries. One of the paramount reasons for this trend was the fact that the workers in the light industries, which had constituted an important factor in Czechoslovak trade, had been mostly Germans. To replace them altogether was simply impossible. On the other hand, the expelled Germans had taken to Germany their high skill in light industries (glassworks, textile products, musical instruments, leather gloves, wooden buttons, stockings, hats, handkerchiefs, lace, artificial flowers and feathers, and so on), and had thus created a serious competition which was bound to lower the price of goods on the foreign market and lead to lower wages in Czechoslovak light industries. Czechoslovakia therefore concentrated on heavy industries, the products of which could be exported mostly not to the west, as before the war, but to Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

The removal of almost three million Germans meant the loss of some 800,000 experienced and often highly skilled industrial workers. To prevent too abrupt a decline in production, essential reforms in the structure of industry had to be introduced. All the confiscated industrial undertakings in the former Sudetenland were divided into three categories:

Category A—the most essential industrial concerns which must, in the interest of Czechoslovakia's economy be maintained unconditionally, and be fully provided with manpower.

Category B—concerns whose continued operation was desirable, but which could eventually be closed down temporarily.

Category C—concerns which were either obsolete or not viable, were destroyed during the war, or did not possess suitable accommodation for their workers, so that their existence was no longer justifiable; such concerns were to be liquidated and their plant and installation made use of in the industrialization of Slovakia, whose industrial development had hitherto been badly neglected.

Out of a total number of 11,212 concerns, 3,823 were placed in category A; category B was subsequently abolished; and a total of 7,389 concerns were classified as category C. To assess the full significance of this classification, it must be kept in mind that the 7,389 liquidated factories of category C employed only 15 per cent of the total number of workers (60,000) in the Border Regions and accounted for some 10 per cent of the production, while 340,000 workers (85 per cent of the total) were employed in the concerns left in operation which embraced about 90 per cent of the area's industry.³³

The purpose of this reform was to concentrate production in a smaller number of efficient and well-equipped factories capable of producing more goods, while employing the same or a smaller number of workers. Such a concentration enabled the transfer of considerable numbers of workers and employees from factories closed down as redundant to more productive and efficient plants. Machinery and equipment of factories found superfluous in the Border Regions were gradually transferred to Slovakia, and partly to southern Bohemia along the banks of the Moldau south of Prague, to the Bohemian-Moravian hill country, and to parts of Moravia adjoining Slovakia. The shift was expected to contribute greatly to the long overdue industrialization of these economically backward provinces. Up to April 1, 1947, 104 plants were thus handed over to the Slovak economy.³⁴

In certain specific branches of industry, particularly in the most vital ones, the Border Regions had to face a very difficult situation.

In the mining industry, German workers used to be responsible for 40 per cent of the total output. With their gradual withdrawal, the manpower problem became dangerously acute, since in Czechoslovakia, just as in other countries, it was extremely difficult to attract youth to take up mining as a career. On August 24, 1945, Premier Ždeněk Fierlinger warned over Radio Prague: "Unless sufficient young workers are willing to go down into the mines, it will be impossible to maintain and increase coal production. . . . In many places production is one-quarter of the normal. Thousands of workers are needed." As a temporary expedient, volunteer brigades were organized to help the nation get the coal it urgently needed for industry and for domestic use. The iron and steel factories were able to supply most of these volunteer brigades, as at that time they were working with almost the same manpower as in prewar days, with only some 70 per cent of the raw material they needed.³⁵ Part of the labor shortage was made up by temporary use of some 16,000 German specialists retained in the coal mines. At the same time, mining was made more attractive to Czechs and Slovaks by special rations and higher wages. Thus, by October, 1946, coal production had reached 85 per cent of the prewar level.³⁶ The satisfactory coal output gave the steel and iron industry a fillip. The all-important workshops producing rolling stock were provided with raw material; production of trucks and engines was launched, and the gaps caused by war and occupation were gradually filled. The production of Vitkovice Iron-works, the largest of their kind in Central Europe, was higher in July, 1946, than in 1938.³⁷

A very serious shortage of labor developed in the textile industry, which before the war had employed 265,000 workers and accounted for 40 per cent of Czechoslovakia's total export. In May, 1945, the industry was left with only 60,000 employees. In June, 1946, this number had increased to 143,000, but the subsequent completion of the transfer of the Germans reduced the available manpower to 100,000. In September, 1946, even after having been modernized and rationalized, the textile industry was still short at least 50,000 workers. To meet the demand for skilled labor, two-year textile schools for 14,000 pupils were opened in thirty-five textile centers. Half of the time spent in the schools was devoted to practical training in the mills.³⁸

One of Czechoslovakia's most successful prewar industries had been

the glass works. Speaking on July 14, 1945, over Radio Prague on behalf of the Administrative Commission for Western Bohemia, Otokar Javornický expressed concern about the future of the highly specialized Czechoslovak china and cut glass industry, 90 per cent of which was concentrated in the Karlsbad district. In 1937 these industries had employed 10,000 people, and despite the low price level and although they were only working to 60 per cent of their capacity, they produced Kr. 160,000,000 worth of goods, of which Kr. 132,000,000 worth was exported. "These industries suffered hardly any war damage and, from the technical point of view, could start work at once, since they produce entirely from local raw material, and even the coal they need is mined in adjoining districts. We need every skilled glass and ceramic worker in order to fill all the vacated positions with reliable Czech workers."

This appeal was not without effect. In May, 1947, the manager of the glass works in Olovi—one of the largest in all Czechoslovakia—told the correspondent of the *New York Times* that 54 per cent of his workers were now Czech as compared with only 10 per cent before the war, and that in another year the percentage would increase to 80 or 90. Although glass-cutters needed three years' apprenticeship, he said, he could train ordinary workers in as many months, and his factory was turning out table, safety, and mirror glass of as high quality as before the war, despite his heterogeneous force of repatriated Czechs from more than a dozen countries.³⁹ On the other hand, in the region of Jablonce (Gablonz), where before the war 20,000 German families in 1,200 small competing family enterprises were producing costume jewelry for export, the Resettlement Office felt compelled to allow some 2,000 non-Nazi Germans, elderly master craftsmen, to stay on the job, as their skills, built up by generations of craftsmanship, could not be easily replaced. Their property was not confiscated and they received the same food rations as the Czechs; 20 per cent of their wages were kept back to meet the needs of the nonworking German population. To replace the expelled Germans, the Resettlement Office brought in Czech workers from the jewelry industries of Železný Brod and Turnow and simultaneously transformed fabrication of imitation jewelry from a cottage industry to a mass-production factory industry. Instead of the former 1,200 cottage enterprises, sixty modern factories were established, making scarabs for Egypt, aigrettes for Bedouin turbans, edelweiss pendants for Switzerland, seed beads and "antique" bracelets for the United States, party buttons for the Soviet Union and the "people's

democracies," and brooches, baubles, and glass eyes for the whole world. "We now have fewer factories and fewer workmen, but our output is almost as great as before," declared a governmental official. The United States became Jablonec's best customer. In the first six months of 1949 Czechoslovakia exported \$1,768,148 worth of imitation stones and jewelry to the United States. In 1939 with 35,000 inhabitants the town of Jablonec had nearly reached its prewar population, and local officials considered the resettlement about completed.⁴⁰

An over-all picture of the early increase of Czech and Slovak labor in industry is given by the following table showing the influx of industrial workers to the Border Regions from August, 1945, up to December, 1946.⁴¹

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES OF CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONALITY
IN THE BORDER REGION INDUSTRY

August 1, 1945	122,491
January 1, 1946	185,837
April 1, 1946	212,655
July 1, 1946	238,573
October 1, 1946	278,606
December 1, 1946	306,210

This influx of Czechoslovak workers permitted a gradual but speedy reduction of German manpower in industry. In September, 1945, 196,370 Germans were still employed in Sudeten industries as against 122,500 Czechs. At the end of the year 1946, only 55,582 German workers remained, while the number of Czech workers had grown to 308,000.⁴² The most "German-free" branches were the food industry, where in December, 1946, Czechs and Slovaks constituted 99 per cent of the total number of workers, and the iron, steel, engineering, chemical, leather, electricity, gas, and water industries with 98 per cent Czech and Slovak workers. The highest percentage of German workers was then registered in the glass industry (21%) and mining (14%). Some 16,000 German specialists were retained in the coal mines, and approximately 26,000 were employed in other branches of industry.⁴³

In their efforts to emancipate the Czechoslovak industry from even the remnants of German manpower, the resettlement authorities had to face the fact that the acute shortage of trained Czech and Slovak technical, administrative, and commercial workers was the inevitable

consequence of years of German occupation. By closing the universities in November, 1939, the Germans stopped the training of the rising generation of Czechs for administrative and managerial positions. On the other hand, by absorbing every physically fit young man of school-leaving age, and even younger ones, into the war industry they prevented gifted Czechs from gaining at least practical experience in the commercial and technical management of industrial undertakings. The postwar exodus of the Germans from industry naturally caused a serious shortage of personnel qualified for the administrative, commercial, or technical management of industry. This shortage was felt especially strongly in the first postliberation years.

Several factors contributed to the gradual improvement of the situation. Many Czech exiles who had spent the war years abroad returned home after the country's liberation and became available for industry and trade. Concentration of industries made possible a more economical use of such qualified personnel as were available. At the end of the university year, a certain number of students who had finished their studies began returning to productive employment. Most of them were highly trained young people who had entered the university before the war and who, even when transplanted to the Reich, were able to gain experience in their specialized fields. Thus, though for a time the lack of qualified industrial management caused considerable difficulties, it did not develop into a lasting phenomenon.⁴⁴

Simultaneously, Czechoslovak resettlement authorities inaugurated a large-scale program of intensive technical instruction and retraining. Besides courses in the factories and workshops, 120 hostels were created in the course of a single year, where apprentices received thorough technical education. Furthermore, a large number of technical and high schools were established, from which cadres of professionally qualified Czech and Slovak workers were directed to industrial undertakings. This permitted a further substantial reduction of the German element in the labor force.⁴⁵

In the management of the nationalized enterprises, the directors, who had been nominated by the Ministry of Industry independently of shop steward committees, were vested with sufficient authority to eliminate any unwarranted interference with production.⁴⁶ Efforts to induce former owners and managers of nationalized establishments to stay on and to work for the State were in many cases successful.⁴⁷

The National Recovery Fund carried out in the course of the year 1946

an examination of the books and working of more than 5,000 former German concerns: of these, 60 to 70 per cent proved to be profit-earning, 18 per cent were breaking even, and 12 per cent were in the red.⁴⁸ The latter were for the most part undertakings which under the settlement scheme belonged to category C and were earmarked for liquidation but had been allowed a longer lease of existence for the completion of previous orders.

Foreign observers of the early years of Czechoslovakia's postwar economy agreed that despite the *blitz* removal of German workers and managers, and despite the paucity of foreign credits received since the liberation, Czechoslovakia's industry was forging ahead. The *New York Times* correspondent cabled from Prague on April 28, 1947: "Probably, no formerly occupied country except Belgium had as good a year as Czechoslovakia had in 1946. She exported that year goods worth \$287,000,000 and achieved an \$80,000,000 export surplus. Some of the production goals she had set in the two-year plan were attained or surpassed in the first three months of this year." Maurice Hindus, who visited the country in June, 1947, reported that the nationalized Skoda armament works, seriously damaged on the last day of the war, had been completely rebuilt and reconverted and were once more soliciting business all over the world. The metal and engineering industry, which embraced 288 factories including Skoda, and employed a quarter of a million workers, was working at maximum capacity. The year's biggest money makers were, however, the chemical, textile, shoe, and leather industries. In 1948, Czechoslovakia achieved an equilibrium in her export and import trade, and during the first five months of 1949 there already was a favorable balance of 180 million crowns (\$3.6 million).⁴⁹ In the course of the following decade Czechoslovakia became, along with the Soviet Union, one of the two creditor and capital-exporting countries in the European Communist bloc. In the first nine months of 1958 she had a favorable trade balance of 910 million crowns. Czechoslovak economists affirmed that the country had been implementing her own industrial expansion program without aid or foreign credits from the Soviet Union or China. Besides being one of the leading producers of capital equipment in Europe, Czechoslovakia in 1958 ranked sixth in crude steel, seventh in pig iron, second in brown coal and lignite, sixth in soft coal, and twelfth in electric power. Engineering had become the most important branch of industrial production; about 43 per cent of the 1958 exports consisted of engineering goods.⁵⁰

These figures, however, do not show the ratio of Czechoslovak exports to Western European countries, which steadily declined. In fact, in 1958 68 per cent of the country's exports (and 70 per cent of imports) were with the states of the Communist bloc. Czechoslovak industry as the 1960's began was producing complete equipment for factories, sugar mills, refineries, and power plants for other East European countries and was able to play an active role in the Soviet-sponsored industrialization of Egypt and Syria.

Far-reaching reforms were carried out in the Border Regions not only in agriculture and industry but also in trade, particularly in handicrafts and business generally. The number of small-trade workshops was reduced from 80,000 to some 42,000 by 1947. The workshops left in operation were to be sold to those national administrators who had proved their worth, to be held in freehold. Czechoslovak officials claimed that in this sector, too, the restrictions mostly affected the poorly equipped undertakings, those in an unsuitable location, and those which failed to pay their way.⁵¹

5.

At the end of 1938—the year of Munich—Czechoslovakia had an estimated population of 14.6 million. This population decreased to 12.2 million as of the census of May 22, 1947—the decrease of 2.4 million reflecting primarily the transfer of Sudeten Germans to Germany. This loss was slow in being made up. The census of March 1, 1950, showed a population of 12.34 million, and in 1958 Czechoslovakia had an estimated population of 13,473,493. Particularly affected was the former Sudeten area. While the 1939 census counted 2,943,187 inhabitants in its three *Regierungsbezirke*, the census of July 22, 1947, registered a population of only 1,914,403; a net loss of 1,028,784, or almost 35 per cent.⁵²

From her own human resources Czechoslovakia could not expect to compensate the population deficit caused by the 1945-1946 transfer. The Prague government therefore resorted to planned repatriation of Czech and Slovak groups scattered over European countries—akin to Israel's "Ingathering of the Exiles."

Over a period of centuries, many a Czech and Slovak emigrated to foreign lands.⁵³ The first wave of Czechoslovak emigration was caused by religious persecution. After the collapse of the Czech uprising in 1618,

about 30,000 Protestant families went into exile to escape Hapsburg Catholic intolerance and settled down in Poland, Prussia, Sweden, and in other countries. Some of them became completely assimilated; but the overwhelming majority maintained their faith, language, and traditions, and are still known under the name of Moravian Church, because their religious leader Comenius was from Moravia. A second emigration wave was prompted by the policy of the Queen Maria Theresa (1740-1780) aimed at repopulating Hungary which had been badly devastated during the wars against Turkish invaders. The immigrants settled in the Hungarian lowland and some of them went to Transylvania. Their descendants formed sizable Czech and Slovak minority groups in present-day Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. In Austria proper, autochthonous Czech and Slovak settlements were concentrated in the lowland, between the rivers Morava and Danube. When growth of Vienna began at the end of the eighteenth century, many a Czech and Slovak moved there, and it is claimed that the majority of the Viennese population were of Czechoslovak descent. In the nineteenth century, considerable numbers of Czechs went to Croatia and even as far as Russia, where they formed prosperous communities. Later on, western European countries (France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxemburg) attracted more than 50,000 Czechoslovak workers. The total number of Czechs and Slovaks in various European countries early in the twentieth century was estimated at 750,000, and at 500,000 in overseas countries.⁵⁴

First abortive attempts to inaugurate the repatriation of Slovak (not of Czech) minorities in Europe were made by the German-sponsored puppet government of Slovakia under Dr. Josef Tiso. The results proved to be very modest. By March, 1941, 3,600 Slovak workers from German-occupied France and Belgium had returned to Slovakia,⁵⁵ but as late as July, 1943, about 25,000 were still in those two countries.⁵⁶ Of the 650,000 Slovaks living in Hungary,⁵⁷ only 1,018 peasant families had been repatriated up until the spring of 1944.⁵⁸ In July, 1944, the Slovak Cabinet decided to repatriate "some Slovak families from the [Polish] General Government and eastern Rumania."⁵⁹ Nothing came of these projects.

After the liberation of Czechoslovakia, the Prague government embarked upon a large-scale repatriation scheme. As early as May 24, 1945, two weeks after its return to Prague, the government, after negotiations with a Czechoslovak delegation from Vienna, decided to repatriate the estimated 100,000 Czechs and Slovaks living in Austria. A special

Czechoslovak Central Commission was appointed for Vienna, with a representative in Prague, and the government undertook to provide adequate financial means for its work.⁶⁰

Very soon, however, it became evident that from the viewpoint of Czechoslovak interests, wholesale repatriation was hardly either possible or desirable. Czechoslovakia's postwar economy needed not simply population, but manpower of special kinds—above all industrial and agricultural workers. Yet a considerable proportion of prospective repatriates from Austria were traders, independent farmers, craftsmen, or people of liberal professions, of whom not by any means all could fit into the government's resettlement scheme. Czechoslovak repatriation projects had to take into consideration not only the natural impulse to attract to the liberated homeland the entire Czech and Slovak Diaspora, and not only the longing of the Czechoslovak minorities for return to their country of origin, but above all the needs and capabilities of the country's economy. Those in charge of repatriation followed, therefore, a carefully designed scheme, and very often Czechs and Slovaks eager to return to Czechoslovakia, after having submitted applications for repatriation to the proper Czechoslovak authorities, had to wait for an official invitation to move. Of the 100,000 Czechs and Slovaks in Austria, not more than 10,000 had been repatriated by the end of 1946.⁶¹

Some 12,000 Czech miners from France and 3,000 from Belgium were resettled in the coal belts near Most and Chomutov, Moravska Ostrava and Usti (Aussig) and Labem in northern Bohemia. Their numbers were swelled by 5,000 more from German Westphalia and the Rhineland.⁶² As a rule, repatriation from Germany proceeded slowly because of extremely careful and scrupulous investigation of the prospective repatriates by the Czechoslovak authorities, anxious to prevent the return of Czech-speaking German expellees. At the beginning of 1947, about 8,000 Czechs from Germany returned to the country. "Certainly all the Czechs and Slovaks from Germany will come home little by little; they always would feel unsafe in Germany; many of them are just the kind of workers we need," stated an official Czechoslovak source.⁶³ Ten thousand Czechs and Slovaks returned from Poland in 1946—5,000 individually and 5,000 by organized transfer.⁶⁴ Six thousand Czech repatriates from Yugoslavia received vineyard land in southern Moravia. Many had been members of the famous Czech Partisan Brigade in Yugoslavia, called "Zizka" after the greatest of all Czech Hussite war leaders. Thirty thousand Czechs and Slovaks applied for repatriation

from Rumania, nearly 95 per cent of them peasants, the remainder being workers, traders and intellectuals.⁶⁶ Approximately 2,000 Czechs and Slovaks in Bulgaria also registered for repatriation.⁶⁶ As stated in Chapter 4, some 27,000 Czechs and Slovaks were transferred from Carpatho-Ukraine under the provisions of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of June 29, 1945.⁶⁷ Similarly, some 28,600 Czechs came from Soviet Volhynia under the treaty of July 10, 1946; 5,400 farms in the Border Regions were, in November, 1946, being worked by Czech repatriates from Volhynia and by ex-servicemen from abroad.⁶⁸ Some of the 33,000 Slovak repatriates from Hungary (see Chapter 7) were sent to the Border Regions, notably to Olovi (famous for its glassworks), which became a center for Czech and Slovak repatriates from a dozen countries: from France, Belgium, Germany, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Ukraine, Poland, and even from Morocco and Algeria.⁶⁹ "On Olovi's streets," wrote the *New York Times* correspondent (May 12, 1947), "one may hear French, German, Hungarian, Serbo-Croate, and Rumanian from the lips of children who are having now to learn Czech and learning it with the facility that children have." Of the 984,000 persons of Czechoslovak stock (of them 319,000 Czechoslovak-born) in the United States very few showed desire for repatriation. On the other hand, strong repatriation tendencies were reported among the some 10,000 Czechs and Slovaks who in 1926 had migrated to Argentina.⁷⁰

After the Communist coup d'état of February, 1948, Czechoslovakia became a full-fledged Communist dictatorship. All industrial and commercial enterprises of any importance were nationalized, and most of the remaining small businessmen were forced into liquidation by ruthless economic pressure. The new Five Year Plan called for a large increase of the heavy industries and a speedy integration of the economy into the Russian orbit. The postwar labor gains in wages, social security, and the like were liquidated and the Russian system of exploitation and speed-up introduced. The *Bulletin* of the National Bank of Czechoslovakia (November-December 1949, p. 235) reported that nationalization had by that time extended to a point where the public sector of the Czechoslovak economy covered 97 per cent of industrial production; 93 per cent of the building industry; almost 100 per cent of regular passenger and freight transportation; 100 per cent of banks, savings banks and insurance companies; 100 per cent of foreign and wholesale trade; and 78 per cent of retail trade. The forced merger of all village economic organizations into "unified cooperatives," and numerous expropriations of agri-

cultural enterprises for nondelivery of quotas or "political unreliability," paved the way for the progressive collectivization of agriculture. Whereas at the beginning of 1951 the "Socialist sector" of Czechoslovakia's rural economy was working 22 per cent of the agricultural land, two years later this percentage had increased to about 48.⁷¹ The bulk of the state farms and collectives were concentrated in the Border Regions. In several districts, 70 to 90 per cent of the land was in the hands of the Socialist sector.⁷²

These developments practically stopped the repatriation movement from Western countries and considerably slowed down the repatriation trend in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. A thoroughly "Communized" Czechoslovakia offered little attraction to Czechs and Slovaks living in Soviet satellites; they were not tempted to exchange their lot for a similar one under another Communist regime.

NOTES

¹ *News of Czechoslovakia*, April-May 1947.

² *Annuaire Statistique de la République Tchécoslovaque*, Prague, 1938, pp. 6, 26-27.

³ *Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1937-1938*, Geneva, 1938, p. 42.

⁴ *Prilomnost*, January 25, 1939.

⁵ *Budujeme Pohraničí*, Prague, 1946, p. 8.

⁶ *Tragedy of a People: Racism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946, p. 29.

⁷ Pierre George, "The New Settlement Policy in Czechoslovakia," *The Slavonic and East European Review*, November 1947, p. 64.

⁸ Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, London, 1940, p. 54.

⁹ *New York Times*, April 28, 1947.

¹⁰ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, July 11, 1945.

¹¹ *Budujeme Pohraničí*, p. 10.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, May 28, 1945.

¹⁴ *The Central European Observer*, March 29, 1946.

¹⁵ *Budujeme Pohraničí*, p. 12.

¹⁶ *Report on the Results of the Resettlement of Population in Czechoslovakia*, put at the disposal of the author by Dr. Myroslav Kreysa, chairman of the Czechoslovak Resettlement Office, p. 10 (will be later referred to as *Report*).

¹⁷ *Budujeme Pohraničí*, p. 13.

¹⁸ *Dokončime Velké Osídlovací Dilo*, Prague, 1946, p. 17.

¹⁹ *Report*, pp. 2-3.

²⁰ *Dokončime Velké Osídlovací Dilo*, p. 23.

²¹ *Report*, p. 11.

²² *Report*, p. 4.

²³ *Czechoslovak News Letters*, published by the Press Department of the Czechoslovak Embassy, London, December 6, 1946.

²⁴ Dr. J. Kolátko, *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, Prague, 1948, pp. 22-24; *Dokončime Velké Osídlovací Dilo*, p. 17; Pierre George, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

³⁵ *New York Times*, August 22, 1949; Elisabeth Wiskemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbors*, London-New York-Toronto, 1956, p. 232.

³⁶ *Germany's Eastern Neighbors*, p. 232.

³⁷ *Archiv* (Göttingen), March 19, 1955.

³⁸ *Rudé Právo*, March 2, 1955.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, December 18, 1954.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, October 12, 1954.

⁴¹ Quoted in *Archiv* (Göttingen), September 22, 1955.

⁴² *New York Times*, August 20, 1959.

⁴³ *Report*, pp. 4-5.

⁴⁴ *New York Times*, April 12, 1949.

⁴⁵ *Report on Czechoslovakia*, by the British All-Party Parliamentary Delegation, London, 1946, p. 14.

⁴⁶ In 1958, Czechoslovakia delivered 8.6 per cent of the world production of brown coal.

⁴⁷ *Report on Czechoslovakia*, p. 12.

⁴⁸ *News Flashes from Czechoslovakia*, September 15, 1946.

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

⁵⁰ *New York Times*, July 26, 1947; August 22, 1949. The Czechoslovak pavilion at the 1958 Brussels International Fair proved that in the field of glassmaking Czechoslovakia had preserved and developed the four-centuries-old tradition of fine work, beauty and inspiration. An explanatory pamphlet distributed at the pavilion emphasized: "Many outstanding creative artists in our country have devoted their art to this work, and special technical as well as artistic schools train glassmaking youth."

⁵¹ *Report*, p. 6.

⁵² *New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

⁵³ Josef Goldman, "Czechoslovak Industrial Development," *Changing Epoch*, Series I, London, 1947, p. 42.

⁵⁴ Labor Problems in Czechoslovakia," *The Central European Observer*, July 19, 1946.

⁵⁵ *Report*, p. 6.

⁵⁶ "Czechoslovakia's Nationalization in Practice," *The Central European Observer*, April 12, 1946.

⁵⁷ *New York Times*, April 6, 1947.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, May 13, 1947.

⁵⁹ *New York Herald Tribune*, June 27, 1947; *New York Times*, April 19 and June 13, 1949.

⁶⁰ *New York Times*, December 7, 1958.

⁶¹ *Report*, p. 5.

⁶² U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *The Population of Czechoslovakia*, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 3, Washington, D.C., 1953, pp. 1, 46, 48; also Alfred Bohman, *Die Entvölkerung der Sudetenländer als Folge der Ausweisung der Sudetendeutschen Volksgruppe*, Troisdorf, 1951, pp. 9-18.

⁶³ Ivan Derer, *Češi a Slováci ve Střední Evropě*, Prague, 1938; Dr. Jan Auerhan, *Čechoslováci v Jugoslávii, v Rumunsku, v Maďarsku a v Bulharsku*, Prague, 1921; Dr. Jan Auerhan, *Dnešní Stan Českoslavenkých Jazykových Menšin za Hranicemi*, Prague, 1932; Stanislav Klíma, *Čechové a Slováci za Hranicemi*, Prague, 1925; R. Urban, *Čechoslováci v Rumunsku*, Prague, 1930; Dr. J. Sedláček, *Čechoslováci v Nizozemí, Belgii a Anglii*, Prague, 1937; Dr. Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Tschechen in Wien*, Vienna, 1919; Dr. F. A. Soukup, *Česka menšina v Rakousku*, Prague, 1928; Tomas Čapek, *The Czechs in America*, New York, 1920; Joseph Chmelíř, *La Minorité Slovaque en Hongrie*, Prague, 1933; *Statistická ročenka Republiky Československé*, Prague, 1959, p. 54.

⁶⁴ *Dokončíte Velké Osídlovací Dílo*, p. 29.

⁶⁵ Alfred Thoss, "Umsiedlungen und Optionen im Rahmen der Neuordnung Europas," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, March, 1941, p. 135.

⁶⁶ *Gardista*, Bratislava, July 27, 1943.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, July 4, 1943.

⁶⁸ *Südost Echo*, April 14, 1944.

⁶⁹ *Gardista*, July 27, 1944.

⁷⁰ *Radio Prague* (Home Service), May 25, 1945.

⁶¹ *Osídlovani* (Prague), 1946, No. 14-15.

⁶² *New York Times*, May 12, 1947.

⁶³ *Memorandum on Transfer and Re-emigration* put at the disposal of the author by Odon Para, Chief of the Fifth Section of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry, p. 3.

⁶⁴ *Osídlovani*, 1946, No. 14-15.

⁶⁵ *New York Times*, May 12, 1947; *Osídlovani*, *loc. cit.*

⁶⁶ *Memorandum*, p. 4.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ *Czechoslovak News Letters*, December 6, 1946.

⁶⁹ *New York Times*, May 13, 1947.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, May 12, 1947.

⁷¹ *Rudé Právo*, February 7, 1951; *Plánované Hospodářství*, No. 1, 1955.

⁷² *Rudé Právo*, September 18, November 10 and 11, 1952; February 15, 1953.

SEVEN

The Slovak-Hungarian Exchange of Population

I.

In the pamphlet *The Future of the Czechoslovak Germans*, published in November, 1944, the Czechoslovak Minister of State Hubert Ripka meaningfully stressed: "I am here speaking to our citizens who are of German [ethnic] nationality . . . but I should like to point out at the very outset that we take the same view of the question of the Magyar minority as well, which will be settled in accordance with the principles to be put into effect as regards the Germans in Czechoslovakia" (p. 8).

Fundamentally, the Czechoslovak government-in-exile made no distinction between the two revisionist minority groups. Although constituting only 4.78 per cent of Czechoslovakia's population,¹ as against 22.32 per cent Germans, the Hungarians in Slovakia were as fiercely opposed to their minority status as were the Sudeten Germans, and persistently refused to acknowledge that they owed allegiance to the Czechoslovak State. The Hungarians had for centuries been undisputed masters over millions of Slavs living on their part of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy, and the *Herrenvolk* mentality became implanted in the Hungarian people as firmly as in the German people. Count Paul Teleki had once characterized his countrymen as follows: "The Magyars are no longer feudally minded, they have conserved at most a domineering mentality. But this is their common patrimony, whether we have to deal with a count or a peasant."² The Hungarians, both in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, have never reconciled themselves to the fact that—as the Hungarian Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi put it before the Peace Conference in Paris—"after World War I one-quarter of the Hungarian people found itself living outside the Hungarian State."³ The revisionist slogan *mindent vissza* (everything back) was the determining feature of Hungarian policy between the two wars. In Czechoslovakia, as far back as 1920, political leaders of the Hungarian minority insisted that they did not regard the Czechoslovak State as the country to which they owed allegiance and that they would at all times endeavor to be reunited with Hungary, their true homeland.

The liberal minority policy of the Prague government in no way

mitigated this intransigent attitude. This is frankly admitted by the mimeographed memorandum *The Hungarian Population of South Slovakia*, which in the spring of 1947 was put at the disposal of this author by the Hungarian Legation in Washington. On page 35 the memorandum says: "Czechoslovakia was a genuine democratic state, and it cannot be denied that the Czechs wished to solve the minority problem. The legal provisions that were put into force would certainly have satisfied smaller minority groups or enclaves. A detached majority, however, such as were the hundreds of thousands of Magyars along the [Czechoslovak-Hungarian] frontiers, could not be satisfied, because the fact of their mother country's being contiguous exercised too powerful and irresistible an attraction. This was what kept the frontier-rectification question permanently up to date." At the time of Lord Rothmere's revisionist campaign (1927), all politically articulate elements of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia unreservedly joined that movement. In all the four parliamentary elections, which took place during the lifetime of the first Czechoslovak Republic, practically the entire Hungarian electorate gave its votes to the two parties whose fundamental point of program was detachment from Czechoslovakia of the territories inhabited by Hungarians. There was a marked kinship between the German and the Hungarian antistate actions. "At every step it took," charges an official Czechoslovak document submitted to the Paris Peace Conference in August, 1946, "the Magyar minority proceeded on parallel lines with the German minority, and the cooperation of these two Irredentist groups culminated in the critical pre-Munich period in the formation of a joint action committee of the Sudeten Germans and the Magyars. Unfulfillable demands and violently provoked disturbances were to facilitate the attack on Czechoslovakia from without, and indeed made possible both the Munich and the Vienna dictates which led directly to the conflagration of the Second World War."⁴

During the months following Munich, Hungarian revisionism achieved its most far-reaching aims. The first Vienna Award (November 2, 1938) compelled Czechoslovakia to cede to Hungary 11,830 square kilometers of territory with a population of 1,027,450; of this total 883,000 were Hungarians, according to Hungarian statistics, and 587,692 according to the Czechoslovak. Further on, between March 15 and April 7, 1939, Hungary annexed Carpatho-Ukraine and adjacent parts, a total of 12,061 square kilometers, with a population of 593,338, of whom 57,509 were Hungarians according to Hungarian statistics, and 25,894 accord-

ing to Czechoslovak sources. The aforementioned Czechoslovak document charged that the Hungarians in these annexed areas had greeted the Hungarian armies and authorities as liberators and, like the Germans in the Sudetenland, had "manifested themselves in murder and violence being meted out to Czechs and Slovaks. . . . Both our minorities [the German and the Hungarian] had an identical aim, namely the breaking up of the Republic, and they have, by joint action, assisted and complemented each other."⁵

2.

The Czechoslovak government made clear its attitude towards the German and Hungarian minority as soon as its authority was re-established on Czechoslovak soil in the spring of 1945. The government program, issued at Košice on April 5, 1945, announced the "confiscation of all land and agricultural implements which belonged to German and Hungarian gentry, or the German or Hungarian citizens, or Czechoslovak citizens of German and Hungarian [ethnic] origin, who had actively helped the Germans and Hungarians." This program thus made a distinction between those who "actively helped" the enemy and those who did not. But this differentiation was short-lived. On May 14, 1945, the Slovak National Council issued a decree (No. 64/46) ordering the confiscation of land property of *all* persons of Hungarian ethnic nationality, and eleven days later it was announced that the Prague government had prepared a decree "for the transfer to public administration of all movable and real property of Germans and Hungarians." The decree was published on June 22 and provided for the immediate and uncompensated confiscation of agricultural property owned by persons of Hungarian [and German] extraction. As persons of Hungarian extraction the decree defined all Czechoslovak citizens who at any census since 1929 had claimed Hungarian ethnic nationality.

The decisive blow to the status of the Hungarian minority was delivered by the Presidential decree of August 2, 1945, according to which all Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian [and German] ethnic nationality were to lose their citizenship on the day this decree came into force. Only those Hungarians who had actively taken part in the fight for liberation were to be exempted. This decree had immediate and far-reaching implications: since only citizens of the Republic were entitled

to employment, no disfranchised Hungarian was eligible for any manual or intellectual job or trade-union membership; all civil servants and private employees of Hungarian descent were dismissed, and payment of their pensions suspended.

In matters of civilian status and property rights, Czechoslovak legislation made no distinction between the German and Hungarian minorities. But as regards the ultimate expression of the Czechoslovak minorities policy—the compulsory transfer from Czechoslovakia—the position differed considerably.

Speaking on June 13, 1945, in Prague about the wholesale compulsory transfer of the German minority, Deputy Foreign Minister Dr. Vlado Clementis said: "The question of the expulsion of the Hungarians is different to a degree, but only to a degree. . . . We know the difference and want to make a distinction between the Hungarian people and its present government on one hand, and the old regime on the other. For this reason we shall, for the time being, remove from Slovakia only those who were sent us by the Horthy regime and those who took an active part in the Hungarian Fascist movement. As regards the remaining Hungarians—those who will remain, for the time, in Slovakia after the completion of the purge—we are willing to come to an agreement about their systematic removal to Hungary."⁶

Removal from Slovakia of Hungarians planted there by the Horthy government after the first Vienna Award was stipulated by the armistice concluded in Moscow on January 20, 1945, between the Hungarian Provisional Government and the Allies. The implementation of this provision started immediately, and as early as May 7, 1945, the U.S. State Department was informed that, according to data released by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, approximately 30,000 Hungarians had been deported from Slovakia; a more conservative source estimated the number of Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia by the end of 1945 at about 25,000.⁷ It must, however, be taken into consideration that large numbers of state-employed and politically compromised Hungarians must have left Czechoslovak territory on their own volition.

When in July, 1945, the Czechoslovak government submitted to the Big Three Conference at Potsdam a detailed plan for the wholesale compulsory transfer of the German minority, it made no mention of the Hungarian minority. This omission was, of course, not accidental. The Prague government did not intend to settle the Hungarian problem in Slovakia by a unilateral action, even if approved by the Big Three. Its

plan called for a solution agreed upon in bilateral negotiations between Budapest and Prague and based on an exchange of population. Accordingly, the Potsdam decisions concerning the compulsory transfer to Germany of "German populations or elements thereof remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary" did not mention the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. Hungarian public opinion saw in this omission an indication that the Great Powers did not favor a forcible transfer of Hungarian minorities. The Czechoslovak government, on the other hand, interpreted the silence of the Great Powers as a tacit encouragement to proceed with their plan for eliminating the Hungarian minority through direct negotiations with the Hungarian government. Writing in *Foreign Affairs* (April, 1946) on the "Problems of Postwar Czechoslovakia," President Beneš insisted that "as far as the Hungarians of Czechoslovakia are concerned, their removal will be carried out on a reciprocal basis: they will be exchanged for Slovaks from Hungary. . . . Members of minorities who refuse to return to their national state (for example, Slovaks who stay in Hungary and Hungarians who stay in Czechoslovakia) will be definitely sacrificed and given up to national assimilation in the other state. Czechoslovakia," stressed Dr. Beneš, "has clearly shown her desire to come to an understanding with Hungary concerning this exchange. Hungary, on the other hand, hesitates to recognize and accept these principles and their consequences."

One of the main arguments voiced by the Hungarian spokesmen against the proposed exchange of population was that of inequality in numbers. The number of Hungarians living in Slovakia at that time was estimated at 600,000 to 650,000 while, according to the Hungarian census of 1930, only 105,000 Slovaks were then living in Hungary; taking into account the natural increase, the number of Slovaks living in Hungary in 1945 was assessed at 120,000. The proportion of Hungarians and Slovaks respectively subject to the eventual exchange would thus be five to one.

In itself discrepancy in numbers could not be considered a decisive obstacle to a successful population exchange. The Greco-Turkish exchange of population involved about 1,250,000 Greeks and 355,000 Turks; under the terms of the Craiova treaty (September 7, 1940), 100,000 Rumanians from Southern Dobrudja were exchanged against 61,000 Bulgarians from Northern Dobrudja; 128,000 Germans from Volhynia, Galicia, and the Narew district were, under the terms of the

German-Soviet treaty of November 3, 1939, exchanged against an unascertained but considerably lower number of Ukrainians, White Russians, and Russians from German-dominated Polish provinces; and finally, as result of the Soviet-German treaty of January 10, 1941, 66,200 Germans from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, were exchanged for 21,300 Lithuanians, Russians, and White Russians from the Memel and Suwalki regions.⁸ Yet in the case of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian negotiations, difference in numbers proved from the very beginning to be the greatest obstacle to any far-reaching agreement.

3.

The Czechoslovak-Hungarian negotiations started in Prague on December 2, 1945. According to the apparently well-informed author of an article in the March, 1947, issue of *The World Today* (organ of the Royal Institute of International Affairs), Hungary agreed to enter into bilateral negotiations on population exchange "upon the advice of one of the Great Powers." The Czechoslovak delegation advocated a complete solution of the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, partly by an organized population exchange and partly by the eviction of those Hungarians who had been, or would be, deprived of Czechoslovak citizenship. The delegation, however, expressed its willingness temporarily—until the problem should be solved—to suspend or "soften up" as far as possible all decrees resulting from the measures taken against Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian delegation, on the other hand, consented only to a partial solution and was willing to agree to an exchange of equal numbers of such Hungarians from Slovakia and Slovaks from Hungary as might volunteer for this scheme. It stipulated that all legislative measures taken against the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia be abolished altogether and that the legal state existing on November 2, 1938, be restored, except for the collective political rights of the Hungarian minority. As for the Hungarians who would remain in Czechoslovakia after such a partial exchange of populations, the Hungarian delegation could not see any solution other than territorial revision.⁹ After discussions lasting three days, the negotiations broke down. The official Czechoslovak communiqué stressed, however, that "the consultations were conducted amicably" and that both delegations expressed willingness to continue them.

The negotiations were resumed on February 6, 1946. The Hungarians once again refused to discuss a total exchange of minorities and insisted on limiting the negotiations to an exchange of those Slovaks and Czechs who would volunteer for it, against an equal number of Magyars from Slovakia. "For the sake of at least a partial solution of the problem," states an official Czechoslovak document, "the Czechoslovak delegation accepted this basis with the reservation that, after a partial solution had been agreed upon, there would be discussions on the possibilities of a total liquidation of the Magyar minority in Slovakia."¹⁰ An "Agreement on Exchange of Population Between Czechoslovakia and Hungary" was signed on February 27.

Under the terms of the Agreement, Hungary granted to the Czechoslovak government the right to call on persons of Slovak and Czech ethnic nationality living in Hungary to volunteer for resettlement in Czechoslovakia. Those who opted for transfer would cease to be Hungarian citizens and become Czechoslovak nationals (Art. I). On the other hand, the Hungarian government agreed to receive an equal number of persons of Hungarian ethnic nationality living in Czechoslovakia, who had, in accordance with the Presidential decree of August 2, 1945, lost their Czechoslovak citizenship; these were to be selected by the Czechoslovak government within six months after the signing of the Agreement (Art. V). Thus, the Agreement provided for voluntary resettlement only as far as Slovaks and Czechs in Hungary were concerned; Hungarians in Slovakia were to be drafted for resettlement regardless of whether or not the persons affected wished to be transferred. In addition to the number of persons agreed upon in Article V, Hungary consented to receive all such Hungarians of Slovakia as were major war criminals, as well as one thousand persons who were minor criminals (Art. VIII).

In matters of transfer of property, the provisions of the Agreement were extremely liberal. While all known interstate treaties on exchange or transfer of population contained essential restrictions regarding the export of movable property, Article VI of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Agreement allowed the prospective transferees to take along, tax- and custom-free, all their movable property, regardless of whether or not they had fulfilled their obligations towards the state; no export licenses were required, with the exception of objects having historical value or objects of art. Excluded from transfer were also archives, files, deeds, or other documents required to secure the uninterrupted operation of

workshops, commercial, industrial, and agricultural concerns, as well as documents concerning nonmovable property left behind on the territory of the state which the transferees were leaving (Art. VII). Ownership of nonmovable property left behind by the transferees reverted to the state they were leaving. The Agreement provided further for the establishment of a Mixed Commission to determine the amount of indemnity owed for this property by the acquiring state. No indemnity was provided for the part of property exceeding 50 hectares (Art. VIII). The competence of the Mixed Commission (composed of two Hungarian and two Czechoslovak members) also embraced all questions pertaining to the interpretation of the Agreement. All decisions of the Commission had to be passed unanimously. In case such unanimity could not be obtained, the members of the Commission had to agree on the choice of a chairman, a national of one of the United Nations, and then a majority vote was to be taken, with which both contracting parties pledged themselves to comply (Arts. X and XI).

In a Protocol attached to the Agreement the Czechoslovak delegation asserted that, pending the conclusion of a more far-reaching accord on final settlement of the problem of the Hungarian minority, the Czechoslovak government would suspend the expulsion and resettlement of Hungarians; only measures motivated by the legislation concerning compulsory labor service would remain in force. They also undertook to suspend the implementation of decrees providing for confiscation of Hungarian property, with the exception of property belonging to persons who had committed crimes against the Czechoslovak Republic; social aid to former civil servants was also promised.

The Agreement was greeted in many circles as a promising step towards normalization of Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations.¹¹ This expectation did not materialize. A series of conflicts between the two contracting parties arose almost immediately after the Agreement was signed.

In accordance with Articles II and III, a Czechoslovak Repatriation Mission was sent to Hungary to register Slovaks opting for transfer to Czechoslovakia. The Mission started its activities on Hungarian territory on March 9, 1946; it was permitted to conduct propaganda in favor of voluntary repatriation among the Slovaks until April 14. Lists of those who wanted to be repatriated had to be prepared by May 26, 1946. Opinions about the facilities of action granted to the Mission differ greatly. The Hungarian government asserted that by a decree of March

4, 1946, the Mission was enabled to publicize its activities freely and that its members enjoyed full support on the part of the Hungarian authorities: adequate localities had been put at the disposal of the Mission, which was also given free use of the Hungarian broadcasting station for half an hour daily and was permitted to arrange theater and film performances, to hold political lectures, and to publish articles, pamphlets, and posters. The Prague government on the other hand, charged the Hungarian government with "sabotage." It complained mostly of the fact that during the second period of the Mission's activities, from April 14 until May 26, the members of the Mission were, in violation of Article III of the Agreement, forbidden to visit the houses of the prospective Slovak repatriates in order to enlist them for transfer to Czechoslovakia. Quoting numerous instances of official Hungarian anti-repatriation propaganda, intimidation of the prospective repatriates, and discrimination and repression against those Slovaks who had applied for transfer, it stressed that systematic administrative pressure was put on applicants, "with the object of causing them to withdraw their applications, and to declare *en masse* that they had applied for transfer by mistake or under compulsion. . . . In these activities the Hungarian organs used printed official forms. . . . All notaries carried on such activities upon instructions from district or superior authorities."

On June 14, 1946, the list of Slovaks living in Hungary and wishing to be transferred to Czechoslovakia was handed over to the Hungarian government. It contained 92,300 names. An additional list of applications was submitted on July 12, bringing the total number of applicants to 99,105 persons. But the Hungarian government recognized as valid the applications of only 62,440 persons in the first list, invalidating 29,950 applications. An official Hungarian memorandum put at the disposal of this author by the Hungarian Legation in Washington divided the objects of this mass invalidation into the following categories: (a) persons of neither Czech nor Slovak [ethnic] nationality (12,577); (b) nonvalid applications (3,549); (c) nonvalid supplementary applications (4,591); (d) persons having applied twice (778); (e) prisoners of war (2,401); (f) unknown (5,901); (g) deceased—up to December 20, 1946 (153). The applications contained in the second list were not recognized at all because they had been submitted after the expiration of the time limit. Thus, whereas the Czechoslovak government claimed that, on the basis of the equality principle accepted in the February Agreement, it had the right of transferring 99,100 Hungarians (less 25,000 who were expelled

before the signature of the agreement), the Hungarian government was willing to accept only 62,440 less 25,000—a mere 37,440.

A further difficulty arose from Article VIII of the Agreement concerning war criminals. The Czechoslovak government submitted a list of 23,192 Magyar war criminals, who, together with their families, would have involved an additional transfer of almost 100,000 persons, and who, while being transferred, were to be deprived of all their property. The Hungarian government vigorously contested this Czechoslovak claim, but the Czechoslovak government insisted that it was quite naturally eager above all to rid itself of those Hungarians who had taken an active part in the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak Republic and played a leading part in Hungarian Fascist organizations. The Czechoslovaks categorically denied that all of such compulsory transferees had to be "leading war criminals," because the relevant clauses of the Agreement provided for the expulsion of persons of Hungarian ethnic nationality who had been guilty of penal acts under the terms of Articles 1 to 4 of the decree of the Slovak National Council of May 15, 1945, No. 33, and of those who had committed penal acts under the terms of Article 5 of the same decree, but with the limitation that the number of persons belonging to the latter category must not exceed one thousand. The Agreement thus implied the supernumerary transfer not only of war criminals in the narrower sense of the word, but of all those who had taken active part in any way whatsoever in preparation for the dismemberment of the Czechoslovak Republic, even in the years before the war. Nevertheless, the Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Clementis assured the Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi that his government was prepared to reduce the number of persons to be expelled under Article VIII of the Agreement to the 999 persons proposed by the Hungarian government, on condition that the latter recognize the validity and the binding character of the Slovak applications for transfer and "cease to sabotage the effective execution of the Treaty."¹²

In the course of the first six months following the conclusion of the Agreement on exchange of population, it became increasingly clear that the two contracting parties approached the task before them in quite a different spirit, that there was no harmony in their intentions and no willingness to cooperate in the implementation of the provisions agreed upon.

4.

In the Protocol attached to the February Agreement both parties acknowledged that the exchange of population it provided for was only a partial answer to the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, and pledged themselves to solve this problem as soon as possible by a more far-reaching agreement; should such an accord prove to be impossible, both parties reserved the right to raise the problem of the Hungarian minority at the forthcoming Peace Conference. The chairman of the Czechoslovak delegation undertook to submit to the chairman of the Hungarian delegation concrete proposals as to the final solution of the problem. On the same day the Agreement was signed, Mr. Clementis handed over to Mr. Gyöngyösi an official letter containing the Czechoslovak scheme for the transfer of 200,000 Hungarians over and above those subject to exchange, outlining the conditions under which Czechoslovakia would put this operation into effect, as well as what assistance she intended to give to the transferees, and stressing the humane manner in which the transfer would be carried out. Mr. Clementis suggested immediate opening of discussions on the subject with the representatives of the political parties which at that time formed the Hungarian government. The latter, as well as Mr. Gyöngyösi, however, avoided any discussion of this problem.¹³ At the beginning of May, 1946, after a delay of over two months, Mr. Clementis received a personal note from Mr. Gyöngyösi stating that the Hungarian government refused to carry on discussions on the basis of the Czechoslovak scheme, and proposing to initiate negotiations for a far-reaching minority status for the Magyars remaining in Slovakia after the completion of the exchange of population.¹⁴

No common basis for negotiations having been found, both parties made use of the clause providing for an appeal to the Peace Conference which assembled in Paris in July, 1946.

The Czechoslovak delegation proposed that after Article 4 of the draft peace treaty with Hungary a new article be inserted to run as follows:

Czechoslovakia is authorized to transfer a maximum number of 200,000 inhabitants of Magyar ethnic origin from its territory to that of Hungary and the latter is bound to receive these persons on its territory and to recognize them as its nationals.

The conditions for the execution of the present article shall be fixed by a bilateral agreement between Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which these two states will conclude between themselves within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. As regards respect for the rights of persons and property, this agreement will establish conditions corresponding to those laid down for this purpose in the agreement concluded on February 27, 1946, between Czechoslovakia and Hungary on the exchange of population. The nonconclusion of this agreement shall not prejudice the execution of the present article.¹⁵

The Hungarian representatives at the Peace Conference vigorously opposed the Czechoslovak proposal. Dr. Paul Auer, the Hungarian Minister at Paris, declared that the attitude of the Hungarian government to the transfer scheme "had been negative since the beginning . . . in our view it is an inhuman and anti-democratic process"; the agreement on exchange of population had been signed by Hungary only "in the desire to relieve the sufferings of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and to re-establish good relations with a neighboring country." Dr. Auer admitted that the February agreement contained a provision that further transfers might be considered, but he maintained that the situation had not yet enabled the implementation of the first accord since there had not been enough Slovak volunteers in Hungary to make up the total of 100,000 for exchange, to which the Hungarian government agreed in February. Complaining that Hungarians in Czechoslovakia were the object of continual persecution, Dr. Auer suggested that the Peace Conference send an international commission of inquiry to study the situation on the spot and see how hundreds of thousands of Hungarians were forced to live in "democratic Czechoslovakia."¹⁶ Similar arguments were strongly presented by Mr. Gyöngyösi in a statement made on August 14 before a plenary session of the Peace Conference¹⁷ and amplified in a memorandum submitted on August 30 by the Hungarian delegation to the Chairman of the Political and Territorial Commission for Hungary of the Peace Conference.

Faced with a deep cleavage between the Hungarian and Czechoslovak viewpoints, the Commission suggested that Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations initiate direct negotiations on the Czechoslovak transfer proposal. During these deliberations the Czechoslovak delegation maintained its original proposal, whereupon the Hungarian delegation stated that it was willing to receive 200,000 Hungarian transferees, provided that this transfer was combined with a rectification of the frontier, so

that at least part of the Czechoslovak territory on which Hungarians lived should be attached to Hungary. The Czechoslovak delegation refused to entertain such a proposal, in which it saw further proof of Hungarian revisionism.¹⁸ The Czechoslovak-Hungarian controversy had thus to be judged by the Peace Conference, where it provoked a lively discussion.

In the Political and Territorial Commission for Hungary, the Soviet delegate Andrey Vishinsky strongly advocated the acceptance of the Czechoslovak amendment. He referred in particular to the precedent of the Polish-Soviet agreement on exchange of population concluded on July 6, 1945, and involving over one and one-half million Poles, Ukrainians, White Russians, and Russians, and blamed the Hungarian government for its strange unwillingness to welcome the homecoming of 200,000 blood brothers. Mr. Vishinsky insisted that the only real means of once and for all eliminating Hungarian revisionist aspirations was a compulsory transfer of the Hungarian minority—compulsory, because “attempts to come to an agreement on voluntary resettlement did not succeed.” Similar views were voiced by other countries belonging to the Soviet bloc—by the Ukraine, White Russia, and Yugoslavia.¹⁹

A different stand was taken by the United States delegation. As reported by John C. Campbell, the delegation's secretary, the delegation “was not at all in sympathy” with the Czechoslovak transfer scheme but “was willing to consider it in connection with a possible general settlement of Czechoslovak-Hungarian differences . . . based on mutual concessions.” The Americans believed that an exchange of territory “satisfying Czechoslovakia's desire for additional territory opposite Bratislava and giving Hungary a portion of the overwhelmingly Hungarian-populated territory adjacent to the frontiers would reduce the scope of the population transfer; even a token gain of territory would enable Hungary to accept more easily the forced migration of thousands of Hungarians.” Accordingly, in meetings of the Deputies of the Big Four, held at the time of the Peace Conference, American representatives urged that the Great Powers jointly insist on such a settlement. Campbell reported that “Hungary, naturally, was eager to make such a deal,” but “the Czechs, sensing the situation, chose to have their claims heard and judged by the Conference rather than to make a backstage bargain with Hungary involving the cession of Czechoslovak territory.”²⁰ When the Peace Conference took up the Czechoslovak demands, Lt. General Walter Bedell Smith on September 9 told

the Political and Territorial Commission for Hungary that while sympathizing with Czechoslovakia's desire to establish a homogeneous state, the United States would not be a party to the forced transfer of Hungarians. He added, however, that it should be possible to reach an agreement for a limited transfer and suggested that Czechoslovakia and Hungary be requested to work out such an agreement. A similar stand was taken by representatives of the United Kingdom and of the British dominions. The British delegate declared that his country understood the Czechoslovak point of view; he thought, however, that Czechoslovakia's experience would be even worse if the transfer were carried out against the will of Hungary. He believed that the best thing for both governments concerned would be to settle the matter in direct negotiations and by mutual agreement. He therefore supported the U.S. proposal to refer this question to a subcommittee.

Mr. Clementis, upheld by the Soviet delegate, refused to link up the territorial and transfer questions. However, he accepted a New Zealand suggestion to appoint a subcommittee to examine Czechoslovak proposals. The appointed subcommittee consisted of representatives of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, and the Ukraine.²¹

On September 12, the subcommittee submitted the following revised version of the Czechoslovak amendment to be inserted as Article 5 into the Peace Treaty with Hungary:

Hungary shall enter into bilateral negotiations with Czechoslovakia in order to solve the problem of those inhabitants of Magyar ethnic origin, residing in Czechoslovakia, who will not be settled in Hungary within the scope of the Treaty of February 27, 1946, on exchange of populations.

In the event of no agreement's being reached within a period of six months of the coming into force of the present treaty, Czechoslovakia shall have the right to bring this question before the Council of Foreign Ministers and to request the assistance of the Council in effecting a final solution.

The Czechoslovak delegation gave its consent to this new version.

Commenting on this unanimously accepted amendment, John C. Campbell soberly remarked: "In a sense it was an evasion of responsibility for the Powers charged with negotiating peace treaties to turn over the tough problem to the parties least likely to agree on solutions. There was little possibility that Hungary and Czechoslovakia would reach a settlement. . . . The treaty clause, as finally drafted, took account of the likelihood of failure."²²

5.

Upon their return from the Peace Conference, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian statesmen found the situation at home in a state of even more acute disagreement and friction than when they had left for Paris. Albion Ross, the *New York Times* correspondent in Bratislava, hardly exaggerated in stating that bitterness arising out of the frustration of the population-exchange agreement had created in Czechoslovakia "one of the most hatred-saturated frontier situations in Europe."²³

The very instrument established by the February Agreement for discussing and settling all controversial questions pertaining to the implementation of the population exchange—the Mixed Commission consisting of two Hungarian and two Slovak members—proved to be a hindrance rather than a help. The Commission started working on June 3, 1946. In a note dated December 7, 1946, the Czechoslovak government complained that although the Commission "had been in almost continuous session since the beginning of June, the results achieved were very restricted, and were only achieved at the very beginning of its functioning." The note asserted that the method of obstruction chiefly employed by the Hungarian representatives was "to raise objections of a general, unsubstantiated nature, upon the settling of which they make the carrying out of the Agreement dependent." As example the note quoted the fact that after having invalidated a great number of Slovak applications for transfer to Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian representatives insisted that no start with the transfer action could be made until it was ascertained which of the applications were valid; at the same time, they did not say which of the applications they considered invalid and why, although the lists of applicants had been delivered to the Hungarian government in June, 1946. In the same way, continued the note, they also raised "unsubstantiated objections to the list of Magyars destined for transfer to Hungary, and held up their transfer." As a result, the activities of the Mixed Commission had been completely frustrated and "Hungary has not, as yet, accepted on Hungarian territory one single Magyar from Czechoslovakia, and she has not even started preparations for the settling of the Magyars that are to be transferred."

This latter charge weighed particularly heavy in the Czechoslovak accusations against their Hungarian counterpart. Under the February Agreement, a system was set up by which, according to officials of the

Slovak Resettlement Office, six or seven transports of Slovaks and six or seven transports of Hungarians were to cross the frontier daily. Each convoy was to have fifty-three cars and to carry thirty-seven families with all their movable belongings. The whole exchange machinery was ready to go into action on September 1, 1946, the operation to be completed within approximately six months. The Slovak population-exchange officials in Bratislava assured the *New York Times* correspondent that up to November 9, 1946, the Hungarian authorities "have not permitted a single transfer to take place." They admitted that 7,000 Slovaks from Hungary did arrive in Czechoslovakia "officially," but insisted that they had done so "outside the exchange agreement"; 6,000 others had crossed the frontier into Slovakia from Hungary "unofficially," fleeing "systematic persecution intended to get them to leave the country without coming under operation of the exchange agreement."²⁴

Things looked even worse as regards the transfer of Hungarians from Slovakia. It was not until July, 1946, that a Hungarian Government Commissariat for the Population Exchange was set up and a Government Commissar appointed. But even after that no effective action was taken to secure the actual moving to Hungary of Hungarian peasants designated for transfer. According to a mutually agreed procedure, notices had to be sent by the Hungarian Government Commissar in Slovakia to the prospective transferees who were to move to a given neighborhood in Hungary that was to be evacuated at the same time by a corresponding group of Slovaks going to Slovakia. By November, 1946, an unascertained number of such notices had been received by Hungarians in Slovakia. But none of them, insisted the Slovak Population-Exchange Office in Bratislava, was told where he was supposed to go, or when he was going, nor informed what he was supposed to do. Albion Ross, the *New York Times* correspondent, confirmed that in one village he visited near Bratislava, sixty-three such notices had been received and none of the families in question knew what was to be their fate or where they were going. The head of the Slovak Population-Exchange Office openly accused the Hungarian Government Commissar and the Budapest government of "sabotaging the whole exchange agreement."²⁵ "Level-headed Slovak officials" assured Albion Ross that the reason behind the failure to implement the agreement was that Hungary was "determined to keep a Hungarian minority in Slovakia with a view to later laying claim to or seizing the wheat lands of Southern Slovakia at the first good chance."²⁶

On November 27, 1946, the Hungarian government suddenly announced complete closure of the frontier for the repatriation of persons registered for transfer and took energetic measures for the suspension of any repatriation, thus making impossible even the return of Slovaks already scheduled for transportation to Slovakia.²⁷ General Dastyh, the Czechoslovak government delegate to the Allied Control Commission in Budapest, intervened and the Control Commission ordered the Hungarian government to open the frontier for the Slovak transports due to leave Hungary on November 30 on their way to Slovakia.²⁸ But the same day, November 30, Mr. Gyöngyösi informed General Dastyh that the Hungarian members of the Mixed Commission would not participate in the work of that body as long as the grievances affecting the very basis of the February Agreement were not remedied. He stated, however, that his government was willing to continue direct negotiations on disputed questions of the agreement as well as on Czechoslovak desires and would be ready to accede to the speediest execution of the agreement—provided that its humane and organized implementation was guaranteed. In a note handed over on January 7, 1947, the Czechoslovak government agreed to continue direct negotiations and invited Hungarian delegates to Prague. On January 14 the invitation was accepted.

Twelve days later Mr. Gyöngyösi and Mr. Clementis met in Bratislava at an "entirely secret and informal conference." The Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister offered to begin with the transfer of at least those Slovaks on the list of registrants under the February, 1946, exchange agreement in regard to whom the Hungarian authorities had raised no objections on the ground that they did not come under the provisions of the agreement. The Hungarian representative, however, refused to accept this suggestion until the issue of objections to the questionable names had been settled by the Mixed Commission.²⁹ The conference ended in a stalemate.

The deadlock continued for several weeks. On March 2, 1947, Czechoslovak and Hungarian delegations met once again to remove obstacles holding up implementation of the February 1946 Agreement. The negotiations were broken off at the end of the fifth day. A communiqué issued by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 7 claimed that "from the Hungarian side demands were often put forward of such a nature as to threaten the success of the negotiations; had they been accepted, the execution of the agreement would have required several years."

This time, the rupture seemed to be final. But apparently powerful forces were at work to prevent further deterioration of Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations, and effective pressure must have been put on Budapest. On March 21, the Hungarian government declared that it was ready to begin the exchange of population by April 8 at the latest, if the Czechoslovak government would by March 25 submit the list of Hungarians to be transferred. On March 23 a new Hungarian delegation of 23 officials and some experts arrived in Bratislava and was handed the list it asked for.³⁰ This time, the negotiations of the Mixed Commission progressed unusually smoothly and successfully. Questions which had been a permanent obstacle for months were dealt with in the spirit of mutual compromise. The actual exchange began on April 21, when the first transport of Magyar transferees left Slovakia for Hungary. According to a scheme agreed upon, 2,000 families had to depart monthly from each country. But the Hungarian reception machinery proved inadequate to this schedule, and Hungarian authorities asked for a reduction of the tempo of arrivals. A total of 31,000 Magyars left for Hungary and about 33,000 Slovaks arrived in Czechoslovakia in 1947, partly in organized transfers and partly by their own means.³¹

This numerically limited operation neither solved nor substantially alleviated the Hungarian minority problem. Czechoslovak-Hungarian relations became dangerously strained. There can be little doubt that at that time antagonism between Prague and Budapest was encouraged by Moscow. As Hugh Seton-Watson put it: "Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary had elements of bourgeois democracy. In both the urban middle class were numerous and influential. In both there was considerable political freedom. Both had traditional and strong connections with the West. It was therefore undesirable that two states so contaminated by the bourgeois spirit have friendly relations. Therefore Moscow's instructions were to intensify chauvinism."³²

The situation changed radically after the events of May, 1947, in Hungary and of February, 1948, in Czechoslovakia, which firmly established in both countries Communist-dominated regimes. Stressing that Czechoslovakia had nothing to fear from a sister "people's democracy," with which she was united in the Cominform group of states, the Prague government dropped all previous plans for the wholesale transfer of Hungarians from Slovakia or for the "re-Slovakization" of racially akin elements among them, and inaugurated a series of legislative acts restoring the prewar status of the Hungarian minority. The Presi-

dential decree of August 2, 1945, which deprived all Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian ethnic nationality of Czechoslovak citizenship, was actually canceled in October, 1948, when Prague parliament passed a bill extending citizenship to all Hungarians who had been resident in Czechoslovakia on November 1, 1938.³³ Two months later, it was officially announced that action on the exchange of population with Hungary had been concluded. Simultaneously, the Slovak Board of Deputy Ministers promulgated decrees re-establishing the prewar minority status of the Hungarian folk group. The decrees provided for the use of the Hungarian language in newspapers, on the radio and in films, and in the schools. In January, 1949, there appeared in Bratislava the first postwar Hungarian-language newspaper in Czechoslovakia, and ten Hungarian-language schools were opened during the same month. In April, 1949, a Czechoslovak-Hungarian treaty of alliance was signed.

NOTES

¹ The Treaty of Trianon, signed on June 4, 1920, transferred to Czechoslovakia 61,633 square kilometers of Hungarian territory, together with a population of 3,517,568. The territories in question included the Slovak area in the west and the Ruthenian area in the east. In the Slovak area the Hungarians constituted 30.6 per cent of the population according to their own sources, and 21.7 per cent according to the Czechoslovak statistics. In the Ruthenian area the Hungarians constituted 29.6 per cent of the population according to Hungarian statistics, and 18.2 per cent according to Czechoslovak sources.

² Quoted in M. A. Kober, *Hungary's War*, London, 1943, p. 8.

³ *New York Times*, August 15, 1946.

⁴ *The Czechoslovak-Hungarian Problem: Its Solution—A Contribution Toward Peace* (Czechoslovak memorandum presented to the Paris Peace Conference), p. 3.

⁵ *The Transfer of the Magyar Population from Czechoslovakia* (Czechoslovak memorandum presented to the Paris Peace Conference), p. 4.

⁶ *Czechoslovak Home Service*, June 13, 1945.

⁷ A. B., "The Hungarian-Slovak Frontier," *The World Today*, March 1947, p. 127.

⁸ Joseph B. Schechtman, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*, New York, 1946, Chaps. I, VII, VIII, XVIII.

⁹ *The Central European Observer*, January 1946.

¹⁰ *The Development of the Negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary Concerning the Movement of Population* (Czechoslovak memorandum presented to Paris Peace Conference), p. 2.

¹¹ "Reconciliation Through Exchange of Population," *The Central European Observer*, March 1, 1946.

¹² Speech of Dr. Vlado Clementis before the Political and Territorial Commission on Hungary at the Peace Conference in Paris, September 20, 1946.

¹³ *The Transfer of the Magyar Population from Czechoslovakia*, p. 13.

¹⁴ *The Development of the Negotiations Between Czechoslovakia and Hungary*, p. 3.

¹⁵ *Conference de Paris*, C.P. Gen. Doc. 1, *Amendments Submitted by Delegations*, Vol. II, Paris, 1946.

¹⁶ *New York Times*, July 28, 1946.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, August 15, 1946.

¹⁸ *The World Today*, March 1947.

¹⁹ *Conference de Paris*, C.P. Gen. Doc. 1, *Amendments Submitted by Delegations*, Vol. II.

²⁰ John C. Campbell, "The Territorial Settlement," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, p. 213.

²¹ *New York Times*, September 10, 1946; *The Central European Observer*, October 11, 1946.

²² John C. Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

²³ *New York Times*, November 10, 1946.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, November 11, 1946.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, November 11, 1946.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, November 10, 1946.

²⁷ *The Central European Observer*, December 20, 1946.

²⁸ *Czechoslovak News Letter*, December 6, 1946. According to a Czechoslovak government note, over 20,000 Slovaks who had registered for repatriation to Czechoslovakia handed over to the Hungarian Premier Ferencz Nagy a memorandum begging the Hungarian government to end their suffering and to enable their repatriation to Czechoslovakia.

²⁹ *New York Times*, January 27, 1947.

³⁰ *The Central European Observer*, April 3, 1947.

³¹ Jacob S. Siegel, *The Population of Hungary*, Bureau of the Census, International Population Statistics Reports, Series P-90, No. 9, Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 37.

³² Hugh Seton-Watson, *The European Revolution*, London, 1956, p. 345.

³³ *New York Times*, October 26, 1948.

PART III

EIGHT

The Polish-Soviet Exchange of Population

I.

For centuries, Poland's foreign policy oscillated between two polar trends: expansion towards the west and the effort to expand towards the east. The Piasts dynasty (from the tenth to the fourteenth century) was, historically, the creator and symbol of the first tendency; the Jagiellons dynasty (1336-1572), Stephan Batory (1576-1586), and Hetman Zolkiewski (beginning of the seventeenth century), instigators of the Union of Hadiacz (1658), have at different times symbolized the second. In terms of international relations, the westward trend signified a drive for the German-dominated Oder Basin and the Baltic coast and a struggle with Germany; the eastward tendency meant expansion to the southwest, towards the Black Sea, at the expense of Russia. For a long period it was the dream of Polish nationalist circles to combine both trends and to create a "Poland from one Sea to another" (from the Black Sea to the Baltic). Pilsudski was the latest personification of the Polish *Drang nach Osten*, the continuator of the Zótkiewsky tradition. According to his own formula, he tried to put the history of Poland back to the seventeenth century. The German-dominated western provinces were strange to him. His thoughts ran in the direction of Smolensk Gate, Pskov, Livonia, and Kiev. In imagination he saw Vilno as the central point of Europe, and he wanted to enter into a federation with the Ukraine.¹

Historically, the ethnic composition of the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) districts, situated to the southeast of the Polish homeland and incorporated in 1569, was determined mainly by social factors. Their incorporation threw wide the door to Polish colonization, which flowed over those areas both because the soil was unusually good and because the efflux of Polish population towards the foreign-dominated Baltic coast and towards the southwest was checked. The spread of Polish colonization in the southeastern provinces led to their rapid, but rather superficial, Polonization. The local nobility and gentry were easily attracted by the type of social and political structure that was introduced by Polish domination, and largely accepted Polish culture and mentality. This was

even more true of the middle class, for whom association with Poland meant a conspicuous improvement in social and political status. But while the middle and upper classes became Polonized, the lower class remained Ruthenian and, what is more, even the peasants who had immigrated from Polish soil became Ruthenianized. "The Poland of those days was a land of nobles, so the nobleman became a Pole; but the people remained, or became, Ruthenian, and the difference which existed between it and the upper classes was above all a social one."²

Ukrainian territories conquered from the Soviet Union in 1920-21 were considered by the Polish government as colonization areas for Polish landless peasants, in particular for former soldiers. Between 1920 and 1923 a total of 640,383 acres of land in the eastern marches, taken over by the government from big landowners (mostly Polish), were assigned for gratuitous allocation among soldier colonists. In fact, however, only slightly more than one-half (351,382 acres) of this land was parceled among former soldiers. Polish colonization activities dropped in 1926 and by 1931 had almost completely stopped. In the final analysis, the non-Polish peasants of the eastern territories received the greater part of the distributed soil. The influx of Polish colonists from outside was insignificant. A Ukrainian author, who is inclined rather to overstate Polish interference, relates that up to 1930 the total number of Polish colonists introduced into the Ukrainian territories (Volhynia, Polesie, and eastern Galicia) amounted to 10,722 families.³ This fact was reluctantly admitted by a competent Polish author.⁴

The empirically bankrupt eastward orientation, still strong in the 1930's, was also in contradiction to the deep-reaching transformations which took place in the structure of the Polish nation after the end of the nineteenth century and which found their main expression in the gradual weakening of the nobility and gentry in favor of a sturdy burgher class, industrialists, and workers' proletariat. These transformations considerably influenced the trend of Polish foreign policy. The predominantly southeastern direction taken by the territorial expansion of Poland after the end of the fourteenth century was determined largely by the economic interests and the mentality of the ruling landowning class.⁵ The Polish nobility and gentry were actively interested in the expansion of their country over the immense eastern vastnesses, where their colonizing instincts could be easily satisfied. On the other hand, they had little understanding of or interest in the Baltic coast: "shipping and overseas trade are the affairs of kings or townsmen."⁶ As long as landowning

classes dominated Poland's foreign policy, the western trend was bound to be neglected. But newly arisen social classes learned to think in different, more realistic and modern economic categories. Access to the sea, the up-to-date economic structure of Poznań, and the mines and iron foundries of Upper Silesia had for them a stronger and deeper appeal than the romanticism of the eastern border. J. L. Popławski gave eloquent expression to this new trend in an article in which he severely criticized Polish statesmen, who "still dream of Vilno and Kiev, but for Poznań they care less, Gdansk (Danzig) they have completely forgotten, and of Krolewiec and Opole (Königsberg and Oppeln) they do not think at all. It is time to break with that tradition, which dubbed the Jeremý Wiśnowiecki [the main exponent of the Polish expansion to the east] heroes but gave up the Kalksteins to their German torturers."⁷

2.

The outbreak of World War II brought the age-old conflict between the western and eastern orientations of Poland's foreign policy to a dramatic climax. German armies crossed the Polish frontier on September 1, 1939, and swiftly conquered large Polish areas. On September 17 Soviet armies, in implementation of the Soviet-German pact concluded on August 23, 1939, entered Poland and occupied the remaining part of the Polish territory. On September 28 the Soviet Union and the Reich signed an agreement under the terms of which the Soviet Union gained the eastern part of the dismembered Polish territory, an area of 77,606 square miles with a population of some thirteen million. As early as October 10, the Soviet Union ceded 2,750 square miles with 457,500 inhabitants to Lithuania and at once engaged in the incorporation of the remaining territories. Assemblies were elected on October 23 in western Ukraine (41,650 square miles with eight million inhabitants) and in western White Russia (34,000 square miles and 4.8 million inhabitants). About 90 per cent of the votes were cast for the only list of candidates, which was the one approved by the Soviet authorities. The National Assemblies thus elected met in Lwów and Białystok, respectively, and petitioned the Supreme Soviet in Moscow for admission into the Soviet Union as parts of the Ukrainian and White Russian Soviet Socialist Republics. The petitions were granted on November 1 and 2, respectively, and formal incorporation of these territories followed on November 3.⁸

The Polish government-in-exile refused to accord recognition to the change in the political status of these territories. After the German attack on the Soviet Union, the latter signed a treaty with the London government-in-exile on July 30, 1941, in which the Soviet-German treaty of 1939 on the partition of Poland was declared to have lost its validity. The question of future Polish-Soviet boundaries was left unsettled. The Poles in London interpreted the treaty as a restoration of the 1939 borders, but the Soviet government took a different view, making plain its intention to retain the parts of Poland incorporated into the Soviet republics by treating persons from those territories as nationals of the Soviet Union. The conflict grew steadily more bitter and less susceptible to compromise. The main stumbling block was the question of the ethnic structure of the contested regions, the Soviet Union contending that Ukrainians and White Russians comprised the overwhelming majority, while the Poles insisted that nearly 40 per cent of the population and the largest single national group was composed of Poles.

In the spring of 1943 the conflict between the Soviet government and the Polish government-in-exile became unbridgeable. The Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations with the Polish government-in-exile (April 26, 1943), accusing it of launching a hostile campaign against the U.S.S.R. "for the purpose of wresting from it territorial concessions at the expense of interests of the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet White Russia, and Soviet Lithuania." Instead, it gave (May 12, 1943) full support to the pro-Soviet "Union of Polish Patriots in the U.S.S.R.," which urged Polish expansion to the west. The Union's press organ *Wolna Polska* argued that Poland should rid herself of eastern territories which were ethnically Ukrainian and White Russian, and concentrate her energies on winning back the German-dominated "old Polish lands in the west."

The Polish government-in-exile found it difficult to dissociate itself from these claims for German territories. At Versailles, the Polish demands for territory in the west had by far exceeded the scope of the demands put forward in Moscow. Incorporation of East Prussia and all of Silesia became an essential part of the postwar program of the exile regime as expressed, for example, in numerous memoranda and pamphlets written by Marin Seyda, an old-time leader from western Poland and Minister in charge of preparation of Polish demands for the Peace Conference. But the London regime was in no way prepared to look upon expansion to the west as *compensation* for concessions in the east. It wanted to regain

the Soviet-incorporated Polish eastern provinces *in addition* to the incorporation of East Prussia.

After the entry of Soviet forces (together with the Soviet-sponsored Polish divisions) into German-occupied Polish territory (January, 1944), a Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL) was set up with headquarters at Lublin and was granted recognition by the Soviet Union. On January 11, the Soviet government issued a statement proposing a new Polish-Soviet frontier on the "Curzon Line." The London Polish government answered (January 15) that it could not recognize any unilateral decisions concerning the frontiers of Poland and announced that it was approaching the United States and Great Britain for mediation. Moscow declared that this statement must be regarded as rejection of the Curzon Line frontier and declined the American mediation offer. The Lublin regime, on the other hand, described the Soviet proposal as "an objectively fair basis for the settlement of the problem of frontiers" and stressed that "such an understanding is all the easier to reach since the Polish people do not deny Ukrainian and White Russian people living within the Polish boundaries of September, 1939, the right to decide their own destiny."⁹ In its inaugural manifesto of July 22 the PCNL proclaimed the principle of "Polish lands to Poland; Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian lands to Soviet Ukraine, Soviet White Russia, and Soviet Lithuania." Simultaneously, the manifesto demanded the return to Poland of "old Polish Pomorze and Oppeln Silesia,"¹ East Prussia, a "wide access to the sea" and "Polish frontier posts on the Oder."

This concept of the future settlement of the Polish boundaries problem was ultimately accepted by the Great Powers. The Soviet Union first officially advanced it at the Big Three Conference at Teheran in November, 1943, and thereafter persistently pressed its claim for the Curzon Line in the east with ample compensation for Poland at the expense of Germany in the west and in the north. At the Yalta Conference of the Big Three (February 4-11, 1945) the Soviet scheme was basically approved. Section VII of the Yalta agreement contains provisions concerning both the eastern and western frontiers of Poland. As regards the eastern frontier, the three signatories of the agreement decided that it "should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of three to five miles in favor of Poland." As regards the western frontier, it was recognized that "Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west." The size of this accession

in the west was to be determined after the opinion of a fully representative Polish government had been taken. No such proviso was included concerning the eastern frontier. It was also stressed that the "final determination of the western frontier of Poland should await the Peace Conference."¹⁰ It is worth noticing that the provisions of the Yalta agreement concerning the Polish boundaries were formulated after the opinion of members of the Polish Provisional Government had been taken (on December 31, 1944, the PCNL proclaimed itself the Polish Provisional Government and entered liberated Warsaw on January 18, 1945), who "were admitted to the Conference and presented their views in full."¹¹

As a result of the Yalta decisions, the finally established eastern frontier of Poland ran from the sources of the San River along its course through the mountains. It left Lwów on the Soviet side and reached the river Bug along the course of which it then ran. It cut through the Białowieża Forest, and continued northward into the Suwałki district. Within the area of former West Prussia it ran westward to the Baltic, leaving the whole Pregola basin with Królewiec (Königsberg) on the Soviet side.¹²

The centuries-old dream of "Poland from one Sea to another" thus collapsed. The new generation of Polish statesmen and scholars realized the elementary fact that "the Poles are not a numerically large nation and were never so numerous as to be able to inhabit the whole of the Baltic-Black Sea land bridge and fill the geographical region naturally bounded by the two seas." They came to the conclusion that "the Baltic-Black Sea land bridge cannot be regarded as a site on which the Polish nation may build a homogeneous national state. . . . Such permanent foundations, in a compact geographical region, duly proportioned to the numbers of the Polish people, can be found in the area of the Oder and Vistula basins. . . . Our historical role is accordingly to make sure that the whole area is filled with Polish inhabitants, whereas it will be the part of succeeding generations to maintain the position."¹³

3.

The whole eastern frontier of present-day Poland and the northeastern edge of the area of what used to be East Prussia, extending altogether from the San River to the Vistulan Haff, divide Poland from the U.S.S.R. This frontier line, 820 miles long and constituting 37 per cent of the total

length of Poland's postwar boundary line, may be subdivided into three sectors, according to which Soviet republic is on the other side. In the southeast Poland is contiguous to the Ukrainian S.S.R.; on the middle Bug and in Podlasie, to White Russia; and further to the northeast, to Lithuania. These three Soviet republics constitute the portion of the U.S.S.R. that is bound to have the greatest influence on the shaping of Polish-Soviet relations in general. The relations between Poland and these republics and the degree of cooperation, or the reverse, which may be established between them are bound to be decisive in their effect on wider relations with the U.S.S.R. as a whole.

For centuries, the apple of discord between Russia and Poland was the fate of the border territories and of their ethnically mingled population. In a bold attempt to solve the ethno-territorial problem definitely and forever the Soviet government on September 9 and 22, 1944—when all of the territory east of the Curzon Line was already liberated from the Germans—concluded with the Lublin Polish Committee of National Liberation a series of agreements providing for the exchange, on a voluntary basis, of Poles living in the disputed areas, and of Ukrainians, White Russians, and Lithuanians living in Poland proper. In accordance with the constitutional amendment of February, 1944, granting the constituent Soviet republics the power to establish their own foreign commissariats, these agreements, though similar in content, were concluded by the Lublin Committee with the governments of the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian republics separately. Complete texts of these agreements have never been published. But there have been detailed communiqués reproducing the main provisions,¹⁴ and this author possesses the text of the Polish-Lithuanian treaty, which can be considered as typical also for the two others. Under the terms of the agreements, all persons of Polish and Jewish ethnic nationality who were Polish citizens before September 17, 1939, and resided within the territory of the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics were allowed to opt for Polish citizenship and to be evacuated to Poland. Correspondingly, persons of Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian ethnic nationality residing within the territory of the Polish state were granted the right to choose Soviet citizenship and to move to Soviet territory. The transfer was to be carried out on the basis of the complete free will of the persons involved. No compulsion, either direct or indirect, was to be permitted. Declaration by the person desiring to be transferred could be either written or oral. Persons of

either country who wanted to resettle were asked to register between October 15 and December 1, 1944. The actual transfer was to be carried out between the latter date and April, 1945.

An essential feature of the agreements was the provision that they applied to Polish nationals not only of Polish ethnic origin, but also to those of Jewish ethnic nationality residing on Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian territory; Jews were specifically mentioned in the text as a special category, not identical with the Poles. No such mention was made in regard to Jews living on Polish territory. Apparently no transfer to the Soviet Union of persons of other than Ukrainian, White Russian, or Lithuanian ethnic nationality was intended.

Eligibility for transfer, as far as the three Soviet republics were concerned, was thus determined by a combination of two criteria: ethnic nationality and citizenship. Applicants for transfer had to prove (a) that they belonged to Polish or Jewish ethnic nationality, and (b) that they were Polish citizens before September 17, 1939. Although the agreements were valid for persons of Polish and Jewish ethnic origin to be found in the entire territory of these republics, not every Pole or Jew had the right to opt for transfer to Poland. Those belonging to indigenous Polish or Jewish minority groups and holding Ukrainian, Lithuanian, or White Russian citizenship were not entitled to do so.¹⁵ On the other hand, not every person who was a Polish citizen before September 17, 1939, was eligible for transfer to Poland. Persons not of Polish or Jewish ethnic origin (for instance, persons of Ukrainian, Lithuanian, or Russian ethnic nationality who held Polish citizenship before September 17, 1939) were not. As regards the prospective transferees from the Polish territory, no citizenship criterion could be applied. Persons of Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and White Russian ethnic nationality living on Polish soil were Polish citizens. If they wanted to be transferred to the U.S.S.R. they had first to opt for Soviet citizenship. After that they were eligible for transfer. But not every Polish citizen was entitled to exercise the right of option—only persons belonging to one of the above-enumerated ethnic groups. Poles by (ethnic) nationality could not opt in favor of Soviet citizenship, nor could Jews.

Persons who opted for transfer were allowed to take with them members of their families if the latter had expressed the wish to join them. "Family members" included children, mother, father, grandchildren, and adopted children, as well as other persons living with the family if they shared in the common economy (*gospodarstwo*).

The agreements provided that persons who chose to be transferred would be relieved of paying all their outstanding taxes, insurance premiums, and production quotas within the territory they were leaving. In the territories of their resettlement, the farms allotted to them would be free for two years from all state taxes and insurance fees. The resettlers were to receive a loan of 5,000 zlotys or 5,000 rubles per household, as the case might be, to take care of farm equipment and other needs, repayable over a five-year period. They were to be permitted to take with them their livestock and their poultry, in addition to household and farming equipment up to a total of two tons per family. Persons engaged in various professions were to be allowed to take with them the tools or machinery needed to carry on their trade. The agreements prohibited the exportation of cash, paper money, or gold and silver coins, with the exception of amounts not exceeding 100 paper zlotys or rubles for every person. The removal of gold, silver, platinum, and precious stones, as well as of objects of artistic and archeologic value was also prohibited. All mechanical vehicles, arms, and photos (with the exception of personal pictures) were barred from exportation. It was stressed that because of wartime difficulties the transport of furniture by rail and car was forbidden. Movable and nonmovable property left behind, with the exception of land, was to be paid for in accordance with the laws of Poland or the Soviet republics. If the resettlers surrendered their current crops to the state before their departure, they were to be fully reimbursed at the places to which they moved. Those who before moving had carried out their full sowing were to receive similar sown areas of approximately the same size in the places to which they moved.

The agreements contained detailed provisions for the settlement and employment of the transferees in their new areas of residence. The resettlement activities were to be carried on by the Lublin Committee within Polish territory, and by the respective Soviet governments within their own territories. Persons transferred from Polish to Soviet territory could join collective farms or, if they preferred, they could have a piece of land for an individual household not smaller than that which they had originally owned, as long as it did not exceed 24 to 36 acres for a single farm. For nonfarmers, conditions were to be created enabling them to obtain work in accordance with their education or special abilities. Persons transferred from the Soviet republics to Poland were, if they desired, to be assigned land for individual farming plots under the new agrarian reform instituted by the Lublin Committee.

An interesting feature of the Polish-Lithuanian transfer agreement was the fact that, owing to the 15-year lapse in diplomatic and trade relations between Lithuania and Poland, there were no adequate railroad facilities between the two countries. Both contracting parties therefore asked the neighboring White Russian Soviet Socialist Republic to extend her facilities for the use of the prospective resettlers. The request was promptly granted.¹⁶

According to a press dispatch from Moscow, foreign diplomats in the Soviet capital "interpreted the agreement as an intelligent move on the part of the Soviet government, and one that should do much to strengthen friendly relations between the Polish people and U.S.S.R."¹⁷ The Soviet government had apparently endorsed the principle of transferring ethnic population groups as a means of solving intricate territorial and national problems. The transfer agreements with the Reich, concluded in the 1939-41 period,¹⁸ could be interpreted as a temporary expedient dictated by a specific critical conjuncture and following the German pattern. But in this instance, the initiative for the population exchange with Poland evidently came from Moscow and could thus be considered as part of a deliberate political scheme. The Soviet leaders were trying to remove the very cause of the Polish-Russian border conflict by creating clear ethnic demarcation lines and by eliminating minorities, the mere existence of which would always furnish material for Irredentist propaganda and activities.

4.

The three Soviet-Polish agreements concluded in September, 1944, provided for an organized exchange of population on an unprecedented scale. They affected millions of people.

Polish sources spoke of 5,274,000 Poles in the Soviet-incorporated areas: 2,583,000 in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, 2,320,000 in the White Russian, and 371,000 in the Lithuanian,¹⁹ and estimated that at least six million would move.²⁰ These figures and estimates proved to be grossly exaggerated. At the second session of the Scientific Council for the Problems of the Recovered Territories held on December 16-18, 1946, in Kraków, Henryk Kopec calculated, on the basis of the census of 1931, that the number of Polish-speaking persons in the territories ceded to the Soviet Union should have amounted, in 1939, to 4,222,037. They were

concentrated mostly in the provinces of Vilno (878,434), Tarnopol (632,945), Nowogródsk (466,579), Lwów (564,637), Volhynia (360,314), and so on. According to the 1931 census, 74.4 per cent of the population in areas incorporated with the Soviet Union were agriculturists, 4.7 per cent were occupied in commerce and insurance, 9.8 per cent in mining and handicraft, and 2.3 per cent in communication and transport.²¹

The number of Ukrainians, White Russians, Russians, and Lithuanians on Polish territory eligible for transfer to the Soviet Union was considerably smaller than that of Poles in the Soviet-incorporated Polish provinces. Official Polish figures published at different times are rather contradictory on this subject. Henryk Kopec estimated that in 1939, on the eve of the war, 832,980 Ukrainians, White Russians, Russians, and Lithuanians lived on the present territory of Poland. The most numerous groups consisted of 701,361 persons who indicated Ukrainian (Ruthenian) as their mother tongue. They were concentrated mostly in the provinces of Rzeszców (429,658 souls) and Lublin (233,294 souls). Smaller agglomerations existed in the provinces of Kraków and Białostok. The White Russian group comprised 79,267 and was concentrated almost exclusively in the province of Białostok (75,775). The Russian-speaking population comprised 42,343 and was centered in the province of Białostok (28,355), while the remainder were scattered over other parts of the Polish territory. The smallest group were the Lithuanians, about 8,000 in all.²²

These estimates, however, are in striking contradiction to the figures supplied by the Chief Representative of the Polish Republic for Evacuation Affairs of the Polish Foreign Ministry, according to which, as of October 1, 1944, only 673,876 persons belonging to the Ukrainian and other minorities were affected by the Soviet-Polish agreements on exchange of population. This discrepancy of about 159,000 souls can in part be accounted for by the fact that in February, 1940, between 35,000 and 40,000 Russians, White Russians, and Ukrainians were transferred to the Soviet Union under the terms of the Soviet-German agreement on exchange of population concluded on November 3, 1939.²³ It may also be assumed that a considerable number had fled or were evacuated to the U.S.S.R., were drafted for forced labor by the Germans, or died during the war years. But the figure of 673,876 published in the February issue of the official organ of the Polish Chief Bureau of Statistics proved to be not the last word.²⁴ The March issue gave a different figure, stating, on the basis of data supplied by the same source, that as of October 1,

1945, the number of Ukrainians and other minority populations affected by the agreements amounted to only 538,186, i.e. 115,690 less.²⁵ This discrepancy is apparently due to the fact that the two figures deal with different areas. Both refer to the minority population of the voevodships of Lublin, Rzeszów, and Kraków; but the first includes 131,615 persons living in "remaining voevodships," while the second does not and mentions only 1,615 persons who were registered by different stages of the Chief Representation for Evacuation Affairs. Minority population scattered in smaller groups over the Polish territory was not taken into consideration.

The agreements concluded in September, 1944, covered the entire Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Russian, and White Russian population on the territory of the Polish State. In the U.S.S.R., they applied to the territories of the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian Soviet Republics only. There were, however, hundreds of thousands of Polish and Jewish refugees and evacuees in other Soviet republics as well. Several consecutive waves of Polish citizens had entered the U.S.S.R. after the beginning of World War II.²⁶ Many had fled to the Soviet-incorporated Polish provinces to escape the Germans in September-October, 1939. The majority of them were Jews (about 200,000 according to an estimate by the Institute of Jewish Affairs), but there were also many non-Jews. In the winter of 1939-40, and again in June, 1940, a number of such refugees, in particular those who neither returned to their homes nor accepted Soviet citizenship, were deported to the eastern part of the Soviet Union. Later the same measure was extended to residents of the incorporated provinces. A White Paper presented to the United States Department of State by the Polish Embassy put the total number of deportees at 400,000. The main movement from Soviet-incorporated areas to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union began in June, 1941, immediately before the German invasion, and increased in volume after the invasion started. Hundreds of thousands fled or were forcibly evacuated to inner and Asiatic Russia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Siberia, etc.). Their number was decreased in 1942 by the evacuation of 75,491 Polish soldiers and 37,756 members of their families and by a high mortality during the first war years. In 1945 Alexander Jaskiewicz, Secretary General of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow, estimated the number of Polish citizens in the Soviet Union at 400,000.²⁷ The same figure was given by Wladyslaw Wolski, Polish Vice Minister for Repatriation.²⁸

With the view of enabling the repatriation of these hundreds of thousands of people, a second agreement on exchange of population between the Soviet Union and the Polish government was concluded in Moscow on July 6, 1945.²⁹ According to this agreement, persons of Polish and Jewish (ethnic) nationality, who had Polish citizenship up to September 17, 1939, and members of their families, were accorded the right to renounce Soviet citizenship and permitted to settle on Polish territory (Art. 1), and persons of Russian, Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian (ethnic) nationality and members of their families were permitted to renounce Polish citizenship and settle on the territory of the U.S.S.R. (Art. 2). The same right, on the basis of decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of June 22 and July 14, 1944, was accorded to persons of Polish nationality listed in these decrees. The agreement provided that change of citizenship and evacuation be carried out on a voluntary basis (Art. 5).

The criteria applied with regard to eligibility for transfer were thus practically identical with those contained in the September, 1944, agreements. There was also no innovation whatsoever with regard to the prospective transferees from Polish territory. The Ukrainian, White Russian, and other populations affected by the July, 1945, agreement were identical with those affected by the agreement of September, 1944. They seemed to be mentioned merely in order to maintain the principle of exchange of population, which can be considered as typical for most of the Soviet transfer treaties. The only specific feature of the July agreement was that it was also applicable to former Polish citizens of Polish or Jewish ethnic nationality living on the territories of Soviet republics other than the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian S.S.R.

Persons entitled to abandon their Soviet citizenship, and who at the moment of the signing of the agreement were on Soviet territory, had the right, up to November 20, 1945, to apply for a change of nationality through the local authorities to the Commission of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. dealing with the exchange and nationality of the population concerned. Persons entitled to change their Soviet nationality and who were at that time in Poland and in other countries could apply not later than November 20, 1945, to the aforementioned Commission for a change of nationality through Soviet Embassies and Legations in accordance with their place of domicile (Art. 6). Persons entitled to change their Polish citizenship who were, at the time of the signing of the agreement, in Poland could apply not later

than November 1, 1945, through responsible local authorities (Art. 7.)

Prospective transferees were given the right to take their families with them. "Family" included wife, husband, children, mother, father, adopted children, as well as other relatives, irrespective of their nationality, if they shared their means of livelihood (*gospodarstwo*), and if they wished to be transferred (Art. 4). To further facilitate transfer proceedings, the signatories established a Russian-Polish Commission of six, with equal representation from each government and headquarters in Moscow. This mixed commission was empowered to appoint advisers and officials of the various distribution centers from which repatriates were to be resettled (Art. 8). Addenda to the agreement stipulated that both governments would provide transportation, food, and medical care for all repatriates until they arrived at the respective borders. Repatriates leaving the U.S.S.R. for Poland had to be sent in the following sequence: first, the families of military men; second, peasants and farmers; third, specialists and technicians; and fourth, those not included in the previous categories. Schools and similar institutions were to be evacuated in an organized way by responsible authorities. Regionally, the first to be repatriated were those located in the north and the east of the Soviet Union, followed by those from the Soviet European areas. Other regions, including Central Asia, were to come last. Students and specialists were permitted to continue their studies in Soviet schools and institutes with the consent of both the Polish and Soviet governments.

Persons leaving for Poland were entitled to carry with them all personal belongings, except such goods as could not be exported from the U.S.S.R. Personal belongings, however, were not to exceed two tons in weight for farmers' families and one ton for urban families. Artists, engineers, research men, and other professionals had the right to take their professional equipment and tools with them. The repatriates were also permitted to take out 1,000 zlotys or, correspondingly, rubles, exchangeable at the border for the currency of the country to which they were being repatriated. All amounts exceeding 1,000 zlotys (or rubles) had to be deposited in the State Bank of the U.S.S.R. or of Poland, to be accredited with their rightful owners through the local bank at the repatriate's final destination. November 1, 1945, was the preclusive date for the exercise of option (Art. 6). The transfer of persons had to be completed by December 31, 1945 (Art. 13). It was, however, later agreed to extend these preclusive dates to January 1, 1945, and June 15, 1946, respectively.³⁰ Actually, transfer operations continued far beyond the latter date.

In a broadcast over the Polish radio in Moscow on July 7, 1945, Zygmunt Modzelewski, Polish Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., gave some essential additional explanations to the official text of the agreement.³¹ He specifically mentioned that on the basis of its provisions those who "may now claim their Polish citizenship and return to the Motherland" were not only "all Poles and Jews who had relocated on the territories of the U.S.S.R. because of the tragedy of the war," but also "all those who had helped to regain the independence of our country either through military service in the Polish Army or through other means." This remark indicated the possibility of opting for Polish citizenship and transfer to Poland by persons who were not Polish citizens before September 17, 1939, but who could claim special services rendered to the liberation of Poland and prove their Polish origin. Another significant amendment to the original text of the agreement was to the effect that although the filing of declarations of intent and the evacuation itself must, as a rule, be carried on in an organized and collective way by the members of the Commission with the cooperation of the local, district, regional, and republic committees of the Union of Polish Patriots, persons residing in the U.S.S.R. without visas or proof of Polish citizenship could apply not to the Commission but to Polish consulates or to the Polish Embassy, where they could obtain exit visas for return to Poland. While urging his co-nationals in the U.S.S.R. to make preparations for a rapid departure, Ambassador Modzelewski added: "Make them in such a way that you leave only the finest impressions upon the Soviet people so that the Soviets who were your hosts will part with you as friends."

On July 25, 1945, the Soviet news agency TASS reported that a Soviet-Polish Mixed Commission provided for by the agreement had been constituted, and had already begun its work. The organization and financing of the repatriation on Soviet territory was entrusted to the Union of Polish Patriots. The Union established a special fund for this purpose which by December, 1945, had at its disposal three million rubles; the Soviet government also allocated several million rubles. Special emphasis was put on the proper sanitary care for the repatriates. Since many prospective repatriates did not possess documents and were unable to prove their Polish citizenship, it was agreed that every Pole wishing to be repatriated would submit a written declaration stating that he was a Polish citizen before September 17, 1939. Such statements were accepted without further investigation.³²

5.

The transfer to the Soviet Union began first and was conducted with the utmost dispatch. Within a month of the signing of the exchange agreements, representatives of the Ukrainian Plenipotentiary Commission for repatriation had arrived in Lublin and had set up in the towns of Lublin, Hrubieszow, Chelm, Zamósć, Lisko, Włodawa, Krasnystaw, Przemyśl, Bilgoraj, Lubartów, and Tomaszów offices for the registration of prospective evacuees to the Ukrainian S.S.R.³³ On November 29, 1944, *Izvestia* reported the arrival of the first 122 Ukrainian families from Poland in the Kherson area "where they want to live and work"; they brought with them their belongings, livestock, and poultry and were scheduled for settlement in the rural Kherson and Veliko-Lepetikhaki districts. A Soviet broadcast of December 2 spoke of the arrival of an unspecified number in Lwów, and another, on January 11, 1945, referred to the arrival of 3,500 families in Zaporozhe. The Soviet wireless commentator mentioned on January 9, 1945, that "the inhabitants of the various islands west of the Curzon Line are steadily leaving under the supervision of mixed commissions."

Up to February 1, 1946, a total of 90,225 families comprising 346,686 persons had registered for transfer. By May 1, 1946, the number of applicants had increased to 438,801 (114,635 families), and by June 1, to 491,541 (126,247 families). On July 1, 135,453 families comprising 528,014 persons had applied for transfer. During the months to come, no considerable increase of the number of applicants took place. The last available figure was that of 136,020 families with 529,925 persons as of December 31, 1946.³⁴

The progress of the actual transfer operations can be seen from the following table:

Date	Number of transferred	
	families	persons
Up to Dec. 31, 1945	91,154	341,715
Up to May 1, 1946	106,607	410,810
Up to June 1, 1946	120,979	472,880
Up to July 1, 1946	132,327	515,998
Up to Dec. 31, 1946	132,994	518,219

By January 1, 1947, a total of 132,994 families comprising 518,219 persons belonging to Ukrainian, White Russian, Russian, and Lithuanian nationalities had been transferred from Poland to the three Soviet republics. In the voyevodships of Lublin (from where 193,420 persons had been transferred), Rzeszów (267,380), and Kraków (20,093) the transfer operations were completed on September 2, 1946.³⁵ On the average, 40,000 persons were transferred monthly.

There are no exact data as to the ethnic distribution of these more than one-half million transferees from Poland. The only indication available is the statement by the Vice Minister for Repatriation, Władysław Wolski, on May 22, 1947, that 483,000 Ukrainians and 30,000 White Russians had left Poland for the U.S.S.R.³⁶ Lithuanians must have made up the difference between these two figures and the total of 518,219 persons who were transferred from Poland under the terms of the September, 1944, agreements.

If we accept the figure of 538,186 members of national minorities eligible for transfer (see above, p. 000), then the completed evacuation of 518,219 transferees had actually disposed of almost the total Slavonic and Lithuanian minority population of Poland. Of the 20,167 who were not evacuated up to January 1, 1947, 11,706 had registered for transfer, so that not more than 8,461 persons had chosen not to opt for Soviet citizenship and to remain in Poland—a negligible number which did not at all affect the ethnic homogeneity of the new Polish state. When asked why these hundreds of thousands had left their age-old homes and “gone to a Communist state,” Vice Minister Wolski answered: “They want to be inside their own country.”³⁷ On the other hand, press dispatches repeatedly reported that bands of armed Ukrainian partisans called *Banderowcy* and *Bulbowcy* had been violently attacking villages, towns, and railways in southeastern Poland, particularly in the part between the Czechoslovak frontier on the south and the Curzon Line on the east. The London *Times* correspondent, who investigated the situation on the spot, came to the conclusion that the chief aim of these attacks, according to the *Banderowcy* themselves, was to prevent the transfer of the Ukrainians from their homes in Poland to the U.S.S.R. He also reported that many transferred Ukrainians had tried to make their way back to Poland, and some had succeeded in doing so. Those who feared to be re-evacuated joined the *Banderowcy* and hid with them in the woods.³⁸

There is no adequate information available as to the resettlement of the transferees in the Soviet Union. It seems that they were not directed

to the incorporated former eastern Polish areas (western Ukraine and western White Russia) to fill out the gap left by the repatriated Poles, but were moved farther toward the Soviet interior (districts of Kherson and Zaporozhe and the province of Odessa),³⁹ whereas Russians and Ukrainians from Siberia and Kazakstan were sent to the newly acquired territories. The New York *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* reported on February 10, 1947, that in the streets of Lwów, capital of western Ukraine, the Russian language could be heard more often than the Ukrainian.

Preparations for the transfer from the Soviet republics to Poland began within three weeks of the signing of the exchange agreements. A Polish State Office for Repatriation, set up on October 9, 1944, to take care of the transferred persons until they were finally settled on Polish territory, had by March, 1945, established 45 local offices in Poland and branches in Wilno (Lithuanian S.S.R.), Luck (Ukrainian S.S.R.), and Baranowicze (White Russian S.S.R.).⁴⁰

By July 1, 1946, 595,000 Poles and Jews (about 132,000 families) had registered for transfer in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, and 341,000 (about 75,800 families) in the Lithuanian. The number of applicants in the White Russian Soviet Republic was by June 25, 1945, 320,000 (71,000 families)—altogether 1,256,000 persons (278,000 families).⁴¹ On December 1, 1945, the number of applicants for transfer reached 1,458,952. Of these, 718,007 (249,543 families) were in the Ukrainian S.S.R., 390,513 (116,134 families) in the White Russian, and 350,432 in the Lithuanian.⁴² The age distribution of this mass of prospective repatriates presented a highly favorable picture. Almost 50 per cent (726,199) belonged to the most active and productive age group between 19 and 59 years; over one-fourth (371,333) were youths from 8 to 18 years; over 15 per cent (231,123) were children from 0 to 7 years; old people over 60 years of age (130,297) represented only 9 per cent of the total. The number of women (832,660) was, however, considerably higher than that of men (626,292).⁴³

Actual repatriation activities were begun in November, 1944, while the front was still on the Vistula. According to a TASS dispatch, the first trainloads of Poles to be transferred from White Russia to Poland left from Baranowicze, Grodno, Stolpce, and Wolkowysk on December 12, but their numbers were not given and it was stated that representatives of the Polish Repatriation Office were rounding up Poles in White Russia and arranging for their transfer to Poland.⁴⁴ For several months thereafter, however, organized transfers to Poland were very limited in

scope, since the permanent settlement of the prospective repatriates was hampered by great difficulties. In particular, there was hardly any possibility of settling the agriculturalists among them on the land, for the comparatively few farms abandoned by the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian repatriates going to the U.S.S.R., even added to the abandoned German farms in the western voyevodships of Poland, did not solve the problem to even a small degree. The situation was rendered worse by the circumstance that in 1943 and 1944, shortly before the liberation of the country from occupation, the eastern portion of Poland had been inundated by large numbers of Poles from eastern Little Poland and Volhynia seeking refuge from the terrorism of Ukrainian bands acting under the unconcealed patronage of the German authorities. The number of these refugees was estimated at over 200,000. They were temporarily accommodated in the villages and estates of the voyevodships of Lublin and Rzeszów, and partly also in that of Kraków. Overpopulation of the Polish countryside in those districts, made it, moreover, impossible to create new farms for the newcomers.⁴⁵ German territories in the west, which were supposed to become the major settling ground for the repatriates, were at that time still in German hands. It was not before January 20, 1945, that Soviet armies had broken through on a 50-mile front in East Prussia, reaching the Oder on a 35-mile front two days later. The frontier into Pomerania was first crossed on January 28. Brandenburg and Kolbing were captured on March 18, and Stettin on April 26. Up to the end of 1944, only 117,212 repatriates entered Poland, all of them from the Ukrainian S.S.R.⁴⁶ A Soviet wireless commentator explained that the Lublin authorities had not thought it fit to hasten the repatriation of Poles living east of the Curzon Line and had limited their work mainly to evacuating men from areas where the anti-Polish sentiment of the surrounding Ukrainian majority was strongest. "Feeling between the Poles and Ukrainians," the commentator added, "has perhaps never run higher than today in those regions where they are in contact."

It was only when the conquered German territories had been gradually taken over by the Polish authorities that mass repatriation became truly possible. This era was inaugurated by a decision of the Polish Council of Ministers, dated March 16, 1945, authorizing the State Repatriation Office to open branches in the Recovered Territories and to direct thither the large trainloads of repatriates who were arriving at that time. The State Repatriation Office had then almost completely

stopped the settlement of newcomers in the "old" Polish territory and concentrated all its efforts on the Recovered Territories, to which it directed not only all fresh arrivals, but also those who had arrived in Poland before organized repatriation began.⁴⁷

The year 1945 saw the repatriation of 701,430 Poles (and Jews) from the Ukrainian (511,877), White Russian (135,654), and Lithuanian (53,899) Soviet republics, an average of 58,400 per month. In 1946, 418,297 repatriates returned from the Ukrainian (158,435), White Russian (136,419), and Lithuanian (123,444) S.S.R., an average of 34,800 per month. The number of repatriates during the first six months of 1947 was negligible and amounted to 224, all of them from White Russia. A total of 1,237,163 persons had returned from the three Soviet republics under the September, 1944, agreements as of July 1, 1947.⁴⁸ A close scrutiny of the figures pertaining to single Soviet republics shows that the most complete results were achieved with regard to repatriation from the Ukrainian territory. By December, 1945, 718,007 persons had registered for transfer in the Ukrainian S.S.R., and 787,524 had been transferred by the end of 1946. This means that not only all the 1945 applicants, but also an additional 69,517 who must have had registered after December, 1945, were evacuated.⁴⁹ The situation was different in the White Russian S.S.R. where 390,513 registered and only 272,185 were actually transferred, and in the Lithuanian S.S.R. with 350,432 applicants and only 177,342 repatriates. In 1947, only 2,090 persons returned from White Russia and 671 from Lithuania. White Russian nationalist sources see the explanation for this discrepancy in the change of Poland's political and economic regime: "After the signing of the repatriation agreement the population had great hopes of escaping [from the Soviet Union] to a democratic country and responded with mass registration. . . . In 1946, the Sovietization of Poland began, and there was no longer any real hope. . . . As a result, the population renounced the idea of repatriation."⁵⁰

Physical conditions of repatriation from the Soviet Union were pitiable. Month after month and through two grim Polish winters, the repatriates had to make their tortuous journey to the west packed into unheated, dilapidated boxcars and open gondolas, which also carried livestock and all the family property up to two tons. Giving way to more urgent traffic, their trains had often to spend days on sidings. Because of lack of trains, they often had to wait two or three weeks at assembly centers. Many had traveled in open peasant carts with their belongings,

and even on foot. On the Polish side of the frontier, the situation was usually not much better, often with hunger added and the ever-present danger of losing food, clothing, and livestock to bandits. "The patience of the people under these sufferings is a marvel," wrote a correspondent of the *Chicago Sun* who visited Poland in the fall of 1945. "They tell their story—even the story of children dying from malnutrition—as if it had always been so and always would be."⁵¹ The repatriated Polish peasants arrived, however, not completely empty-handed. Those who returned up to September, 1946, brought with them 76,000 horses, 169,000 head of cattle, 70,000 pigs, and 80,000 sheep and goats.⁵²

Repatriates from Soviet republics other than Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian who returned under the terms of the agreement of July 6, 1945, numbered in 1945 only 22,058. Most of them were transferred in 1946, when their number reached 226,140,⁵³ an average of 18,800 per month. In July, 1946, it was reported that "the departure of Poles from Soviet territory is drawing to a conclusion. The repatriates who are now returning from Russia come from the remotest corners of Soviet Asia. More than 6,000 persons have left the Krasnoyarsk region, 1,785 came from Irkutsk, almost 1,500 from Kazakstan, over 900 from the Tumen region in East Siberia, and so on."⁵⁴ In 1947, only 10,801 arrived. Among them, 2,090 came from the former Polish territories incorporated with the White Russian S.S.R., 76 from former Polish territories incorporated with the Ukrainian S.S.R., and 571 from the Lithuanian S.S.R.; 7,964 came from other parts of the Soviet Union.⁵⁵

The total number of repatriates brought from the U.S.S.R. in organized transfers in the course of the 38-month period (November, 1944, to January, 1948) amounted thus to 1,495,938.⁵⁶ To this number must be added about 10 per cent of the 1,900,000 Poles who had by that time returned from Germany and the west. These 190,000 repatriates formerly had lived east of the Bug and San rivers and therefore fell under the provisions of the September, 1944, agreements. They were dealt with in the same way as repatriates from the east. Besides this group, there were also tens of thousands of demobilized Polish soldiers from beyond the Curzon Line. After having been evacuated to the Soviet Union, they had there joined the Red Army or the Polish Forces (1st, 2nd, and 3rd divisions) and entered Poland with these military units, leaving their families in Soviet territory. The majority of them, estimated at about 70,000, after their demobilization did not return to their former homes in territory ceded to the U.S.S.R., but remained in Poland.

Finally, 200,000 to 240,000 Poles had returned individually, outside the organized transfer, taking refuge in Poland in consequence of the terrorism of the Ukrainian bands.⁵⁷ Altogether, from 1,950,000 to 2,000,000 persons falling under the terms of the transfer agreements returned to Poland up to the end of 1947.

6.

The numerical results of the transfer action from the Soviet Union to Poland proved to be rather disappointing. The number of Poles (and Jews) entitled to opt for repatriation amounted to over four million. Of them, only 1,458,952 had registered up to December 11, 1945. Even if we add to this number the 69,517 persons who had presumably applied for repatriation in the Ukrainian S.S.R., after that date (p. 170, above), the total would not exceed 1,529,000. The three categories of repatriates from beyond the Curzon Line mentioned above, which could not be included in the statistics on direct and organized transfer, bring the total to about two million—still only about one-half of the supposed number of persons entitled to option and transfer. Of those who remained, some 514,000 were Poles residing in former Polish territories incorporated with the Soviet Union.

This discrepancy can be explained in part by certain deficiencies of the option procedure. At the second session of the Scientific Council on questions concerning the Recovered Territories in December, 1946, Dr. W. Skrzyman stressed that according to private reports the registration for transfer in the Soviet country districts had met with great difficulties. The applicants were obliged to prove not only that they spoke the Polish language, but also their Polish origin, which was very often impossible since documentary proofs were lost or destroyed during the war and the German occupation. Dr. Skrzyman insisted that mixed commissions working on Soviet territory should consider a declaration of belonging to the Polish nationality as sufficient to qualify the applicant for transfer to Poland. He especially stressed the fact that in the Vilno district Lithuanian members of the commissions, interested in retaining in this area the highest possible number of Catholics, were unnecessarily complicating the procedure of option for the transfer.⁵⁸

All this may have accounted for a considerable part of the failure of a wholesale transfer from the Soviet Union. It does not, however, basically

change the fact that a high percentage of persons of Polish origin had abstained from opting for Polish citizenship and subsequent transfer to Poland. Thus, while the problem of Slavonic and Lithuanian minorities in Poland could be considered as solved by their total transfer, there still remained considerable Polish minority populations in the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian S.S.R.

There are no official data as to the ethnic distribution of the repatriates from the Soviet Union. The overwhelming majority were Poles. Of the hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees from Poland who had found shelter in the U.S.S.R. only 250,000 to 300,000 had survived. Some 150,000 of them opted for transfer to Poland.⁵⁹ The first batch of Polish Jews to return from Siberia and other parts of the U.S.S.R. arrived in Warsaw in January, 1946. In addition, Jews were at that time returning from beyond the Curzon Line—from Lwów, Luck, Vilno—mainly by special trains, but in some cases in improvised carts and on foot.⁶⁰ By the middle of 1946 their number reached 136,579⁶¹ and by the end of the same year, about 170,000.⁶² Smaller groups, amounting to a few thousand, were repatriated in 1947 and 1948. The occupational distribution of 136,579 Jewish repatriates who arrived up to the middle of 1946 was as follows:⁶³

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Per cent</i>
Artisans	50.9
Commerce and manufacturing	6.2
Civil service and white collar workers	10.5
Workers	14.2
Agriculturists	1.1

According to an authority on questions concerning Jewish refugees and displaced persons, the most characteristic feature of Jewish repatriation from the Soviet Union was "the compelling wish to emigrate rather than to return to the country of origin. Most of the Jewish refugees who go back to Poland and Rumania do not do so because they intend to resettle there. They desire to emigrate to Palestine or elsewhere. However, since the Soviet laws do not favor emigration, they ask to be repatriated in the hope that this will make their further emigration that much easier. It is these repatriates who provide perhaps the greatest percentages of infiltrates into the D.P. camps in the United States and British occupation zones in Germany and Austria. . . . There seems to be

a fixed pattern to the wanderings of these Jews. They return to their country; they look around and do not find any of their families, relatives, and friends; they bid farewell to the ashes of their dearest ones and to the ruins of their homes and their communities; then they proceed directly to the West, towards the strategic passageways to the 'gates' that lead to Palestine and to other lands overseas."⁶⁴ The Polish government, while wholeheartedly in favor of permanent resettlement of the repatriated Jews in Poland and willing to give them every opportunity for a free life and economic and social advancement, did not oppose their emigration to Palestine or elsewhere. Mr. Jan Galewicz, Polish Consul in New York, aptly formulated the attitude of the Polish government as follows:

Some of the Jews of Poland who, returning to their former homes, find no relative or friend alive and who, on the other hand, have relatives abroad, have the natural desire to emigrate. These are mostly people who do not have definite occupations or professions, many of them being young people who at the beginning of the war were of school age and who actually have no trade. The Polish government fully understands that it is not an easy thing to build up one's life on the cemetery of the past and that for psychological reasons some of these people long to join their families abroad. The Government therefore declared that far from preventing them from leaving Poland, it would wholeheartedly permit emigration. Premier Edward Osobka-Morawski also declared that the Polish government sympathizes with Jewish efforts to found a home in Palestine, for, like every other people, the Jews have a right to a country of their own.

The new Poland, however, does not believe that the solution of the Jewish problem in Poland lies in emigration, and only advocates this step for those who wish to go abroad. The Government wants the Jews to remain in Poland where they may build their lives anew, on new principles, on new foundations. To this end, the Government is giving them every support and aid.⁶⁵

Till March, 1948, the Polish government faithfully adhered to the policy of free emigration for the Jews and issued passports to virtually any Jewish applicant able to demonstrate that he could obtain a foreign visa. But in the spring of 1948 the regulations became more rigid, and by the beginning of 1949 the government stopped issuing passports to applicants.⁶⁶ This new turn considerably complicated the position of the Jews in Poland, many of whom were preparing to emigrate to Israel.

Emigration was resumed in the fall of 1949 when the Polish government announced that Jews intending to leave for Israel would be allowed

to do so till August, 1950. Those applying for emigration, however, had to state that they gave up their Polish citizenship; and exit permits were to be valid for a period of two months only.⁶⁷ Single emigrants paying their own expenses were allowed to transfer to Israel 100,000 zlotys (\$250) each; persons traveling in family groups were entitled to transfer 66,000 zlotys (\$165) each.⁶⁸ 40,000 of the then 80,000 Jews in Poland had applied for exit permits by August 31, 1950, when registration ended, and 25,931 arrived in Israel during the period from September, 1949, to December, 1950.⁶⁹

7.

Repatriation of Polish nationals, which seemed to have been brought to a close by the end of 1947, was resumed in 1956. Although only 8,523 Polish nationals returned in 1955, their number in 1956 reached 33,240.⁷⁰ Negotiations conducted in Moscow in November, 1956, paved the way for increased influx of repatriates.⁷¹ On March 25, 1957, a new agreement was signed in Moscow. It provided for the repatriation of all Polish nationals who, for one reason or another, had been unable to take advantage of the previous agreements. For all practical purposes, its content was identical with that of the 1944 and 1945 agreements. Applications for repatriation were to be submitted until October 1, 1958 (in September, 1958, the validity of the agreement was extended for another twelve months). The Soviet Union undertook to "make every effort to ascertain the fate and whereabouts in the U.S.S.R. of persons whom Polish institutions or citizens are trying to locate"; persons entitled to repatriation and now in places of confinement were to be released ahead of time and repatriated or turned over to Polish authorities.⁷² Four to five hundred thousand Poles were expected to benefit from the agreement:⁷³ 26,763 arrived in the first three months of 1957, 20,839 came in April-June, and 18,750 in July-September; the total for 1957 reached 95,275.⁷⁴ The influx continued in 1958: 20,504 came in the first three months of the year.⁷⁵ Two reporters of the German illustrated magazine *Sie und Er* (Zofingen), who went to Poland to witness the repatriation, related in the April 18, 1957, issue of that magazine that in Warsaw they saw a transport of repatriates, the majority of whom came from Siberian forced-labor camps, in physically bad shape and looking listless. Many did not know a single word of Polish and could give only vague answers to the

question of their origin and why they were repatriated. In some cases, the impression was that they were persons of whom the Russians just wanted to get rid.

Like its 1945 predecessor, the March, 1957, agreement stated (Art. 14) that all its provisions "also apply to persons of Jewish [ethnic] nationality who possessed Polish citizenship on September 17, 1939." The Paris Yiddish daily *Unzer Wort* of March 19, 1957, carried a news agency dispatch from Warsaw stating that, "according to conservative estimates on the part of Polish government circles," about 150,000 Jews were scattered all over the Soviet Union, mainly in Siberia.

By the end of 1957 about 10,000 Jewish repatriates from the Soviet Union had arrived in Poland. The London organ of the World Jewish Congress reported in May, 1958, that well over 40 per cent of them were

without any prospect of finding permanent employment. These are the people who were deported to or sought refuge in the U.S.S.R. in the early years of the last war and who were allowed to return to the country of their birth following the Soviet-Polish Repatriation Agreement of March, 1957. Having arrived without many belongings and in many cases without profession or skill that could be utilized in the difficult economic conditions prevalent in Poland, often without proper knowledge of either Polish or Yiddish because they had left the country when young, their position remains rather hopeless. To make matters worse, the labor market has been swamped by thousands of workers and officials who have been dismissed from the State administration, the State enterprises, and the vast party apparatus in the Government drive aimed at streamlining economic life. The first victims of this industrial and administrative purge have been the Jewish employees.⁷⁶

Most of the Jewish repatriates were directed to the newly regained Polish territory: 2,000 came to Wroclaw, 2,000 to Lignice, 830 to Walbrzyc, 800 to Szczecin, 700 to Upper Silesia, and so on. But, as the Institute of Jewish Affairs in New York put it, "they did not come to Poland to stay and hardly have an intention to do so."⁷⁷ The overwhelming majority arrived with the intention of continuing to Israel. "Until last Monday," reported the Warsaw correspondent of the *New York Times* on March 14, 1958, "virtually all of these [repatriated] Jews went on to Israel as soon as transport and other arrangements could be made for them." At an early stage, the Polish government raised no obstacles to their emigration. But

since Monday . . . the situation has changed. Polish police headquarters has rejected all emigration applications of Jews from the Soviet Union. These Jews have been told that since they returned here as Poles they must assume Polish citizenship and apply for permission to emigrate in a normal way.⁷⁸

In fact, certain formalities for obtaining a passport for Israel were for a time made more complicated. Emigration nevertheless continued, and from 1957 until November, 1958, over 35,000 immigrants from Poland—about half of the country's total Jewish population—arrived in Israel.⁷⁹

NOTES

¹ Josef Feldman and Zygmunt Wojciechowski, "Poland and Germany, The Last Ten Years," in the collective work *Poland's Place in Europe*, Poznan, 1947, p. 362.

² Zygmunt Wojciechowski, "Poland and Germany—Ten Centuries of Struggle," in *Poland's Place in Europe*, p. 219.

³ E. Revyuk, *Polish Atrocities in Ukraine*, New York, 1931, pp. 491, 499-500.

⁴ Gustav Zalecki, *Polityka Cen Ziemi w Polsce i Problemy Naszej Powojennej Zamorskiej Kolonizacji Chłopskiej*, Warsaw, 1930, pp. 56-61.

⁵ *Poland's Place in Europe*, pp. 319-320.

⁶ W. Konopczynski, *Dzieje Polski Nowożytnej*, Kraków, 1936, Vol. 2, p. 213.

⁷ Quoted from *Poland's Place in Europe*, pp. 302-321.

⁸ *Prawda*, October 28 and 29, 1939; November 4, 1939.

⁹ *Rada Narodowa*, Lublin, February 5, 1944.

¹⁰ The full text of the Yalta agreement was published in the *New York Times* of March 25, 1947.

¹¹ A. Klafkowski, "The Legal Bases of the Oder-Lusatian-Nisa Frontier," *The Western Review*, July-August 1947, pp. 93-94.

¹² On May 22, 1951, Poland and the Soviet Union agreed on an exchange of small parcels of territory on Poland's eastern frontier. Poland obtained a strip of 185 square miles near her present southeast frontier in the oil-bearing region of Drohobycz, with a predominantly Ukrainian population. The Soviet Union acquired 185 square miles of territory east of Lublin. The agreement provided for the exchange of population in the exchanged territories. The resettlers were allowed to take with them their movable property, but real estate equipment and communication facilities had to be left intact. *Biuletyn of the Polish Research and Information Service* (later referred to as *Biuletyn*), May 25, 1941; *New York Times*, May 23, 1951.

¹³ Maria Kiełczewska Zaleska (Professor of Anthropogeography at the Nicholas Copernicus University of Torun), "The Geographical Bases of Poland," in *Poland's Place in Europe*, p. 60.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, September 15, 1944; *Washington Post*, September 15, 1944; *Radio Polska* (Lublin), September 23, 1944; *Prawda*, September 25, 1944; Polish Provisional Government broadcasts (Moscow), April 8, 1945.

¹⁵ The indigenous Polish minority in Lithuania was estimated at 150,000 in 1945; the 1926 census listed about 480,000 Poles in Soviet Ukraine. Bolesław Olszewicz, "Sprawa Reemigracji Ludności Polskiej" in *2 Sesja Rady Naukowej dla Zagadnień Ziemi Odzyskanych*, 16-18, XII, 1946, Zeszyt 1 (Warsaw, 1946), pp. 150-151.

¹⁶ Theodore Bayer, "Voluntary Population Transfer," *Soviet Russia Today*, December 1944, p. 25.

¹⁷ *Washington Post*, September 5, 1944.

¹⁸ Schechtman, *European Population Transfers*, pp. 145-206.

- ¹⁰ *Concise Statistical Year Book of Poland, September 1939-June 1941*, p. 9.
- ¹¹ *New York Times*, October 28, 1944.
- ¹² Henryk Kopec, "Zjawiska demograficzne towarzyszące zmianom granic Polski," in *2 Sessja Rady Naukowej dla Zagadnień Ziem Odzyskanych*, pp. 19 and 54.
- ¹³ Henry Kopec, *op. cit.*, p. 21.
- ¹⁴ Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 368-369.
- ¹⁵ *Statistical News of the Chief Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Poland*, February 1946, p. 19.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*, March 1946, p. 35.
- ¹⁷ Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe*, Montreal, 1943, pp. 58-59.
- ¹⁸ *Kurier Codzienny*, December 12, 1945.
- ¹⁹ *Zycie Warszawy*, November 20, 1945.
- ²⁰ *Soviet-Polish Relations, A Collection of Official Documents*, London, 1946, pp. 32-33; *Polpress News*, July 18, 1945.
- ²¹ *Kurjer Polski* (London), November 21, 1945, quoting a TASS dispatch from Moscow.
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- ²⁴ *Radio Polskie* (Lublin), October 15 and 20, 1944.
- ²⁵ *Statistical News*, Nos. 3, 7, 10-11, 14, 19, 1946; Nos. 6/7, 1947.
- ²⁶ *Statistical Year Book of Poland*, 1947, p. 30.
- ²⁷ *Czas*, May 25, 1947.
- ²⁸ Irving Brant, *The New Poland*, p. 33.
- ²⁹ Quoted by J. Lada, "The Ukrainian Rising in Poland," *Free Europe*, June 1946, pp. 183-184.
- ³⁰ *Izvestia*, November 29, 1944 and February 17, 1945; Moscow Radio, January 1945; Moscow report, October 12, 1945.
- ³¹ Broadcast from the Polish Embassy in Moscow, March 12, 1945.
- ³² Stanisław Pietkiewicz i Michał Orlicz, "Plan regionalny przesiedlenia osadników rolnych na Ziemie Odzyskane," in *1 Sessja Rady Naukowej dla Zagadnień Ziem Odzyskanych*, 30, VII-1, VIII, 1945, Zeszyt III, *Zagadnienia Ogólne Osadnictwa Ziem Odzyskanych*, Kraków, 1945, p. 19.
- ³³ *Statistical News*, February 1946, No. 2, p. 18.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*
- ³⁵ *New York Times*, December 13, 1944.
- ³⁶ M. Olechnowicz, "The Settlement of the Recovered Territory," *The Western Review*, July-August 1947, pp. 108-109.
- ³⁷ *Statistical Year Book of Poland*, 1947, p. 29.
- ³⁸ Olechnowicz, *loc. cit.*
- ³⁹ *Statistical News*, August 20, 1947, p. 242.
- ⁴⁰ On May 6, 1947, it was officially announced that the exchange of population between Poland and the Ukrainian S.S.R. was completed. *Robotnik*, May 8, 1947.
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- ⁴² Irving Brant, *The New Poland*, p. 32.
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- ⁴⁵ *Statistical Year Book of Poland*, 1947, p. 29.
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- ⁴⁸ M. Olechnowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
- ⁴⁹ *2 Sessja Rady Naukowej*, p. 71.
- ⁵⁰ Zorach Warhaftig, *Uprooted: Jewish Refugees and Displaced Persons After Liberation*, New York, 1946, p. 59.
- ⁵¹ *The Jewish Chronicle* (London), January 25, 1946.
- ⁵² H. Szner, "Oblicze repatriacji ludności żydowskiej z Z.S.S.R.," *Prawo Człowieka*, September 15, 1946.

- ⁶² *New York Herald Tribune*, December 29, 1946.
- ⁶³ H. Szner, *op. cit.*
- ⁶⁴ Zorah Warhaftig, *op. cit.*, p. 68; see also M. Mirski, "Why Do Polish Jews Leave the U.S.S.R.?" in *Morning Freiheit* (New York), July 31, 1946.
- ⁶⁵ "Jews Find a New Life in Poland," *Poland of Today*, April 1946.
- ⁶⁶ *New York Times*, January 19, 1949.
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- ⁷⁶ *World Jewry* (London), May 1958.
- ⁷⁷ Institute of Jewish Affairs, *The Position of the Jewish Communities in Eastern Europe on the Eve of 1958*, New York, 1958, p. 21.
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NINE

Transfer of Germans from Poland and the Recovered Territories

I.

The independent Polish state as it emerged from World War I contained within its frontiers a sizable German minority. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles Germany was obliged to cede to the newly created Polish Republic most of the provinces of Posnania and West Prussia, with a population (including Danzig) that was two-thirds Polish and one-third German. After conducting a plebiscite in industrial Upper Silesia, the Council of the League of Nations decided to leave Germany more than half the people and land of this province, but to give Poland most of the economic resources.

About 705,000 persons of German and non-German origin left the Polish-incorporated former German provinces during and after the war. Following this mass migration, the German minority in the three western provinces of Poland (Pomorze, Posnania, and Silesia) numbered, according to the Polish census of 1931, about 375,000—amounting to 8 per cent of the total population in these parts; the number of Germans in the whole of Poland was given as 741,000. German sources contested these figures on the grounds that the census criterion of the mother tongue was misleading. They claimed that in mixed areas many persons speaking both German and Polish were likely, for political reasons, to tell the census taker that their mother tongue was Polish. They asserted, therefore, that there were a million Germans in Poland.

The position of the German minority in Poland was considerably strengthened by the Polish-German Commercial Treaty of March 17, 1930. Articles 19 and 20 of this treaty gave the right to settle in Poland not only to German merchants and industrialists, but also to their expert assistants, men of the free occupations, connected with trade and industry, and finally to all Germans who had migrated to the Reich since January 1, 1919, and now manifested a desire to return.

In September, 1939, 36,117 square miles of conquered Polish territory with a population of some 10,740,000 were incorporated with the Reich. The Germans in these incorporated Polish provinces comprised barely

6 per cent of the total population, or about 600,000.¹ This ethnographic composition of the area was a permanent *memento mori* for the German conquerors. It was, therefore, imperative to alter radically the ethnographic balance—to de-Polonize the area and to Germanize it. Accordingly, the Reich laid down two fundamental propositions: first, the Polish and Jewish elements must be dislodged; and second, German colonists must be settled in mass on the soil. The prerequisite for the realization of the first part of this program was the mass deportation of Poles and Jews; the second part presupposed a mass transfer of German settlers from abroad. Both policies were inaugurated and vigorously implemented by the Reich.

By December 31, 1940, according to a provisional estimate of the Polish government-in-exile, about 1,500,000 Poles and Jews had been deported from the incorporated Polish provinces.² By January, 1944, more than 403,000 transferred *Volksdeutsche* had been resettled in vacated Polish farms and houses (p. 35, above). In addition, several hundred thousand Germans of the Old Reich, mostly officials, overseers, and merchants, were induced to settle down in the area by the favorable opportunities offered them there. By the end of 1944 there were 1.6 million Germans in the prewar Polish territory.³

The German inhabitants of the incorporated Polish provinces—local *Volksdeutsche*, transferees from other countries, and Reich Germans alike—were intensely hated by the oppressed and terrorized native Polish population. An underground report on the situation in the Polish villages, published by *Free World* in May, 1943, contains a revealing description of the temper prevailing among the Polish peasants: "The farm population harbors a terrible, silent, grim, truly peasant hatred. People in Poland today do not expend themselves in speeches. There is no talk of revenge nor of the mass executions and massacres. The peasant merely says, 'The day will come. . . .'" The Polish underground and leading Polish circles abroad made no effort to conceal their conviction that all the Germans living in the incorporated and occupied Polish areas must eventually be removed without exception.⁴ In the "Program for People's Poland," drawn up by various Polish underground groups after much deliberation and discussion, a special paragraph dealt with the problem of the colonized Germans and the *Volksdeutsche* in the future liberated Polish Republic: "The German population, which settled on Polish soil in order to promote the Germanization of Poland, will be returned to Germany. The same is to apply to all who

registered as *Volksdeutsche*. Permission to remain in Poland should be granted only to those citizens of German origin who have given active proof of their devotion to the Polish State, particularly during the present war and the Nazi occupation."⁵ No less specific on this point was the stand taken by the Polish Committee for National Liberation in a Lublin radio broadcast on September 28, 1944.

In full accord with this dominant trend of Polish political thought, Edward Taborsky advocated "an integral transfer of all the German minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia after the war" as the best possible solution of this difficult problem.⁶ It remained doubtful, however, whether this organized and constructive solution, which presupposed relatively peaceful conditions and a certain amount of mutual goodwill, would be feasible in the immediate postwar period. It seemed more probable that the sorely tried local population, intent on avenging the cruel harm inflicted by the German masters, would forestall such transfer plans. Furthermore, as the *Polish News Bulletin* significantly noted, most of the German settlers would not wait to welcome the old Polish owners back.⁷

In January, 1945, Soviet troops advanced into the German-incorporated Polish provinces. As early as the preceding October, Gauleiter Arthur Greiser, although maintaining that "it is not likely that the Russians will ever break through the Vistula bend," had announced that German authorities had made all preparations to meet even that contingency and to secure the "evacuation to safer districts in orderly columns."⁸ Such preparations, however, were completely upset by the *blitz* tempo of the Russian advance. The territory overrun by the Soviet armies proved to be so much larger than anticipated that the whole evacuation scheme simply collapsed.⁹ Herbert Hahn, writing in *Das Reich*, frankly admitted that "the number of those who had to be evacuated doubled almost overnight. Systematic evacuation turned into an improvised stream of refugees flooding back in batches. Timetables, itineraries, special trains, luggage transports, food and supply centers—all the well-rehearsed welfare arrangements had to go by the board."¹⁰

According to German estimates, about 800,000 Germans—one-half of the German population in prewar Poland—were still there when the Polish authorities took over administration from the Red Army.¹¹ But, contrary to all dire predictions, there was no spontaneous outbreak of popular violence against the remaining Germans; no wholesale bloody revenge was taken for the oppression. Official German sources complain

in the main of persecution and discrimination by Polish authorities and militia, and of violence by Soviet soldiers. They do mention "insults and ill-treatment which were often committed by young people," but at the same time take note of cases "when a friendship with Polish families rendered protection." Appraising the general attitude of the Polish population, they state: "When we consider the crimes committed against Poles and Polish Jews during the time of German occupation, we can understand the behavior of the Poles, but we can under no circumstances excuse it."¹²

Both the Polish Provisional Government and Polish public opinion were unanimous in their firm resolve to eliminate, once and for all, the German menace from the Polish territory. On February 5, 1945, the Lublin radio broadcast the following warning: "What will be the attitude of the Poles toward the Germans who have settled in the western territories? Through their bestiality and the enormity of their crimes, the Germans have created between themselves and the Poles an abyss which cannot be bridged. . . . It is our wish that there should not be any German minority in Poland." A mass demonstration in Katowice demanded the immediate removal of the Germans from Silesia and from the Dabrowa mining district: "The Polish people cannot allow the Germans, who have harmed Poland for centuries, to remain on Polish territory. . . . The Poles should treat the Germans in the same way as the German invaders treated the Poles." In Łódź, the Polish Citizens' Militia started to round up Germans as soon as the city was free. First, they put them to work clearing snow; subsequently, all males over 17 years of age were made to repair ruined buildings.¹³ In Kalisz, a number of remaining Germans were immediately imprisoned and others were asked to leave town.¹⁴ In the Inowrocław district, 918 farms, totaling 17,731 acres, previously taken by the Germans, were taken over by the State and prepared for Polish repatriated peasants, while 4,828 Germans conscripted for labor were employed on the sowing of the land throughout the district.¹⁵

A wholesale removal of all "persons of German [ethnic] nationality, irrespective of their citizenship" from territories which were within the Polish frontiers on September 1, 1939 (Silesia Province, the districts of Bedzin and Zawiercie, and the town of Sosnowice) was ordered on July 2, 1945, by General Zawadzki, Governor of Silesia and Dabrowa Province. Until July 20, these persons had to register for voluntary transfer to individually chosen places in German territory. Failure to

register by July 20 entailed removal to an extradition camp. Polish public security organs and the civic militia were ordered to aid local executives in carrying out this measure. General Zawadzki called on all Poles to disclose to the security organs and village executives the names of Germans not complying with the order of registration and warned that "aiding and hiding the Germans will be punishable."¹⁶ On September 13, 1946, a government decree deprived of Polish citizenship all "persons who after having reached the age of 18 have through their conduct manifested German national separatism (*odrebnosc*).¹⁷ Those deprived of Polish citizenship were to be expelled from the Polish territory and their property confiscated. The decree expressly stipulated that its aim was the "elimination of persons of German [ethnic] nationality from the Polish community."¹⁷

According to available data from Allied sources, over 398,000 expellees and refugees from pre-1939 Polish areas were registered in the British zone of Germany on October 29, 1946; over 125,000 in the U.S. zone, and over 11,000 in the French zone—a total of 397,000.¹⁸ There are no data on the number of Germans from these areas in the Soviet zone.

The majority of Germans who remained on prewar Polish territory were placed in forced-labor camps; many of them had to answer individually before special penal courts for crimes committed against the Polish nation. The Polish census of February 14, 1945, registered 212,400 Germans in Poland proper, of them 146,300 in rural areas. Their number decreased steadily in the course of subsequent months. In October, 1947, not more than 37,000 *Volksdeutsche* were still detained in three camps, awaiting final decision on their fate.¹⁹ Following the Moscow-dictated *rapprochement* between Poland and East Germany (see below, p. 331) the law of July 20, 1950, quashed all pending proceedings against Polish citizens who during the war had declared themselves to be Germans; those affected had their citizenship rights restored, and no new proceedings were initiated.²⁰

2.

Poland's eastern frontiers were determined in February, 1945, at the Yalta Conference of the Big Three (see previous chapter). The question of her western frontier had been under discussion at the diplomatic level since 1943: from the very beginning it was centered on the transfer to

Poland of parts of Germany's eastern provinces, combined with the forcible transfer of their German population.

On March 14, 1943, the British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden mentioned to President Roosevelt in Washington Polish claims to East Prussia. Harry L. Hopkins, who was present at this encounter, relates that both Eden and Roosevelt had endorsed this demand, and that the latter had added:

We should make arrangements to move the Prussians out of East Prussia the same way the Greeks were moved out of Turkey after the last war; while this is a harsh procedure, it is the only way to maintain peace, and in any circumstances, the Prussians cannot be trusted.²¹

On October 5, 1943, the President instructed his Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who was leaving for Moscow to participate in the conference of the Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A.: "East Prussia should be detached from Germany, and all dangerous elements forcibly removed."²² At the Teheran Conference (November 28–December 1, 1943) Roosevelt, while agreeing, as did Churchill, to most of Stalin's territorial suggestions, was more cautious in regard to the character of the prospective removal of the German population and asked Stalin "whether he thought a transfer of population on a voluntary basis would be possible." The answer was that "probably it would be."²³ Upon his return from Teheran, Churchill, on January 22, 1944, submitted to the Polish government-in-exile a five-point program for the solution of Poland's ethno-geographical problems. Point two spoke of granting to Poland East Prussia, Danzig, and Upper Silesia to the Oder River, and point four said: "All the German population within Poland's new boundaries [is] to be removed from Poland."²⁴ In August of the same year, the Prime Minister of the Polish government in London, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, went to Moscow and later reported to President Roosevelt that Marshal Stalin had promised to "see to it that Poland was extended to the Oder and Neisse rivers," and that "he would clear that territory of all its German population."²⁵ Both President Roosevelt and Churchill at that time fully endorsed this aspect of Stalin's promise. On November 17, 1944, Roosevelt wrote to Mikolajczyk: "If the Polish Government and people desire in connection with the new frontiers of the Polish State to bring about the transfer to and from territory of Poland of national minorities, the United States Government will raise no


objection, and as far as practicable will facilitate such transfer."²⁶ Speaking in the House of Commons on December 15, 1944, Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister of the British Cabinet, stated:

The transference of several millions of people would have to be effected from the east to the west or north, and the expulsion of the Germans (because that is what is proposed—the total expulsion of the Germans)—from the area to be acquired by Poland in the west and north. For expulsion is the method which, so far as we have been able to see, will be the most satisfactory and lasting. There will be no mixture of populations to cause endless trouble as in Alsace-Lorraine. A clean sweep will be made. I am not alarmed at the prospect of the disentanglement of population, nor am I alarmed by these large transferences, which are more possible than they ever were before through modern conditions.²⁷

Three days later the U.S. Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius, stated on behalf of his government that "if . . . the government and people of Poland decide that it would be in the interests of the Polish state to transfer national groups, the United States, in cooperation with other governments, will assist Poland as far as practicable in such transfers."²⁸

The problem of transfer of population largely dominated the deliberations of the Yalta Conference, where the incorporation into Poland of certain German areas was first discussed. James F. Byrnes, who was at that time U.S. Secretary of State, relates that when Marshal Stalin expressed himself in favor of extending the Polish western frontier to the Neisse River, Churchill "doubted the wisdom" of such a decision because he estimated that "taking off territory in East Prussia as far west as the Oder would necessitate the moving of six million Germans." His objections were, however, directed merely against what he considered an excessive amount of territory being demanded for Poland, and not against the principle of removal as such. Stalin countered this objection by arguing that the number of Germans to be transferred would be much smaller because "where our [Soviet] troops come in, the Germans run away." Churchill, on the other hand, insisted that consideration must be given "to where those Germans are that run away" and asked: "Will there be room for them in what is left of Germany?"²⁹

Notwithstanding these objections, the Big Three unanimously announced that "Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west." This decision implied the principle that the en-



Map III Poland's "Removal to the West"

visaged territorial accessions had to be *Germanrein* (free of Germans), either because of mass flight of their German population which should not be permitted to return, or, if Stalin's statement should prove exaggerated, through the compulsory mass removal of the remaining Germans. The British government, whose Prime Minister was so hesitant in Yalta about these implications, officially accepted and defended them in the course of the Parliamentary Debates on Poland which took place in the House of Commons on February 27 and 28 and March 1, 1945, shortly after the Yalta Conference. Mr. Churchill firmly advocated the extension of Poland's boundaries both in the north and in the west. "In the north," he said, "she will certainly receive, in the place of a pre-

carious Corridor, the great city of Danzig, the greater part of East Prussia west and south of Königsberg, and a long, wide sea front on the Baltic. In the west she will receive the important industrial province of Upper Silesia and, in addition, such other territories to the east of the Oder as it may be decided at the peace settlement to detach from Germany after the views of a broadly based Polish Government have been ascertained." Churchill particularly stressed the value for Poland of that "fruitful and developed land in the west from which a very large portion of the German population has already departed." He meaningfully insisted that "we need not fear that the task of holding these new lines will be too heavy for Poland, or that it will bring about another German revenge, or that it will, to use a conventional phrase, sow the seeds of future wars. We intend to take steps far more drastic and effective than those which followed the last war, because we know much more about this business, so as to render all offensive action by Germany utterly impossible for generations to come." Anthony Eden, at that time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Churchill's Cabinet, was even more outspoken in this respect. Speaking in defense of the Curzon Line as the most desirable frontier between Poland and the U.S.S.R., Mr. Eden put particular emphasis on the fact that this frontier line eliminated substantial ethnic minorities, and asked his opponents: "Are my hon. Friends absolutely convinced that the structure of the Polish State is strengthened by the inclusion of large, or considerable, non-Polish elements in it? I wonder." Here Mr. Eden was interrupted by a Laborite Member of Parliament (Aneurin Bevan) asking: "On the west, too?" Mr. Eden's answer was: "The assumption in regard to the west is that the population shall be removed. That is the whole basis. In most cases, I can tell the hon. Gentleman, they have gone already."³⁰

Wholesale transfer of the German population from German territories to be ceded to Poland was, in the words of Mr. Eden, "the whole basis" of the new settlement of Poland's western frontier as agreed upon by the Big Three. It formed the main background of the deliberations of the conference of the Big Three at Potsdam in July and August, 1945.

The question of Germany's eastern boundary had not been thoroughly considered before the fifth plenary session on July 21.³¹ The official Protocol of the Conference states that "in conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea [Yalta] Conference," the Big Three sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity "in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west

which Poland should receive." While reaffirming their opinion that "the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement," the three powers agreed that "pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the Western Neisse and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former Free City of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish state."³² Three thousand nine hundred and eighty-six square miles of German territory, one-third of Poland's present area of 121,000 square miles, were added to the territory under Polish administration.

The question whether the transfer of this territory to Poland was justified does not in itself belong within the framework of this study. The author does not intend to discuss it and to take sides in the controversial issues connected with the problem of Poland's frontiers. It is, however, indubitable that the allocation of former German eastern provinces to Poland was bound to imply a mass transfer of their German population. It would have been a most dangerous disservice to Poland to saddle her with areas—irrespective of their size—inhabited by millions of Germans. The Earl of Mansfield aptly said on March 8, 1944, in the British house of Lords:

It has been suggested, apparently more or less officially, that Poland shall be compensated for any changes that may occur on her eastern boundaries by receiving certain German territories to the west and to the northwest of her former boundary. Should this come to pass, it is essential in the interests of Poland that the German population presently resident herein should be removed, for the worst enemy of Poland could wish her no more deplorable fate than that she should be faced with not even her former problem of a moderately substantial German minority but a really substantial German minority. Such a solution would be bound to lead to trouble, and probably to war, within a fairly short space of time. Therefore no matter how hard such a solution would seem to be for the German population concerned, that solution will have to be faced.³³

The participants in the Potsdam Conference were confronted with the fact that Germany's provinces east of the Neisse River were held by

the Soviet and Polish armies. The Soviet High Command had transferred them to Polish administration, with the exception of the city of Königsberg and the area adjacent to it which were taken over by the Soviet administration. According to the speech by Mr. Byrnes delivered at Stuttgart on September 6, 1946, the Soviet delegation in Potsdam argued that "Germans in large numbers were fleeing from these areas and that it would in fact, because of the feeling aroused by the war, be difficult to reorganize the economic life of these areas if they were not administered as integral parts in the one case of the Soviet Union and in the other case of Poland."³⁴ President Harry S. Truman and British Prime Minister Clement R. Attlee accepted this *fait accompli*. Mr. Byrnes testifies that the question they were mostly concerned with in this connection was "the huge displacement of population" resulting from placing those territories under Polish administration. Although Marshal Stalin claimed that "no single German remained in the area to be given to Poland," American information indicated that there were at least two million Germans left there. Later, representatives of the Polish government admitted the presence of approximately a million and a half Germans.³⁵

The Big Three were, thus, fully aware that handing over German areas to Polish administration implied the removal of what German population was left in these areas. Accordingly, Article XII of the Potsdam Agreement states that "the three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German population, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland . . . will have to be undertaken."³⁶ An official U.S. document on "policy and progress" of the U.S. occupation of Germany admits that "the United States, although not viewing with favor the unilateral or indiscriminate expulsion of Germans from the east, has approved the transfer to Germany of German population or elements thereof in order to avoid the rise of dangerous minority problems in the states concerned."³⁷

In application of the Potsdam decision, the Allied Control Council in Berlin on November 20, 1945, approved a plan of wholesale removal from Poland to Germany of the entire remaining German population: two million were to be admitted into the Soviet zone of occupation and 1,500,000 into the British zone.³⁸ A *New York Times* editorial of April 26, 1947, interpreted the Potsdam decisions as referring only to the German minority on prewar Polish territory. This minority, however, amounted to a bare 800,000 people, and a considerable part of them had left with

the withdrawing German army; the same applied to the majority of the some 400,000 German settlers transferred during the war years to the German-incorporated Polish western provinces. Since the aforementioned scheme of the Allied Control Council spoke of 3,500,000 Germans, there can be no doubt that the Council had in mind not the prewar German minority in Poland proper, but the whole remaining German population of post-war Poland, including the territories put under Polish administration at Potsdam. The Council's definition of the term "Poland," used in the Potsdam Agreement in connection with the transfer of the German population, was unmistakable and clear: prewar Poland *plus* the former German territories east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers. The Potsdam decision to allocate these territories to Polish administration inevitably led to the decision of the Allied Control Council to transfer the *entire German population* from the *entire area* handed over to Poland. No distinction was made between single provinces of this area: it was to be cleared in its totality of the whole remaining German population; all Germans who had fled their residences were implicitly prohibited from returning.

It is most unlikely that so sweeping a measure would have been decided upon if the Allies had at that time contemplated the possibility of returning at least a part of this area to Germany. The removal of millions of people is not an expedient to be resorted to "on a temporary basis." It presumes finality. In the words of a Polish scholar, it is "no country dance, three steps forward and three steps back, but is a process carried out with superhuman effort, the positive results of which may not be undone in normal times of peace."³⁹ A lead article in the *London Times* (May 21, 1947) aptly stressed: "Since the Polish Government was encouraged or allowed without protest to proceed to the immediate removal of the German inhabitants of the ceded area, the cession was bound to be regarded as final by the Poles at least; and President Truman's broadcast after the Potsdam conference appeared to lend the highest American authority to this view."⁴⁰ John C. Campbell, in 1946 Secretary of the U.S. Delegation at the Council of Foreign Ministers in London, also reluctantly agreed that the Polish and Soviet claim that the Potsdam delimitation of the areas allotted to Poland was a final one "seemed confirmed by subsequent American approval of the transfer to Germany of the Germans in the area taken over by Poland."⁴¹

Meanwhile, as we will see, the transfer of the bulk of the German population from this area became an accomplished fact. Moreover, six million Polish settlers were by now colonized there to form, with the

million indigenous Polish inhabitants of the region, a Polish population of over seven million.

Writing from Wroclaw in the *New York Times* of October 15, 1946, Sydney Gruson summarized the situation in the Recovered Territories as follows: "Poland's new western frontiers may be subject to revision, as Secretary of State Byrnes has stated and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov has denied, but a brief visit to the territories Poland gained from Germany leads to the conclusion that the Poles are there to stay." In an interview granted on September 17, 1946, to the representative of the Polish News Agency (PAT) in Paris, the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister, Vyacheslav Molotov, said: "Who can think that this eviction of Germans was undertaken only as a temporary experiment? Those who adopted the decision on the eviction of the Germans from these territories, and who understood that Poles from other Polish districts would at once move into these territories, cannot suggest after a while carrying out reverse measures. The very idea of involving millions of people in such experiments is unbelievable, quite apart from the cruelty of it, both towards the Poles and the Germans themselves."⁴² Max Werner soberly reminded in the *PM* of March 16, 1947, that a revision of the current German-Polish frontier would be "not an allotment of an area under discussion, but the re-annexation of a settled Polish territory"; it "would make necessary the mass eviction of Poles and resettlement of the Germans. It is impossible to think that such a new migration could be carried out." At the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in November, 1947, the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault unequivocally took the realistic view that "Poland's new frontier and the transfers of population were accomplished facts and there was no use thinking they could be reversed now."⁴³ In a special issue (May 1948) of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* devoted to "Peace Settlement of World War II," Professor Carl J. Friedrich, governmental affairs adviser to the U.S. Military Governor and C.C. Europe, formulated the problem of the former German territories in the east as follows (p. 122):

Whatever one's estimate of the situation, historically speaking, a realistic appraisal of conditions as they exist in the spring of 1948 allows one no alternative but to consider the German provinces lying east of the Oder-Neisse line, plus the harbor of Stettin (west of the Oder) as outside any future German State. These territories are in the process of being settled by Polish people, and while the success of this migration may be a


matter of controversy, it is hardly reasonable to assume that these millions of people could be moved out again and the German expellees returned.

3.

In the final phase of the war, when Germany's eastern front was disintegrating under the heavy blows of the Soviet-Polish offensive, more than five million Germans left the provinces of Silesia (3.2 million out of a population of 4.7 million), East Prussia (1.85 million out of 2.35 million), East Brandenburg and the German-occupied West Polish territory (the *Reichsgau* Wartheland and the western half of the *General-gouvernement*: 40 to 60 per cent of the 1.4 million Germans in this area).⁴⁴ Their departure assumed the character of a wholesale exodus, a panicky flight from an impending day of reckoning. In several instances the flight was spontaneous, but as a rule it was ordered by the German *gauleiters* and *kreisleiters*. These orders did not have to be repeated. The Nazi press and radio had for years been painting a terrifying picture of the fate that awaited every German in case of Polish-Soviet invasion of German territory. This psychological preparation paid off. An authoritative German source admits that "the [National Socialist] Party loudly published the [Soviet] atrocities for their own reasons, particularly to stiffen the backs of the people to resist"; it stresses, however, that even "apart from this, the East Germans were unanimous in their conviction that they had to expect the very worst from the Soviet troops."

The official orders for evacuation were often fruitless, because the flight began in a panic, when the Red Army merely appeared. A controlled evacuation was generally impossible or began too late. The authorities responsible for the evacuation were unable to prevent precipitate and wild flights. . . . The command of the Party in measures of evacuation was in general a disadvantage, but it did not mean that the flight or evacuation had been carried out against the will of the population. This is evident from the fact that the population fled, even when no order had been issued to do so.⁴⁵

Inevitably, the evacuation degenerated into a wild rout, Panic-stricken people rushed blindly toward the west, dragging with them everything they could take, primarily horses, cattle, carts, and the most valuable parts of facilities of workshops and factories, packing the roads and fighting their way across the Oder River. Many groups were overrun by the



Map IV. The Expulsion and Flight of Germans from their Home Areas.

THE GERMAN POPULATION IN THE AREAS OF EXPULSION

Before Expulsion		
German population in 1939		
Eastern areas of the German Reich		9,575,000
East Prussia	2,473,000	
East Pomerania	1,884,000	
East Brandenburg	642,000	
Silesia	4,577,000	
Czechoslovakia		3,477,000
Baltic States and District of Memel		250,000
Danzig		380,000
Poland		1,371,000
Hungary		823,000
Yugoslavia		337,000
Rumania		786,000
(total*)		16,999,000
Excess of births over deaths 1939-1945		+ 646,000
War casualties 1939-1945		- 17,645,000
German population at the end of the war		16,345,000
*) in addition in the Soviet Union 1½ to 2 million		
War casualties		
Losses through expulsion		
Total losses		

advancing Soviet troops. The losses on the road were high, caused by "enemy action, the intense cold, or exhaustion among the aged and children. It will never be possible to ascertain the sum total."⁴⁶

Thus, the great majority of the German population had left the eastern provinces of the Reich before they were conquered by the Soviet armies and before the Polish administration arrived. The Poles took over large areas almost entirely deprived of inhabitants (voyevodships of Olsztyn, Szczecin, western part of the voyevodship of Poznan).⁴⁷ Only the southern part of the voyevodship of Wroclaw had an increased population, since considerable numbers of persons evacuated from the Germany proper had been directed there.⁴⁸ In the eastern districts of the voyevodship only 3 per cent of the population remained, while in the southwest the population exceeded the prewar total.⁴⁹ Most of the refugees and evacuees went to the western parts of the Reich, to Saxony, Thüringen, and Bavaria. But about 1.6 million from Silesia made for the mountains on the frontier, for the Sudeten territory, or for the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in Czechoslovakia.⁵⁰

After the conclusion of military operations and during the first months following the capitulation of Germany (May 9, 1945), there began, through the still open frontiers, a re-migration of large numbers of German refugees to their abandoned homes. As an official German source put it, "all German refugees who had fled their homes in East Germany . . . at the beginning of 1945, imagined that they would soon be able to return home, when everything was over. . . . The great majority of the refugees had certainly no clear notion of how and when

After Expulsion	
Expelled	
from the eastern areas of the German Reich	6,944,000
from Czechoslovakia	2,921,000
from other countries	1,865,000
	<hr/> 11,730,000
Remained in the home area (Status 1950)	
in the eastern areas of the German Reich	1,101,000
in Czechoslovakia	250,000
in other countries	1,294,000
	<hr/> 2,645,000
Presumed still living as prisoners (1950)	72,000
	<hr/> 14,447,000
Losses through expulsion	
in the eastern areas of the German Reich	1,212,000
in Czechoslovakia	275,000
in other countries	613,000
	<hr/> 2,098,000
	<hr/> 16,545,000
1,100,000	
2,098,000	
<hr/> 3,198,000 persons	
i.e. 18.8% of the German population in 1939.	

they would return. But they believed firmly in this return, because they simply could not imagine that it would be otherwise, or that the flight was the first step to permanent removal from their homes."⁵¹ The flood of war had passed away, the first rudiments of a regular administrative machinery had been established and promised a minimum of normal existence. On the other hand, the food and housing situation in central and west Germany proper proved to be precarious, and the Czechoslovak authorities started interning and/or expelling the German refugees. The return movement assumed increasingly large proportions.

Particularly strong was the stream coming to Silesia from Czechoslovakia: "They returned over the same route by which they had previously fled from the Russians. The only difference was that the refugees had become much poorer, and most of them had to walk, as the Russians and Czechs had stolen their horses and carts and a considerable part of their baggage. . . . The villages and towns of Silesia, some of which had been completely empty, were again full of people. They had regained 50 per cent of their previous number of population when the return movement of refugees ended in July. . . . The German population of Silesia (frontier of 1937) had again reached about 2.5 million."⁵²

The following German statistics illustrate the changes in German population east of the Oder and Neisse as a result of the flight and the return of refugees in the first part of 1945:⁵³

Districts east of the Oder and Neisse	Population end of 1944	Population after flight from Red Army: April-May, 1945	Population after return (summer 1945)
East Prussia	2,653,000	600,000	800,000
East Pomerania	1,861,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
East Brandenburg . .	660,000	300,000	350,000
Silesia	4,718,000	1,500,000	2,500,000
Polish Territories . .	1,612,000	800,000	800,000
Danzig	420,000	200,000	200,000
	11,924,000	4,400,000	5,650,000

Polish sources, though less specific, also admit that the number of returnees was "fairly considerable." For instance, whereas in May, 1954, there were about 6,000 Germans left in Szczecin, in October of the same

year they again numbered 60,000 as against 35,000 Poles. Similar phenomena were registered in many towns and villages.⁵⁴

Upon their return, however, the Germans had to face a powerful influx of Polish transferees from beyond the Curzon line and from Central Poland (see Chapters 8 and 10). Under the pressure of these settlers, the returning Germans began to withdraw again westward. The influx of German refugees to Berlin and to many large towns in south-eastern Germany such as Dresden and Leipzig was causing considerable difficulty to the Allied representatives responsible for supplying the needs of the population of these areas. Allied authorities attempted "to check, if not entirely prevent, the flow of German refugees westward so as to avoid great confusion in those districts," but realized that "making the rivers Oder and Neisse in parts of their courses into uncrossable barriers can be only a temporary postponement of the big issues which are bound to come later."⁵⁵

4.

In the initial, unorganized stages of the removal action there was much unnecessary hardship and suffering, and many thousands of Germans were expatriated under conditions which were anything but "orderly and humane."

In the British magazine *The Nineteenth Century and After* (November 1945) F. A. Foigt related that a British officer returning from eastern Germany described this whole area "as a gigantic Belsen":

Millions of Germans, Danzigers and Sudetenlanders are on the move. Groups of 1,000 to 5,000 will take the road, trek hundreds of miles and lose half their numbers by death through disease or exhaustion. The roadsides are dotted with graves. Children have arrived in Berlin looking like emaciated creatures shown in pictures of Belsen.

One train, which arrived in Berlin on August 31, started from Danzig on the 24th with 325 patients and orphans from the Marien Hospital and the Orphanage in the Weidnergasse. They were packed into five cattle trucks, with nothing to cover the floors, not even straw. There were no doctors, nurses, or medical supplies. The only food provided when their journey began was twenty potatoes and two slices of bread for each orphan. The patients had nothing, but the train stopped from time to time so that those of the passengers who were fit enough could forage. . . .

Between six and ten of the patients in each truck died during the journey. The bodies were simply thrown out of the train. When the train arrived in Berlin, sixty-five patients and orphans were removed to the Robert Koch Hospital, where nine of them died.

Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who in December, 1944, was not at all "alarmed by large transferences" of population and recommended a clean sweep with regard to the German population in the eastern provinces to be allotted to Poland, who was co-responsible for the Yalta decisions, and (in the early stages) for the decisions taken at Potsdam, very shortly after having lost power bitterly attacked the transfer of Germans from these provinces. Speaking in the House of Commons on August 16, 1945, Mr. Churchill stressed that he was

particularly concerned at this moment with reports reaching us of conditions under which the expulsion and exodus of Germans from new Poland have been carried out. Between 8,000,000 and 9,000,000 persons dwelt in these regions before the war. The Polish Government say that there are still 1,500,000 of these not yet expelled within their new frontier. Of these other millions most have taken refuge between British and American lines, thus increasing the food stringency in our sectors. Enormous numbers are unaccounted for. Where have they gone and what is their fate? Guarded accounts of what has happened, what is happening have filtered through, but it is not impossible that tragedy on a prodigious scale is imposing itself behind the iron curtain which at present divides Europe in twain.⁵⁶

Churchill's accusations and warning found a widespread echo in world public opinion and resulted in energetic action by the British Labor Government. On October 10, 1945, Hector MacNeil, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Attlee Cabinet, told the House of Commons that Britain had recently asked the Soviet Union, the United States, and France to join her in the "strongest approaches" to the Polish government over the continued expulsions of Germans from Poland in violation of the Berlin agreement of the Big Three. Similar representations were made to the Czechoslovak government. But, said Mr. MacNeil, while Prague had "earnestly attempted to cooperate" in the spirit of the Potsdam decisions calling for a temporary stop to forced transfers, expulsions had gone on unchecked in Poland, although as recently as October 1 the Polish Ambassador in London had assured the Foreign Office that strict orders were being given to stop further expulsions.⁵⁷ Replying to this

accusation, Henryk Strassburger, Polish Ambassador to the Court of St. James, declared that all measures for the forced removal of Germans had stopped, but that "spontaneous movements of Germans continued in territories from which Poles had been expelled by Adolf Hitler's administration [that is, in the former German-incorporated Polish provinces]. I must frankly confess," added Mr. Strassburger, "that I doubt whether it lies in human power to stop this spontaneous movement of population."⁵⁸

However, the situation Churchill referred to seems to have lasted a relatively short time. The voluminous official German indictment of the Polish expulsion methods specifically refers to the period from the end of June to the middle of July as the worst of the entire operation. It admits that "this stage of expulsion had been restricted to two to three weeks," involving a total of "about 200,000 to 300,000 people," and that "no stage of the later expulsions was carried out by such inhuman and brutal methods."⁵⁹ Gladwin Hill, who visited the Recovered Territories in the fall of 1945, reported in the *New York Times* of October 10: "Contrary to numerous reports, I found no undue pressure by the Poles to complete the evacuation of Germans from their newly acquired western territories. It is plain to any sensible German living in this area that there is no economic or social future for him. But the settlement of Poles on German-occupied farms is effected by an orderly process of the requisitioning of farms already abandoned, of which there are plenty. Meanwhile, pending the migration, even the Germans in cities can eke out a living, and those 'deserving' get the same soup-kitchen meals given to similarly impoverished Poles."

In some cases, Germans subject to evacuation tried to arouse the compassion and solicit the support of influential foreign visitors. When, on October 9, 1945, the United States Ambassador in Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, visited the former Silesian city of Hindenburg (renamed Xabrze), a throng of tearful Germans surrounded his automobile crying that the Poles were forcing them to speak Polish, starving them, and deporting them to the Reich. Mr. Lane's answer was, however, hardly comforting: "I have been at the Embassy in Warsaw for two months. What I have seen there—where you Germans went from house to house dynamiting, burning, and destroying the whole city—is a crime against civilization; I am confounded that any of you Germans can ask compassion."⁶⁰

The status of those Germans who, while expecting evacuation, were allowed to remain temporarily in their homes, was described by the

special correspondent of the liberal *Manchester Guardian* (May 23, 1946) as follows: "Those that remain are working in clearing the ruins, in municipal enterprises such as trams and buses, and in state factories." The pay of the about 50,000 Germans employed at that time in the state-owned factories was "virtually the same as that fixed for Poles, with a 15 per cent reduction in the form of a compulsory contribution towards the Polish Relief Fund for the Aid of Victims of Nazism. Their food rations are those of a nonworking Pole—that is the third category—but German specialists receive almost the same as a Polish worker." Germans employed in Wroclaw's municipal institutions were obliged to wear yellow armbands; outside the city, some local Polish authorities compelled all Germans over fourteen to wear white armbands.

The remaining Germans were far from being reconciled to this status. On October 10, 1945, Gladwin Hill reported in the *New York Times* that "already the Germans are again becoming arrogant. Stettin [Szczecin] authorities report a revival of Nazi underground organizations and a vicious, concerted effort to aggravate the tension between the occupying Russian forces and the Poles moving in to take over the area from them. In this atmosphere random shooting in the streets both by day and by night is common and has earned the region the soubriquet of 'Wild West.'" The situation did not improve during several months that followed. "Although outwardly the Germans here seem to have accepted their present status calmly," wrote the special correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* from Wroclaw on May 23, 1946, "there is a good deal of underground opposition. Mr. Barchacz, the Polish Vice-Governor here, told me of twelve different German youth organizations active in Lower Silesia which maintain and propagate the Nazi spirit. Secret leaflets and whispered propaganda tell the Germans that 'Germany will soon be free again' and that their departure from Lower Silesia is 'only temporary.' German priests, too, at their Sunday services which are not restricted, often speak of the better days ahead." Larry Allen of the Associated Press also related that "many Germans still retain much of their swagger and taunt the Poles. 'We are coming back, and the next time we'll make sure there won't be a single Pole left,' they say. . . . Here in Wroclaw the presence of nearly 200,000 Germans, compared to 60,000 Polish settlers, has been a source of irritation and potential trouble. There has been much sporadic shooting in the streets at night and many Poles and Germans have died."⁶¹ According to the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, German arrogance seemed to be an

"additional reason why the Poles were so anxious to deport the Germans as quickly as possible. Their presence, it is said, only tends to increase the atmosphere of insecurity and thus prevent that stabilization of conditions which the Polish government and local authorities are so eager to create. For although a good deal has been achieved by way of re-settlement and rehabilitation, the Polish settlers are often discouraged by the presence of the Germans and hesitate to start arranging their new life."⁶² The backbone of the German aggressive attitude, however, was broken by their mass removal, and by the end of 1946 the correspondent of the *London Times* (December 19, 1946) was able to report a quite different picture of the behavior of the Germans, who at that time still remained in the Recovered Territories: "Those Germans who remain are a self-effacing minority on the fringe, who speak their language as little as possible and limit their outdoor activities to the market place and curbstome where they sell remaining items of household goods and clothing before their final departure."

5.

After February, 1946, when the removal of Germans began to be carried out in an organized way, all reports by foreign correspondents agreed that the basic requirement of the Potsdam decision—that the transfer "should be effected in an orderly and humane manner"—was met by the Polish Repatriation Office.

The Warsaw correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* wrote on April 20, 1946:

Though rather crude at the beginning, the methods of deportation are today orderly and as far as possible humane. There can be no comparison between the brutal deportations of Poles by Germans in 1940 and 1941 and those in Polish Silesia today. The Poles were expelled by Germans at a quarter-hour's notice. Germans receive at least 24 hours' notice. What is more, they are allowed to take with them as much luggage as they can carry or put on a wheelbarrow—something denied Poles moved by Germans. There is no beating. Conditions in which the Germans are traveling are infinitely better than those allowed Poles by Germans. Of their belongings the Germans are allowed to take with them all their clothing, linen, cutlery, kitchen utensils, curtains, furs, and even carpets. They are not allowed to take any foreign currency except 500 German marks but they can take their

valuables. Each departing German is permitted to take food to last about four days.

Homer Bigart of the *New York Herald Tribune*, who investigated the situation in May, 1946, "saw absolutely no evidence to support the tales of Polish brutality one hears in Germany."⁶³ He saw "a trainload of Germans leaving Wroclaw, carrying great bundles of personal property they had taken to the train in carts. Although forbidden to take furniture, many had brought chairs and cots which they set up inside freight cars to make the long journey easier. They seemed well fed and the children had rosy cheeks." Larry Allen of the Associated Press wrote two weeks later:

They [the Germans] travel in comparative comfort and with sufficient food. . . . Some Germans leave by truck caravans, but the majority ride in boxcars or third-class railway coaches. . . . Polish soldiers and repatriation officials go about their jobs quietly and determinedly. . . . Poles are sent to advise German families when they are scheduled to leave, allowing them time to get their belongings together. . . . Each German is given a medical examination. Expulsion is delayed for those who are sick. Polish authorities supply food rations sufficient to last 10 or 12 days—three to four times as much as the British require. Fuel is placed aboard each train to make travel reasonably comfortable.⁶⁴

A similar picture is drawn by Sydney Gruson of the *New York Times*, who in October, 1946, witnessed the departure from the town of Braniewo (Braunsberg) of a train with 1,200 German transferees:

No one, not even the Germans involved, could object to the Poles' handling of the repatriation carried out today. The Germans had assembled in this town, just five miles from Poland's new northeast border with Russia, during the past two days and had been taken to their train this afternoon. The Poles gave the Germans the freedom of the town for the two days and told them they could take anything they could carry with them, except Polish money. So they unloaded their savings and spent, by the mayor's estimate, 5,000,000 zlotys in buying up almost everything in Braniewo's few shops. The Germans trudged to the train loaded with truckloads of food, chocolate, clothing, shoes, and household utensils. With thirty persons in each boxcar, there was plenty of room for every one to stretch out. The cars were clean, if not luxurious, and a hot afternoon meal was served to every

one. Two extra cars with seven beds and a Polish Red Cross nurse to look after the sick was attached to the train.⁶⁵

Gruson's evidence coincides with personal observations of this author, who, on August 14, 1947, witnessed the departure of a German transport from Wroclaw. The transferees looked healthy, the luggage they carried with them was voluminous and varied; the carriages were clean; the food distributed before departure was tasty and abundant. In personal conversations, transferees said they regretted the necessity to leave their homes and were rather afraid of the insecure future in devastated Germany; but they did not complain of bad treatment on the part of the Polish authorities and were quite satisfied with the accommodations for their transportation.

According to Gruson, many among the departing Germans even manifested their delight in going back to Germany. Of the 1,200 assembled for the trip, only two applied for Polish citizenship on the station platform and received certificates. One young woman told the story of all the adults, 70 per cent of whom were women, ranging in age from 18 to 80: "It will be better for us in Germany just to be among our own again," she said. "We have spent all our lives here, but we are Germans. The Poles have treated us well but you cannot live forever among strangers. We know it will be hard there, as hard or harder than it is here, but we don't mind. Bread is scarce there, but it is scarce here as well. And the children want to go. None of us knows where we are going, but our people are in American and British zones and we want to join them."

The only ascertained violation of the "orderly and humane" procedure prescribed by the Potsdam decisions seems to be the case of two transports of German transferees which arrived in the British zone in the bitter cold month of December, 1946. According to a government statement made in the British House of Commons on January 22, 1947, by Mr. J. B. Hynd, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, circumstances of these revolting incidents were as follows:

On December 15, 1946, a train arrived at the boundary of the British zone carrying Germans expelled from Polish-administered territories: the train contained four dead and 109 cases of frostbite. The expellees stated that they had been ordered by the Polish authorities to report at the collecting center in Poland on December 7 and 8, that no accommodation was available for them and that they had to wait in the rain and sleet until entraining on December 11. The journey itself was unduly pro-

longed because the locomotive broke down inside the Russian zone and there was some delay before it could be replaced. The cars on this train were totally unheated. On a second train which arrived on December 21, fifteen people were found dead and there were 53 cases of frostbite. A number of further deaths which occurred afterward were attributed to the conditions of the journey. Both trains carried a high proportion of elderly and infirm persons and in both cases the food supplied for the journey was said to be totally insufficient. The British made protests to the Polish authorities, and while the second train was still on the way, decided to suspend further movement. The Polish government was so notified on December 23. "In spite of this decision," said Mr. Hynd, "the Poles dispatched one more trainload of refugees, but in this case the train was heated and no casualties due to cold were reported; the Polish authorities were informed once again that no more trains could be accepted until we were satisfied that conditions were suitable."⁶⁶ An announcement by the Polish Military Mission in Berlin, published in the Berlin German paper *Telegraph* on January 21, 1947, insisted that the journey in question was a regrettable accident which took place a year after "the smooth and fully planned execution of the evacuation scheme. It took place with the knowledge of the British inspecting officer." Moreover, the Polish announcement emphasized, there were stoves, straw, and hay in all railway carriage used.

These explanations apparently did not satisfy the British government, and Mr. Hynd insisted on making "absolutely clear that in regard to these trains we consider that the Polish authorities have not carried out the movement of these Germans in a humane and orderly manner as prescribed by the Potsdam Agreement." While admitting that "the very cold weather arrived unexpectedly early this year," he held the Polish government responsible for the casualties. The transfer to the British zone was suspended and was not resumed after January, 1947.

6.

The organized transfer of Germans carried out on the basis of the Potsdam decisions and in accordance with the scheme prepared by the Allied Control Council in Berlin, was considerably delayed in starting. The Allied Control Council's scheme of November 20, 1945, was elaborated with regard to the British zone at an Anglo-Polish meeting in

Berlin on January 5, 1946. On February 14, after a tour of the area involved, Lt. Colonel F. L. Carroll for the British, and Commander T. Konarski for the Poles signed a more detailed agreement regulating organization of the transfer, which was rather unfortunately christened "Operation Swallow" (the Germans took it to mean that their evacuation was temporary, since swallows return).⁶⁷ Actual transfer operations started only on February 20, 1946, more than two months later than had originally been intended.⁶⁸

The British-Polish agreement provided for three land routes and one sea route.⁶⁹ Sea transport was scheduled to run from Szczecin (Stettin) to Lübeck at the rate of approximately 1,000 persons per day. Should it prove necessary to close the port of Szczecin, either Gdańsk (Danzig) or Gdynia would be used instead. Land routes were: (1) from Szczecin to Bad Segeberg by rail, at the rate of 1,500 per day; (2) from Kalawsk (Kohlfurt) to Mariental and Alversdorf by rail, at the rate of 3,000 per day (two trains); (3) from Kalawsk to Friedland by rail, at the rate of 2,500 per day—to be started later. British repatriation teams, stationed at Szczecin and Kalawsk, were appointed to inspect and approve trainloads and shipments in Polish territory which should then be accepted without question by the British zone authorities. All German transferees had to be dusted with DDT powder supplied by the British. They were permitted to take with them as much of their own luggage as they could carry in their hands, including bedding and cooking utensils, and a maximum of 500 Reichsmarks per head; no currency other than Reichsmarks was permitted to be imported into the British zone. The trains had to be accompanied by Polish guards, approximately ten per train. In accordance with the length of the route, Polish authorities had to supply the transferees with two to three days' rations, plus one day's reserve. It was agreed that the first shipments would be confined to transferees in good health and that none would be moved who would require hospitalization immediately after arrival in the British zone. With regard to further shipments, Polish authorities pledged themselves to inform the C.R.X. (Combined Repatriation Executive) of all eventual hospital cases in order to ascertain when they could be accepted in the British zone. The same applied to orphans and to inmates of mental asylums and prisons. Pregnant women were not to be shipped six weeks before and after confinement. No splitting of families was permitted. In the event of sickness of one member of a family, the expulsion of the entire family had to be postponed until all members were fit to travel together.

The Polish-Soviet agreement on organized transfer to the Soviet zone of occupation was not officially signed before May, 1946. But actual transfer operations had continued uninterruptedly throughout the months preceding the conclusion of a formal agreement, whose provisions were similar to those contained in the Polish-British accord.

The transfer machinery established by the Polish government was headed by the Ministry of the Recovered Territories (*Ministerstwo Ziem Odzyskanych*, M.Z.O.). The Ministry was in charge of preparing the entire transfer scheme, including the timetable; it also controlled all transfer operations. In single voyevodships, the transfer action was headed by the respective voyevodas. Every county of the Recovered Territories had established points of departure for the prospective German transferees. The Polish Repatriation Bureau (*Polsky Urząd Repatriacyjny*, P.U.R.) was in charge of transporting the Germans and of sanitary care and feeding en route. It operated the transport trains between the Recovered Territories and the frontiers of the British and Soviet zones of occupation in Germany. The entire German population of the Recovered Territories was liable to transfer. First to be transferred were the nonworking and nonresident elements (for instance, war refugees from other areas). Then came the turn of Germans occupied in privately owned Polish commercial and handicraft undertakings, as well as domestic servants and Germans whose undertakings had already been taken over by Polish resettlers. The last category comprised nonskilled German workers in state-owned and municipal undertakings who temporarily could not be replaced; they were provided with so-called "green cards."

7.

The scope of the unorganized removal of Germans, which had begun long before the signing of the agreements regulating the transfer to the British and Soviet zones of Germany, cannot be established statistically. Only the census of February 14, 1946, and the subsequent transfer statistics provide a solid basis for tracing the process of elimination of the German population in the Recovered Territories.

On February 14, 1946, there was in these territories (including the former Free City of Danzig) a total of 2,076,000 Germans. Their gradual removal in 1946 was as follows:⁷⁰

February	10,717	August	198,801
March	131,638	September	88,993
April	153,439	October	97,660
May	231,357	November	123,391
June	241,778	December	106,311
July	232,470		

A total of 1,616,555 Germans were thus transferred in organized movements during eleven months of 1946, an average of 146,950 a month. The German population of the Recovered Territories diminished accordingly. On February 14, 1946, it amounted to 2,076,000 (41.5 per cent of the total population); on November 1, 1946, to 689,000 (13.5 per cent), and on January 1, 1947 to 433,000 (8.5 per cent).⁷¹ Of these 433,000, the majority were concentrated in the voyevodships of Wrocław (171,000) and Szczecin (166,000); the voyevodship of Olsztyn counted 56,000 and the voyevodship of Gdańsk 25,000 (including 12,000 in the former Free City of Danzig); insignificant numbers remained in the voyevodships of Silesia (10,000), Poznań (3,000), and Białystok (2,000).⁷²

The distribution of the German refugees and transferees from the Recovered Territories between the British and Soviet zones of occupation as of October 29, 1946, was as follows:⁷³ British zone—3,200,000 (57.14 per cent of the total); Soviet zone—2,400,000 (42.86 per cent of the total). In November–December, 1946, 229,702 Germans were transferred to both the British and the Soviet zones; there are no data on their distribution between the two zones.

Because of the extremely cold weather in Central Europe in December, 1946, and January, 1947, the Commissioner-in-Chief of the British zone, Marshal Sholto Douglas, decided on January 3, 1947, to call a temporary halt to the movement of Germans to the British zone over the Christmas period and the following fortnight, and thereafter to review the position every fortnight in the light of weather conditions. Sir Sholto expressed his conviction that this decision "would be in accordance with the undertakings made in Potsdam and those made in the subsidiary agreement between the British and Polish authorities."⁷⁴ "Operation Swallow," however, was not officially resumed after January 3.

On January 20, 1947, hard atmospheric conditions also stopped the organized transfer to the Soviet zone. It was resumed on April 20: 25,976 Germans were removed during the last ten days of that month,

78,415 in May, and 64,475 in June, 1947.⁷⁶ In the course of four months (from April 20 to August 20, 1947), according to figures obtained by the author from the Polish Foreign Ministry, a total of 326,956 Germans were transferred to the Soviet zone of occupation—an average of 2,680 per day. By June 1, 1947, the number of Germans in the Recovered Territories was reduced to 289,000, distributed as follows: voyevodship of Olsztyn—32,000; voyevodship of Szczecin—116,000; voyevodship of Wrocław—113,000; voyevodship of Gdańsk—18,000; the remaining 10,000 were scattered over other parts of the area. At least a part of them were deliberately detained by the Polish authorities as badly needed skilled workers: a Warsaw announcement published on October 14, 1947, in the *Neue Züricher Zeitung* estimated their number at 35,000. To this category belonged a compact group of German miners in the coalfield of Walbrzych (Waldenburg) in Lower Silesia, where mining was difficult and required particular technical skill. Many German technicians were sent into Central Poland—textile workers, for instance, into the Łódź area. The Polish authorities took pains to scatter the remaining Germans. The isolated ethnic islands represented no political danger and were encouraged (sometimes even compelled) to stay on as valuable additions to Poland's scarce skilled-labor force.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate accurately the number of deaths suffered by the Germans as the result of the creation of the Oder-Neisse frontier and a homogeneous Poland to the east of it. An authoritative German source estimates them at two million.⁷⁶ Analyzing this figure, Elisabeth Wiskemann found its components "too high . . . quite unscientific . . . highly deceptive," and came to the conclusion that "one may safely estimate that the expulsion of the Germans by the Poles cost something well under one million German lives." She reminded that "on the other hand, the war brought about by the German attack upon Poland is usually reckoned to have cost at least 6 million Polish lives, nearly a quarter of the Polish nation."⁷⁷

8.

The status of the remnants of the German minority in Poland underwent far-reaching changes between 1950 and 1954. Following the Moscow-dictated policy of friendship and cooperation between the "people's democracies," the Communist government of the East

German Democratic Republic on July 6, 1950, officially recognized the Oder-Neisse frontier. In December of the same year President Wilhelm Pieck paid an official visit to Warsaw. March, 1951, was proclaimed as a month of Polish-German friendship, and on April 22 President Boleslaw Bierut paid a return visit to Berlin.

In line with this new trend, a Polish decree of January 8, 1951, provided that all persons who had previously been German citizens and were still in the Polish-incorporated German provinces were entitled to acquire Polish citizenship, irrespective of whether they were of German or Polish descent, or whether they spoke Polish or German (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Pos. 106/46). In the same year the *Arbeiterstimme*, a Communist weekly in German, made its appearance in Wroclaw. Small elementary schools for Germans (with four classes and one teacher) began to open. In the autumn of 1954 their number reached 160, with 230 German teachers. Some of these schools also provided evening classes for young people who had had no schooling in the years between 1945 and 1951. German church services were authorized in some localities of Silesia and Pomerania. Germans were allowed to vote at the elections to the national councils in December, 1954, and three Germans were nominated as candidates.⁷⁸ Commenting on the marked change that had come over the Germans in Poland, Bronislaw Winnicki, the editor of *Arbeiterstimme*, wrote:⁷⁹ "For twelve years they hid their German-ness and even tried to speak bad Polish instead of their own language. Part of this was because they were not popular and to be a German was not a good thing. But part also was because they still felt some shame. No longer. Now they feel strong and very German, mainly because they have West Germany behind them."

Notwithstanding this favorable turn, a strong trend developed among the remaining Germans to leave for Germany. They saw no future for themselves and their children in Poland. Germany's unprecedented economic recovery and high standard of living exercised a powerful attraction. Another impulse was the desire of broken families, whose members were torn asunder, to be reunited. A letter published in November, 1957, in *Arbeiterstimme* gave concise and eloquent expression to this trend: "Some of us have only one goal, to join our kin in Germany. Since we consider ourselves as Germans, it is only to Germany that we wish to go."

About 204,000 Germans (out of a total of 300,000 ethnic Germans still in Poland) registered with the German Red Cross for repatriation to

Germany.⁸⁰ The British authorities, in collaboration with the Red Cross, inaugurated the so-called "Operation Link," designed to reunite separated family members. In the autumn of 1949 the Allied High Commission in Germany restricted to 25,000 the number of those to be admitted under the terms of this action. Nevertheless, from March, 1950, to the end of 1951, 44,000 arrived.⁸¹ In 1956 the repatriation was resumed: 33,036 Germans left Poland in the course of the year.⁸² In September, 1957, the Polish Western Press Agency reported that more than 23,000 ethnic Germans had left the Lower Silesian region alone since the beginning (in 1956) of the campaign for the reunification of families: some 6,000 went to the Soviet-dominated German Democratic Republic and some 17,000 to the German Federal Republic. About 2,000 Germans were leaving monthly from Wrocław and Wrocław voevodship for West Germany, and about 800 monthly for East Germany. The total for 1957 was 148,472. In the first three months of 1958, a further 37,080 left.⁸³ German sources claim that the Polish authorities "did not keep to the arrangements" and were dispatching, instead of family members claimed by their relatives in West Germany, sick, aged and invalid Germans unfit for work, and whom they "were not at all anxious to keep."⁸⁴

The German minority in Poland was dwindling fast and nearing complete extinction.

NOTES

¹ Polish Ministry of Information, *The German New Order in Poland*, London, 1941, p. 11.

² Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Polish White Book*, New York, 1942, p. 22.

³ *Documents on the Expulsion of the Germans from Eastern-Central Europe*, Vol. I, *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse*, Bonn, 1957 (later referred to as *Documents*, p. 95).

⁴ "Whatever a Man Soweth, That Shall He Also Reap," *Polish Review*, No. 4, November 16, 1942; "There Will Be No Place For Such Germans in Poland," *Polish Review*, No. 28, July 27, 1943.

⁵ *Underground Poland Speaks*, p. 9.

⁶ Edward Táborský, "The Minority Problem in Central Europe," *National Review*, September 1942.

⁷ *Polish News Bulletin*, December 5, 1941.

⁸ *Svenska Dagbladet*, October 22, 1944.

⁹ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, February 1945.

¹⁰ Quoted in *Der Bund*, February 5, 1945.

¹¹ *Documents*, p. 95.

¹² *Documents*, p. 96.

¹³ *Radio Polska* (Lublin), January 28, February 4, and February 22, 1945.

- ¹⁴ Federal Communications Commission, *Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service Report*, February 21, 1945.
- ¹⁵ Broadcast by the Moscow Embassy of the Polish Provisional Government, April 17, 1945.
- ¹⁶ *Polish Provisional Government Home Service*, Lublin, July 7, 1945.
- ¹⁷ *Dziennik Urzędowy M.Ż.O.*, No. 13, December 2, 1946, pp. 201-202.
- ¹⁸ Office of Military Government for Germany, *Statistical Annex*, Issue No. XXVI; *Report of the Military Governor*, April 1949, No. 44, p. 27.
- ¹⁹ *Buletyn of the Polish Research and Information Service*, October 23, 1947.
- ²⁰ *Dziennik Ustów*, Pos. 270-50.
- ²¹ *The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins*, Vol. II, p. 707.
- ²² *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, Vol. II, New York, 1948, p. 1265.
- ²³ Winston Spencer Churchill, *The Second World War*, London, 1948-1954, Vol. V, p. 763.
- ²⁴ Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory*, New York, 1947, p. 269. See also Arthur Bliss Lane, *I Saw Poland Betrayed*, New York, 1948, pp. 55 ff.
- ²⁵ Ciechanowski, *op. cit.*, p. 326.
- ²⁶ *Poland, Germany, and European Peace, Official Documents 1944-1948*, published by the Polish Embassy, London, 1949, p. 108.
- ²⁷ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, December 15, 1944.
- ²⁸ *New York Times*, December 11, 1944.
- ²⁹ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York and London, 1947, p. 30.
- ³⁰ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, February 27, 28, March 1, 1945.
- ³¹ William D. Leahy, *I Was There*, London, 1950, p. 474.
- ³² *Occupation of Germany—Policy and Progress*, The Department of State, Publication 2763, European Series 23, pp. 74-75. For the Polish appraisal of the Potsdam decision see Joseph Kokot, *Logika Poczdamu (The Logic of Potsdam)*, Katowice, 1957, and Bolesław Wiewiora, *The Polish-German Frontier in the Light of International Law*, Poznań, 1957. For the German view see Wolfgang Wagner, *The Genesis of the Oder-Neisse Line*, Stuttgart, 1957.
- ³³ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords*, March 8, 1945.
- ³⁴ *Occupation of Germany*, p. 75.
- ³⁵ *Speaking Frankly*, p. 80.
- ³⁶ *Occupation of Germany*, p. 151.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 25.
- ³⁸ Department of State, Communiqué No. 16, December 7, 1945.
- ³⁹ Maria Kielczewska Zaleska (Professor of Anthropogeography at the Nicholas Copernicus University of Toruń), "The Geographical Bases of Poland," in the collective work *Poland's Place in Europe*, Poznań, 1947, p. 45.
- ⁴⁰ President Truman said: "The territory that would be administered by Poles would grant Poland an opportunity for the better sustenance of the population. . . . Inhabited by Poles, it would lead towards the creation of a pure homogeneous nation."
- ⁴¹ John C. Campbell, "The European Territorial Settlement," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, p. 200.
- ⁴² *Poland, Germany, and European Peace*, p. 112.
- ⁴³ *New York Times*, November 28, 1947. On March 19, 1959, President Charles De Gaulle, at one of his rare press conferences, endorsed this position by stating that Germany's reunification and freedom "seems to us the normal destiny of the German people, provided that this does not bring into question its present frontiers." This implicit recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's permanent Eastern border was a blow for the Adenauer government. Responsible French political sources, however, held that General De Gaulle "did no more than state publicly one of the realities of international policy." *New York Times*, March 27 and 28, 1959.
- ⁴⁴ *Documents*, pp. 18-47.
- ⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 22.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 27.
- ⁴⁷ *Poland, Recovered Territories*, p. 38.
- ⁴⁸ Leopold Gluck, *Eighteen Months of Work*, Poznań, 1947, p. 8.
- ⁴⁹ *Polish European Service*, in Russian, May 26, 1945.

⁸⁰ Documents, pp. 42, 47.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 54-55.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 62. The General Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, which is responsible for these figures, admits that they "are based chiefly on averages, which were arrived at from systematic inquiries and a comparison of the statements in reports on the number of population in different East Prussian districts and localities". The Ministry believes, however, that although the figures "cannot claim to be statistically accurate, they, nevertheless, give us a reliable picture on how great changes in the number of population were" (p. 356).

⁸⁴ Leopold Gluck, *op. cit.*

⁸⁵ Leopold Gluck, "The Economic Reconstruction of the Recovered Territories," *The Western Review*, July-August 1947, p. 117.

⁸⁶ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, August 16, 1945.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, October 10, 1945.

⁸⁸ *New York Times*, October 20, 1945.

⁸⁹ Documents, pp. 109-110.

⁹⁰ *New York Times*, October 10, 1945.

⁹¹ *Boston Daily Globe*, June 4, 1946.

⁹² *Manchester Guardian*, May 23, 1946.

⁹³ *New York Herald Tribune*, May 22, 1946.

⁹⁴ *Boston Daily Globe*, June 4, 1946. The movement of Germans by railway was duplicated at various points, and particularly around Stettin, by sea transport. Every vessel unloading Polish repatriates from Germany and elsewhere in western Europe was immediately reloaded with Germans.

⁹⁵ *New York Times*, October 3, 1946.

⁹⁶ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, January 22, 1947.

⁹⁷ Elisabeth Wiskemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbors*, pp. 115-116.

⁹⁸ Polish Press Agency, March 1, 1946.

⁹⁹ *The World Today*, December 1946.

¹⁰⁰ *Statistical Year Book of Poland*, 1947, p. 20.

¹⁰¹ Leopold Gluck, "The Economic Reconstruction of the Recovered Territories," p. 117.

¹⁰² *Population of the Recovered Territories and of Gdansk, Kraków*, 1946, p. 16.

¹⁰³ Dr. G. Reichling und Dr. F. H. Betz, *Die Heimatvertriebenen: Glied oder Aussenseiter der deutschen Gemeinschaft*, pp. 10-11.

¹⁰⁴ *British Zone Review*, January 4, 1947.

¹⁰⁵ *Statistical News*, August 20, 1947, p. 242.

¹⁰⁶ Documents, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 158-160.

¹⁰⁷ *Germany's Eastern Neighbors*, pp. 121-122.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 273-275.

¹⁰⁹ Quoted by Sydney Gruson in "German Minority Quitting Poland," *New York Times*, November 28, 1957.

¹¹⁰ Documents, p. 121.

¹¹¹ Documents, p. 119.

¹¹² *Biuletyn Statystyczny*, 1958, No. 4.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, No. 6.

¹¹⁴ Documents, p. 119. According to Polish sources, some Germans from the Warmia and Mazury regions who had left for Germany within the framework of "Operation Link" had begun to return. The reason advanced for such a move was mostly inability to find appropriate work in Germany and frustrated hopes for better material conditions. Others were nostalgic for the abandoned familiar surroundings. *Western Press Agency*, 1957, No. 9.

TEN

Resettlement of the Recovered Territories

1.

At the Yalta conference Winston Churchill, while agreeing that Poland's western frontiers should be moved into what had been German territory, insisted that it would be a "pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that she will die of indigestion."¹ This implication that Poland would simply be incapable of "digesting," demographically and economically, the 39,986 square miles to the east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, became a potent argument against the final allocation of these territories to the Polish Republic. Ernest Bevin, then British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, said in the House of Commons on October 22, 1946: "We should also wish to be assured that the Poles were able to develop this territory so that the economic resources were properly used, and that it did not become a wilderness from which the Germans had been excluded, but which the Poles were unable to populate."² Five months later Mr. Bevin admitted that the area situated between the western Neisse River and eastern Neisse River "seems to have been repopulated;" but he still was not sure whether this was the case with regard to the "rich territories situated between Frankfurt on the Oder and the Baltic. Before finally transferring such a territory one has a right to study the question."³

Secretary of State George Marshall expressed the same doubt in a more cautious form on April 9, 1947, at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow. While conceding that southern East Prussia and German Upper Silesia with its industrial complex should definitely become Polish territory, he argued that in deciding about the "division of the remaining territory . . . we must consider what territory Poland needs and can effectively settle."⁴ Various members of the American delegation at the Moscow meeting repeatedly stressed that Poland would be unable to handle the rehabilitation and repopulation of the entire incorporated area and to realize its economic resources to their full capacity.⁵ In their propaganda against the Polish claims for Germany's former easternmost provinces, German nationalistic circles put particular emphasis on Poland's demographic weakness. Dr. Wilhelm Külz, Chairman of the German Liberal-Democratic Party,

told the representative of the journal *Der Abend* in Berlin: "The war caused such a loss of blood to Poland that she quite simply has not enough people to be able to administer such vast areas."⁶

The Polish government had been aware from the very beginning that its only chance to counter successfully the anticipated demands for restoration of the Recovered Territories to Germany was the rapid settlement of this area by the Poles and its economic integration with the rest of Poland. Polish statesmen entertained no doubts as to the validity of the Polish historical claim to these ancient lands and as to the strength of the legal claim based on the Potsdam decisions. But they were also not unmindful of the fact that, however foolproof their historic or legal argument might be, their ability to resettle and properly develop the Recovered Territories would be pragmatically more compelling and decisive. By the wholesale transfer of the former German population and its replacement by Poles, they made a determined effort to establish a demographic *fait accompli* and to put any would-be frontier-changers in the difficult position of having to deport millions of already settled Poles and move back millions of already evacuated Germans. At the same time, they endeavored to bolster their moral claim by proving that Poles were able not only to fill the regained area but also to make it prosper.⁷

That is why the speediest repopulation and economic reconstruction of the western provinces became task number one on the agenda of the Polish government. The necessity to counter eventual attempts at returning to Germany certain parts of the Recovered Territories had also decisively influenced the planning and timing of the resettlement effort. The chances that Poland's possession of East Prussia would be disputed being very slim, high priority was given to settling the more controversial western regions. By summer of 1947 it was calculated that in these regions five Poles had been resettled for every seven former German inhabitants, while in East Prussia only one German in three had been replaced by Poles.

Another major compelling reason for an intensive effort to repopulate and rebuild the Recovered Territories was of strictly economic nature. In the first Three-Year Plan for Poland's economic reconstruction this area was assigned a paramount part. Thirty-four per cent of the coal output envisaged in the plan was to be produced in the Recovered Territories, and so was 25 per cent of the pig iron; for coke the ratio was 34 per cent; for the metal industry 29 per cent; for railroad car production 50 per cent; for sulphuric acid 48 per cent; for superphosphates 71 per cent; and

finally, for coal electrodes 100 per cent.⁸ "What is the meaning of these figures?" asked Mr. Hilary Minc, Minister of Industry and Commerce, at the September, 1946, session of the Polish National Council. He replied:

They mean that without the Recovered Territories we would be unable to surpass our prewar consumption level, but would, in fact, be left far behind it. . . . If we tried for a moment to visualize Poland's postwar economy without the Recovered Territories, the picture would strike us as the blackest nightmare of low consumption, heavy overpopulation, and chronic unemployment; it would be the picture of a country so weak that its independence would have to be seriously questioned. Without the Recovered Territories there is no economic reconstruction of Poland. Without the Recovered Territories there is no economically sovereign Republic of Poland. That is why we say in our project that the integration of the Recovered Territories with our original areas should be completed within the scope and duration of the plan.

The task of repopulation and reconstruction, tremendous and difficult in itself, was even more complicated by the utter destruction suffered by the former German eastern provinces.

When Poland took over the area in the summer of 1945, it presented a picture of appalling devastation. Hostilities in these provinces, the last line of German military resistance, had caused destruction even greater than in other parts of Poland which had been theaters of battle three times during the war. According to figures published by the Polish Main Statistical Office, 123,800 farming estates in the Recovered Territories were destroyed or damaged; the losses amounted to 910 million zlotys. In addition, 177,824 urban real estates, covering 305,085 square meters, were destroyed or damaged: the losses amounted to \$918,670,000. The total sum of losses for farm and urban buildings amounted to \$1,092,079,000 in the newly acquired provinces as against \$1,197,734,000 in prewar Poland.⁹ These figures did not include buildings in the communication system nor military and industrial buildings. Since the area of the Recovered Territories represents one-third of Poland's total territory, their losses were almost twice as high as those in the rest of the country.¹⁰

Industry was destroyed up to 70 per cent. The branches which suffered most were: synthetic fuel (100 per cent), inorganic chemistry (95 per cent), artificial fertilizers, zinc, glass (90 per cent), quarrying and

lime kilns, machinery and tools (80 per cent).¹¹ According to the London *Economist* (February 15, 1947), destruction in Upper and Lower Silesia, where five-sixths of this area's industry had been concentrated, was immense. Of 1,032 of the largest plants in Lower Silesia, 344 were irreparably destroyed; in upper Silesia 46 per cent of all plants, including the entire synthetic oil industry, were completely demolished, and all of the coal mines were inoperative, although the majority were undamaged. All the railway wagons were removed or destroyed, and of 11,000 kilometers of railways 7,600 were wrecked. Sea and river ports were heavily damaged. At Danzig and Gdynia, only 6.2 miles remained out of the 21 miles of docks and quays existing before the war.¹²

The agricultural situation was even more serious. The Germans carried away what they could, burning and laying waste what they could not. Of 856,000 horses counted in 1938 only 8 per cent remained; of 3,920,000 cattle, 8 per cent; pigs, 4 per cent; and sheep, 3 per cent.¹³ The *New York Times* correspondent reported on November 4, 1945, that the Recovered Territories had at that time an average of only two horses to 250 acres of farmland and that some 1,000,000 farms were without even a cow. Only 5 per cent of the land on the larger farms and 25 per cent on the smaller ones was under cultivation.¹⁴

The results achieved by Poland in the repopulation and economic reconstruction of the regained areas must be viewed against this background of devastation.

2.

The process of demographic Polonization of the Recovered Territories during the period between February, 1946, and January 1, 1947, is best illustrated by the following table.¹⁵

Date	Polish population		German population	
	Thousands	%	Thousands	%
February 14, 1946	2,919	58.4	2,076	41.5*
November 1, 1946	4,375	85.8	689	13.5*
January 1, 1947	4,584	91.4	433	8.5*

* The remainder is composed of other nationalities, or is undetermined.

In addition, 240,000 people (228,000 Poles and 12,000 Germans) were living on the territory of the former Free City of Danzig (Gdańsk).

Immediately after the end of the extraordinarily severe and long winter of 1946-47, the transfer of Germans, interrupted by the weather, was resumed, as was the transfer of settlers from Central Poland. As a result of these two parallel processes, by June, 1947, the number of Germans had decreased to 289,000 and the number of Poles reached 4,743,000. The sum total of the population of the Recovered Territories (including the territory of the former Free City of Danzig) as of June 1, 1947, amounted to 5,283,000. It was distributed as follows:

POPULATION OF THE RECOVERED TERRITORIES¹⁶ (JUNE 1, 1947)

Voyevodship	Total population	Poles	Germans	Others
Białostok	55,000	53,000	1,000	1,000
Olsztyn	484,000	452,000	32,000	0
Gdańsk	399,000	380,000	18,000	1,000
Szczecin	951,000	833,000	116,000	2,000
Poznań	363,000	362,000	1,000	0
Wrocław	1,692,000	1,575,000	113,000	4,000
Silesia	1,339,000	1,330,000	8,000	1,000
Total	5,283,000	4,985,000	289,000	9,000

The density of population (as of January 1, 1947) is shown in the following table:

DENSITY OF POPULATION PER SQUARE KILOMETER¹⁷

Voyevodship	May 17, 1939	February 14, 1946	January 1, 1947
Białostok	48.4	14.0	20.2
Olsztyn	48.7	18.2	23.0
Gdańsk	142.4	65.0	75.2
Szczecin	59.3	29.5	30.7
Poznań	59.5	24.4	31.3
Wrocław	124.2	78.0	63.5
Silesia	156.1	123.1	136.9
Average density	86.4	50.0	50.1
Former Free City of Gdańsk ...	225.9	105.8	126.3

The Polish population, amounting on January 1, 1947, to 4,584,000, was composed of the following groups:¹⁸

Local Poles	1,067,000	or 23.2 per cent
Repatriates from the U.S.S.R.	1,650,000	} 41.1
Repatriates from the West	234,000	
Settlers from Central Poland	1,633,000	35.7

Thus, 76.8 per cent of the Polish population were by 1947 people transferred either from abroad or from other parts of Polish territory under schemes of organized migration: a ratio hitherto unparalleled. In the course of about two years (June, 1945 to June, 1947), over four million people had been transferred to and settled in the Recovered Territories. By the end of 1955 the area's population had reached the figure of 6,762,000, and in November, 1957, it exceeded seven million. Of this total, the "native" Polish population amounted to one million; five million were repatriates and settlers from other parts of Polish territory or from abroad; and over a million were children born in the area after it became Polish territory. The density of population reached 180 inhabitants per square mile.¹⁹

These results could obviously have never been achieved with Poland's own depleted population resources. The Warsaw *Rzeczpospolita* of March 27, 1945, in an article entitled "Reception of Repatriates," frankly admitted that "the war and the German occupation have exhausted the country in respect to population; in rebuilding our country we feel acutely the effects of our depleted population." On March 11, 1945, a broadcast by the Moscow Embassy of the Polish Provisional Government announced that in order to encourage the population increase, the Polish National Council voted special bonuses for families with many children: after the fifth child, the family would receive 500 zlotys, after the sixth 800 zlotys, and after the seventh 1,000 zlotys.²⁰ But it was clear that, left to her domestic demographic reserves and potentialities, post-war Poland would never be in a position to fully populate an area of almost 40,000 square miles, from which more than eight million of its 1939 inhabitants had fled or had been deported. The country's own population of 23 million (it increased to 28,997,000 in 1958), even living in an overpopulated area, was manifestly unable to "deliver" the several million settlers needed to fill the gap. The 1958 Polish population of the Recovered Territories (seven million) represented an aggregate of

three different components: the area's local Polish population, resettlers from Central Poland, and repatriates from the territories ceded to the U.S.S.R. as well as from the west.

3.

Prewar estimates of Polish population in Germany varied between 1.2 and 2 million. The 1910 census acknowledged the existence of 1.5 million Poles (excluding those territories which subsequently were allotted by the Treaty of Versailles to the Polish state). This number rapidly decreased in the subsequent German censuses, adapted as they were to the requirements of the German nationalistic policy. The census of 1925 mentioned only 214,000 Poles, that of 1939, 14,000.²¹ In order to conceal the actual size of the Polish minority, the German authorities deliberately emphasized and magnified local differences between separate provincial Polish groups and instead of classifying all of them as Poles identified them by the names of the provinces they inhabited: Mazurs, Kashubs, Warmians, and so on; they even invented a purely imaginary category of "Waterpoles," indicating people speaking poor Polish.

Although the abrupt "disappearance" of the Polish element in the German statistics was in the main the result of the subservience of German statisticians to the official "Greater Germany" policy, it could not be denied that a considerable section of the ethnically Polish population in the eastern German provinces had yielded to the process of Germanization, culturally as well as politically. Most of them spoke German, although they also kept their local Polish dialect, and in the plebiscite of July 11, 1920, held under Allied supervision, the Mazurians voted 97.86 per cent for Germany and 2.14 per cent for Poland.

Yet, notwithstanding persecution and Germanization, over a million people of Polish ethnic origin survived in the Recovered Territories. This ethnically Polish element was recognized by the Polish resettlement authorities as the core of the future Polish population of this area. Every person able to establish his (or her) Polish lineage and prove that he (or she) did not belong to a Nazi organization, who passed an examination of an investigating tribunal and signed a declaration of intention to become a Polish citizen, was granted Polish citizenship. The official Polish policy with respect to proofs required was a rather liberal one. Decrees pub-

lished on March 8 and April 28, 1946, defined these requirements as follows: Polish origin or manifestation of link with the Polish nation, and declaration of allegiance to the Polish nation.

As a result of the administrative verification operations, Polish citizenship was granted to Poles in the following numbers in the regions listed.²²

Opole Silesia	850,000
Warmia and Mazury	117,000
Gdańsk and district	25,000
Szczecin Vovyevodship	24,000
Wrocław Vovyevodship	15,000
Lubusz district	6,000

1,037,000

By January 1, 1947, their number had increased to 1,067,000, 23.2 per cent of the area's total Polish population. Eager to stimulate their attachment to their new Polish fatherland, the Polish authorities not only left in their possession the 840,000 acres of arable land they already owned, but added some 450,000 acres,²³ often taken from the German estates upon which they had formerly worked. Each farm, however, was limited to a maximum of 247 acres, thereby complying with Polish agrarian legislation.²⁴ In the Olsztyn area, where most of those "autochthonous" peasants were concentrated, they obtained ownership deeds for the farms, houses, apartments, and shops they occupied—in many cases the same places they had held before and during the war—several months in advance of all other Poles in the Recovered Territories.²⁵

Opinion about the value and national reliability of these "recovered Polish Brethren" differed widely. Minister for the Recovered Territories Władysław Gomułka stressed that the Polish government "does not wish to lose" these "partly Germanized Polish people, especially around Opole."²⁶ The *Manchester Guardian* correspondent was considerably impressed by the "important part" this native element was playing in the Recovered Territories: "Since they are familiar with local conditions, they have been given leading posts in the administration and almost every second District Governor I met was a Silesian Pole. They struck me as efficient and conscientious, though I felt some of them may have grown rich too quickly."²⁷

On the other hand, the same correspondent acknowledged that some people had felt the authorities were "too lenient towards the claims of

those suspected of being Germans two years ago who now claim to be Polish." Irving Brant, who went to Poland in the fall of 1945, also recorded "complaints of Polish repatriates from east of the Bug that the Polish peasants in Lower Silesia are more German than Polish."²⁸ Sidney Gruson of the *New York Times*, after a visit to the Opole region where over 850,000 of the "re-Polonized" Mazurians were concentrated, gave a rather contradictory evaluation of their "Polishness." In a dispatch published on October 1, 1946, he reported that "the Mazurians have embraced the new fatherland fairly enthusiastically, judging by the speed with which they have learned the language and have started to intermarry with Poles. They converse freely in Polish with their new countrymen, and German—the language they learned from birth—is hardly spoken at all in the city." Quoting Mr. Tadeusz Palucki, energetic Socialist president of Olsztyn, Gruson related that "intermarriage and the Mazurians' willingness to adopt the customs, language, and culture of the Poles is the best reason for supposing that they will cause no minority problem in the future." However, two days later, the same correspondent came to the conclusion that these hopes "probably are wrong" and that "the core of the pro-German minority . . . will never be Polish no matter how many citizenship certificates they take out." He admitted that in some communities the atmosphere was so Polish and Mazurians made up such a small part of the population that they seemed to have been assimilated well. But he noted that outside the cities, on the farms and in the little villages, where most of them lived, the Mazurians would tell him eagerly—in German: "We are Germans. We would go back if there was enough to eat there. We have Mazurian certificates, but we do not feel Polish." Gruson continued, "Their children, too, speak German and feel German. . . . It will be a long time, if ever, before any of them feel Polish. The older Mazurians rather imply that they expect German rule over this territory again before that happens." Similar was the experience of the *Newsweek* correspondent who spoke to people on the Katowice-Opole highway. He stopped two girls skiing along the road and asked: "Do you speak German?" "Ja, we are German." A little boy who was with them piped up in his childish voice: "*Draussen spricht Polnisch, zu Hause spricht Deutsch*" (Outside one speaks Polish, at home one speaks German).²⁹ It is likely that at least some of them had claimed Polish nationality merely to avoid being interned and expelled.

4.

Another basic component of the Polish population of the Recovered Territories were Polish settlers transferred from the rural districts of the prewar Polish territory. These districts had always been highly overpopulated. The overtly landless rural population, composed of estate servants and agricultural workers, numbered about 570,000 families. A further two million peasant families lived on dwarfish holdings with an over-all area of 20,195,383 acres. If an average of 24.7 acres for a sound, normal farm is taken as a basis, this area was sufficient for only 817,000 families. The remaining 1,183,000 peasant families constituted the hidden overpopulation of the Polish countryside. "Of all the East European countries it [Poland] had the biggest problem of concealed rural unemployment," wrote *The World Today* in March, 1947. In 1939 the number of Polish peasant families awaiting an allocation of land amounted to 1,580,000; this, with an average of 4.5 persons per family, was equivalent to at least 6.3-7.9 million people. The shift of frontiers in the east involved a loss of one-third of the population and diminished the number of such families to about 1,055,000, or 4.2-5.25 million people. This figure was not substantially reduced by the tremendous demographic losses suffered by Poland during the war. The German extermination action was directed primarily against the urban population. Farmers, expected to secure the production of foodstuffs, were on the whole spared. In addition, losses suffered by the rural population did not, as a rule, destroy entire families and were largely compensated during the war by the natural increase: the birth rate considerably exceeded the mortality. It can therefore be assumed that, despite war-time losses suffered by Polish peasantry, the above account, based on the prewar overpopulation of the country, was still correct when the war ended.³⁰

Before the war, emigration overseas and to some European countries offered a partial outlet for the teeming village population. In the five-year period 1926-1930, almost one-half million Poles left their country; about 50,000 people a year went to work in Germany. Had it not been for immigration restrictions in the United States, the numbers of overseas emigrants would have been much larger. In the ensuing years emigration fell off, until in the period immediately preceding the war, it came to a virtual standstill in the face of the growing difficulty of finding open

countries. In the postwar world the opportunity for mass emigration became simply nonexistent. On the other hand, the need for emigration grew even more acute than in "normal" prewar times. The destruction suffered by the rural districts of the prewar Poland west of the Curzon Line was tremendous. Of a total of 1,666,310 farming estates, 343,149 (20.6 per cent) were destroyed or damaged; the losses amounted to \$299,788,000.³¹

The land reform act of September, 1944, by no means completely solved Poland's problem of agricultural overpopulation. According to a report on the carrying out of the reform up to January 1, 1947, issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform,³² a total of 387,949 peasant families in prewar Polish territory had benefited from land allocation. Among them, farm laborers and their families constituted 6.9 per cent; landless farmers, 13.9 per cent; owners of miniature farms (one acre or less), 23.5 per cent; smallholders (owners of farms of less than ten acres), 28 per cent; the rest were gardeners, local workers, and so on. Landed property situated in former Polish territories and previously in German possession was also included in the land reform. This property—with an area of over 2.1 million acres—was settled by 79,544 families of farmers, smallholders, and landless farmers. In all, 466,593 peasant families in prewar Polish territories were provided with plots. Some 75,000 families were settled on farms left by the Ukrainians and White Russians transferred to the Soviet Union.³³ The total number of persons thus benefited can be estimated at 2.7 million, one-sixth of Poland's estimated farm population of 16.2 million. Over 510,000 peasant families out of the 1,055,000 in need of land allocation still remained land-hungry.

There was no fair chance of accommodating the Polish postwar population of 24,000,000 (according to the February, 1946, census), plus its natural increase, within the curtailed boundaries of post-Yalta Poland, which ceded to the U.S.S.R. 46 per cent of her prewar territory, including the rich black soils of Volhynia and Podolia. Colonization of the Recovered Territories offered the only possible outlet for Poland's surplus agricultural population.

The actual movement to the Recovered Territories started in the spring of 1945. On April 20, the Polish Press Agency in Moscow reported that in the previous few days 5,000 peasants from the Kraków district and 650 families from the Kielce area had moved westward; in the Warsaw area 7,000 persons had registered for departure.³⁴ An appeal issued

on May 29, 1945, by the Central Resettlement Committee reminded the Polish people that "an overpopulated countryside is no longer menaced by hunger." The appeal continued: "Peasants! There is no more need for you to emigrate. The new Poland has enough land for you. Do you want land? There is land in the West."³⁵

The taking over of the former German eastern provinces also created possibilities of an immediate shift from destroyed Polish cities to towns in the Recovered Territories. All appeals to the population of Central Poland stressed that not only peasants but city dwellers as well were urgently needed and welcome. The manifesto "To the Working People of Poland," jointly issued on April 17, 1945, by the Polish Peasant Party, the Polish Workers' Party, the Polish Socialist Party, and the Democratic Party, pointed out that "various industries wait for more workers, engineers and technicians. Merchants and tradesmen will be able to develop private initiative to the full for the benefit of society. A great part will be played in the task of reconstruction by the working intelligentsia. Social and educational work is awaiting them in the Germanized territories." Similarly, the war correspondent of *Polska Zbrojna* wrote on April 13, 1945, from Pomerania that "there is also an urgent need for carpenters, smiths, and mechanics. . . . Pomerania cries out for more pioneers in crafts, industry, and trade; for good administrators, architects, and engineers; for representatives of the working intelligentsia." Six weeks later, the Central Resettlement Committee promised that "town dwellers will find workshops and shops, black-coated workers will have employment in offices and civil services."³⁶

The appeals urged the population to make haste in moving to the Recovered Territories and stressed the advantages of an early arrival. "The sooner you go, the sooner you will reap the benefit, and the better the state of your new estate and dwelling house will be," insisted a broadcast of the Central Resettlement Committee. "Tens of thousands of your compatriots are there already, and more are arriving by train, car, other vehicle, or on foot. . . . Let us go West in parties and crowds, to our towns and villages, to work and plenty." The slogan "One Million Settlers in July" was proclaimed on July 5, 1945.³⁷ Yet the newspaper *Życie Warszawy* of the same date insisted that the million figure "is only the minimum . . . we shall exceed it . . . we must not count in months but in days, and even hours."

These enthusiastic and urgent appeals and slogans proved to be a double-edged weapon. While they indubitably stimulated a vigorous

resettlement movement among wider circles of the Polish peasantry and town dwellers, they also conveyed to certain dubious elements among the Polish population the feeling that the Recovered Territories were a Promised Land for quick and reckless self-enrichment. Paralleling the influx of *bona fide* settlers, which in the beginning was necessarily slow, a number of adventurers and profiteers rushed to the new provinces, which for a certain time became, in the words of *Poland of Today* (September 1946), "a sort of Wild West, the Mecca of plunderers and criminal elements." In a broadcast entitled "Why is it difficult to find room in westbound trains?" Radio Warsaw on September 10, 1945, vigorously denounced these would-be resettlers:

Decent citizens think that these trains are full of settlers. Each one of these so-called settlers has a passport and a colonization ticket entitling him to a free ride. The decent citizen is astonished when he sees the same trains coming back even more crowded, loaded not only with people, but with bundles, baggage, parcels, rucksacks, bicycles, sewing machines, typewriters, radios, and so on. The "settlers" return as carpetbaggers with all manner of goods which they acquired more or less illegally. The first trip was successful, so they try it again. When one province has been stripped, the "settlers" move on somewhere else: from Silesia to Pomerania, from Pomerania to East Prussia, and back from there to Silesia.

This wild looting of the Recovered Territories' riches continued for several months. Only after the Potsdam Conference had definitely placed this area under Polish administration and the Soviet military command had started handing over one province after another to the Polish authorities, could effective measures against carpetbaggers be taken. On February 14, 1946, the Ministry of the Recovered Territories issued special instructions for securing property, enterprises, and apartments left behind by German refugees and transferees, thus preventing their looting and destruction. Decrees and circulars issued on February 22, May 24, and June 26, 1946, barred the removal of movable property from the Recovered Territories to other parts of Poland.³⁸ The worst abuses were checked. But James Reston reported to the *New York Times* that in the city of Wrocław the period of lawless individual self-enrichment at the expense of the German population lasted far beyond the initial stages of the Polish administration. "Even the Poles," wrote Reston on August 2, 1946, "are not very proud of what happened here in the first eighteen months after the fighting ceased. Not only did Soviet

soldiers plunder the city and do what they liked with the Germans who survived, but when the Russian Army left, a wave of Polish entrepreneurs took over and grabbed what they could of the apartments, businesses, and possessions of the conquered populace. . . . Unlike Warsaw, where they have to rebuild if they want to house another family, the Poles of Breslau [Wrocław] merely have to expel another German family to get more space."

Even discounting possible exaggerations in Reston's description of the situation in Wrocław (particularly as regards the eighteen-month period, which is simply an impossibility as eighteen months had not passed between the cessation of hostilities in May, 1945, and August 2, 1946, when his correspondence appeared in the *New York Times*), it must be admitted that much lawlessness and injustice had taken place in the course of the early "Wild West era." Yet Reston himself acknowledged that "now, the authority of the central Polish government is well established. The battle for property has settled down under legal process. The central officials have assumed temporary control over every house, business, and factory, and rent them to any politically acceptable person who can pay the tariff." Notwithstanding all mistakes and shortcomings connected with the transfer of settlers from Central Poland, this movement proved to be of great importance for the Recovered Territories.

Up to the end of 1945, a total of 1,361,112 Poles had moved from Central Poland to the Recovered Territories. Most of these 1945 resettlers (286,897 of them) came from the heavily destroyed Warsaw district. Next in order followed the district of Kraków with 209,385 persons, the district of Kielce with 206,220, Łódź with 196,682, Rzeszów with 209,385, Lublin with 121,161, Poznań with 97,107, Silesian Dąbrowa with 53,899, Pomerania with 32,280, and finally Białystok with 24,524.³⁹

Simultaneous with the influx of settlers from Central Poland was the mass repatriation of Poles from the Soviet territory and from other European countries, so that by the end of March, 1946, almost all the agricultural holdings up to 100 hectares (247 acres) that were ready for immediate cultivation had been taken up. The resettlement authorities therefore decided to interrupt the transference of individual agricultural settlers from Central Poland as of April, 1946, reserving the still vacant peasant holdings for the hosts of repatriates from the U.S.S.R. and for re-emigrants from other countries. However, they proceeded with the parcellation and settling of larger estates and outlying estate farms of

over 247 acres, which for the most part were lying fallow; groups of associated settlers continued to arrive and either took over whole estates as cooperative undertakings or received small individual plots.

By January 1, 1947, the number of persons registered in Central Poland for transfer to the Recovered Provinces reached 2,217,000 persons (768,179 families). They came from the following provinces:⁴⁰

Voyevodship	Families	Persons
Kraków	118,600	341,724
Łódź	150,645	332,723
Pomerania	29,690	94,845
Lublin	73,863	272,412
Kielce	99,146	241,275
Poznań	58,766	161,176
Białostock	23,801	80,761
Warsaw	138,729	484,292
Rzeszów	74,202	204,908
Silesia	737	2,759
	<hr/> 768,179	<hr/> 2,216,875

As appears from the above table, the largest numbers of prospective settlers were recruited in voyevodships which had suffered most from military operations, namely Warsaw (484,000), Łódź (332,000), and Kielce (241,000), and from the overpopulated voyevodship of Kraków. Transferees from Central Poland formed the largest population group in the voyevodship of Szczecin—365,228 of a total of 924,105. They also formed the largest section of the Polish population in the voyevodship of Olsztyn—175,100 of a total of 387,235.⁴¹ "In some cases," reported the *London Times* of December 19, 1946, "whole villages [in Central Poland] have been lifted, men, women, children and their belongings, cattle and farm implements, and transferred to some German abandoned village in the west." The *Manchester Guardian* correspondent (August 25, 1946) saw, about 30 miles from Opole, a village whose inhabitants had come from a village near Kraków, called Naprawa, which was notorious for its poverty. "They now have more land and better homes than before. A peasant who had three acres and a hovel in Naprawa now lives in a well-furnished four-roomed house with 40 acres of land. Many others live in similar style, including the priest, who has 75 acres."

Notwithstanding mass migration to the Recovered Territories, Poland's central provinces seemed still to contain a large reservoir of "surplus" manpower. In the late summer of 1947 a Polish agricultural expert told Russell Hill of the *New York Herald Tribune* that, despite war losses and some transfer of population to the recovered areas, there was still an excess farm population of 2,000,000 in central Poland. "If we give these people farms of between twenty and thirty-seven acres, which we consider the proper size in the new provinces, there will still remain about 800,000 to be absorbed by industry." Internal migration continued also in 1948, and during the first ten months of 1949 6,900 families from nine voevodships in the "old" Polish territory settled in the voevodships of Szczecin and Wrocław.

The Polish authorities, however, were dissatisfied with the progress of the enrollment for resettlement and were doing their utmost to stimulate it. On February 16, 1952, *Życie Warszawy* announced that in the voevodship of Olsztyn 1,500 farms in fertile soil were waiting for occupants. On February 28 a government decree was published promising far-reaching assistance to small farmers and laborers from the overcrowded regions of Lublin, Kraków, Kielce, and Rzeszów, willing to settle on formerly German land; they were to be allowed a free journey of inspection, free repairs, *ad hoc* loans, and exemption from taxes and from compulsory deliveries for a time (*Tribuna Ludu*, February 29, 1952). *Gospodarska Planowa* (No. 52, 1952) reported later that 10,200 families were moved between March 15 and October 15, 1952; *Życie Gospodarcze* (No. 25, 1952) spoke of 17,000 families which were to be settled in the western territories. In 1954, 214,000 resettlers arrived, and 188,000 in 1955. The Polish authorities made a determined attempt at attracting young "pioneers": youth organizations were enjoined to find volunteers for agricultural work in the Recovered Territories. Five thousand such pioneers were reported to have been sent to the state farms in 1954, with several thousand more training for this assignment. Nevertheless, *Rada Narodowa* of November 20, 1954, complained that only 64 per cent of the year's quota of enlistment and only 55 per cent of the actual resettlement plan were fulfilled. At the same time there was also a very considerable movement out of the Recovered Territories: 154,700 in 1954 and 167,300 in 1955, so that the net two-year increase amounted to but 80,800.⁴²

5.

In order to stimulate, regulate and facilitate the movement of settlers to the Recovered Territories, the Polish government established a special machinery, comprising governmental and nongovernmental bodies. On the basis of the governmental decree of October 7, 1944, a Polish Repatriation Office (*Polski Urząd Repatriacyjny*—P.U.R.) was established on October 9. By a decree dated May 7, 1945, the P.U.R. was placed in charge of all matters pertaining to the movement of repatriates from the west and southeast, and of resettlers from Central Poland, to the Recovered Territories. Voyevodship and *Powiat* (district) Transference Committees, under the chairmanship of the chiefs of the general administration, were instructed to cooperate with the P.U.R.⁴³

Simultaneously a Central Resettlement Committee was set up with regional, district; and municipal committees under its jurisdiction. These committees consisted of the representatives of political parties, trade unions, and social organizations, and officials of the central and local governmental bodies. Their task was defined as follows: registration of farms and other establishments; assessment of the number of inhabitants an area should contain, bearing in mind its normal social and economic structure; setting up of reception centers for settlers until they could settle down on their own holdings; grouping of settlers in accordance with their professional training as shown by the certificate issued by the Repatriation Office. Owing to the shortage of railway transport, repatriation proceeded mainly by road transport, and even by foot; district committees were therefore instructed to establish information centers along the frontier, where prospective settlers would receive adequate information.⁴⁴ On May 14, 1945, the Government Delegate General (*Polnomocnik Generalny*) for the Recovered Territories issued a circular letter to the regional (*Okręg*) and district (*Powiat*) delegates urging them to carry out the resettlement action with the cooperation of regional, district, and municipal resettlement committees,⁴⁵ and to set up Resettlement Offices (*Wydziały Osiedlencze*) and Reference Sections for Resettlement (*Referaty Osiedlencze*) attached to the district administration offices (*Starostwa Powiatowe*) in the Recovered Territories. The task of the Resettlement Offices was "to secure the planned distribution of repatriates and settlers." They had to establish contact with the regional resettlement committee (*Wojewódzki Komitet Przesiedlency*) of the districts

from which the repatriates or settlers were being transferred and to distribute among the latter copies of the title deeds to farms, houses, and workshops; they were also charged with securing food and transport for settlement purposes. The task of the Resettlement Reference Sections included endorsing of certificates issued by the resettlement authorities of the district from which the repatriate or settler had been transferred; organizing the transfer of farms or other places of habitation (the transfer had to take place not earlier than one month, and not later than two months after the arrival of the resettler); preparation, twice a month, of reports on the progress of the resettlement action, and notification of the Settlement Offices as to the number of vacant farms and places of work and habitation for resettlement purposes.⁴⁶

Following the establishment, on November 13, 1945, of a special "Ministry for the Recovered Territories" (*Ministerstwo Ziemi Odzyskanych*) under Deputy Premier and Secretary General of the Polish Workers (Communist) Party, Wladyslaw Gomułka (*Dziennik Ustaw*, Pos. 294/45), the Polish Cabinet decided to appoint "special commissioners for insuring the efficiency of the settlement campaign." The position of Chief Commissioner was assumed by Wladyslaw Wolski, Undersecretary in the Ministry of Public Administration, who nominated regional Commissioners for Central Poland and the Recovered Territories. The regional commissioners, in turn, appointed district commissioners. All government and municipal organs dealing with resettlement were put under the authority of the commissioners. Special courses for instructors and task group leaders were also organized. In July, 1946, 24 instructors, who had completed training in the third course for instructors, and 70 task group leaders were sent to the regions of Olsztyn, Gdańsk, West Pomerania, and Lower Silesia.⁴⁷

The staffing of this new administrative machinery presented staggering difficulties. Even the "old" Polish territory suffered from a marked shortage of trained public officials. During the German occupation of the country cadres of the Polish intelligentsia were drastically depleted; the Germans were particularly hard on persons with administrative experience. At the early stage of the resettlement operation, very few of those who had survived in various German concentration camps succeeded in returning to Poland, and the repatriation of the political émigrés from abroad had not yet begun. The available scarce personnel were badly needed in Central Poland, and every official sent to occupy an administrative position in the Recovered Territories left a gap in the

administration of other parts of the country. Those who went had to travel in ramshackle trucks which often broke down on the way—not to speak of the fact that each of the trucks with its requisite load of petrol reduced the already inadequate transport supplying the towns of Central Poland with food. The entire personal baggage of the dispatched officials often consisted of a single change of underwear and a stock of food sufficient for a few days, carried sometimes in a rucksack, but usually in a sack slung by a string over the shoulders, as all rucksacks had been confiscated by the Germans.

Apart from governmental bodies and *ad hoc* resettlement organizations, spreading of relevant information about the Recovered Territories and propaganda for resettlement there was channeled through the Polish trade unions and political parties.

A manifesto "To the Working People of Poland," issued by four leading Polish parties, appealed to the peasant youth "to break from the old life and poverty and to go to the West to reach for a new life for themselves and Poland. . . . Peasants, organized in self-aid societies and transferred to the western territories will take over German possessions. They must show initiative and set a good example, to encourage more peasants to come there."⁴⁸ The Association for Western Lands also launched a large-scale resettlement campaign. Resettlers were registered, provided with extensive information on the resettlement area, and given proper directives and help throughout the journey and on arrival. At their destination they received food cards and accommodation. Propaganda was conducted under the watchword: "The right man in the right place." The Association took "special care that settlers picked for the Recovered Territories maintain a particularly high ethical and ideological level."⁴⁹ A special Resettlement Fund was established to help the state in carrying out the repopulation of the regained lands: shops and offices were busy selling stamps of 50, 100, and 500 zlotys; theater and movie returns were often donated.⁵⁰ The Bureau for Resettlement and Transference Studies at Kraków, in conjunction with the Central Resettlement Committee and the governmental bodies, prepared a detailed plan for the transfer from Central Poland to the Recovered Territories.⁵¹ Resettlers and those among the local Polish population who had suffered under the German rule were granted far-reaching tax privileges.⁵²

6.

The third major component of the Polish population in the Recovered Territories were the "repatriates"—people transferred from the territories ceded to the U.S.S.R. under the Polish-Soviet agreement and those who had returned from other European countries. The transfer from the Soviet Union has been dealt with extensively in Chapter 7 of this study. Fewer in numbers, the groups of Polish repatriates from several countries of western, northern, central, and south-eastern Europe who had settled there before World War II were diverse in background and characteristics.

The most numerous Polish colony in Europe was that of France. After the war it numbered 325,000, about 23 per cent of the total number of foreigners in that country. The Poles were occupied mainly in agriculture and forestry (76,000), mining (53,000), industry (41,000), transport (8,735), commerce and banking (6,305), liberal professions (4,271), domestic service (11,864), and so on.⁵³ Spontaneous repatriation to Poland started at the end of 1945. It assumed an organized character in 1946, when an agreement was reached with the French government and 5,000 families of miners and 2,000 peasant families, totaling 22,373 persons, arrived in the Recovered Territories.⁵⁴ In the first seven months of 1947, 34 transports brought from France 8,245 families. Among them were 2,812 peasant families, 2,010 families of industrial workers, 2,380 families of miners, and 974 families of artisans and tradesmen.⁵⁵ By August, 1947, about 50,000 Poles, 18 per cent of the Polish émigrés in France, had left for Poland.⁵⁶ They represented a particularly valuable asset for the Recovered Territories. The farmers introduced new methods of intensive agricultural economy which they had learned in France; some brought considerable agricultural equipment. For instance, an entire train was needed for the transport of eight peasant families who left France late in August, 1947, carrying with them 64 head of cattle and horses, four trucks, several electric motors and agricultural machines, and great quantities of seeds.⁵⁷ Skilled miners from France were welcome in Lower Silesia's mining industry. The *Manchester Guardian* correspondent, who spoke to Polish repatriates in the important coal mining center of Walbrzych, reported (August 26, 1946) that "all said they were happy and would not return [to France] even if they had the choice. . . . They lead a much happier life in Poland today than they

ever did in France. . . . Housing and food, they said, were superior to anything they had when working in French mines. . . . They constantly write to other Poles still in France urging them to come to Poland. Almost every day more arrive to find jobs waiting for them." The quota for 1948 was 16,000.⁵⁸

The Polish colony in Belgium before the war numbered about 25,000, almost exclusively coal miners working in the districts of Limburg, Liège, Charleroi, and Namur. Their repatriation started in 1946 when the first 2,402 resettlers arrived in the Recovered Territories.⁵⁹ Between July, 1946, and December, 1947, 4,288 Poles returned from Belgium.⁶⁰ Thereafter the influx abated.

From Denmark, where about 10,000 Polish immigrants, predominantly agricultural workers, had settled before World War I, 5,000 arrived.⁶¹

When Germany capitulated in May, 1945, several Polish ethnic islets were scattered over all four zones of occupation. According to prewar German statistics, they numbered 132,253; Polish sources estimated the over-all number at about 260,000, with some 50-60,000 in the Soviet zone, and approximately 200,000 in three other zones, principally in Westphalia, the Rhine area, Bavaria, Holstein, and Hamburg. Fifty per cent of this Polish minority in Germany were workers and 25 per cent were occupied in agriculture, the rest being tradesmen, employees, small artisans, and members of free professions.⁶²

Only a relatively small percentage of this important Polish minority returned to Poland during the second half (July-December) of 1946: 10,397 came from the Soviet zone, 3,238 from the French, and 553 and 509 respectively from the American and British zones, a total of 14,697; by the end of March, 1947, the total number reached 17,039.⁶³ In August, 1947, the Polish Military Mission in Berlin reached an agreement with the Soviet occupation authorities providing for voluntary repatriation from the Soviet zone of Polish emigrants who had settled there years earlier. The repatriates, mostly artisans, industrial workers, and members of liberal professions, were allowed to take with them all their movable property, including household furniture, modern agricultural machines, complete equipment of their workshops, doctor and dentist cabinets, etc. During the months of August-November, 1947, 570 families comprising 2,000 persons arrived in the voyevodships of Wrocław (where, by August 1, 1947, 1,150 repatriates from Germany were already settled), Szczecin, and Olsztyn.⁶⁴ Between July, 1946, and

December, 1947, a total of 46,287 Polish repatriates and re-emigrants returned from the Soviet zone.⁶⁵

The process of repatriation of the 100,000 Polish industrial workers and miners from Westphalia and the Upper Rhine region in the British zone of occupation proved to be much more difficult. Although Polish settlement in Westphalia was almost 100 years old, 75 per cent of the Poles in this province had fully preserved their language and national consciousness.⁶⁶ Some 13,000 Westphalian Poles spontaneously registered with Polish consular officials in the British zone for transfer to the Recovered Territories. British occupation authorities, however, contended for a long time that "these persons are now Germans"; while accepting individual requests for emigration to Poland, they insisted that no organized transfer could be considered since the "German economy cannot stand the loss of these persons."⁶⁷ Not until February, 1948, did they acquiesce in planned repatriation, promising not to oppose the departure of the first batch of 12,000 Polish miners, metal workers, and farmers.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, two months later Polish authorities were still complaining that of the 34,000 Westphalian Poles who had by that time applied for repatriation only 247 had actually arrived in Poland.⁶⁹

In about 1890 a group of Poles from Galicia, which was at that time part of the Austro-Hungary Monarchy, had settled in Bosnia, another province of the Monarchy; between 1900 and 1908 other Polish groups joined the original settlers. When Bosnia became a province of Yugoslavia, they became Yugoslav citizens. Their prewar number was estimated at 16,500; there were also about 6,500 Polish nationals in Yugoslavia.⁷⁰ On July 1, 1945, a meeting of this Yugoslav Polish group unanimously decided to return to Poland. A special delegation was sent to the Recovered Territories and, after thorough prospecting, selected a compact area in two administrative districts of the vovodship of Wroclaw.⁷¹ On January, 2, 1946, the Polish and Yugoslav governments signed a "protocol concerning the resettlement of Poles from Yugoslavia."⁷² The Yugoslav government gave its consent to the voluntary transfer of "Yugoslav citizens of Polish nationality whom the Polish government will settle on its territory." The resettlers had to cede their non-movable property to the Yugoslav government, but were entitled to take along all their household furniture, agricultural machinery and implements, tools, two head of cattle, and two horses; those who did not possess cattle and horses could take out three sheep and three pigs. Yugoslav currency (dinars) in possession of the resettlers had to be

deposited against a receipt at the Polish Embassy in Belgrade, to be used in Yugoslavia only. A mixed Polish-Yugoslav commission was entrusted with the implementation of the agreement.

By the fall of 1946 the resettlement action was completed. Thirty-two transports brought 15,201 Poles from Yugoslavia, together with 3,600 cows, 1,000 horses, 2,000 sheep and pigs, and several hundred tons of wheat.⁷³ An additional 100 families, mostly local intelligentsia, physicians, and small industrialists who had postponed their emigration in order to be able to take with them the technical equipment and installations of their trade joined them in June, 1947.⁷⁴ By August, 1947, a total of 17,000 Yugoslav Poles had settled in the voyevodship of Wroclaw.

Nine thousand Poles registered for transfer in Rumania; 552 pioneers returned in 1946.⁷⁵ The first two transports to arrive in 1947, comprising 1,000 persons, among them a considerable percentage of skilled industrial workers and artisans, reached Lower Silesia in May; a further transport of 780 was reported in Katowice the following month; in July a transport of 615 people arrived, mostly peasants with all their belongings, agricultural implements, horses, cows, and several hundred pigs and sheep;⁷⁶ they settled predominantly around Wroclaw, where a total of 1,450 resettlers from Rumania were registered by August 1, 1947. By the end of 1947 a total of 4,208 Poles had returned from Rumania.⁷⁷

The Recovered Territories also became the abode of a considerable portion of the remnants of Polish Jewry. Of the 86,000 Jews living in Poland in the spring of 1946, 20,000 were concentrated in Upper Silesia, 16,300 in Lower Silesia, and 1,200 in the area of the former Free City of Gdańsk.⁷⁸ By July, 1948, the number of Polish Jews settled in Lower Silesia alone had reached 50,000. Some 20 per cent of this number found occupation in mining, 25 per cent in industry, 16 per cent in handicraft, 4 per cent in agriculture, 7 per cent in free professions, 19 per cent in teaching, health services, and institutions of social welfare, and 7 per cent in trade.⁷⁹ As early as August 28, 1946, the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent met Jews wherever he went in Upper and Lower Silesia—in business, in free professions, and even in coal mines, where they were earning the same wages as other miners and seemed to get on well with their non-Jewish colleagues; this also applied to the Jewish textile workers. *Głos Łódzi*, organ of the Polish Workers' Party, pointed out on June 13, 1947, that Polish Jews repatriated from the U.S.S.R. and resettled in Lower Silesia were establishing better production records in heavy industry and mining than the Germans who had worked there

before the province was incorporated by Poland. In August, 1947, this author visited several Jewish individual farms and collective settlements in Dziordzonów (voyevodship of Wrocław). They seemed to get on not too badly, although many colonists lacked the feeling of security and stability. In fact, as noted in the previous chapter, a very high percentage of the Jewish repatriates left Poland for Israel.

The following table gives an over-all picture of the resettlement of the repatriates in various voyevodships by January 1, 1947.⁸⁰

Voyevodship	In the country		In towns		Altogether	
	Families	Persons	Families	Persons	Families	Persons
Olsztyn	15,545	59,883	18,158	53,329	33,703	113,212
Białystok (part) ..	807	2,461	1,816	5,781	2,623	8,242
Gdańsk (part) ..	7,697	28,856	17,128	76,521	24,825	105,377
Szczecin	39,918	152,569	49,112	177,816	89,030	330,385
Poznań (part) . . .	28,557	114,380	20,873	72,619	49,430	186,690
Wrocław	112,877	410,161	95,897	307,949	208,774	718,110
Silesia (part)	23,320	93,566	47,837	143,917	71,157	237,483
	228,721	861,876	250,821	837,932	479,542	1,699,808

The Polish population of the Recovered Territories comprised several distinct groups with different backgrounds and was far from being culturally homogeneous. The local Poles, over one million strong, comprised a sharply defined entity. The bulk of them lived in a compact mass in Opole-Silesia (850,000), while smaller groups were scattered over other provinces of the area, especially in the Mazury, Warmia, Złotów, and Bytów regions. They formed a cultural unit with very pronounced social characteristics; the overwhelming majority were workers and peasants. Their cultural level was described as "extremely high." According to Dr. Roman Lutman, director of the Silesian Institute, this group "kept its Polish regional culture, which is not, of course, without some measure of German influence, but the core of which is undoubtedly Polish. . . . Only now are they slowly coming within the reach of Polish cultural life." This group had to "become not only outwardly, but also inwardly conscious of their belonging to the Polish nation."⁸¹

The repatriates from the territories beyond the Curzon Line presented a different pattern. Their "Polishness" was above suspicion, but their cultural level was considerably lower than that of the local Germanized

Poles, whom they did not trust and who, in turn, regarded them as lazy because, coming from the rich black earth belt east of Lwów, they hesitated to work earnestly on thin land which required potash and lime.⁸² Some of them "are longing for their old homes in the east, now destroyed in battle or taken over by the Russians,"⁸³ and they tried to preserve the habits and memories of their old homes, eating and meeting at the same places and refusing as yet to mix with the local population.⁸⁴

Also among those with distinct characteristics were Polish repatriates from Yugoslavia, miners from France and Belgium, or those who had lived in Germany proper. Each of these groups returned with a cultural background, way of life, and habits of its own. Their integration into the common pattern of Polish culture in the Recovered Territories presented a difficult and complicated task.

A great deal of animosity against both the repatriates and the partly Germanized local Poles was manifested by the transferees from Central Poland who considered themselves the only "true and one hundred per cent Poles." The Ministry of Recovered Territories issued, on August 13, 1946, a special circular deploring the fact that not all strata of Polish society, including even government officials, were showing a proper attitude toward the repatriates, who by their returning to Poland "had proved their patriotism and active adaptability to the new realities of the Polish State." The circular insisted that the repatriates, as an "economically weaker element, torn from their working places, be given all possible help and support by the state authorities. . . . Otherwise an atmosphere of anger, bitterness, and depression is liable to be created among the repatriates, undermining the collective effort for the up-building of a better future."⁸⁵

Mutual adaptation and cultural unification of the heterogeneous elements was from the very beginning a major problem in the Recovered Territories. Fully aware of the importance of a consistent cultural policy in this area, the Polish government created an extensive network of houses for children, kindergartens, primary schools, professional schools, teachers' colleges, courses for adults, and schools for higher learning.⁸⁶ The Western Press Agency (July 1957) pointed out that among the most important factors shaping the new community were marriages between representatives of various groups, which tended to do away with the differences between them. The number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants in the Recovered Territories exceeded the all-Polish average.

The population was younger and had a higher birthrate than other parts of the country. More than one-third of the people living in the area had been born there.⁸⁷ It seemed likely that the structure, character, and future of the new Polish community would be determined by this younger generation rather than by further influx of new settlers.

7.

The repopulation of the individual provinces did not progress at an equal pace.

By August, 1947, the highest number of inhabitants (1,700,000) was reported for the voyevodship of Wroclaw. Of this number 1,586,500 were Poles, almost all resettlers; not more than 15,600 local Poles were to be found in this province. The majority of the newcomers were repatriates from the U.S.S.R. (818,000) and other European countries (30,000), as well as from overseas (900). They settled mostly in the country (486,500); the towns attracted 362,400 people. The settlers from Central Poland (722,000) were distributed almost equally between the urban areas (364,000) and the rural (358,000).⁸⁸

The voyevodship of Silesia, whose possession by Poland was most earnestly disputed, in 1947 had a population of 1,399,000 (including some 8,000 Germans). The largest group in the area comprised a solid block of local Polish stock. Among the resettlers, repatriates from the territories ceded to the U.S.S.R. totaled 237,483; the majority of them (143,917) settled in the towns.

The population of the voyevodship of Szczecin (951,000—including 116,000 Germans—in June, 1947) consisted almost exclusively of repatriates and transferees. According to figures of November 1, 1946, there were not more than 15,080 local Poles in this area. The majority among the newcomers constituted transferees from Central Poland (365,228) who settled mostly in the rural districts (204,061); 161,227 went to the towns. Among the 330,385 repatriates from the U.S.S.R. the majority settled in the towns (171,816) while the rural areas attracted 152,569.⁸⁹

Next in size of population came the voyevodship of Olsztyn with 484,000 inhabitants (among them 32,000 Germans). Local Poles, though a minority, comprised here on January 1, 1947, a considerable group of 78,843. Transferees from Central Poland (175,000) exceeded

the number of repatriates by 61,785; the latter settled predominantly in the rural districts (59,883).

Of lesser importance were the results achieved in the remaining voyevodships.⁹⁰

It is extremely difficult to follow the further evolution of the Recovered Territories because after 1949 they no longer existed as a distinct entity. In order to stress the progressing integration of this area into Poland's over-all political and economic fabric, the Polish government on January 11, 1949, abolished the Ministry of Recovered Territories (*Dziennik Ustaw*, No. 4, Pos. 22) and with it the separate administration of these territories, whose very name had indicated the recent character of their incorporation into Poland; it was replaced by a purely geographical denomination, "Western Territories." This reform was completed by a law of June 28, 1950, which reorganized the voyevodships of Poland into what were claimed to be more economically rational divisions (*Życie Gospodarcze*, No. 14, 1950). To the voyevodship of Gdańsk (Danzig) were added portions of interwar Germany; the voyevodship of Olsztyn was expanded, and three new voyevodships of Koszalin, Zielona Góra, and Opole were created. The seven western voyevodships, whose total area (48,880 square miles) approximated that of the Recovered Territories, also included 3,700 square miles of "old" Polish territory. After 1950, Polish statistics no longer treated the Western Territories as a separate entity; all statistical data were thereafter collected and classified according to the administrative boundaries of local units. "This is why," commented the *Western Press Agency*, "from this time on, it is very difficult, or even impossible, to obtain separate numbered data for the Western Territories."⁹¹

The distribution of the Polish population between rural and urban areas on January 1, 1947, was as follows: rural—2,702,000 (54%), urban—2,326,000 (46%). The rural element thus predominated by a margin of some 376,000—reflecting the composition of the local Polish population, of whom about 600,000 were peasants and only some 400,000 townsmen. Among the newcomers, the proportion of urban and rural elements was almost equal, notwithstanding the special effort made by the government to encourage the latter. Among the settlers transferred from Central Poland the urban population was even in a considerable majority. It was only the repatriates from the U.S.S.R. (in addition to the indigenous Poles) who made up the balance. The changes that occurred during the period from January 1, 1947, to October 1, 1948,

further accentuated the predominantly rural character of the area. According to the *Western Press Agency* (December 1957, p. 6), at this latter date the rural population increased to 3,125,000, while the urban population numbered 2,498,000.

Agricultural and forestry holdings in the Recovered Territories totaled 23,475,779 acres, of which 15,732,853 acres were arable.⁹² Immediately after the cessation of hostilities, large-scale settlement began on these mostly devastated and deserted area. On January 1, 1947, the Polish rural population of the Recovered Territories amounted to 2,702,000, considerably exceeding the figure of 2,493,758 registered by the German census of May 17, 1939.⁹³ At an early stage, the principle of private ownership was carefully observed in the distribution and settlement of arable land taken over from the Germans. The decree of September 6, 1946, regulating the agrarian structure and settlement in the Recovered Territories and the former Free City of Gdańsk, made the individual peasant holding of from 17 to 47 acres (depending upon the soil condition, terrain, climate, and economics) the very basis of its agrarian economy. As in the rest of Poland, there was no attempt at that time to introduce the collective principle in farming. It was stipulated that not more than 10 per cent of the total surface under cultivation might be excluded from peasant settlement and devoted to other purposes: experimental farms, nursery gardens, government estates, and the like.⁹⁴

According to a report issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform, up to January 1, 1947, over 10 million acres in the Recovered Territories had been subject to Land Reform and 337,782 peasant families settled. Repatriates were given 121,212 farms, transferee farmers from overpopulated Central Poland received 162,957 farms, and the remainder went to veterans and to Polish farmers who had lived in the area before the war.⁹⁵ By December, 1947, the number of peasant families thus resettled had reached 446,000; 400,000 of them had by that time already applied for ownership deeds and 335,000 such applications had been granted.⁹⁶ Settlers had to pay for the holdings they received in ownership. The land was valued in accordance with its average yearly revenue. Repatriates from the territories ceded to the Soviet Union received their holdings free if they had left behind holdings of similar value.

Over 31 per cent of the arable land, i.e. about 4,878,000 acres, consisted of some 8,000 estates with an area exceeding 247 acres. At first they were administered by managers delegated by the Ministry for

Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. In March, 1946, a special body called "State Real Estates" was formed, entrusted with the administration of this category of land and its parceling. Estates and farms actually taken over by the State Real Estates embraced an over-all area of 3,136,970 acres, 2,137,415 of which were crop land.⁹⁷ With the exception of 185,305 acres sown to winter grain by the army, they were utterly barren. Livestock was almost nonexistent. There were in the whole area but 10 per cent of the prewar number of horses, some 8 per cent of the horned cattle, some 4 per cent of pigs, and some 3 per cent of sheep. The county of Boleslawiec (Bunzlau) in Lower Silesia, with an area of over 400 square miles and 5,181 agricultural holdings of various sizes, had altogether four pairs of emaciated horses, six cows, and five pigs. Manpower was desperately scarce. Only about 8 per cent of the Polish agricultural workers remained.⁹⁸

Nevertheless, a new organization of economic life was soon initiated. Part of the area taken over by the State Real Estates was in possession of the first wave of individual settlers as early as 1945. In addition, 1,233,000 acres were taken over by the army (for supply purposes—about 988,000 acres), by the state establishments for horse-breeding and the like (about 75,000 acres), and by several organizations and associations. This arrangement was at that time considered to be of a transitory character, with the exception of horse-breeding and plant-cultivation centers. In 1946 the State Real Estates assigned for parceling 650 estates with an area of about 370,000 acres of arable land. In addition to the land, about 80,000 quintals of grain, 70,000 quintals of root crops, 600 horses, 1,000 cattle, 1,200 larger agricultural machines, and about 5,500 tools and implements were allotted for settlement purposes. In 1947, 16,449 peasant families, organized in 1,505 groups, were settled on 925,120 acres of arable land allotted for parceling.⁹⁹ On the other hand, even though the main effort was concentrated on the reconstruction of settlers' holdings, the State Real Estates in 1946-47 were able to cultivate on their own over 1,480,000 acres with the aid of 25,000 draft units (a horse—one unit; and ox—0.7 unit) and 4,000 tractors.¹⁰⁰

In order to utilize farm buildings on larger estates subject to division, a special form of agricultural settlement was devised, involving installation of two or more families on holdings from 49 to 247 acres. Such families were to benefit in common from farm buildings and living quarters until such time as individual settlers would be able to build their own.¹⁰¹

Another form of agricultural settlement were the Parceling and Resettlement Cooperative Societies, which were considered but a transitory form of management of property that later on was to be allocated to individual owners. These Societies were supposed to exist for a period of no more than five years, after which they were to be dissolved automatically; they could also be dissolved at an earlier date, whenever they had served their purpose. Only a settler who had obtained from the administrative authorities a transfer deed for an agricultural property, i.e. had become the owner of his plot, was entitled to join the cooperative and to use, together with others, farm buildings and equipment which could not be adapted to the needs of smaller units. Withdrawal from the Society did not in any way involve loss of the land parcel.¹⁰² In the course of the first three quarters of 1937, 102 such cooperatives, comprising 2,179 families, were established on 216,904 acres of land. Every new member had to pay an enrollment fee of about three dollars and was obliged to contribute his share in the form of a certain number of work hours (helping in building his cooperative neighbors' farms, and so on), or by cash payment amounting to about four dollars per each 2.47 acres (one hectare) of his own farm.¹⁰³ Over-all supervision and management of this first experiment in collective farming in Poland was entrusted to a group of organizations (such as the Peasant Self-Help Society, the Rural Youth Union, *Wici*, and the *Zwiazek Walki Mlodych*) which formed the Social Council of the Parceling and Resettlement Cooperatives. The Council acted through its branches in provincial (*voyevodship*) and district councils.

Resettlement was carried out in accordance with the so-called "Regional Plan": for each region in the "old" territories a corresponding area was selected in the Recovered Territories, similar in climate, soil, landscape, and so on. Within a few months, 526 delegations were sent to the Recovered Territories by the All-Polish Council of the Parceling and Resettlement Cooperatives to set aside 332 estates, of which by the end of 1946 310 were taken over by resettlement groups; the total area of former estates under this type of management exceeded 416,000 acres.¹⁰⁴

A subsidiary form of agricultural colonization was the settlement of agricultural workers employed on estates slated for parceling and administered by the State Real Estates. A special system of obligatory deductions from wages and prices was to enable every worker, who did not possess the amount required for membership in a parceling co-

operative, to purchase the necessary equipment for the individual farm he intended to acquire after the parceling.¹⁰⁶

The Three-Year Plan provided for the allocation by the State Real Estates for settlement and parceling of about 568,000 acres in 1947, 568,000 in 1948, and 939,000 in 1949.¹⁰⁸

During the period from autumn, 1945, to spring, 1946, 4,420,000 acres of land were sown; during the period from autumn, 1946, to spring, 1947, the sown land amounted to 7,900,000 acres—66 per cent of the total arable area.¹⁰⁷ In 1946 in Lower Silesia, around Wrocław and farther towards the Czechoslovak border, almost all the land was already under cultivation and had yielded a fine harvest. The situation farther north was much less satisfactory, and was still less so around Szczecin.¹⁰⁸

Individual farmers were actively helped by the government. Hilary Minc, Polish Minister for Industry, stated in October, 1946, that 30 per cent of Poland's available agricultural machinery was being sent to the Recovered Territories.¹⁰⁹ Twelve thousand individual farms were supplied with seed, and 4,000 tractors were used for ploughing; fertilizers were supplied on credit.¹¹⁰ The plan for 1949–1951 called for the collectivization of but one per cent of the land yearly.

However, by the middle of 1948 far-reaching changes were introduced in Poland's over-all political and economic system. The government became the exclusive domain of the Communist Party. The Party plenum in the summer of 1948 heralded the intensification of the Sovietization of the country's economy. Key leaders demanded an outright "fight against all forms of capitalism" and gradual elimination of the well-to-do peasantry. Soviet Russia grew impatient over the "slow progress of the rural collectivization" and urged its determined speeding-up. In response the government increased pressure for the establishment of co-operative farms. Collectivization became the order of the day on January 1, 1950, when the Six-Year Plan came into operation. In 1950–1953 the number of collective farms grew from 240 to 8,000, and the area of farm land involved from 148,000 to 3,458,000 acres—6.5 per cent of the then cultivable land in Poland. The trend was particularly strong in the Recovered Territories. In 1952, of the land cultivated by the state farms, 70.8 per cent was in the six western voyevodships. By June, 1954, 40.7 per cent of the utilized agricultural land in the voyevodship of Szczecin belonged to the State Real Estates and 24.2 per cent to cooperative societies, a total of 64.9 per cent. Individual farmers were left with 35.1 per cent of the land.¹¹¹ According to the *Tribuna Łódz* of

January 14, 1955, the percentage of land worked by state farms had by that time reached 49 per cent of the total. The voyevodships of Olsztyn and Koszalin came next after that of Szczecin in the extent of their state farms, while that of Opole (where two-thirds of the peasants were "autochthonous") had the smallest area of land under state farm administration.

The government policy of collectivization did not fail to affect adversely the agricultural development of the Recovered Territories. In 1957-1958, when it became safe to criticize the "errors of Stalinism," the semi-official *Western Press Agency*, which specialized in problems of the Recovered Territories, admitted that "serious mistakes [had been] made in Poland's agrarian policy." Stressing that "the common cooperative farming of the former German estates by groups of settlers . . . was intended to be temporary, during the period when the settlers of a group were, with state aid, attaining the means to carry on individual farming," the Agency's report on agriculture in the Recovered Territories regretfully stated:

With the passing of time, the above forms of settlement, though basically transitory, acquired a permanent character. As a result of the change in Polish agricultural policy which took place in 1948 advantage was taken, above all, of this [collective] kind of settlement, to form farming co-operatives. This was not carried out without the previously mentioned errors, well known today. . . . These factors were certainly not of a positive character in the process of populating the countryside of the Western [Recovered] Territories.

By December 31, 1948, only 50.7 per cent of the agricultural land was in the hands of individual settlers; an additional 8.3 per cent was worked individually by the native Polish population. On the other hand, 17.2 per cent of the land was administered by State Real Estates, the State, and public institutions; 5.2 per cent was held by the Soviet Army, and 6.1 per cent by 1,776 parceling cooperatives and groups. During the six-year period 1950-1956 new settlers were discouraged from building their existence on individual farming. Of the 89,784 peasant families who arrived in 1950-1956 in the Recovered Territories, 40,575 (45.3 per cent) settled on State Real Estates lands, a further 5,027 families found their livelihood on state forestry enterprises, 2,560 families chose co-operative farms, and but 46,624 families (46.4 per cent) were enabled to settle on individual farms. Though the rural population in most of the

voyevodships increased considerably during the period 1949-1955 (an increase of 12.4 per cent in the Zielona Góra voyevodship, 12.6 per cent in the Olsztyn voyevodship, and 18.3 per cent in the voyevodship of Szczecin), the authors of the *Western Press Agency* report acknowledged that this progress was achieved "in spite of" the government's agrarian policy.

The Six-Year Plan brought considerable disillusionment to the rural population. It assigned far more investment to industry than to agriculture, which was supposed to increase by only 50 per cent. The settlement of repatriated peasants continued, though at a lower rate, but by that time the most attractive farms had been distributed, and the newcomers, having few resources of their own, often found themselves compelled to join cooperative farms; their enthusiasms was dampened and they became apprehensive of the future. Independent peasants felt oppressed by heavy taxes and compulsory deliveries of their products to the state. In the hope of reducing their obligations and avoiding classification as "Kulaks," they often divided their land between single members of the family, or abandoned parts of it, sometimes only temporarily; others abandoned it altogether and reluctantly went to work as laborers on a state farm.¹¹²

The new economic policy, inaugurated in October, 1956, by the government of Wladyslaw Gomulka, considerably influenced the ratio between collective and individual land ownership. The report, *Basic Information about Poland's Western Territories* (Part III, "Economic Problems"), published in 1957 by the Western Press Agency contains (pp. 12 and 13) a cautious reference to the fact that "in 1956, a great number of the farming cooperatives dissolved, and their farmland was acquired by private landowners. . . . Others, which were not dissolved in 1956, are being wound up at the present moment, in accordance with the wishes of the peasant farmers and to meet local farming conditions." A glowing account is given of the changes effected by this new trend. Admitting that the era of forced collectivization had "weakened the efforts of the farmers and resulted in incalculable losses in cultivation," and that "the greatest negative effect of this situation was the not infrequent occurrence of inhabited settlements being abandoned and the phenomenon of recurring fallow land," a subsequent report (No. 14, January 1958, pp. 22-23) says:

This whole unfortunate period is left behind us. . . . Within literally a few

months the fallow lands not only disappeared, but the state farms began to return to the peasants the lots which, having been abandoned, were in the past included in the state farms. For the first time since the completion of the land reform the peasants began to ask for the parceling out of the state farms. . . . The elimination of superfluous interference by the administrative authorities, the cessation of collectivization through administrative pressure, and an increased profit potential . . . all this has already caused a tremendous development in agriculture and will continue to do so.

The twelfth plenary session of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' (Communist) Party, held in October, 1958, officially "admitted errors in agricultural policy, particularly in the years 1951-53." Directives issued by the Central Committee conceded that "excessive burdens were placed on the countryside, peasant farms were allowed insufficient means of production, and the voluntary principle was violated in the formation of collective farms." While deploring the almost total dissolution of the collective farms after 1956, the directives specifically emphasized that no attempt would be made to re-establish them by compulsion; the existing system of compulsory deliveries to the state would be replaced by a system of taxation.¹¹³

The Peasant Party monthly *Wies Wsposzczesna* (*Contemporary Village*) of October, 1960, gives detailed up-to-date statistics on the virtual collapse of the collectivization drive. Of the 8,000 collective farms created since the end of the war, 6,000 were dissolved within a few weeks following the October, 1956, relaxation of government pressure, and little was accomplished during the period 1956-1960 to retrieve the situation. A total of 245 new collectives were formed in 1959 and 151 were established in the first four months of 1960; but in the same period 201 were dissolved. In April, 1960, Poland counted but 2,132 collective farms covering 1.2 per cent of the country's arable land and only 1.4 per cent of individual farmers' holdings. The tendency prevailing in recent years, including 1959, says *Wies Wsposzczesna*, was "continual limitation of existing collectives, a decrease in average land area (an average of 320 acres per collective) and membership (an average of 16 farmer members per collective)."

The Peasant Party's organ insisted that collective farming still was "the future of agriculture, and it should be encouraged wherever possible." Wladyslaw Gomulka even called for sanctions against peasants who resisted the regime's effort to increase agricultural production by "organized collective management." He claimed that 800,000 Polish

peasants had joined collective farms. But *Wies Wspolczesna* revealed that 54 per cent of the country's socialized farm acreage was in the hands of "dwarf" collectives (smaller than 247 acres), which usually consisted of three or four families using the collective-farm label to obtain preferential treatment from the government.

8.

The German census of May, 1939, listed 3,767,413 persons living in urban centers of the area which later constituted the Recovered Territories; on January 1, 1947, the urban population of this area amounted to 2,326,000¹¹⁴—a deficit of some 1,340,000, which was largely due to the utter destruction of the major urban centers. Of the approximately four million rooms which had been available for housing in 1939, about 1.5 million were 50 per cent destroyed during the war; minor damages affected a further 300 to 500 thousand rooms. Thus, one-half of the total number of rooms were not fit for use.¹¹⁵

Particularly acute was the situation in Wroclaw (Breslau), the largest city of Silesia, which in prewar times had a population of 600,000. During the final stage of the war, it suffered terrific destruction. A fanatical Nazi garrison defended Breslau even after the fall of Berlin. After an eighty-day siege, 249,000 acres of its territory were almost completely devastated, and the remaining 172,900 acres suffered severe damage. Approximately 77 per cent of the buildings were destroyed.¹¹⁶ The industry, of which Wroclaw was a great center, was over 60 per cent incapacitated.

But as early as May 10, 1945, while the city was still burning, a little band of Polish professors, technicians, and politicians from Lwów and Kraków, numbering exactly seventeen persons, entered Wroclaw and established the nucleus of Polish administration. Next came most of the streetcar operators and a number of workers from the power plant in Lwów; with the aid of Soviet soldiers and the frightened German survivors, they put out the fires, cleared away the mines, and got the power, water, and transportation systems working again. For a year, until the Russians obtained the settlement they wanted in Eastern Poland, the Soviet occupation army dominated the life of the city, removing a great deal of what had been left of the machinery in the undestroyed parts of

the city. Not until May, 1946, were the Poles able to take over on their own and master the situation.

Reporting in the *New Poland* (London) of April, 1947, on the "Pioneers of the Polish West," Stewart Valdar wrote: "Here (in Wroclaw), the Polish settlers came into a deserted and derelict, once beautiful town like a blood transfusion into a wasted and impotent body; the corpse revived, but it had assumed a new identity in the process." Joe Gang, special correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* (November 16, 1947), who had visited the Recovered Territories in May, 1946, and revisited them in November of the same year, "noticed remarkable progress."

Wroclaw, almost as ruined as Warsaw, was a dead city then; no lights, no public service, no shops, Germans in the thousands pulling their cart loads toward the station. It was dangerous to walk about the streets after dark. Today the Germans have almost completely disappeared. The few still in town lead an indoor life, venturing into the streets merely to sell the few belongings they have before departing to Germany. There is light, gas, and water, and trolleys are running. The streets are cleared. Several good hotels are open, some with bathrooms. There are good restaurants, cafés, and even an opera playing every night. In spite of its appalling ruins, the city is alive, full of activity, and all of it Polish.

In April, 1947, the population of Wroclaw already amounted to 203,000, including 18,000 Germans.¹¹⁷ In the fall of the same year the mark of 250,000 was reached; barely 10,000 of them were Germans.¹¹⁸ Seventy industrial establishments, employing 22,000 persons, started working; the most important, the National Rolling Stock Works, employing 4,050 Polish workers, in January of 1947 had an output of 390 railway cars.¹¹⁹ Thirty new school buildings had been furnished and eighteen hospitals rebuilt. The half-ruined university campus was restored and occupied by a Polish University and Institute of Technology, each with more than 3,000 students. Most of the professors and lecturers were repatriates from the University of Lwów. The wrecked radio transmitter was rebuilt and enabled to broadcast regularly. In 1958, Wroclaw had a population of 396,100.¹²⁰

Wroclaw was not an exceptional case. Many other cities and towns that had been ruined and deserted by the Germans were rebuilt and resettled by the Poles. The largest port in the area, Szczecin, was in pre-war times a city of 250,000. When, on August 5, 1945, it was deserted by two-thirds of its German inhabitants, there were only 84,000 Germans

and barely 600 Poles left. Six months later, in January of 1946, the number of Germans had diminished by half, while the Polish population had increased to 27,000. By January 1, 1947, the number of Poles had increased to 112,221 and that of the Germans diminished to 13,776. A number of industrial enterprises were set in working order, beginning with the sugar plant in Gumieniec (a suburb of Szczecin). In 1957, Szczecin's population reached the 240,000 mark. More than 30 per cent of this number were repatriates from Soviet-incorporated former Polish Eastern territories; the rest were settlers from Central Poland.¹²¹ In Olsztyn, a town with a prewar population of 60,000, "bombardment and the normal vandalism of the retreating and advancing armies destroyed 40 per cent of the city." Nevertheless, by September of 1946, its Polish population had reached the figure of 45,000, and the housing situation was strained to the point where the authorities had to limit each person to fifteen square meters of living space.¹²² In Silesia, the town of Walbrzych by November, 1946, had a population of 72,789; Zielona Góra, 39,991; Bytom, 93,227; Zabrze, 104,206; Gliwice, 95,835; Lignica, 24,437; and so on.¹²³

The over-all growth of the urban population in the areas of the Recovered Territories which later became incorporated into the seven voyevodships of the Western Territories (see p. 238) is illustrated by the following table.¹²⁴

URBAN POPULATION IN THE RECOVERED TERRITORIES
(in thousands)

Territory	Feb. 14, 1946	Jan. 1, 1947	Oct. 1, 1948
Western Territories including former Free City of Danzig	1,923.8	2,423.0	2,614.9
Bialystok Voyevodship (3 districts)	8.2	17.8	21.4
Olsztyn Voyevodship	96.0	154.8	163.9
Gdańsk Voyevodship (part)	208.4	292.7	318.6
Szczecin Voyevodship	307.6	412.9	459.4
Poznan Voyevodship (part)	106.1	162.9	171.3
Wroclaw Voyevodship	732.6	857.4	935.6
Silesia Voyevodship (part)	464.9	524.5	544.7

By the end of 1955, the urban population of the area had reached 3,441,000, almost equaling its prewar mark (3,767,413).¹²⁵ Paralleling

the growth of the urban population was the rebuilding of industrial production.

Industrial establishments were at first taken over by engineers and technicians sent by the Ministry of Industry. In the great majority of cases their main task was to make an inventory and to secure the existing equipment, buildings, and the remaining stock against destruction and pilfering by the numerous bands infesting the area. Special commissions of experts were sent to investigate the state of the damaged factories and the possibilities of starting them up again.

A considerable role in restoring the industrial activities of the Recovered Territories was played by so-called "Patronates." Industrial enterprises in the "old" Polish regions assumed care of analogous plants in the newly regained area. They "lent" to their counterparts professional staffs, of which they themselves were so short and which were indispensable for the reconstruction, refitting or even only the restarting of the deserted and badly damaged factories. These technical staffs organized vitally needed training courses for Polish workers. In some cases the "Patronate" enterprises were able to supply the missing machinery, or parts of it.¹²⁸

The pace of industrial reconstruction of the Recovered Territories may best be judged by the increase of the Polish labor force, as shown in the following table.

EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY IN THE RECOVERED TERRITORIES

Date	Workmen Employed		
	In Poland	In Recovered Territories	% in Recovered Territories
Aug. 31, 1945	441,057	75,235	17.0
Dec. 31, 1945	623,891	110,522	17.7
Mar. 31, 1946	765,005	171,136	22.6
June 30, 1946	851,833	206,393	24.2
Aug. 31, 1946	900,208	230,402	25.6
Dec. 31, 1946	1,005,334	288,694	28.7
Mar. 31, 1947	1,036,166	289,436	27.9
June 30, 1947	1,248,943	304,595	29.0
Dec. 31, 1947		540,365	29.5

Also highly instructive is the table showing the progress of rebuilding of separate branches of industry in the Recovered Territories and the

percentage participation of the state-controlled industry in this area in the total production of Poland.¹²⁷

SHARE OF THE RECOVERED TERRITORIES IN THE TOTAL
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION OF POLAND
Percentage for year

Branch of industry	1945	1946	1947
Coal mining	29.2	30.6	32.8
Iron and steel.....	3.9	7.8	12.0
Metals	1.7	14.7	22.0
Textiles	3.3	13.9	19.6
Chemicals	8.6	16.6	18.9
Minerals	7.9	37.1	40.0
Electric power	26.7	29.9	30.1
Gas and by-products	14.7	30.7	35.2

The state invested heavily in the industrialization of the Recovered Territories. Of the 68.5 billion zlotys invested in 1948, 18.7 billion (27.3 per cent) were allocated to this area.¹²⁸ These figures refer to "state-controlled industries." In fact, this category was practically identical with the total industrial production of the Recovered Territories.

At an early stage of reconstruction, private initiative was recognized as an organic and essential element of the area's economy. The then Deputy Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka emphatically stated at the ninth session of the Polish National Council (December 29, 1945, to January 3, 1946): "The Ministry of Recovered Territories has taken over city real estate, workshops, and small enterprises in the regained areas and those will be leased to cooperatives and private individuals. The Ministry will support private initiative of cooperatives, particularly in the productive industries. Private capital should find an outlet in production on the Recovered Territories."¹²⁹ The decree of January 3, 1946,¹³⁰ providing for the nationalization of industry in Poland declared as state property all the big and medium-sized industrial establishments; industrial enterprises employing not more than 50 workmen on one shift (in some branches of industry this figure was increased to 100 and occasionally to 200) were in principle exempt from nationalization.

"In the Recovered Territories, however," admitted the *Western Press Agency* in 1957, "the scope of nationalization was considerably wider . . . and even smaller industrial plants, which were not covered by the decree,

became state-owned, as did all former German property (with the exception of a few plants owned by members of the Polish native population or by foreigners)."¹³¹ A later decree, promulgated on December 6, 1946, divided the former German industrial property into two categories: one that was considered "essential" to the state, and another that was "disposable" and could be sold to individuals and corporations. "In practice, however," admitted the same source, "all industrial plants (with very few exceptions) were found to be essential as public utilities, and they were set apart for the socialized economy, to be run either by the state, the municipalities, or by cooperatives. A very limited number of industrial plants were leased to private individuals in the initial period of Polish administration." Of the 402,309 industrial workers employed in the beginning of 1948 in the Recovered Territories, 351,259 were employed in state industry, 18,360 in cooperative enterprises, and only 32,690 in private industrial enterprises.¹³²

Weakest among privately owned industry were small industries and handicraft workshops. Of the 180,000 pre-war workshops only 20,000 survived that were considered fit to be rebuilt and operated. Their number increased slowly: it reached 31,723 by December 31, 1947, and 33,358 by July 1, 1948, with 64,235 workers employed. The *Western Press Agency* regretfully acknowledged that "the development of heavy [state-controlled] industry was considerably faster than that of small industries and handicrafts."¹³³

This unequal development, which unfortunately as time passed became even more pronounced, unfavorably influenced the setting up of a balanced economy in the Western Territories. It had an especially adverse effect upon the economic situation of the small towns.

The managers of the state industry, who quite naturally devoted all their energy in the initial period to restoring the big industrial plants of the key industries, did not take sufficient interest in the small plants. A certain number of such plants were dismantled and permanently closed at the time when the basically correct but sometimes misconstrued idea of the integration of industry was being applied indiscriminately.

The overwhelming majority of the private workshops were concentrated in the production of consumer goods and in secondary industries. Of the total number of workshops in existence on July 1, 1948, in the Western Territories, 8,685 were handling food (26%), 6,651 represented metal crafts (20%), 5,009 were working with textiles (15%), 4,867 were

producing leather goods (14.6%), 2,514 were service centers of various kinds (7.5%), 2,494 were working in wood (7.5%), 2,188 represented the building trades (5.6%), 813 were workshops dealing with paper or printing (2.4%), and 142 were chemical laboratories (0.9%).¹³⁴

"During 1948 a certain decrease in the number of workshops in the Recovered Territories became noticeable," continued the same semi-official source.

One of the reasons for this decrease was the registration of all enterprises ordered at the beginning of 1948. In order to obtain a license permitting the practicing of a particular trade, one had to give proof of proper qualifications. All those who had no professional training and who had entered this field in the hope of quick profits had to quit. The closing of shops only masquerading as handicrafts was undoubtedly a sound measure.

Unfortunately, the development of handicrafts in the following years will be handicapped by the erroneous policy of the government in this field, particularly by applying high taxes and curtailing the supply of raw materials and allocation of premises.¹³⁵

At the end of 1953 the number of private workshops dropped to 15,825 (as against 33,358 in July, 1948), employing but 22,168 artisans (as against 64,235 in July, 1948). The results of this decline were disastrous. "In many small villages the closing down of workshops resulted in the economic ruin of the villages themselves, which in many cases were deserted by the inhabitants and thus depopulated. On the other hand, the lack of craftsmen and their services made proper maintenance of property very difficult, both in the villages and in the countryside."¹³⁶

The decrease of small private industry was only partly counter-balanced by the development of the craft cooperatives.¹³⁷

CRAFT COOPERATIVES IN THE RECOVERED TERRITORIES

Date	Number of craft cooperatives	Number of members
Dec. 31, 1945	56	1,310
Dec. 31, 1946	215	5,790
Dec. 31, 1947	552	11,310
Nov. 30, 1948	434	21,823

It was not before the end of 1956 that small private industry started

recovering. Owing to a more favorable policy of the Gomulka government which offered reduced taxation, loans, and priority in housing facilities, about 10,000 new private workshops were opened between September, 1956, and September, 1957, bringing the number of such establishments to 30,925 with 40,850 employed artisans—still below the 1948 status.¹³⁸

In June, 1948, the Polish government offered for sale to urban settlers in the Recovered Territories one-half million buildings: houses, handicraft workshops, and small industrial establishments. The first 8,000 dwellings that became available ranged in price from 120,000 to 150,000 zlotys (\$300–375), payable in sixty monthly installments. Priority on the purchase of these one- and two-family houses was granted to teachers, state and local government officials, and workers in state industries; however, persons working in the private sector of economy were also encouraged to purchase homes and small businesses. The prices were balanced against the cash income of these classes, which ranged from 25,000 to 60,000 zlotys a month. Repatriates from the U.S.S.R., early settlers, and settlers who had served in the army received further concession for payment. Persons working in private trade had to pay more in proportion to their earnings. To encourage them, the government announced that money spent on the original purchase and on improvements would be deductible on income tax returns, and prices would be slashed 25 per cent for cash payment of the entire amount.¹³⁹ The government's general economic policy, which since the second part of 1948 had become increasingly unfavorable towards the private sector of the country's economy, considerably curtailed the chances of "persons working in private trade" to take advantage of this offer.

One of the greatest obstacles to development of industry in the Recovered Territories had been from the very beginning—and still is—the shortage of manpower. It was necessary to replace hundreds of thousands of often highly skilled German workers. The available human material consisted for the most part of Polish repatriates from Soviet Russia or settlers from Central Poland: for many of them this was "a first experience in industrial work."¹⁴⁰ Their employment presupposed a thorough and lasting training. A shortage of manpower is even now felt in all branches of the area's economy. As late as November, 1957, it was announced that "despite the constant influx of settlers, mainly repatriates from the Soviet Union," the Recovered Territories "are still capable of employing and providing accommodation for a great number of people.

A shortage of artisans is particularly felt in the small towns. There is also a shortage of agricultural workers on the state farms and in forestry enterprises. . . . Agriculture of Olsztyn voyevodship (both state and private) can absorb an additional 4,000 workers. . . . Szczecin, too, has a great number of posts available."¹⁴¹

9.

The early stages of the Polish resettlement effort in the Recovered Territories, which was the most spectacular in terms of numbers—both in repopulation in immediate economic achievements—was very favorably judged by foreign observers, including those most inclined to criticize.

Sydney Gruson wrote in the *New York Times* of October 16, 1946: "There may be much to criticize in current Polish politics, but the spirit with which the Poles have taken on the enormous job of rebuilding the shattered western lands and the success so far fill one newly arrived with admiration." Gruson's colleague, James Reston, also acknowledged (August 1, 1947) that "what has happened in the last year and a half is a tribute to the industry and will-power of the Poles." The French Ambassador to Poland, Mr. Carrear, who had paid a number of visits to Silesia and Pomerania and whose opinion was based on personal experience, told the press that "the Poles deserve the greatest admiration for the work carried out during the last eighteen months in the Recovered Territories. . . . I can state with complete impartiality that enormous progress has been achieved."¹⁴² N. Elwyn Jones, British prosecutor at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, who in August, 1947, spent two weeks in Western Pomerania, stated: "Before leaving for Poland I had a talk with the German Minister of Agriculture in the British zone of occupation. I was told that beyond Odra River stretches a desert. . . . Now, after having visited Western Pomerania, I see that information spread by certain sources in the West is simply fantastic."¹⁴³ The Warsaw correspondent of the *London Times* (December 16, 1946) was outspoken in his appraisal of the Polish achievements in the Recovered Territories:

What has been accomplished in actual resettlement seems little short of a miracle. . . . Even in an age when the shifting of whole populations had

become a commonplace, this Polish recolonization of Eastern Germany must be a record in speed and numbers. . . . The Poles have had little opportunity to prove their worth as colonizers. It will take a generation to measure their success in terms of human standards of life and well-being. But in its initial stage the resettlement of the newly won provinces, involving the movement of over 3,000,000 people with a minimum of favorable facilities, the makeshift repair and organization of devastated cities, villages, factories, and farms, is an outstanding feat of ingenuity and improvisation.

Russell Hill of the *New York Herald Tribune* (September 1, 1947) acknowledged that "there can be no doubt that the Poles have done a remarkable job of reconstruction in the new territories when one considers the obstacles they faced. . . . A great deal has been done with very little."

This is also the considered opinion of this author who made a study trip to Poland in August, 1947.

The ultimate completion of this "job of reconstruction," as Russell Hill called it, depended to a great extent upon Poland's demographic resources. A semiofficial Polish survey of the resettlement of the Recovered Territories published in the July-August 1947 issue of the *Western Review* came to the conclusion that "at the present moment . . . Poland has realized all the actual possibilities. . . . Further possibilities will be opened only by the realization of the National Economic Plan, which proposes to complete the settlement of the territory, parallel with the general reconstruction of the country, in the three years 1947-1949."

The large-scale resettlement action had thus apparently reached at least a temporary lull. Resettlement on a reduced scale continued but, unlike the summer of 1947, when the repatriates from abroad had constituted the majority of the new settlers, most of the 1948 and 1949 resettlers were people from the overpopulated central Polish provinces, peasants and town dwellers alike. During the first ten months of 1949, one-half of the 22,700 families resettled in the Recovered Territories were small peasants from the "old" Polish territory, most from the voyevodships of Bialystok, Pomorze, and Poznan, while the other half were remigrants and landless agricultural workers. A total of 477,229 peasant families had settled by November, 1949, on an area of 9,000,000 acres.¹⁴⁴

The process of further repopulation had its ups and downs. In the years 1950-1956, a yearly average of 14,964 peasant families settled in the Recovered Territories, a six-year total of 89,784 families.¹⁴⁵ This influx was almost exclusively the product of internal migration from

"old" Polish provinces, which, however, showed a downward trend: the net increase through this migration (deducting the return movement of those who left the area) was 60,100 persons in 1954 and 20,800 in 1955.¹⁴⁶

But, as related in Chapter 8, the end of 1956 and the years 1957 and 1958 saw a resumption of repatriation from the Soviet Union, opening vast possibilities for further resettlement of the Recovered Territories.

The integration of the resettlers also had its ups and downs, both economically and psychologically. There were periods of doubt as to the stability and permanence of their status in the area. "For most of the fourteen years [1945-1959] the Poles—because of Western policy, mistakes of their own government, and the rootless nature of the new population—sat on their suitcases, and it held up development of the Western territory," reported *New York Times* correspondent A. M. Rosenthal from Wroclaw in the spring of 1959. "The feeling of uncertainty that gripped the Western territory . . . has not totally disappeared, but it is going. . . . 'The land is ours, fully and finally,' the Poles say. . . . 'We are not sitting on our suitcases any more. We have unpacked . . . we feel we are staying.'"¹⁴⁷

NOTES

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² *Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, October 22, 1946.

³ *Ibid.*, May 15 and 16, 1947.

⁴ *New York Times*, April 10, 1947.

⁵ *Trud* (Moscow), April 14, 1947.

⁶ Quoted by the Western Press Agency, April 26, 1947.

⁷ Russell Hill, "Poland Moves to the West," *New York Herald Tribune*, September 1, 1947.

⁸ *Poland of Today*, November 1946.

⁹ *Poland, Recovered Territories*, Poznan, 1947, p. 24; *Statistical Year Book of Poland*, 1947, p. 33.

¹⁰ *Devastation in Rural and Urban Buildings in Poland*, Western Press Agency, February 24, 1947.

¹¹ Jan Zdzitowiecki, "Remarks on the Economic Significance of the New Polish-German Frontier," *The Western Review*, July-August 1946, p. 88.

¹² *Ibid.*; also *Statistical Year Book of Poland*, 1947, p. 103.

¹³ Jan Zdzitowiecki, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, November 4, 1945.

¹⁵ Leopold Gluck, "Economic Reconstruction of the Recovered Territories," *The Western Review*, July-August 1947, p. 117.

¹⁶ Data put at the disposal of the author by the Polish Ministry of the Recovered Territories.

¹⁷ *Population of the Recovered Territories and of Gdansk*, Western Press Agency, May 23, 1947.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Western Press Agency*, November 1957, pp. 25-26.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Leopold Gluck, *Eighteen Months of Work*, Poznan, 1947, p. 14.

²² *Poland, Recovered Territories*, p. 30.

- ²² *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1948, p. 59.
- ²³ Stefan Arski, *The New Polish-German Border, Safeguard of Peace*, p. 59.
- ²⁴ *New York Times*, October 1, 1946.
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- ²⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, August 26, 1946.
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- ³² *Poland of Today*, August 1947.
- ³³ *Poland's Demographic Problems*.
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- ³⁵ Polish Provisional Government, *Home Service*, May 25, 1945.
- ³⁶ Polish Provisional Government, *Home Service*, Lublin, May 29, 1945.
- ³⁷ *Soviet Overseas Service* (in English), July 5, 1945.
- ³⁸ *Dziennik Urzędowy Ministerstwa Ziemi Odzyskanych*, No. 17, March 20, 1946, p. 17; No. 6, August 1, 1946, pp. 16-19.
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- ⁴⁴ *Radio Polskie*, Lublin, May 15, 1945.
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- ⁵² *Dziennik Urzędowy M.Z.O.*, No. 4, May 1, 1946, p. 24; No. 8, September 1, 1946, pp. 16-18.
- ⁵³ *Gazeta Ludowa*, September 18, 1947.
- ⁵⁴ *Robotnik*, August 28, 1947; M. Olechnowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
- ⁵⁵ *Kurier Codzienny*, August 20, 1947.
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- ⁵⁸ *Continental Daily Mail*, April 24, 1948.
- ⁵⁹ *Dziennik Polski*, June 4, 1947.
- ⁶⁰ *Biuletyn*, May 6, 1948.
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- ⁶³ *Statistical Year Book of Poland, 1947*, Warsaw, 1947, p. 78.
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- ⁶⁶ *Rzeczpospolita*, August 11, 1947.
- ⁶⁷ *New York Times*, September 17, 1947.
- ⁶⁸ *Biuletyn*, February 20, 1945.

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- ⁶¹ M. Olechnowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*
- ⁶³ *Zbiór Dokumentów*, No. 3 (6), 1946, pp. 63-66.
- ⁶⁴ PAP (Polska Agencja Prasowa), November 26, 1946; M. Olechnowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
- ⁶⁵ *Dziennik Polski*, June 4, 1947.
- ⁶⁶ PAP, January 24, 1947; M. Olechnowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 114.
- ⁶⁷ *Dziennik Polski*, June 4 and July 12, 1947.
- ⁶⁸ *Biuletyn*, May 6, 1948. Beginning in summer of 1948, Communist domination of Poland started stiffening both politically and economically. Ties with the West were progressively cut. This development virtually stopped repatriation from free-world countries and considerably affected the influx of Poles from the Soviet satellites. The Soviet Union remained the sole source of further repatriation.
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- ⁷⁰ *Biuletyn*, July 12, 1948.
- ⁷¹ M. Olechnowicz, *op. cit.*, p. 111.
- ⁷² Dr. Romand Lutman, "Cultural Problems of the Regained Territories," *Contemporary Thought*, January 1947, p. 20.
- ⁷³ Irving Brant, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
- ⁷⁴ *New York Times*, July 31, 1947.
- ⁷⁵ *Manchester Guardian*, August 28, 1946.
- ⁷⁶ *Dziennik Urzędowy M.Z.O.*, No. 8, September 1, 1946, pp. 143-144.
- ⁷⁷ *Eighteen Months of Work*, pp. 44-46.
- ⁷⁸ *New York Times*, March 27, 1959.
- ⁷⁹ Data put at the disposal of the author by Mr. Alexander Barchaz, vice-voyevoda of Wrocław.
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- ⁸¹ *Ibid.*
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- ⁸⁴ *Statistik des Deutschen Reiches*, Vol. 557, Pts. 1, 2, 4, 5.
- ⁸⁵ *Poland of Today*, March 1948.
- ⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, August 1948.
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- ⁸⁹ J. Kolipinski, "A Story of the Regained Provinces in Poland's Economic Organism," *Przegląd Zachodni*, No. 6, 1946, p. 517.
- ⁹⁰ *State Real Estates in the Recovered Territories: Biuletyn*, January 28, 1948.
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- ⁹³ W. Lechnowicz (Director of the Resettlement Department of the Ministry of Recovered Territories), "The Cooperative Movement and Resettlement," *Contemporary Thought*, January 1947, p. 18.
- ⁹⁴ *Biuletyn*, January 24, 1948; J. A. Wilder, *op. cit.*, p. 59.
- ⁹⁵ *Biuletyn*, January 24, 1948.
- ⁹⁶ *Eighteen Months of Work*, p. 29.
- ⁹⁷ *State Real Estates in the Recovered Territories.*
- ⁹⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁹⁹ *Manchester Guardian*, August 26, 1946.
- ¹⁰⁰ *New York Times*, October 15, 1946.
- ¹⁰¹ *Poland of Today*, May 1947.
- ¹⁰² *Wiesł w Liczbach*, 1954, p. 288; *Rocznik Statystyczny*, 1955, pp. 104-105; "The Dilemma of the Polish Economy," *The World Today*, May 1954.
- ¹⁰³ Western Press Agency, December 1957, No. 10, pp. 10-12; January 1958, No. 11, pp. 11-12; and No. 14, pp. 6-7, 31; Elisabeth Wiskemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbors*, p. 222.

- ¹¹² Western Press Agency, October 25, 1958.
¹¹⁴ *Eighteen Months of Work*, p. 41.
¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*
¹¹⁶ *Poland, Recovered Territories*, p. 64.
¹¹⁷ *Poland of Today*, April 1947.
¹¹⁸ *Biuletyn*, October 23, 1947; *New York Times*, August 1, 1947.
¹¹⁹ *Poland, Recovered Territories*, p. 64.
¹²⁰ Stefan Arski, *op. cit.*, p. 56; Western Press Agency, November 1957, p. 18.
¹²¹ *Poland, Recovered Territories*, p. 66; Western Press Agency, November 1957, pp. 18-19.
¹²² *New York Times*, October 1, 1946.
¹²³ *Poland of Today*, November 1946.
¹²⁴ Western Press Agency, No. 12, 1957, p. 17.
¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 8, November 1957, p. 25.
¹²⁶ J. A. Wilder, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.
¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.
¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.
¹²⁹ *Polish Press Agency*, January 22, 1946.
¹³⁰ *Dziennik Źródło*, Pos. 17/46.
¹³¹ Western Press Agency, No. 12, December 1957, pp. 7-8.
¹³² *Ibid.*, p. 11.
¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.
¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.
¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 10, December 1957, p. 12. See also Western Press Agency, *Basic Information About Western Territories*, Part III, *Economic Problems*, Kraków, 1951, p. 19.
¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 12, December 1957, p. 14.
¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.
¹³⁹ *New York Times*, June 4, 1948.
¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 8.
¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, November 1957, p. 22.
¹⁴² *New Poland*, London, October 1946.
¹⁴³ *Kurier Codzienny*, August 20, 1947.
¹⁴⁴ *Biuletyn*, December 15, 1949.
¹⁴⁵ Western Press Agency, No. 14, January 1958, p. 31.
¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 8, November 1957, p. 20.
¹⁴⁷ *New York Times*, March 27, 1959.

PART IV

ELEVEN

Elimination of German Minorities from Southeastern Europe

I.

The German settlements in southeastern Europe can be tracked back as far as the eleventh century. German colonists arrived in successive waves composed in turn of warriors, landowners, officials, peasants, artisans, and professional classes. The main objectives of German colonization were the then Hungarian provinces of Transylvania, Banat, Vojvodina, and the Zips which later became parts of Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Slovakia.

In 1940 German sources estimated the number of *Volksdeutsche* in Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary at 2,151,546. This estimate was based on registrations carried out by German organizations and was at considerable variance with the national censuses in the respective countries. The following table shows the discrepancies between figures given by German and official sources:¹

Number of Germans	According to national census (*1930, ^b 1931)	According to German sources 1940	Discrepancy
In Rumania	745,173 ^a	818,000	72,827
In Yugoslavia	499,326 ^b	685,000	185,674
In Hungary	478,630 ^a	648,546	169,916
Total	1,723,129	2,151,546	428,417

Taking into account, on the one hand, the tendency of the official Rumanian, Hungarian, and Yugoslav census authorities to minimize the number of persons belonging to national minorities, and, on the other hand, the tendency of German organizations to inflate these figures and, furthermore, the application of different criteria to determine ethnic nationality, we may assume that the actual number of *Volksdeutsche* in southeastern Europe amounted to some two million.

The occupational structure of this large *Volksdeutsche* population was characterized by the prevalence of land-bound elements. Some 74 per cent of the German folk group in Rumania lived on the land, while only 26 per cent were concentrated in the towns. The German minority in Yugoslavia were similarly distributed. In Hungary, only 17 per cent lived in urban areas, while 83 per cent belonged to the farm population.² There were, of course, regional discrepancies in the rural-urban distribution of the German groups. In Rumania, for instance, 96.3 per cent of the Germans of Bessarabia lived in villages while in Bukovina 83 per cent lived in towns and only 17 per cent in rural areas. With the exception of Bukovina, where 15 per cent of the German population were employed in industry, there were almost no industrial workers among southeastern Germans. Artisans were more numerous. The percentage of artisans among the German folk groups was as follows: in Hungary 10.5 per cent; in Bessarabia and Dobrudja 13 per cent; in Banat 18 per cent; in Transylvania 19 per cent; and in Bukovina 41 per cent. Most of them lived in rural areas. The percentage of *Volksdeutsche* in the liberal professions varied considerably between countries and provinces. It was very small in Bessarabia (1.8), Dobrudja (1.2), and Banat (1.72); in southern Bukovina it amounted to 3.5 per cent, while in northern Bukovina it reached 3.5 per cent and in Transylvania 6.5 per cent.³

Despite the small size of an important fraction of all German agricultural holdings, the diligence and skill of German peasants brought them considerable wealth and a corresponding standard of living. This, in turn, led to an exceedingly low birth rate; although there was a simultaneous decline in the death rate, natural increase among the southeastern *Volksdeutsche* was unusually small, as can be seen from the following figures:⁴

Country	Year	Births per thousand	Deaths per thousand	Natural increase per thousand
Rumania.....	1936	21.2	15.7	5.5
Yugoslavia	1935	17.0	14.0	3.0
Hungary	1936	15.9	14.0	1.9

These figures are particularly striking when compared with the overall natural increase in these countries: 11.7 per thousand in Rumania (as

compared with 5.5 among the Germans), 6.3 in Hungary (as against 1.3), 13.0 in Yugoslavia (as against 3.0).⁵

The German Reich—not only Nazi Germany, but the Weimar Republic as well—considered southeastern Europe and, in particular, the German colonies there to be of paramount importance to its interests. Several research agencies and publications, especially after 1933, dealt exclusively with southeastern Europe. Among them the most renowned were the *Südostausschuss der Deutschen Akademie*; *Südostdeutsche Forschungen* in Munich; *Südosteuropa Gesellschaft* in Vienna; *Leipziger Vierteljahresschrift für Südosteuropa*. Extensive materials on southeastern Europe in general,⁶ on the relationship between southeastern countries and Germany,⁷ and especially on the German minorities in these countries⁸ were being published in the Reich. With Hitler's coming into power, the German minorities in southeastern Europe became an important pawn in the Reich's political game. In all southeastern countries the German folk groups enjoyed a highly privileged status which was still further enhanced during the war years. Simultaneously, however, various factors such as transfer to the Greater Reich, mobilization for the German army, evacuation and flight contributed to their numerical decline. With the final Allied victory in Europe a drastic reversal of their position set in, culminating in most of the countries in an almost complete elimination of the German folk groups.

This process of elimination took different forms in Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.

2.

Prewar Rumania, with its 745,421 *Volksdeutsche* (1930 census), forming 4.1 per cent of the total population, contained the fourth largest German minority group in Europe, exceeded only by those of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Poland. This German population was distributed geographically as follows: 320,955 in Transylvania, 225,017 in the Banat, 81,089 in Bessarabia, 75,533 in Bukovina, 12,581 in the Dobrudja, and the remainder scattered throughout Old Rumania.⁹

In June, 1940, Rumania ceded Bessarabia and North Bukovina to the Soviet Union. Some 135,000 Germans in the Soviet-incorporated territories were transferred to the German-incorporated Polish provinces in September–October, 1940, on the basis of a Soviet-German agreement of

September 5, 1940.¹⁰ The so-called Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, gave the northern part of Transylvania (with 60,046 Germans)¹¹ to Hungary.

The Germans who remained in rump Rumania at that time not only enjoyed equality with Rumanians, but actually held a privileged position and had no reason to apprehend the future. Nevertheless, like their compatriots in the Soviet-annexed areas, the Germans in Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja were summoned to leave for the Reich. On October 22, 1940, an agreement on their transfer was reached between Berlin and Bucharest, and 66,100 Germans from these two provinces answered "the Führer's call for repatriation"¹²: only 3,734 Germans remained in the Bukovina and 1,639 in the Dobrudja. The Rumanian census of April, 1941, enumerated 542,325 Germans distributed as follows: 221,762 in the Banat, 268,878 in southern Transylvania and the Crisana district, and the remaining 51,685 in the other provinces.¹³

The number of *Volksdeutsche* repatriated in the fall of 1940 constituted about 10 per cent of the German population in the reduced Rumanian kingdom. The bulk of the German folk group in Rumania, who lived in the Banat and in Transylvania, were asked to stay. Bernard Newman¹⁴ expressed the well-founded belief that it was "Hitler's deliberate policy . . . to leave a large German population in rump Rumania to justify a subsequent claim as German territory." He also recalled the suggestion made at one time that a portion of Transylvania be carved out to form a new German state, for which the name *Donaustaat* had already been selected. The *Volksdeutsche* remaining within the boundaries of the Rumanian state firmly believed that they owed allegiance not to the government under which they were living but to the Führer of the German Reich. Instead of serving with the Rumanian army, some 73,000 of them volunteered for the German Waffen-SS and left for the front in July, 1945.¹⁵ Contrary to the general rule that nationals of a state who join a foreign army lose their citizenship, a Rumanian-German agreement based on a Rumanian law of January 16, 1939, safeguarded for these volunteers their claim to Rumanian citizenship.¹⁶

Those who had joined the German army, left never to return home. Thus the German group lost some 73,000 men in the prime of life, reducing its number in 1943 to about 475,000.

Political and military events in the late summer of 1944 brought about a sudden collapse of Germany's ambitious plans. In September, 1944, Rumania went over to the Allied camp and declared war on the Reich.

The new Rumanian government decided to revoke the citizenship of all *Volksdeutsche* who had belonged to any civilian, military, or paramilitary German organization or who had held any privileged position during the period of German ascendancy.¹⁷ It also decided to dissolve the organized German folk group in Rumania.¹⁸

The situation of the Germans became especially precarious in Transylvania, where the local Rumanian population was openly hostile. Soviet armies crossed into this province with the cooperation of Rumanian troops, and the Germans found themselves face to face with the "Bolshevist menace."

The Reich tried to save the endangered folk group through evacuation. On September 29, 1944, *Transocean* reported that the whole German minority group in Transylvania, numbering about 250,000 persons living in an area roughly outlined by the cities of Sibiu, Brasov, and Cluj, had been evacuated, rural and urban population alike, and that they had been directed to Hungary from where they were to be sent to the Reich. The *Slovak Home Service* reported on October 14, 1944, that the German folk group in the Rumanian Banat, 220,000 strong, was also involved in this evacuation. This information proved to be incorrect. The retreating German army was unable to evacuate both its military contingents and the local civilian German population. The majority of the latter were trapped by the swift advance of the Soviet and Rumanian troops and remained in their homes. The German census of October 29, 1946, revealed the presence of 108,000 Rumanian *Volksdeutsche* in the three Western zones of occupation (their number increased to 149,000 by September 13, 1950), and of 57,000 in the Soviet zone.¹⁹

The *Volksdeutsche* who remained in Rumania anticipated that the Rumanians and the Soviet troops would take revenge for their arrogant and treacherous behavior during the Antonescu regime. But when nothing happened to them during the first few months after the withdrawal of the German armies, they gradually recovered confidence and went about their business in precisely the same way as before.

An entirely new situation was created early in January, 1945, when the Soviet head of the Allied Control Commission (ACC), General Sergei Vinogradov, ordered the mobilization of all able-bodied members of the German folk group in Rumania and their deportation for reconstruction work in devastated areas of the U.S.S.R. This order covered men from 17 to 45 years of age, and women from 18 to 30, except those

nursing children under one year. The mobilization was to be carried out from January 10 to 20.

The Rumanian government, headed by General Radescu, and the Rumanian political parties which supported it, strongly opposed the Soviet deportation order. Their basic objection was that the affected Germans were Rumanian citizens and that the Rumanian government alone was entitled to decide their fate; the Soviet-Rumanian Armistice gave the Soviet representatives in Rumania no right to mobilize any population group for forced labor in the U.S.S.R. But the Rumanian government did not venture to demand the abolition of the deportation decree: it merely endeavored to obtain some partial concessions. A formal government note, submitted to General Vinogradov, acknowledged that a section of the German minority had aided the German war effort and that the internment of actively hostile elements was justified, but raised a number of legal and humanitarian objections on the Soviet procedure. The note argued that the "violent uprooting" of the able-bodied *Volksdeutsche*, who for centuries had formed an integral part of Rumanian society, was bound to dislocate the national economy, thereby hindering the implementation of the armistice; the removal of the *Volksdeutsche* would also make the general manpower shortage more serious than ever. The Soviet authorities were requested to consider whether the mobilized *Volksdeutsche* might not be assigned to labor projects on Rumanian territory.

There is no indication that the Rumanian objections had any effect on the Soviets. When requested to exempt from deportation at least those known for their left-wing convictions, they answered that such persons could well resume their activities in the Donets region.

The deportation of the *Volksdeutsche* was officially completed on February 3, 1945, although small groups may have been mobilized since that date. According to the Soviet authorities, the following totals were arrived at:

<i>Volksdeutsche</i> eligible	
for mobilization	93,538
Persons mobilized	80,083
Men	41,230
Women	38,853
Persons shipped	
to Russia	69,332

Men.....	36,590
Women	32,742
Persons released	
after mobilization	10,771
Men.....	4,653
Women	6,118

Some of the *Volksdeutsche* slated for deportation had gone into hiding. The deportees were allowed as much as 500 pounds of luggage and were generally well treated.²⁰

The Soviet deportation was believed to have delivered the final blow to the German ethnic group in Rumania, whose disintegration had been effected in four consecutive moves:

1. In 1940, 66,100 ethnic Germans were transferred from Southern Bukovina and Northern Dobrudja.

2. By 1943, over 73,000 ethnic Germans had left Rumania in the ranks of the Waffen-SS.

3. A considerable number of Germans left with the retreating German troops in September, 1944. It can be assumed that predominant among them were adult members of families of *Volksdeutsche* SS volunteers who were particularly fearful of retaliatory measures. When the Soviet authorities in Rumania ordered the registration of all *Volksdeutsche* men between 17 and 45 and of all women between 18 and 30, only 93,538 Germans belonging to these age groups were recorded. This can serve as the basis for a rough estimate of the total German population which remained in Rumania by the time the country was occupied by the Red Army. No data on the age of the Rumanian Germans are available. But by analogy with the age distribution in Central Europe where the population trend was similar to that of the Rumanian *Volksdeutsche*, it can be assumed that the above-mentioned age groups comprised about 35 per cent of the total population. Accordingly, the number of Germans who remained after the evacuation with the retreating German army would amount to some 265,000. As the total number of Germans after the departure, in 1940, of 66,000 repatriates and, in 1943, of 73,000 who joined the German armed forces was about 470,000, it can be estimated that about 205,000 were evacuated or fled with the retreating German army.

4. In 1945, Soviet mobilization largely exhausted the reserves of the adult German population. Of the 93,538 *Volksdeutsche* subject to mobiliza-

tion, 63,332 (74.1 per cent) were deported to Russia, leaving less than 25,000 Germans in the productive ages in Rumania. The overwhelming majority of those not affected by deportation orders were men under 17 or over 45 and women under 18 or over 30.

On the basis of the above evidence, not more than 205 to 210 thousand Germans should have remained in Rumania after 1945. In fact, however, the Rumanian census of 1948 showed 343,913 German-speaking persons, 2.2 per cent of the country's total population. The 1956 census counted 391,388 German-speaking Rumanian citizens; of this number, 382,400 declared themselves to be of German ethnic nationality. Apparently, not less than 120,000 Germans must have returned to Rumania during the three-year period 1945-1948. Natural increase and further re-immigration probably account for the increase of 48,000 for the period 1948-1956.

The German minority in Rumania's present territory was reduced from 542,325 counted by the 1941 census to 384,708 registered by the census of 1956; but it still represents a sizable minority group.²¹

Its economic status, however, seems to have been undermined beyond redemption. The land reform decreed in March, 1945, by the government of Peter Groza ordered (Art. 3) the expropriation of all land belonging to Rumanian citizens who had

- a. enlisted in the German army or the SS or were parents or descendants of such volunteers;
- b. left the country with the German (or Hungarian) army;
- c. belonged to the organized German folk group;
- d. spread Hitlerite propaganda by working against democratic principles or by contributing in any way to the assistance of Hitlerite Germany in the field of politics, economy, culture, or sports.

The agricultural property of all these persons, with all farm installations, livestock, and equipment, both in villages and in towns, became the property of the state and was distributed among peasants entitled to land grants.²² Since among the 542,325 Germans registered by the Rumanian census of 1941, 370,460, or nearly 70 per cent, belonged to the rural population and were almost all prosperous farmers, the very foundations of the German economy in Rumania were thus shattered. The *Arbeitsbrief der deutschen Jugend des Ostens* (Folge 11/55) described the situation as follows: "Rumania is the only country in southeastern Europe

which has not expelled its German minority. But it has ruined the very basis of existence of this minority by expropriating first its rural, and later also the urban, industrial, commercial, and artisan property. The value of the robbed property amounts to billions." In 1949, in line with the policy adopted by other Soviet satellites (Czechoslovakia, Poland), the Rumanian government announced the restoration of all civil rights to all Rumanian citizens of German ethnic nationality.

3.

Germans formed the largest minority group in prewar Yugoslavia. In 1930, official Yugoslav data put the number of Germans in that country at 499,326 (3.9 per cent of the total population),²³ while German sources claimed the number to be 685,000.

In May, 1941, Yugoslavia was invaded by German and Bulgarian troops. Most of the *Volksdeutsche* lived in provinces annexed by Hungary (Bachka, Baranya, part of the Banat), Italy, (the Dalmatian coast, the town of Ljubljana and the surrounding territory of the Yugoslav province of Drava), and Germany (Lower Styria), as well as in the puppet state of Croatia; in the rump state of Serbia proper only about 200,000 Germans remained, concentrated mainly in the Serbian section of the Banat, where they numbered about 130,000.

With the full liberation of Yugoslavia by the Partisans and the Red armies early in 1945, the unity of the Yugoslav state territory was re-established, although on a federative basis. In the course of about four years of foreign occupation, the German folk group was numerically reduced by the following moves:

1. On October 6, 1942, a German-Croatian agreement was concluded providing for the transfer of 26,000 Germans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in Croatia proper. About 20,000 Germans registered for the transfer.²⁴ They were resettled in the Lublin district of the German-occupied Polish Government General.²⁵

2. In the Hungarian-annexed Yugoslav Vojvodina (Bachka, Baranya, Banat), the 200,000 *Volksdeutsche* were the first to respond to the appeal of the Reich to enlist voluntarily in the German army, mainly in the Waffen-SS, instead of fulfilling their military service in the ranks of the Hungarian army. According to *Berliner Lokal Anzeiger* of July 30, 1943,

"these people ardently love their new country [Hungary] but a homesickness for the uniform of Adolf Hitler took possession of their hearts." Of the 25,000 men of six age groups to whom the appeal was directed (those who had just reached 18 and those between the ages of 30 and 34), 22,500 volunteered for the Waffen-SS and 20,000 actually joined; only 2,500 men, i.e. 10 per cent, "evaded their national duty."²⁶ By September, 1943, over one thousand of the 1942 volunteers had already been killed in action.²⁷ In May, 1944, the number of Bachka Germans who voluntarily joined the SS reached 26,000; all of them left for the Eastern front.²⁸ They never returned to liberated Yugoslavia.

3. In December, 1941, a few months after Yugoslavia's dismemberment, 1,925 Germans were transferred from Serbia proper²⁹ for resettlement in the Polish Government General.³⁰

These three German-initiated moves reduced the German folk group in Yugoslavia by some 50,000 persons.

When, in September of 1944, news began to spread that Soviet troops were nearing the Serbian Banat, 80 to 90 per cent of the German folk group tried to leave in the wake of the retreating German army. It seems, however, that only some 20 per cent succeeded in getting away. The rest were rounded up by the Partisans and put into special labor and detention camps. Their entire property was confiscated. Subsequently, Soviet military authorities began to ship all Banat *Volksdeutsche* between 16 and 60 years of age to the Soviet Union for compulsory labor. In the town of Bela Crkva alone, some 700 houses formerly inhabited by Germans were empty by the end of 1944. The Serbian population welcomed the forced removal of the Germans with enthusiasm. A similar policy was carried out with regard to the *Volksdeutsche* in the Yugoslav province of Vojvodina, where after the German withdrawal all able-bodied male ethnic Germans were shipped in special convoys to Soviet Russia for forced labor. Diplomatic information which reached Washington by the middle of April, 1945, placed the number of Germans removed to Russia from Yugoslavia at 100,000.³¹ A spokesman of the Yugoslav Foreign Office categorically denied, however, the allegation that Yugoslavia had sent forced labor to the Soviet Union and declared at a press conference held in Belgrade on October 20, 1946, that "the Yugoslav government has lodged a vigorous protest against such false statements."³²

A note transmitted by the Yugoslav government on January 16, 1946,

to the United States Embassy in Belgrade stated that the German minority in Yugoslavia numbered at that time 110,000 persons; the remainder had, according to the note, "left Yugoslavia together with the retreating German troops, thus showing that they were the subjects of Germany and not of Yugoslavia." The Yugoslav Embassy in Washington admitted that these 110,000 Germans were detained "in civilian work camps." In most cases, said a Yugoslav Foreign Office spokesman, "persons detained in those camps were men who had joined SS units with the Nazi Prinz Eugen Division."³³

The official Yugoslav policy towards the remnants of the German minority in the country was directed toward their transfer to the Reich. A statement made on October 18, 1946, by the Yugoslav chargé d'affaires in Washington said: "Pending a decision concerning them [the 110,000 Yugoslavia Germans detained in the 'civilian labor camps'] by competent Allied authorities, my country has repeatedly asked that, as provided for in the Potsdam Agreement, they be resettled in Germany. On January 19, 1946, and again on May 16, 1946, my Government requested the American Embassy in Belgrade to use its good offices to speed a settlement concerning these people by the Allied Control Council in Berlin. There were no replies to these requests."³⁴ In the first of the requests referred to, which was followed on January 23, by a detailed aide-memoire on "Transfer to Germany of the Remainder of the German Minority in Yugoslavia," the Belgrade government insisted that the German minority "represents a serious menace to the national security of Yugoslavia and international peace in general, and therefore is considered an undesirable and pernicious enclave within the national bloc of the Yugoslav peoples. . . . Desirous of ensuring a lasting peace and with the object of minimizing the danger of renewed German aggression, the Yugoslav government deems it necessary to transfer the whole of the German minority from Yugoslavia to Germany."

The note stressed that the Yugoslav government had not put forward this demand earlier only because it was obvious that the lack of means of communication resulting from postwar conditions would not technically permit the transfer of a great number of persons. In the belief that these technical reasons had in the meantime been removed, the Yugoslav government expressed the conviction that "there now exists no such hindrance to the transfer of Germans from Yugoslavia to Germany" and that such a demand was "in accordance with the wishes and endeavors of the Great Powers as formulated at the Potsdam Conference."

The Yugoslav military mission in Germany was instructed to communicate with the Allied Control Council in Berlin and ask for inclusion of the German minority in Yugoslavia into the general plan of transfer of Germans. The note requested the United States government to support the plea that Yugoslavia should have priority in the transfer of Germans from her territory.

No satisfactory answer to this Yugoslav government request was received.

In May, 1947, reports to the Allied authorities in Austria indicated that members of the German minority in Yugoslavia were leaving the country—either under pressure of the Yugoslav government or with no interference—to become displaced persons.³⁵ Originally they came in over the southern Austro-Yugoslav border, but later that route was blocked, and the main stream began to proceed from the east, via Hungary, crossing the Soviet zone of Austria to enter the British zone, into which some 3,000 a week were reported pouring during and after the summer of 1947.³⁶ According to German sources, 730 ethnic Germans arrived in West Germany by the roundabout way of France. A further 24,707 came individually, through the efforts of the German Red Cross, and 1,489 children were brought to their parents in collective transports.³⁷

As a result of this new migration, the German minority in Yugoslavia, which in 1930 numbered 499,326 according to official Yugoslav data, and 685,000 according to German sources, was by 1948 reduced to 55,318 (0.4 per cent of the country's population instead of 3.9 per cent). Seventy-five per cent of them lived in Serbia and 18 per cent in Croatia, with the remaining 7 per cent scattered over the rest of the country.³⁸ The 1953 census registered 62,000 ethnic Germans in all of Yugoslavia.³⁹ On the other hand, the German census of October 29, 1946, registered 98,000 Yugoslav *Volksdeutsche* in the three Western zones of occupation (their number increased to 123,000 by September 13, 1950), and 24,000 in the Soviet zone. The remnants of the *Volksdeutsche* minority in Yugoslavia enjoyed a modest amount of cultural freedom: in 1955, in eleven elementary schools special classes with 350 pupils functioned with German as the language of education.⁴⁰

4.

About two million Germans lived within the pre-1914 boundaries of Hungary: in Banat, Burgenland, Transylvania, the mountains and valleys of Buda and Pilis, the vicinity of Budapest, the country of Tolna and Baranya (which was called the Swabian Turkey), on the Upper Danube and in the Szepcs. In the highlands they were called Zipser; on the right bank of the Danube, the Swabians (or Svabs); and in Transylvania, the Saxons. After the collapse and dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, most of the areas containing a large German element were incorporated into Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Austria. About 500,000 Germans were left in postwar Hungary.

In November 1938, March 1939, and April 1939, Hungary annexed considerable areas of Czechoslovakia, containing a German population of 13,168.⁴¹ On August 30, 1940, by virtue of the second Vienna Award, Hungary incorporated the regions of Marmorosch and Kreisch, as well as all of Rumanian Northern Transylvania, with 44,686 Germans. In April, 1941, Hungarian troops occupied the Yugoslav provinces of Bachka, Banat and Barnya with a German population of over 200,000. Through these successive territorial gains, Hungary became a country harboring "the largest German minority in Europe."⁴² Her 1941 census registered 719,762 Germans (4.9 per cent of the entire population); of this number 540,000 lived in Hungary's pre-1938 boundaries.⁴³ German sources estimated the number of *Volksdeutsche* in Greater Hungary at 1,250,000.⁴⁴

Early in 1945 the Hungarian Provincial National Government of General Miklos with its seat in Debrecen surrendered unconditionally to the Allies. The Red Army occupied the country. The surrender terms deprived Hungary of all annexed Czechoslovak, Rumanian, and Yugoslav areas and reduced her territory to the boundaries established by the Trianon Treaty. These territorial changes returned over 250,000 Germans to the sovereignty of the aforementioned countries, leaving in Hungary proper some 540,000 persons of "German mother tongue" according to the 1941 census. Some 360,000 of them had declared their ethnic nationality as German; 340,000 were members of the notorious German *Volksbund*. Even within her narrowed frontiers Hungary remained saddled

with a numerous, nationalistic, and well-organized German minority.

However, not all of the 540,000 Germans registered in 1941 remained in Hungary by the time the German armies left the country.

Responding to the appeal of the Reich, some 40,000 *Volksdeutsche* in "Greater Hungary" joined the Waffen-SS instead of fulfilling their military service in the Hungarian army,⁴⁶ and left for the Eastern front. Among them about 10,000 originated from Hungary proper, the rest being volunteers from newly annexed Yugoslav and Rumanian provinces. According to Hungarian legislation, persons enlisting in a foreign army forfeited their Hungarian citizenship. The Hungarian *Official Gazette*, *Budapest Közlöny*, regularly published long lists of *Volksdeutsche* who had for that reason been deprived of Hungarian citizenship. When on March 19, 1944, German troops occupied Hungary and installed the pro-Nazi Sztojay government, the original citizenship status of Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* serving in the German army was restored. A decree published in June, 1944, in the Hungarian *Official Gazette* stipulated that those Hungarian citizens who, during the current war, had lost their citizenship through serving with the German Armed Forces, were again considered Hungarian citizens, and were to be treated in every respect as if they had never been deprived of their citizenship.⁴⁶ According to *Deutsche Zeitung*, this decree "gave back their country to all those of our racial comrades who are fighting in Adolf Hitler's army."

Then events took a different turn. After Hungary's surrender, the new Provisional National Government invalidated all decrees promulgated by the Sztojay regime; those Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* in the German army who had survived the debacle were again declared foreigners and barred from returning to Hungary.

Many *Volksdeutsche* had left Hungary with the retreating German armies. Some were evacuated in orderly fashion into Germany or Austria; others simply fled or joined the German troops and retreated with them. As early as October, 1944, the *German Forces' Service* reported that Germans from eastern and southern Hungary, "menaced by the proximity of the front, have moved in solid blocks and are now being brought to safety in Germany."⁴⁷ How large a proportion of the 540,000 fled and how many remained cannot be accurately ascertained. According to descriptions of conditions in various settlements, it seems that in most of the communities in the vicinity of Buda over half the German

population remained (e.g., 13,000 out of 22,000 in Soroksar, 4,200 out of 7,100 in Budaörs). Farther north, the proportion of those who remained was apparently higher; but in the south, where the German population was more compact and also more nationalistic, it seems to have been substantially lower. From some villages the entire population fled.

However, some remained—too many, in the opinion of the Hungarian population, who were deeply incensed against the *Volksdeutsche* (usually called Swabians) because of the treacherous and often cruel activities of the latter before and during the war. A strong agitation for expelling all Swabians from Hungary was initiated by the National Peasant Party. Originally, this demand was raised in connection with the Land Reform, when it became clear that the supply of land did not equal the demand; another reason was the mass influx of Hungarian refugees from Rumania and Czechoslovakia who had to be settled. Subsequently, however, these practical considerations were superseded by a broader concept of the "impossibility of coexistence of Magyars and Germans." *Szabad Szó*, the organ of the National Peasant Party, wrote on April 22, 1945: "All our history is interwoven with the constant struggle against the Germans. . . . We Hungarians and the Germans have lived side by side for a thousand years, and a thousand years have not sufficed to build up a friendship deeply rooted in the minds of the two peoples. . . . Today . . . there can be no hope that the two peoples will be on peaceful terms with each other. One of them must go, and it cannot be in doubt which is the one to go." The newspaper recalled that all the talk about German assimilation with the Hungarian spirit had proved to be vain talk: "In vain was there great joy over the success of assimilation, in vain did every good son of the Swabians write and speak eloquent Magyar; in the hour of decision the ancient Germanic feeling got hold of the spirit; the usually lukewarm blood was beating fast in their temples when the Horst Wessel song was sung." The Berlin-directed *Volksbund* "divorced the *Volksdeutsche* from the Hungarian community—the Swabians do not deserve any mercy. . . . They must get out as they came: with a bundle on their backs. Their houses, their estates must be left to the most exploited fighter of Hungarian history: the agrarian proletariat. . . . They should leave with 5 pengő (\$10 at the official rate of March, 1945) and a parcel weighing not more than 30 kilograms (66 pounds). . . . There will be room for them in Germany."

The campaign for expulsion of all Germans from Hungary was

energetically backed by the Communists. But the most powerful pressure in this direction came from the Soviet representatives in Hungary.

Early in 1945 Marshal Klementy Voroshilov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission (ACC) in Hungary, started urging the Hungarian government to prepare for the wholesale expulsion of the Germans. The Soviet political representative, Georgy Pushkin, repeatedly enjoined the Hungarian Foreign Minister, János Gyöngyösi, to approach the Allies with a demand for the expulsion of the German minority. The Russian argument was that the removal of Germans would be of great benefit to Hungary: it would relieve her from a dangerous fifth column and would eliminate once and for all the possibility of German interference in Hungarian domestic affairs under the pretext of protecting the German folk group.⁴⁸

The influential Independent Smallholders Party strongly opposed the idea of a wholesale expulsion of the German minority, arguing that Hungary should not imitate the racial theories of Hitler, nor adopt the doctrines of collective responsibility. They insisted that not every person of German mother-tongue had been disloyal to the Hungarian state and could, or ought to be, expelled. Only those should be made to go who had proved their disloyalty by declaring themselves of "German nationality" in the census, or by joining the *Volksbund*

The matter came before the Cabinet on May 4 and 16, 1945. According to the semiofficial *Magyar Nemzet* of May 1, 1945, Premier Miklós decided to call a special Cabinet meeting on this problem because "the Cabinet considered as one of its most important tasks the just but thorough solution of the Swabian question. The events of the past years have proved that without the proper settlement of this question there can be no peaceful life in the Hungarian orbit." The official communiqué published after the Cabinet meetings refuted the doctrine of collective responsibility and stated that every *Volksdeutsche* would be judged on his merits: it would be carefully investigated whether he had joined the *Volksbund* or the German army, whether he had been hostile to the Hungarian state or to democracy. Those whose disloyalty or Nazi sympathies were proven (membership in the *Volksbund* in itself, was apparently not conclusive) would suffer loss of citizenship, confiscation of property, and expulsion. But even Germans found loyal would not be allowed to remain, as they had for centuries, in compact groups in their traditional residence; they would be scattered over Hungary, to bar the

danger of ideological mass infection. This relocation would be carried out by the Office for Refugees and Repatriation.

In accordance with the stand taken by the Council of Ministers, the Hungarian government on May 26, 1945, addressed an official note to the government of the Soviet Union. While admitting that "it would be necessary to transfer from Hungary those Germans who became the servants of Hitlerism and traitors to Hungary's cause," it put the number of prospective expellees at from 200 to 250 thousand.⁴⁹ There was no immediate reaction. But early in August, 1945, Marshal Voroshilov told the Hungarian government to get ready for the expulsion of 400,000 Germans from the country. To all arguments to the effect that this figure was arbitrary and the entire scheme impracticable, the Minister of the Interior Ferenc Erdei (member of the Peasant Party, but actually following the Communist line), who had been charged with preparing the expulsion, "simply replied that the expulsion of the Germans was a Russian order which we could not resist." Somewhat later this "order" became even more irresistible, and larger in scope, when the Hungarian Foreign Ministry received (characteristically enough—in Russian) the authentic text of the decisions of the Tripartite Conference at Potsdam, providing for the transfer of 500,000 Germans from Hungary. This was considerably more than Hungary had ever asked for. But there was no arguing against a clear decision by the Big Three. "From this time onward," states Stephen Kertesz, "Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement became the basis for the expulsion of the Germans. Whether this text was intended to be an authorization, suggestion, or a polite order with the endorsement of collective responsibility, was a matter of interpretation . . . [but] the phrase that the transfer of German population 'will have to be undertaken' was not mitigated by any qualifying statement. . . . The insertion into this inter-Allied decision of the figure of 500,000 Germans 'to be moved' from Hungary was a new development. . . . An inter-Allied agreement doubled the number of the 250,000 potential German expellees, a number indicated by the note of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry on May 26, 1945."⁵⁰

The Hungarian Foreign Minister and the five Ministers representing the Smallholders Party in the Cabinet continued their endeavors to limit the expulsion to those Germans who were guilty individually. In a note to the Big Three dated December 1, 1945, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry argued that not more than 303,000 ethnic Germans had remained in the country, about 56 per cent of the prewar German minority

of 540,000.⁵¹ But the meeting of the Council of Ministers, held on December 22, went along with the Soviet stand. The Communist leader Mátyás Rákosi and Prime Minister Zoltan Tildy, who carried the majority, argued that, no matter what the Hungarian point of view had been in the past, Hungary was only executing the order of the victorious powers as expressed in the Potsdam Agreement and in the decision of the Allied Control Council (ACC) for Germany of November 20, 1945, that 500,000 Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* were to be removed to the United States zone of occupation in Germany. In accordance with this view, the decree ordering the expulsion of the German minority began with the following preamble: "In executing the decision of the Allied Control Council of November 20, the Ministry [of the Interior] ordains the following: . . ."⁵²

This attempt to establish an alibi, putting the entire responsibility for the wholesale expulsion of the German minority squarely on the Allied Big Three, did not remain unchallenged. At the meeting of the ACC of January 25, 1946, General William B. Key, American representative on the Council, strongly objected to the introductory part of the decree. In an unpublished diary, which he put at the disposal of Stephen Kertesz, General Key gives the following description of his intervention:

I pointed out that the Hungarian government's decree for the removal of the Swabians stated that it was by a decision of the ACC, which left the impression that we were responsible for the deportation. I proposed that the Hungarian government be directed to change this decree to show that they themselves initiated this movement and sought the cooperation from our governments to accomplish it, which was approved at Potsdam. The Marshal [Voroshilov] agreed and stated that he would direct the Hungarian government to rewrite the decree to state the truth and also make appropriate correction in the press; he also stated that the responsibility for selecting the Swabians was solely that of the Hungarian government, that all the ACC did was to see that humane measures were observed in the movement and that they were received by the U.S. authorities in their area in Germany.⁵³

Having achieved the Soviet purpose by the promulgation of the Hungarian decree on wholesale German expulsion, Marshal Voroshilov readily made common cause with the American attempt to alibi the Big Three and demanded, in a note to the Hungarian government, that the reference to the ACC decision be deleted from the decree of December 22, 1945. But it was not until August 31, 1946, that, in a declaration on

the resumption of the temporarily suspended removal of the Germans (see p. 282), the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior stated that the Potsdam Agreement had given to Hungary "the right to expatriate her German population into Germany. The expatriation is not mandatory for the Hungarian government, but the Potsdam Agreement accords the right to do so."⁵⁴

The organized movement of Germans from Hungary to the U.S. zone of Germany was initiated through a bilateral agreement reached between the U.S. military occupation authorities and the Budapest government in the first part of January, 1946. It was later revised, and another agreement was signed in Budapest on August 22, 1946, providing for the following main guarantees:

- a. The German expellees will be moved in family units and families will not be split up.
- b. Hungary will allow up to 100 kilograms of personal belongings, food, and hand tools to be taken out by each expellee.
- c. Expellees must possess a minimum of clothing, including a complete outer garment, underwear, hose, shoes, coat, and hat. Expatriates without financial means and lacking suitable clothing must receive this minimum equipment from the Hungarian government.
- d. Expellees must receive a monetary allowance if they possess no funds. They may take with them wedding rings, watches and alarm clocks (if not of precious metals), bank books on German banks, and identification documents.⁵⁵

The first official loads of German expellees from Hungary arrived in the U.S. zone during January, 1946. The first trainload encountered delays while passing through the Soviet zone in Austria, with the result that food supplies provided by the expelling Hungarian authorities became exhausted and suffering from hunger occurred. "The first trainload from Hungary," testifies General Lucius D. Clay, U.S. Commander in Germany, "was a pitiful sight."⁵⁶ The monthly report of the military governor of the U.S. zone dated February 20, 1946, added: "The expellees had been assembled in such a manner as to preclude the bringing of full allowance of food and personal baggage." These facts were reported to the Allied Control Commission for Hungary; the report expressed the hope that "future transfers [from Hungary] will be made in a humane manner" (p. 25). In all, 9,166 *Volksdeutsche* from Hungary entered the U.S. zone during this first month of organized transfer.⁵⁷

During the month of February a relatively low number of expellees were received (6,649) because of bad weather and the "inability of the Hungarian authorities to meet the conditions for humane movement" required by the U.S. authorities.⁵⁸ They began to arrive in greater numbers during the months of March (15,613), April (29,696), and May (54,408); in June the number of arrivals decreased to 34,931.⁵⁹ In July the movement of expellees from Hungary was almost completely suspended owing to the inability of the Hungarian government to furnish each expatriate with the 500 Reichsmarks he was entitled to receive upon leaving the country; only 170 Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* were admitted to the U.S. zone during the month of July. This situation continued in August when of 10,365 Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* received in the U.S. zone, only 7,060 came directly from Hungary, the remaining 3,305 being expelled from Austria where several tens of thousands of German refugees from Hungary had fled before the advancing Soviet armies; in September, 5,843 German expellees from both Hungary and Austria were admitted.⁶⁰ In October the movement of German expellees from Hungary and Austria was once again stopped, to be resumed in November (3,924 expellees) and December (2,239). As of January 1, 1947, 179,103 Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* had been received in the U.S. zone in organized movements. Not a single German expellee from Hungary arrived during 1947.⁶¹ In 1947 and during part of 1948, transports of German expellees were directed to the Soviet zone of Germany. According to the estimate of German refugee organizations, about 50,000 expellees were removed to Eastern Germany.⁶² A few of the expellees preferred to settle in Austria rather than in Germany. The office of the United States High Commissioner for Austria reported that in January, 1951, there were in that country 9,136 ethnic Germans from Hungary.⁶³

It appears, then, that of the 500,000 ethnic Germans slated for expulsion, only about 260,000 were actually expelled or fled from Hungary. In a publication of the U.S. Bureau of the Census, *The Population of Hungary*, Jacob S. Siegel ascribes this result not only to the suspension of the movement of the expellees by the American Military Government, but also in part to the reluctance of the Hungarian government: "Not having been flooded by refugees from surrounding countries, Hungary found it needed the Germans."⁶⁴

It seems that on the whole the transfer of Germans to the U.S. zone of Germany was carried out under relatively decent conditions. The authors of the pamphlet *Men Without the Rights of Man: A Report on the*

Expulsion and Extermination of German-Speaking Minority Groups in the Balkans and Prewar Poland, published in New York in 1947 by the Committee Against Mass Expulsion, acknowledged (p. 11) that "by and large the Hungarian government proceeded less ruthlessly against the German minority than any other Soviet satellite. . . . The expellees were allowed to take more property with them than similar groups in Poland, Yugoslavia, or Rumania. Fewer people perished in 'work camps' than in neighboring countries." The American-licensed German newspaper *Neckarzeitung* wrote on June 19, 1946: "The refugees are arriving in fair health. The expellees from Hungary have more baggage than those from other countries: one hundred kilograms, including food. They have bedding, kitchen utensils and some clothing besides what they wear." The expellees to the Soviet zone in the years 1947-1948 fared much worse, and even some Hungarian papers (*Ellensék* of October 4, 1947 and *Hazánk* of October 17, 1947) carried accounts of the abuses they suffered.

In 1948, the Hungarian government, apparently following new directives from Moscow, suspended further expulsion and announced that henceforth the country's German-speaking population would enjoy full civic equality. But the Germans who remained in the country still carefully avoided acknowledging their ethnic nationality. In the census of January 1, 1949, only 22,453 persons (0.2 per cent of the total population) gave German as their mother tongue; the overwhelming majority found it safer to identify themselves with the dominant state language. The German-speaking minority all but disappeared in the 1949 data, which even the Hungarian Statistical Office described as "seriously understating the number of Germans in Hungary." By way of illustration, one of the stories reportedly recounted in that office was that any number of respondents, when asked what their mother tongue was, replied with the German "*Ungarish*"; the enumerators, then, cooperatively checked "*Magyar*" in the appropriate space.⁶⁵

The announced new policy of benevolence towards the remaining German minority was pursued with considerable consistency. The German ethnic group was accorded a certain amount of cultural freedom. The German language was introduced as a subject in 76 elementary schools; if the parents so demanded, it could become the language of education in such schools where pupils of German origin formed a majority. In June, 1954, a German-language paper *Freies Leben* appeared in Budapest.⁶⁶ Hungarian authorities have deliberately minimized problems arising from ethnic and religious differences, and recent official

writing treats with pronounced disdain the emphasis given such subjects as mother tongue and nationality in previous Hungarian censuses as well as in the censuses of other countries. Official Hungarian estimates for 1955 gave the number of citizens of German mother tongue as 220,000 (2.2 per cent of the total population).⁶⁷

In March, 1950, the Hungarian government published a decree authorizing the return of the German expellees as full-fledged citizens.⁶⁸ For some time, many German expellees were anxious to be repatriated and were prepared to make great sacrifices to prove their loyalty to Hungary. However, when it became obvious that the Communist regime was firmly established, the same people were glad to remain in Western Germany and desperately tried to bring their relatives out of Hungary.⁶⁹

NOTES

¹ Hein Brunner, "Biologische und Soziologische Streiflichter auf das Südostdeutschum," *Nation und Staat*, July 1940, pp. 362-364; Helmut Wolter, "Zur Volksbiologie der deutschen Volksgruppen," *Nation und Staat*, December 1939, pp. 90-91.

² Brunner, *op. cit.*, pp. 363-364.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 368-369; *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, Nos. 1 and 7.

⁴ Wolter, *op. cit.*, pp. 83, 96.

⁵ *Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations*, 1937-1938.

⁶ H. Gross, *Südosteuropa*, Leipzig, 1937; H. Ullmann, *Die Völker im Südosten*, Jena, 1933; H. O. Wesemann, *Das Verkehrsweesen Südosteuropas*, Wien, 1940; J. Hobus, *Wirtschaft und Staat im Südosteuropäischen Raum*, Leipzig, 1939; H. Hummel, *Südosteuropa und das Erbe der Donaumonarchie*, Leipzig, 1937.

⁷ *Deutschland und Südosteuropa*, herausgegeben vom Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Institut der Deutschen Arbeitsfront (1940); H. Gross, *Die Wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Südosteuropas für das Deutsche Reich*, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1941; R. W. Krugmann, *Südosteuropa und Grossdeutschland* (Breslau, 1939); H. Schröder-Steinberger, *Südosteuropa in der deutschen Donaunraumwirtschaft*, Berlin, 1939; H. Zeck, "Die deutsche Wirtschaft und Südosteuropa," *Macht und Erde*, Leipzig, 1939, Heft 14.

⁸ Heinz Brunner, *Das Deutschtum in Südosteuropa*, Leipzig, 1940; L. Gruenberg, *Die deutsche Südostgrenze*, Leipzig, 1941; E. Klebel, *Siedlungsgeschichte des deutschen Südostens*, Munich, 1940; K. Müller, *Die Bedeutung des deutschen Blutes in Südosteuropa*, Munich, 1939; J. Schultze, *Die deutschen Volksgruppen in Südosteuropa*, Leipzig, 1940; W. Schneefuss, *Deutschtum in Südosteuropa*, Dresden, 1939; F. Valjovec, *Der deutsche Kultureinfluss im nahen Südosten*, Munich, 1940; H. Ullmann, *Das Südostdeutschum*, Berlin, 1935.

⁹ *Anuarul Statistic Al Romaniei*, 1937-1938, Institutul, Central de Statistica, Bucharest, 1939, p. 60.

¹⁰ *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 7.

¹¹ According to the data of the Rumanian census of 1930, *Nation und Staat*, March 1941, p. 206. The Hungarian census of 1941 enumerated 44,686 Germans in the incorporated Transylvanian territory. *Magyar Statistikai Szemle*, Budapest, 1941, Vol. XXII, pp. 1, 4, 13.

¹² *Wirtschaft und Statistik*, 1941, No. 7.

¹³ Institutul Central de Statistica, *Communicari Statistice*, January 15, 1945, p. 3.

¹⁴ *The New Europe*, New York, 1943, pp. 282, 462-463.

¹⁵ *German Home Service*, November 18, 1943.

- ¹⁶ *Bukarester Tageblatt*, July 28, 1943.
- ¹⁷ *Rumanian European Service*, October 5, 1944.
- ¹⁸ *Turkish Home Service*, September 29, 1944.
- ¹⁹ *Statistical Pocket-Book on Expellees*, Ed. Federal Statistical Office, Wiesbaden, 1953, p. 3.
- ²⁰ The foregoing description and statistical data are based on intelligence reports which were available to the author when he was serving with the Office of Strategic Services in Washington, D.C.
- ²¹ *Recensământul Populației din 21 Februarie 1956, Rezultate Generale*.
- ²² *Monitorul Oficial*, March 23, 1945.
- ²³ *La Yougoslavie d'Aujourd'hui*, p. 8.
- ²⁴ *Relazioni Internazionali*, October 31, 1942, p. 8; *Hrvatski Narod*, October 15, 1942.
- ²⁵ *Wiesci Polskie*, Budapest, April 9, 1943.
- ²⁶ *Deutsches Volksblatt*, Novi Sad, November 7, 1943.
- ²⁷ *Deutsche Zeitung*, Budapest, September 29, 1943.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, May 25, 1944.
- ²⁹ *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, 1943, No. 10.
- ³⁰ *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 4, 1944.
- ³¹ John M. Hightower, "Germans Taken to Russia to Repair War Damage," *The Evening Star*, Washington, April 16, 1945.
- ³² *New York Times*, October 21, 1946.
- ³³ *Ibid.*, October 19, 1946.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, October 20, 1946.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, May 15, 1947.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, January 3, 1948.
- ³⁷ *Care and Help*, published by the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims, Bonn, 1956, p. 24.
- ³⁸ U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *The Population of Yugoslavia*, Washington, D.C., 1954, pp. 53, 54.
- ³⁹ Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Federal Statistical Office, *Statistical Bulletin*, Series B, Vol. I, No. 29, Preliminary Results of the Population Census of March 31, 1953, p. 38.
- ⁴⁰ *Statistical Pocket-Book on Expellees*, p. 3; *Archiv* (Göttingen), October 20, 1955.
- ⁴¹ *The Central European Observer*, December 16, 1939, p. 392; *Annuaire Statistique Hongrois*, Budapest, 1940, v. 47.
- ⁴² *Tagespost* (Graz), December 14, 1942.
- ⁴³ *Uj Nemzedek*, August 12, 1943.
- ⁴⁴ *Deutsche Zeitung* (Budapest), April 4, 1943; *Krakauer Zeitung*, October 23, 1941.
- ⁴⁵ *Paris Home Service*, October 23, 1943.
- ⁴⁶ *Transcontinent Press*, June 15, 1944.
- ⁴⁷ *FCC*, October 27, 1944.
- ⁴⁸ Stephen Kertesz, "The Expulsion of the Germans from Hungary: A Study in Postwar Diplomacy," *The Review of Politics*, April 1953, p. 182. Stephen Kertesz was a member of the political division of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry in 1943-1944 and was charged with the preparation of the Hungarian case for the Peace Conference in view of the German defeat. In 1945-46 he was the head of the peace preparatory division of the Foreign Ministry, and in 1946, Secretary General of the Hungarian Peace Delegation. Thus he observed from close quarters the problems connected with the German expulsion and intervened in some phases of the events.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 184-185.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁵¹ See Ferenc Nagy, *The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain*, New York, 1948, pp. 131-132, 168-169, 198-202; *La Hongrie et la Conférence de Paris, Les Rapports Internationaux de la Hongrie avant la Conférence de Paris*, Publié par le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères de Hongrie, Budapest, 1947, pp. 37-39.
- ⁵² Kertesz, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 200.
- ⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁴⁴Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), *Displaced Persons, Stateless Persons, and Refugees* (Cumulative Review), *Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone*, May 8, 1945-September 30, 1946, No. 15, p. 8.

⁴⁵Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany*, New York, 1950, pp. 313-314.

⁴⁶Military Government of Germany, *Monthly Report of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone*, February 20, 1946, No. 7, p. 25.

⁴⁷*Monthly Report*, March 20, 1946, No. 8, p. 58.

⁴⁸*Monthly Report*, September 1-30, 1946, No. 15, p. 20.

⁴⁹*Ibid.*

⁵⁰Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), *Report of the Military Governor*, May 1-31, 1947, No. 23, Statistical Annex, p. 2. Besides, 15,894 Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* refugees were repatriated or expelled from Austria up to October, 1946. (Military Government of Austria, *Report of the U.S. Commissioner*, August 1946, No. 10, p. 45, and September 1946, No. 11, p. 35). The German census of October 29, 1946, however, revealed the presence of only 138,000 Hungarian *Volksdeutsche* in the three Western zones of occupation; by September 13, 1950, their number had increased to 178,000 (*Statistical Pocket-Book on Expellees*, p. 3).

⁵¹Kertesz, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

⁵²U.S. Department of State, High Commissioner of Austria, *Report of the U.S. High Commissioner, Statistical Annex, No. XVIII*, first quarter 1951.

⁵³U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *The Population of Hungary*, International Population Statistics Reports, Series p-90, No. 9, Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 38.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁵⁵*Archiv* (Göttingen), January 27, 1955.

⁵⁶*The Population of Hungary*, p. 72.

⁵⁷*New York Times*, April 2, 1950.

⁵⁸Mathias Annabring, "Das Ungariändische Deutschtum, Leidensweg einer südostdeutschen Volksgruppe," *Südoststimmen* II Sondernummer, March 1952, pp. 70-71.

TWELVE

Resettlement of Transferees in Germany

I.

The "Report on the Tripartite Conference" published on August 2, 1945, at Potsdam, contained special provisions on "orderly transfers to Germany of German populations or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary."¹

The question of the distribution of the expellees between the four zones of occupation was first submitted to the Inter-Allied Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons Directorate, which recommended to the Coordinating Committee of the Allied Control Authority quotas and timetables for the acceptance of the arriving Germans. The "Combined Repatriation Executive" (CRX), which had been established in October, 1945, by the Allied Control Council in Germany for the purpose of facilitating and controlling the movement of prisoners of war, displaced persons, and the like and was composed of the repatriation officers of the four occupying powers (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France), was made responsible for all organized movements of nonmilitary personnel, including transfer of German minorities.


Very soon substantial friction developed among the Allied representatives with regard to the distribution of the prospective transferees among their respective zones of occupation. French representatives, who felt that they were not bound by the Potsdam decisions in which they did not participate, were very critical of the entire scheme.² By the end of October, the four partners were "already balking at fixing the number that each of their zones in Germany is to assimilate and pleading that there is neither food nor shelter for them."³ Finally, on November 20, 1945, at the twelfth meeting of the Allied Control Council in Berlin, arrangements were completed for organized transports in conformity with Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement. Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary were to send regularly scheduled transports of their respective *Volksdeutsche* into the then boundaries of Germany where the German civil authorities of each zone of occupation, in cooperation with the military occupation authorities, would receive them. This organized

movement of transports was scheduled to begin on December 1, 1945.⁴ It was agreed to ship about 28,000 persons per day, the whole operation to be concluded about July 31, 1946, so that the anticipated transfer would amount to about six and one-half million persons. According to an official announcement by the U.S. State Department, 10 per cent of the transfers were to be made in December, 1945; 5 per cent each in January and February, 1946; 15 per cent each in March and April, 20 per cent each in May and June, and 10 per cent in July.⁵

Out of the up to 2,500,000 Germans to be transferred from Czechoslovakia, up to 1,750,000 were to be directed to the U.S. zone of occupation and up to 750,000 to the Soviet zone; those from Poland and Polish-incorporated former German eastern provinces were to be received in the British zone (up to 1,500,000 persons) and the Soviet zone (up to 2,000,000); the destination of the up to 500,000 prospective German expellees from Hungary was the American zone. As Austria was not mentioned in the Potsdam Agreement, and as there were large numbers of German refugees and expellees, an agreement was reached whereby the French would receive up to 150,000 *Reichsdeutsche* in their zone beginning April 15, 1946.⁶

The "official" transfers, however, were only a part of the total expellee movement, and actual distribution by no means always corresponded to the zonal allocations agreed upon by the Allied Control Council. Little or no efficacious control was exercised over interzonal movements, so that hundreds of thousands of expellees and refugees were moving to areas of their own choice.⁷ In addition, some 300,000 expellees not included in the Council's allocation arrived from Yugoslavia and Rumania. Instead of the 6.5 million expellees slated by the Allied Control Council as a maximum estimate of those to be received in organized transfers, 9.68 million were counted by the October, 1946, census.

While quadripartite action was taken on the general plan, its implementation transpired through a series of bilateral agreements within the framework of the master plan. Failure to initiate these bilateral agreements in some instances, and difficulties in concluding them in others, caused the time schedules and quotas set forth in the original scheme to be inoperative almost from the beginning. Very soon it became apparent that the transfers would not be concluded as originally set forth and that expellee movement was bound to continue at least through the year of 1946-1947, and possibly even longer.



Map V. Arrivals of expellees and refugees in the Federal territory until the end of 1950 totalled 13.4 million, from:

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Pomerania | 8. Poland |
| 2. East Prussia | 9. Soviet Union |
| 3. East Brandenburg | 10. Czechoslovakia |
| 4. Silesia | 11. Rumania |
| 5. Total from the German Eastern provinces | 12. Hungaria |
| 6. Danzig | 13. Yugoslavia |
| 7. Memelland | 14. other European countries and from overseas |
| 15. (unlabeled) | |
| 16. (unlabeled) | |

The population census taken on October 29, 1946, in all four occupation zones and in Berlin registered 9,688,000 expellees. Of this total 5,846,000 came from the former German provinces east of the Oder-Neisse line, and 3,872,000 from abroad (including 2,404,000 Sudeten Germans). The expellees were distributed as follows:⁸

The three Western zones of occupation	Berlin	The Soviet zone of occupation	Total in the four zones and Berlin
5,963,000	120,000	3,605,000	9,688,000

Predominating among the expellee mass in the Soviet zone were the arrivals from the territories east of the Oder-Neisse line (2,273,000) and from Czechoslovakia (841,000); smaller groups were represented by 246,000 expellees from Poland proper, 72,000 from Danzig, 57,000 from the Soviet Union (including the Baltic States and the Memel territory), and so on. The expellee population of the Anglo-American zone was a motley one. In addition to 3,205,000 from the area east of the Oder-Neisse line (55.3 per cent of the total), and 1,542,000 (26.6 per cent) from Czechoslovakia, it received 1,050,000 (18.1 per cent) from a half-dozen other countries. The most numerous single groups within this latter category were the 276,000 *Volksdeutsche* from the "old" Polish territory; 140,000 from Hungary; 100,000 from Rumania; 100,000 from the Soviet Union (including the Baltic Germans); and 95,000 from Yugoslavia.

The sex, age, and occupational distribution of the expellees—notwithstanding Allied official statements to the contrary—was similar to that of the local German population. The census showed that the percentage of women was:⁹

Zone	Women among the expellees	Women among local Germans
In the four zones and Berlin	56.5%	55.6%
In Bizonia (combined Anglo-American zone of occupation)	55.2	54.6
In the Soviet zone	58.7	57.0

The age pyramid in Bizonia was as follows:

Age	Among the expellees	Among local Germans
Up to 14 years	24.9%	23.0%
14 to 20 years	10.1	8.9
20 to 50 years	44.1	42.9
50 to 65 years	14.0	16.1
65 and over	6.9	9.1
Total	100.0%	100.0%

The most productive age category (20 to 50 years) was better represented among the expellees (44.1 per cent) than among the native German population (42.9 per cent).

The occupational structure of the expellees can be properly judged only if considered against the background of their occupations in the countries of their origin. The following comparative table gives an approximate picture of their occupational structure:

Occupation	Before expulsion	After expulsion
Agriculture and cattle breeding	40.0%	29.3%
Industry and handicraft	31.2	37.5
Trade and transport	18.9	11.8
Domestic services, public health, public administration, judiciary, liberal professions, etc.	9.9	21.4

After October, 1946, the numbers and distribution of the expellee population changed considerably. The influx of expellees continued. According to the census of September 13, 1950, about 7.87 million expellees were at that time living in the Federal Republic of Germany. By October 1, 1955, their number had increased to 8,707,600, comprising 17.3 per cent of the total population; in addition, 159,400 expellees lived in West Berlin.¹⁰ Data concerning the number of expellees in the Soviet-dominated East German People's Republic are contradictory (see p. 293).

From the first, all four Occupying Powers established the principle that reception and absorption of the expellees were the responsibility of the native German population. But in actual practice during the first

years of the mass influx there were considerable differences in the handling of the arriving expellees in the different zones of occupation.

The American occupation authorities handed over authority in their zone completely to the local German administration, so that almost all the activities connected with the influx of millions of expellees were handled by the German authorities.¹¹ In the British zone, in spite of repeated declarations that authority would be transferred and British administration would confine itself to control, the British authorities tended to allow the Germans very little initiative. The French kept very tight hold on their zone and believed in direct management even more than the British. The Russians, although appearing to devolve much responsibility on the Germans, actually controlled very closely all the administrative matters in their zone.¹²

2.

The mass influx of German refugees and expellees from Poland and Polish-incorporated eastern provinces of Germany, and from Czechoslovakia, into the Soviet zone of occupation started before the Potsdam decisions. The Berlin correspondent of the *London Times* reported in September, 1945, that "at least 5,000,000 of these people have been wandering about the Russian-occupied zone in circumstances of the greatest distress; about 1,000,000 have passed through Berlin and have been dispersed in the surrounding countryside and in Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Saxony." The correspondent stressed that the Soviet authorities were trying to cope with the situation without adequate transport facilities, food, medical supplies, or communications, and that bands of hungry people were scouring the countryside for food and shelter which were not sufficient for the people who already lived in the area. "Most of these refugees are women and children, since most of the men who were not called up for service in the Wehrmacht are being retained in Poland to provide labor for the reconstruction of that country's devastated areas."¹³

Most of the expellees who reached the Soviet zone during the period preceding organized transfer provided for by the Potsdam decisions were from the East. According to Polish data, 917,815 Germans were shipped to the Soviet zone during the second half of 1945 and up to February, 1946

The scheme worked out by the Allied Control Council in Berlin provided for the transfer of 750,000 Germans from Czechoslovakia to the Soviet zone. But Sudeten Germans started arriving in the Soviet zone even before the Potsdam decisions, and 257,222 were accepted by June 15, 1946, when the Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement providing for the organized transfer of an additional 600,000 Germans was signed. The transfer was completed on October 15, 1946.

An official Soviet source claimed that by June, 1947, the Soviet zone of occupation had received in all 5,256,900 German expellees from various countries.¹⁴ This figure appears questionable. The census of October 29, 1946, established the presence in the zone of 3,605,000 expelled Germans.¹⁵ It is most unlikely that within seven months (November 1946-June 1947) 1,651,900 new expellees had arrived in the Soviet zone. An unofficial German source (*Jahrbuch Arbeit und Sozialfürsorge* 1947-48) estimated the number of expellees in the Soviet zone in 1947 at 4,332,748 (24.2 per cent of the zone's total population). Taking into consideration various factors involved (influx of new expellees, flight to Western Germany, and the natural increase of population) Professor P. H. Seraaphim, in a well-documented study *Expellees in the Soviet Zone of Occupation*, comes to the conclusion that in the five-year period 1946-1951 the expellee population in the zone increased to but 3,853,000.¹⁶

Evidence concerning the reception and resettlement of this huge mass of newcomers is contradictory. In 1945, 237,000 expellees were living in 358 camps under disastrous hygienic conditions; many of these camps became breeding grounds of typhus, spotted typhus, and other epidemic diseases.¹⁷ Delbert Clark, who early in 1947 made a survey in the province of Meklenburg, reported that "neither the Russian military administration nor the [German] Meklenburg provincial government gives them anything but shelter." He found housing conditions very unsatisfactory. After a visit to a rambling castle situated a few miles from the market town of Warcn, where 100 German refugees from the Polish-held area and the Sudetenland found shelter, Clark gave the following picture of their existence:

Dirty urchins wander about the grounds while their bedraggled parents while away the time with no attempt to appear busy. Despite the size of the castle, the refugees huddle in restricted quarters for lack of window glass and heating facilities. One Sudeten family of seven has a single room with five beds—two double deckers and one single. Most of the refugees have the customary featherbeds and hand-embroidered pillowslips, which they

characteristically carried on the long journey from Czechoslovakia or Pomerania while leaving other property behind. Each family received a fixed sum in cash on being deported and now lives on this. They pay no taxes and live very frugally; food prices are rigidly controlled. A few thousand marks, at this rate, last a long time.¹⁸

It seems, however, that by no means all the expellees were condemned to this idle and aimless existence. Soviet authorities personally took charge of the integration of the expellees and took pains to find homes for all of them. It was for them a matter of highest political importance to be in a position to disclaim the very existence of a "refugee problem" in the Soviet zone and thus to neutralize propaganda for the return to Germany of her Polish-incorporated eastern provinces.

In 1945 the Soviet military authorities established, as part of the German Central Administration, a Central Administration of Resettlers to supervise the welfare and absorption of the arriving expellees, whom they euphemistically called "resettlers." Backed by the Soviet authority and widely employing coercion, this body in the years 1945-1946 did an effective job of controlling the reception camps and the expellees' redistribution among the *Länder* (States). Later this body was absorbed by the Central Administration for Labor, thus eliminating even any semantic trace of a specific status or treatment of the new arrivals as compared with that of the native German population. As Leo W. Schwarz aptly put it: "The Soviets immediately erased any distinction and imposed a policy of integration; the Western powers recognized distinction [in their respective zones of occupation], especially of a social and economic character, and left integration to the normal process of assimilation. These contrasting policies are rooted in different concepts of society. Which will ultimately more successfully achieve its purpose cannot as yet be determined."¹⁹

The Soviet occupation authorities carried out in their zone a far-reaching land reform, breaking up estates of more than 247 acres and distributing them among landless and nearly landless peasants and refugees. By July 1, 1947, 7,500,000 acres of land had been confiscated under the land reform and over 5 million had been distributed among 496,795 peasant families, comprising about 2,000,000 persons; among them were 83,806 resettler and refugee families which received over 1,600,000 acres as private property. The average land grant was about 19 acres.²⁰

Clark described the working of the resettlement machinery as follows:

The land is not handed out free but sold for a moderate price. For example, the best land in this area [Mecklenburg] is about 100 marks an acre, which at the Soviet Zone's rate of exchange would be about \$40 an acre. Long-term loans without interest are available to approved farmers for the purchase of land, livestock, small machinery, and building materials. Livestock on undivided estates is sold to new landowners on a lottery basis. . . . Once a farmer has received his allocation of land, he may not sell it. It goes to his heirs on his death if they are able and willing to operate it; if they are not, or the farmer is without such heirs, it reverts to the provincial government and is reallocated. Land is allocated on a basis of ability to operate. Thus a farmer with two strong sons gets more than a childless one, and one with two horses gets a larger farm than one with only one old mare. . . . The provincial administration is apparently adhering strictly to the rule that no one can get a farm unless he satisfies the land commission that he can and will operate it.

Loans to a total of 250,000 marks were granted to the resettler farms; they also received draft animals and farm implements. The government of the state of Saxony alone allocated 9 million marks for the purpose of building homes for the newcomers, and supplied them with implements and fertilizers as well. In Thuringia, they received assistance to the amount of 43 million marks and were provided with 20 million bricks, 14 million tiles, 10 million cubic yards of timber, 10,000 square yards of glass, and 120,000 square yards of roofing material for the construction of 2,000 homes. Some 120,000 peasant families in the Mecklenburg Province built their homes using timber from their own forest plots. Substantial help was extended to the resettlers by nongovernmental bodies. The Peasants' Mutual Assistance Society in Saxony, for example, made an appropriation of 2 million marks for repairs of agricultural machinery set aside for the new peasants, and the Saxon People's Solidarity Organization gave 250,000 marks to buy furniture for them.²¹

Experience proved that many of the new landowners were inexperienced and incapable of efficient farming. Some complained that the small farm plots they received were not large enough for successful farming. One of the resettled expellees was having a very difficult time because he had always been used to growing grain "and now they were making him grow vegetables, with which he had no experience." On the other hand, a woman from the Danzig area who, with her sister and daughter, was

allotted a 20-acre plot, told Clark her family had had about the same acreage in their former home and had no complaints about the new allotment. The woman conceded that it was an arduous life making the deliveries required, but she hoped it would get better when more fertilizer and the like was available. According to Clark's observations, the difference between failure and some measure of success appeared to lie to a considerable extent in the individual enthusiasm of the new settlers.

By July 1, 1948, the number of resettled peasant families had reached 88,231, comprising 351,719 persons (41.1 per cent of the expellees in the Soviet zone belonging to the rural group). Professor Seraphim estimates that about 15 per cent of the resettled expellee farmers could be considered as successfully established; another 15 per cent were a manifest failure; and 70 per cent were painfully eking out a meager living. A considerable number were working as hired laborers in state farms.²²

The resettlement of the nonagricultural elements proved to be more difficult, since the Soviet zone was industrially underdeveloped. Nevertheless, numerous resettlers' handicraft cooperatives were set up; by June, 1947, 53 such undertakings employing about 30,000 people were functioning in the province of Brandenburg alone.²³ The Soviet administration also sponsored a substantial Bohemian glass industry in Saxony, utilizing the experience of the Sudeten expellees who were renowned for their high skill in the manufacture of the famous Bohemian glassware. They succeeded in creating an excellent product, directly imitating the traditional Czech glass and not marked to indicate that it came from Germany. It is estimated that, in addition to industry, 5 per cent of the expellees found occupation in handicraft, trade, and commerce.²⁴ According to the *Tägliche Rundschau* of October 21, 1950, a total of 140,360 expellees were employed in public service: of that number, 44,000 were in the post office and mail service, 73,000 in central and provincial administration, and 23,000 served as teachers, constituting about 30 per cent of the total teacher staff of the zone.

As early as June 13, 1947, *Soviet News* claimed that 94 per cent of all resettlers "have already received permanent jobs, of the kind for which their training and experience fit them." This claim is probably somewhat exaggerated. Nevertheless, ten years later its economic aspect was reluctantly confirmed by no less an authority than *Regierungsdirektor* Dr. Hans Liebrich of West Germany's Federal Ministry of all-German

Affairs. In an article "The Expellees in the Soviet Zone," the West German high official admitted that


assistance by the [East German] government seemed better and more effective than in the western zones. Camps were evacuated in a comparatively short time, the government coped energetically with the resistance of the local population, assigned dwellings to the expellees, and gave them some loans for the purchase of household effects. Work was found for those able to work, and those who were willing to farm were given acreage provided by the land reform for cultivation. Economic adaptation was therefore quickly achieved. . . . But this was done in a dictatorial manner, without leaving the individual any choice in his place of work. . . . The individual expellee could hardly hope that the kind of work or settlement provided for him might be only temporary and might someday be changed according to his own will.

Another distressing aspect of the situation was "social isolation that practically excluded all neighborly assistance. . . . Everybody had to fend for himself. . . . [The expellees] are still economically the weakest group. By and large, they still have a lower standard of living than the indigenous population." All this "made the expellees, since 1945, move westwards from the Soviet zone." Of the 931,000 immigrants from Soviet-dominated East Germany who were admitted in the Federal Republic between 1949 and 1953, expellees constituted an estimated 40 to 50 per cent.²⁸

3.

The organized movement of German expellees into the U.S. zone of Germany was officially begun on January 25, 1946. Owing to severe weather, the rate of flow for the first three months was relatively small. It increased considerably during the summer months. Through June, July, and August, nearly 10,000 expellees were received in the zone every 24 hours. As of December 31, 1946, a total of 1,854,861 arrived, of whom 1,675,758 were Sudetens from Czechoslovakia and 179,103 were Swabians from Hungary. The over-all figure of 1,854,861 included 228,338 who had fled into the U.S. zone prior to the Control Council's plan of transfer of population of November 20, 1945, and 123,000 who had entered the zone between November 20, 1945, and January 24, 1946, under that plan.

**Areas of Origin of the Expellees and Refugees in the
Federal Territory (September, 1950)**



Early in November 1946, the military government announced that the U.S. zone was not able to provide for reception and treatment in a humane manner of expellees from Czechoslovakia and Hungary during the winter months. During the month of November, 29,991 Sudeten expellees and 3,924 expellees from Hungary were admitted, but in December the respective numbers decreased to 1,750 and 2,239.²⁶ No Sudeten expellees were admitted in 1947, and only fifty

were received during 1948 "for compassionate reasons" (to join their families). No expellees from Hungary were admitted after January, 1947.²⁷

The bimonthly review of the military governor of the U.S. zone for the period February 1 to March 31, 1947, stressed that since "in terms of settlement of expellees the task of the German authorities in the U.S. zone has scarcely begun, the continued acceptance of Swabians and Sudetens under the present conditions would jeopardize what has so far been achieved." By the end of 1946 there was a backlog of more than 100,000 expellees in distributing centers, caused by the inability of German communities to assimilate into the German economy those already admitted. Inability to supply the newcomers with stoves, and shortage of fuel in the zone compelled the German authorities to hold these 100,000 expellees in winterized camps where their care could be more economically provided. It was in order to permit the distribution throughout the zone of expellees backed up in the reception and distribution camps that the U.S. occupation authorities decided to suspend further organized transfer into the U.S. zone.²⁸ But besides the expellees who had arrived under the Control Council's plan of transfer of population, 758,871 German refugees and expellees from east of the Oder and Neisse rivers resided in the U.S. zone as of January 1, 1947. To these numbers must be also added hundreds of thousands of *Volksdeutsche* refugees and expellees who were formerly members of the German minorities in Yugoslavia, Rumania, "old Polish" territory, and the Baltic countries.²⁹

The procedure of the expellees' reception was as follows. Upon arrival in the U.S. zone trains were allocated to the zone's three *Länder* (Bavaria, Hesse, Württemberg-Baden) in accordance with a quota established by the *Länderrat*. Representatives of the *Länder* waited at the border reception station to assign destinations for each train. On arrival at one of the eight established *Kreis-Durchschleusungslager* (reception centers), of the assigned *Land*, the expellees underwent screening by means of a special questionnaire, were given a medical examination, deloused, documented, and classified according to skills and trades. The whole process took, on the average, between four and five hours; the expellees were kept in these temporary quarters for barely a week. From there, they were moved into the local communities to which they were allocated. The majority were directed to *Regierungslager* (transit camps), where they usually stayed for from four to six weeks; sick people were sent to a hospital while their

relatives remained in the camp, so that the family was, as a rule, not separated.

Conditions in the transit camps were highly unsatisfactory. Reports of Württemberg-Baden Labor Offices for October, 1946, spoke of overcrowding and undernourishment which were encouraging diseases, particularly tuberculosis, so that isolation barracks for TB sufferers had to be established in several camps. Unsettled living conditions were the biggest stumbling block to employment. Single rooms housed five to eight persons. Most of the rooms had no stove.³⁰

At no time was a sizable number of expellees kept for a long while in the transit camps. By the end of November, 1946, only about 30,000 were still kept there. Some were transferred to *Landratslager* (base camps) or to semipermanent camps. The great majority, however, were billeted in private houses. A physical census was taken of every house and every apartment in the country, and every available room—no matter to whom it belonged—was required by law to accommodate (against payment) two persons. The available dwelling space was extremely limited. Aerial bombardment and land fighting during the war had destroyed about 2.2 million dwelling units in the Federal Republic, approximately 21 per cent of the 10.6 million dwellings available in 1939. The expellees, therefore, in the U.S. as well as in the British zone, were directed predominantly to smaller towns and villages which had suffered less destruction.³¹ In 1946, approximately five out of every six expellees were living in what might be roughly classified as rural areas, where the inhabitants were still able to produce food and had a roof over their heads. Every effort was made to prevent any influx into the heavily damaged industrial areas. The geographic distribution of the expellees followed the rate of industrialization, but in reverse order. This policy could be considered valid for the immediate emergency. As a long-term course it proved to be erroneous and conducive to delaying the expellees' integration. The Allied Statistical Report of March 5, 1949, belatedly admitted this mistake: "Refugees have in the main gone to the areas of lower population density, whereas from an employment aspect the areas of heavy density would normally be more beneficial to them."

The distribution of the expellees was entrusted to the *Länderrat* composed of representatives of the three *Länder*. In November, 1945, the *Rat* ruled that Bavaria was to accept 50 per cent, Greater Hesse 27 per cent, and Württemberg-Baden 23 per cent. It was stipulated that in the spring of 1946 the *Länder* were entitled to reconsider their respective percentages

in the light of the possibilities of absorption and the housing facilities then available. The administration of Greater Hesse and of Württemberg-Baden took advantage of this provision, and by the end of November, 1946, the Bavarian quota was increased to 52 per cent, while the quotas of Greater Hesse and Württemberg-Baden were reduced respectively to 26 and 22 per cent.³² The receipt of expellees through organized transport by each *Land* as of December 31, 1946, is shown below:

EXPELLEES RECEIVED IN THE LÄNDER³³

	Jan. 1- Mar. 31	April 1- June 30	July 1- Sept. 30	Sept. 30- Dec. 31	Total 1946	In %
Bavaria	82,409	365,624	234,182	103,822	786,037	51
Greater Hesse.	57,217	194,726	107,405	39,818	398,164	26
Württemberg- Baden . . .	52,785	138,526	120,583	49,425	361,319	23
U.S. zone . . .	192,411	698,876	461,170	193,065	1,545,520	100

The actual number of expellees in Bavaria was, however, considerably larger. By January 1, 1947, there were in Bavaria besides those who arrived through organized transfer, 537,716 expellees and refugees from behind the Oder-Neisse line (mostly from Silesia), 23,445 *Volksdeutsche* expellees from Rumania, 39,496 from Yugoslavia, 32,369 from Poland, and 57,696 from other countries. The total amounted to 1,672,546.

Each of the three *Länder* worked out plans for allocating expellees to its *Kreise* (counties), based on a preliminary housing survey and on estimates of absorption capacity, submitted by local officials in the *Gemeinde* (communities). Each *Kreis* was responsible for planning its share of absorption, and its public welfare office was charged with the coordination of activities on behalf of the expellees. These activities included provision for emergency housing, medical inspection, distribution, employment, and welfare assistance. As indicated before, the expellees were as a rule allocated to the rural counties. Heidelberg, Mannheim, Frankfurt, Kassel, Ulm, Wiesbaden, and other principal urban centers were declared critical housing areas and were closed to the expellees. Thus, the immediate burden of caring for these people fell on the small rural areas and in particular on the local communities.

4.

By the end of 1946 the mass influx of the expellees into the U.S. occupation zone had stopped, and German authorities were able to start taking stock of some three million new German inhabitants of the zone and to plan their permanent resettlement.

While well aware of the necessity of temporary measures in the reception of expellees, the U.S. Military Government had insisted on their total economic, social, and political integration into the German community. It was seeking to impress upon the German authorities a sense of the vastness of this problem and the necessity of dealing with it on a long-range basis. Directives sent on July 15, 1947, by the State, War, and Navy Departments to General Lucius D. Clay, U.S. Commander in Germany, instructed him "to require that persons of German extraction, who have been transferred to Germany, be granted German nationality with full civil and political rights, except in cases of recognized disqualification under German law." The directives also stressed the necessity "to assist the German authorities in effecting a program of resettlement."⁸⁴ At the request of the German authorities, the U.S. Military Government extended an invitation to German refugee commissioners and military government officials of the three other zones of occupation, to meet at Stuttgart on October 11, 1946, to discuss problems pertaining to refugees and expellees. However, only representatives from the British zone accepted the invitation. According to the report of the U.S. Military Government (No. 16, 1-31 October, 1946, p. 31), "valuable discussion, interchange of information concerning mutual problems, and cooperative action ensued from the meeting, and further similar interzonal meetings were scheduled."

On January 24, 1947, the military government approved for enactment by the *Länder* the "Law on the Admission and Integration of German Refugees" (the Refugee Law) which was recommended by the *Länderrat*. Enacted on February 19, 1947, the law took effect on March 1.⁸⁵ It provided for the integration of the expellees into the indigenous German population with equal rights and obligations, and enjoying equal opportunity in obtaining public welfare assistance, employment, and supply of critical items of consumer goods. The law prescribed the formation of advisory boards for refugee affairs at all legislative levels; at least half the members of the board were to be expellees.

In conformity with this law, the Cabinet of Hesse established a "Central Agency for Refugee and Expellee Resettlement," composed of the ministries of Labor, Welfare, Economics, Interior, Reconstruction, Culture, and Food and Agriculture, and an Advisory Committee to the Central Agency, consisting of 15 members, of whom nine were expellees and six were representatives of private welfare agencies, professional and trade groups. Similarly, the Bavarian legislature on January 31, 1947, decided to create a separate administrative office for refugee questions within the Ministry of the Interior. Expellees and refugees comprised one-fourth of the members in the advisory councils to the Secretary for Refugees and to the heads of the five administrative districts, and one-half of the advisory committees to the district officers.³⁶

The first step towards integration was the redistribution of the expellees. In the early stages, the influx was so rapid that labor offices were overwhelmed and often directed the newcomers to places where there was no chance of finding employment. For instance, a group of 57 Sudeten Germans, all of whom turned out to be textile workers from the region of Eger, were sent to the village of Dauborn near Limburg. Ludwig Heiman, the village's mayor, was at a loss: "We will have to get rid of most of them, there are no textile mills around here," he declared. As a temporary expedient, the group were required to pitch in with farm chores and help gather firewood for the winter.³⁷

In the autumn of 1948, two years after the main influx, a competent British observer found that integration of the expellees in the different *Länder* varied "to a degree which seems surprising when one remembers the attempt made to divide the burden equally."³⁸ The biggest progress was made in Hesse, and after that in Württemberg-Baden, where the authorities had from the outset adopted a realistic policy of absorbing the expellees as quickly and as thoroughly as possible. Especially in Hesse, where they were placed from the first in billets, not in camps, and quickly gotten into productive employment, a sensible attempt was made to use the particular skill and training of the expellees to fill in the gaps in the local economy. Definite results were achieved by this policy. The camps were emptied and most of the expellees were employed, many of them in independent enterprises or in ex-Bohemian industries restarted with their old craftsmen in Western Germany; a few thousand were in new agricultural colonies. The observer admitted that even in Hesse and Württemberg the number of expellees firmly and satisfactorily established in administration, business, industry, or agriculture was relatively

small; that most of those "employed" were working on public works or in the lowest-grade positions; and that the agriculturists, most of whom were independent smallholders in their own homes, were working as farmhands under tightfisted peasant masters who, to do them justice, could hardly afford much hired labor. If Hesse and Württemberg nevertheless could register a certain degree of integration of expellees, it was mainly because their damaged houses and factories made it difficult for them to take, at first, so high a proportion of expellees as the relatively untouched villages of Bavaria.

The situation in Bavaria was much less satisfactory; here by the end of 1946 the German Refugee Commissioners had to cope with the problem of reception, distribution, care, and settlement of a huge mass of 1.75 million expellees plus 1.5 million refugees. The bimonthly *Review of the Military Governor, U.S. Zone* for the period December 1, 1946-January 1, 1947, reported:

The immensity of the task was reflected in the annual report of the Bavarian Land Commissioner for Refugees. An organization comprising nearly 1,500 employees needed for the reception and distribution of expellees and refugees had to be established, with no previous pattern to follow. An Emergency Refugee Law provided the authority to acquire the necessary operational facilities and supplies, but those available for acquisition were inadequate for the essential needs of the incoming tide of expellees and refugees. Within two years, RM 162 million were expended for these people. It was necessary to establish camps, hospitals, and asylums; supply millions of articles of clothing and blankets; provide tens of thousands of cots and beds, mattresses, china and glassware, pieces of soap, and other articles. Stoves and shoes were the more critically short items. Lack of stoves made housing almost unbearable, and lack of shoes prevented employment of adults and attendance of children at schools.

By the end of 1947 the Bavarian Refugee Administration, acting under the exclusive authority of echelons of government ranging from the Prime Minister to the village mayor, had found individual quarters for 1,100,000 expellees out of the total of 1,823,484 then registered; 45,580 expellees were at that time still living in dormitories (in barracks, schools, hotels, boarding houses, castles, and so forth), and in some instances members of families were separated. Another 18,537—one per cent of the total—were still herded in camps, dance halls, gymnasiums, and bunkers. Wolfgang Jänicke, Secretary for Refugee Affairs in the Bavarian

Ministry of the Interior, promised in his second annual report that "during 1948 these camps are to be completely eliminated." Nevertheless, at the end of 1948 there were still 56,000 expellees (more than in 1947) in mass camps in Bavaria.³⁹ Bavarian farmers were reluctant to make full use of the additional manpower. The available labor force might perhaps have made it possible to institute far more intensive cultivation, but the German farmer, like his counterpart in many other countries, obviously preferred to continue along traditional lines. On April 7, 1949, Drew Middleton cabled to the *New York Times* from Frankfurt:

"No one wants us, no one will give us work," said a tall, gaunt Sudeten miner at a camp in Weildheim in Bavaria. "And how long can we live like this?"

He gestured at a big barn, formerly a cattle auction hall, in which 180 men, women, and children were living in tiny alcoves made by hanging blankets on ropes.

Most of the men were miners or industrial workers. Agricultural Bavaria has no openings for them in their own trades. They get season work as lumbermen.

Under a law that requires the licensing of any business, the refugees are prevented from starting new enterprises. New legislation has been proposed but at the moment it is blocked by strong sections of the dominant Christian Socialist Union and the Bavarian party.

Nevertheless, even in Bavaria, as early as the beginning of 1947 there were promising symptoms of rehabilitation. On January 25 Dana Adams Schmidt, the *New York Times* correspondent, reported that some 500 new business enterprises producing exportable goods had been established in Bavaria by persons expelled from other areas, mostly from the Sudetenland. The most promising were those started by personnel of the Gablonz glassworks, which formerly exported many millions of dollars worth of goods annually⁴⁰: 139 new enterprises with nearly 12,000 employees were established in the Bayreuth and Kaufbeuren region. Bohemian glassworks from Steinschönau also made a promising beginning at Vohenstrauss. Makers of musical instruments from Schönbach and Graslitz who formerly had a large export market in the United States set up shops at Erlangen and Kratburg on the Inn. Former exporters of leather gloves from Bärtingen and Abertham established workshops at Offenburg on the Danube, and specialists in making wooden buttons from Tachau

started a plant in Wolfratshausen. The Kunert Concern, which once had one of Europe's largest stocking factories in Warnsdorf, began turning out 400 pairs of stockings daily in the Allgau, while the formerly huge hat manufacturer, Huckl & Company, made a beginning at Weilheim. Makers of handkerchiefs, lace, artificial flowers and feathers who had once worked on a family home industry basis began producing at scores of towns including Martoberdorf, Traunstein, Grafenau, Zwiesel, and Haunzenberg. "This development," reported Schmidt, "gave German authorities hope that the new skills and enterprise brought into the country by the refugees . . . during the last year may prove more valuable in the long run than the property they left behind [and that] new industries, particularly glassware, textiles, woodwork, and leather goods would fit in with the British and United States efforts to make peaceful Germany solvent."

Plans for the integration of the expellees in Bavaria included the founding of a "textile village" at Osterhofen in Lower Bavaria and a center for furniture manufacturers from Königsberg at Wolfratshausen or Eschenbach. Fifteen months later (on March 14, 1948) Kathleen McLarighlin, another *New York Times* correspondent, reported that 5,700 Sudeten Germans were producing costume jewelry, religious articles, and porcelain in a former Dynamite A.G. plant near Kaufbeuren; the costume jewelry produced was in itself worth about 4 million Reichsmarks monthly, and it found active markets among German women as well as abroad. On May 29, 1949, Jack Raymond cabled that in Bad Vibel, near Frankfurt, an entire new city had been founded by expellees from Czechoslovakia.

However, at this early stage, most of these successful attempts at economic rehabilitation originated with those among the Sudetenlanders whose specialized small-scale consumer-goods industries once had been the largest source of export for the Austro-Hungarian Empire and later for the Czechoslovak Republic. Expellee peasants from the eastern provinces occupied by Poland and from Hungary fared much worse. According to Reichling and Betz,⁴¹ out of about 50,000 expellee candidates for agricultural resettlement in Bavaria and Hesse only 514 peasant families had by 1949 received fully equipped farms provided for by the agrarian reform. In addition, 315,000 expellees in these two *Länder* were allotted tiny garden plots of 200 square meters each. This, however, could hardly be considered as integration into the rural economy.

Up to the year 1949, the handling of the expellees was in the hands of

the individual *Länder* which, since 1947, had endeavored to coordinate their activities in the British and American occupation zones. They did so in accordance with the uniform directives of a "Working Committee for the Administration of State Refugees." The merging of the two zones on January 1, 1947, led to the establishment of a "Department for Matters Affecting the Expellees," which worked within the framework of the "Administrative Council of the Merged Economic Area" (with the seat at Frankfurt am Main) and which later became the basis for the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War Victims.⁴²

5.

The number of expellees who arrived in the British zone in a controlled movement known to the British occupation authorities as "Operation Swallow" amounted by April 1, 1949, to 3,949,700, distributed as follows.

Niedersachsen	1,812,400
Nordrhein-Westfalen	1,094,700
Schleswig-Holstein	956,100
Hansestadt Hamburg	86,500

In addition, 504,000 refugees from the Soviet zone and from Berlin entered the British zone up until April 1, 1949.⁴³

Not all these people belonged to the category of expellees under the terms of the Potsdam decisions. German statistics make a distinction between "expellees" and other migrants from the East, usually referred to as "refugees." *Expellees* are ethnic Germans who were resident on October 1, 1939, in foreign countries and Reich Germans from former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line *plus* their children. Although the majority of expellees came directly to Western Germany, there was a continuing secondary movement of such persons from their first refuge in Berlin and the East German Democratic Republic. *Refugees*, on the other hand, are persons who are native to Berlin and the Soviet zone of Germany. The difference between the two categories is obvious. As Dudley Kirk put it, "The latter were persons whose motives were less urgent and more voluntary than the former: the expellees were 'pushed' into Western Germany; the majority of the immigrants were

'pulled' by the better economic and employment conditions in the West."⁴⁴ Unfortunately, the two categories are not always sufficiently distinguished in the statistics.

In July, 1946, the British occupation authorities started to slow down the movement of the expellees into the British zone. Beginning July 26, the inflow was reduced from 8,000 to 5,000 persons daily. Simultaneously, on the recommendation of a special commission, the whole of the province of Schleswig-Holstein was declared a "black area," into which no more expellees from Poland should be directed. Announcing this decision, the *Monthly Report of the Control Commission for Germany* (British Element) for August, 1946, significantly added: "The absorptive capacity of this [the British] zone has now nearly reached the saturation point in all regions, and the greatest difficulty is being experienced in fitting into the few vacant *Kreise* the large numbers of refugees and expellees still arriving" (p. 37).

Notwithstanding this announcement, the influx of expellees continued, and their number increased from 1,048,166 by the end of July to 1,204,170 by the end of August; 184,879 of those people "traveled by other than official routes." Beginning September 5, the rate of influx was drastically cut down from 21 to 2 trains per week.⁴⁵ Besides the expellees who arrived in the British zone under the Potsdam agreement, there was a constant stream of expellees from other countries of Eastern and Central Europe. By October 29, 1946, 79.3 per cent of all the expellees in the British zone originated from east of the Oder-Neisse line, 7.0 per cent from Polish prewar territories, 2.5 per cent from Czechoslovakia, and 11.2 per cent from other countries.⁴⁶

Early in January, 1947, Marshal Sholto Douglas, the British Commissioner in Chief, ordered a "temporary halt" in the movement of Germans from Polish-administered territories. This decision was officially motivated by the extremely severe atmospheric conditions then prevailing in Central Europe.⁴⁷ But when spring came, "Operation Swallow" was not resumed, nor for that matter in the summer or later. According to British reports, 25,113 expellees nevertheless "illegally entered the British zone" in the course of the first five months of 1947, bringing the total of Germans from Poland in the zone to 1,398,354 (including 136,114 already checked into the zone from October, 1945, to October 28, 1946).⁴⁸

For a time, these several million uprooted people in the British zone probably suffered a worse lot than those in other zones of occupation.

Most of them arrived destitute, with insufficient clothing and without bedding or cooking utensils, and the production of needed consumers' goods in the area was completely inadequate to meet their requirements. In October, 1946, official British sources expressed "grave concern" about the living conditions of refugees and expellees and predicted that "their plight this winter will be desolate in the extreme." "Shortage of suitable housing accommodation, complete lack of furniture, bedding, pots, pans, cutlery, and other household goods is really acute," stated the *British Monthly Report* No. 5. "Many hundreds are living in cellars and disused bunkers with no blankets or beds, and with the prospect of there being little or no fuel available for the winter" (p. 39).

The British occupation authorities, while repeatedly voicing "deep concern" about the situation, did very little to improve it. Officials of the British Control Commission dealing with the transferees and expellees assumed from the very beginning a passive, almost fatalistic attitude, describing the situation as "deplorable without being desperate, and chronic rather than critical"; they openly spoke of the "hopelessness of the position" and insisted that "it is difficult to see a long-term solution."⁴⁹ The British authorities considered and treated the arriving Germans as but an annoying burden. Asserting that new arrivals were mainly old people and women and children and that out of 1,204,170 accepted under "Operation Swallow" up to the end of August, 1946, only 18 per cent had been men, and only 60 per cent of the men had been fit for work,⁵⁰ the *British Monthly Review* No. 2 complained that "the British zone virtually has been burdened with very many useless mouths to feed." Accordingly, the main effort of the British administration was aimed not at constructive resettlement of the transferees, but rather at preventing their further arrival under the Potsdam scheme.

Even more than in the U.S. zone, the expellees arriving in the British zone were distributed in the most arbitrary and unreasonable manner. Most of them, three-fourths of whom had a nonagricultural background, were directed to the almost entirely agricultural *Land*, Schleswig-Holstein, where every third person was an expellee (a total of 996,100) or a refugee (108,800), or to the predominantly agricultural Lower Saxony, where every fourth person was an expellee (1,812,000) or a refugee (281,600). The neighboring *Land* of Hamburg, on the other hand, had taken but 86,500 expellees (plus 61,200 refugees). While Schleswig-Holstein incurred a deficit of 130 million German marks in the nine months after the currency reform of June, 1948, Hamburg had a con-

ceased budgetary surplus of 300 million German marks for the financial year 1948-49. "For a long time now," the organ of the German Social Democratic Party wrote in the spring of 1949, "the overcrowded *Länder* of Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein have been attempting to get rid of the unbearable burden of their population surplus by way of negotiations, but the other heavily burdened *Länder* of Bizonia declare themselves to be in no position to bear further burdens through an admission of refugees."⁵¹ Chaos also prevailed in the distribution of the expellees between urban and rural areas of the same province. "In many cases . . . people suitable for the land were assigned to towns while industrial workers, artisans, technicians, engineers, scientists, artists, and others were billeted in remote villages where they can find no effective activities in accordance with their vocational capabilities."⁵²

Unsettled conditions quite naturally bred acute unrest. British intelligence officials complained of Communist propaganda among the expellees and refugees. This propaganda admittedly was wasted upon those who had fled from the Soviet zone, but it found eager listeners among victims of expulsion, many of whom were demanding drastic land reform, similar to that in the Soviet zone, in the hope of getting their own farms. The British occupation authorities, however, were unwilling to introduce any genuine reforms. In the Soviet zone of Germany ordinances for the redistribution of land were published in September, 1945, affecting all land property of war criminals and responsible war leaders, of the "Nazi leaders and the active supporters of the Nazi party and its affiliated organizations, and of all leading personalities of Hitler's State," as well as all estates over 247 acres belonging to "feudal squires and big estate owners"; and a similar decree was published in the American zone affecting estates over 247 acres;⁵³ but British occupation authorities and British-sponsored German reactionary parties prevented any constructive step in this direction.

Notwithstanding this basic handicap, individual *Länder* made commendable efforts to solve at least a part of the problems they faced. Schleswig-Holstein, which was burdened with the biggest number of expellees and refugees, drew up both a short-term and a long-term program for the integration of those expellees who could not be directed to other *Länder*. The short-term plan, calling for an expenditure of 200 million Deutsche marks, provided for the establishment of a textile industry (near-by Bremen being the German cotton import port), and the setting up of paper and woodworking industries to re-establish trade

with the Baltic ports.⁵⁴ The long-term program envisaged the construction of roads and bridges over the Elbe, drainage works on the North Sea coastline over a period of five years, and the reconstruction of dikes and rehabilitation of the Lübbecke blast furnace works.

These plans, however, could not materialize unless funds were forthcoming from other *Länder* administrations. The only way in which the refugee problem could be tackled effectively was equitable distribution of the financial burden among all the *Länder* governments. A small beginning was made in this direction, with Schleswig-Holstein receiving advances from other provinces in anticipation of some such legislation. But these advances were far too small to solve the pressing difficulties, and it became evident that only over-all legislation would meet the situation.⁵⁵

As early as September 6, 1946, the British member of the Directorate of the Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons submitted to his colleagues a paper asking for the review of the originally established scheme of distributing German expellees over the four occupation zones. He stressed the critical housing, food, and economic situation in the British zone, and "the consequent inability of the British military authorities to maintain to their satisfaction the humanitarian standards prescribed in Article XIII of the Potsdam Agreement." The memorandum claimed that the British zone had suffered relatively greater physical destruction than the other three zones, so that the average dwelling space there was at that time 6.5 square meters per person, whereas in the U.S. zone it was 7.6 square meters, in the French zone 9.4 square meters, and in the Soviet zone 14.4 square meters. It also claimed that the British zone had by that time received a far greater percentage of the respective quotas than either zones: 1,173,000 expellees from Poland had entered the British zone (in organized movements and illegally) by August 10, 1946, against the maximum quota of 1,500,000 (78.2 per cent), while 1,109,563 out of a quota of 2,250,000 had been received in the U.S. zone (49.3 per cent), 1,158,000 out of 2,750,000 had been accepted in the Soviet zone (42.1 per cent), and none out of 150,000 had reached the French zone. After careful preparation, on September 20, 1947, the British representatives in the Allied Control Council officially submitted to the Council a proposal that German refugees and expellees from Eastern Europe be reapportioned among the four zones of occupation "to achieve a better balance of population and a more equal distribution of the refugee burden."⁵⁶ No action was taken by the Directorate on this British proposal.

It was not before December, 1948, that a Tripartite Working Party was set up to examine the whole question of refugee redistribution not on a *Land* or zonal, but on an over-all basis. The report of this Working Party was submitted on March 31, 1949, to the Tripartite Board (Military Governors of the three Western zones) which approved a scheme providing for the immediate transfer from the Bizonal area to the French zone of 120,000 German expellees, to be increased gradually to 300,000. The German authorities concerned agreed that these persons would be taken in the proportion of two-one-one from Schleswig-Holstein, Lower Saxony, and Bavaria.

Some of these people actually were moved. But on the whole, the French share in the reception and resettlement of the expellees remained infinitesimal. The French occupation authorities were reluctant to permit any noticeable increase of the German population in the vicinity of the Rhine. Arguing that "France was not at Potsdam," they also insisted that the 120 to 300 thousand expellees they had agreed to accept must be considered as a desirable maximum rather than an obligatory and fixed minimum, and that they had the same privilege as the other Occupying Powers to determine the speed with which they would receive the flow of expellees into their zone. The French authorities maintained that they were ready to receive any and all "genuine" German expellees from Austria, but that surveys did not indicate more than 10,000 persons in this category.

Official French data spoke of 142,900 expellees and 45,600 refugees admitted in the French zone as of October 1, 1948. These figures were refuted by British and German sources. *The New Statesman and Nation* reported that, in fact, by the beginning of 1949 only 68,000 expellees had been accepted by the French zone while its "fair share" would be 750,000;⁵⁷ in April of 1949 *News from Germany*, organ of the German Social Democratic Party related that according to the latest survey not more than 67,000 expellees and refugees were counted in the French zone.⁵⁸ It became evident that all schemes of small-scale redistribution had scant chances of success.

A turning point in the handling of the expellee problem was the proclamation by the Allies, on May 23, 1949, of the Federal Republic of Germany (effective September 1, 1949).

The Basic Law of the German Federal Republic transferred the over-all control of expellees and refugees within the Western zones to the Federal authorities. Article 74(b) put "matters relating to refugees and

expellees" within the field of concurrent legislation which signified that all *Länder* had "powers of legislation so long and so far as the Federation makes no use of its legislative right" (Art. 72(i)). Additional powers in this sphere were conferred on the Federal Government under Article 119, which stated that "in matters relating to refugees and expellees, in particular their distribution to the *Länder*, the Federal Government may, with the approval of the *Bundesrat*, issue orders having the force of law pending a regulation of Federal legislation." Under the same article, the Federal Government was also empowered to issue "individual instructions" which, except in emergency, were to be directed to the highest *Land* authorities. The *Amt für Fragen der Heimatvertriebenen* (office for the problems of those driven from their former homes), which had been established at Frankfurt at the beginning of 1949, was transformed into a Federal Ministry, and on October 12, 1949, Dr. Hans Lukaschek, the first Minister of this government department, called a conference of the corresponding Ministers of the eleven *Länder*, at which he announced a plan for the redistribution of refugees. A week later the *Bundesrat* adopted a resolution calling upon the Federal Government to make immediate use of its powers under Article 119 of the Basic Law. On November 29, 1949, the Federal Government made public its first resettlement program calling for 300,000 expellees to be taken over by the industrial *Länder* from agricultural areas. For individual refugees the move was voluntary, but both the dispatching and the receiving *Länder* were made responsible for the implementation of the scheme. Dispatching *Länder* had to bear the cost of transferring the refugees and their belonging to their new homes, and the receiving *Länder* were to meet all other costs. The Federal Government was to make all the necessary financial adjustments as between the *Länder* affected, and see to it that the financial burden was ultimately shared equitably. This promise of "financial equalization" was intended to overcome the opposition in the receiving *Länder* who had always been afraid of bearing the heavy financial burden of redistribution.

Before this first redistribution program was fully implemented, the resettlement of a further 300,000 expellees was initiated by the resettlement law of May 22, 1951, supplemented on December 23, 1952: 600,000 expellees were to be resettled by the middle of 1953. Finally, a third redistribution program was announced on February 13, 1953, involving another 315,000 expellees and evacuees. This latter program dealt particularly with the reunion of separ-

ated families, at the place where the supporter of the family was working.⁵⁹

On August 14, 1952, the Federal Government enacted the Equalization of Burdens Law, preceded, on April 21 of the same year, by the Law for Fixing Damages Resulting from Expulsion and War. The preamble to the first Law contained the face-saving "special reservation" that "the granting and acceptance of help does in no circumstances involve renunciation of claims on the part of the expellees for the return of the property they had been compelled to leave." But its determining feature was the introduction of a special levy on all kinds of property and capital of the resident population and of businesses to establish a "Fund for the Equalization of Burdens." During the period from 1952 to 1979, the Fund was to collect an annual revenue of \$10 billion which would allow partial compensation of the property losses suffered by expellees and certain other categories of war victims. By March 31, 1955, the Fund (together with Immediate Help disbursements) spent 15,269 million Deutsche marks, of which two-fifths went for the Immediate Help and three-fifths for the Equalization of Burdens; the greater part of this amount went for housing, which by March 31, 1955, had been financed in different ways to the amount of 4,809 million Deutsche marks.⁶⁰

The aggregate number of persons scheduled for resettlement was 1,050,000. By December 31, 1957, 890,000 persons, or 84.7 per cent of the envisaged total, were actually resettled. The respective *Länder* bore 15 per cent and the Federal Government 85 per cent of the actual transport cost. In addition to this organized and state-financed redistribution, a much larger individual migration from rural to industrial areas took place within the Federal Republic.⁶¹ The expellees, most of whom in the early years of their displacement had been depressed and bereft of initiative, now when offered a chance of rehabilitation demonstrated extraordinary vigor and determination. Elisabeth Wiskemann relates "a widely accepted opinion that these other Germans, who have often come from a harder climate and a poorer soil and from more backward conditions, are more industrious and more modest in their requirements than are the Bavarians or Rhinelanders. . . . Most of the immigrants, precisely because they had to begin again from nothing, worked 'all out' with desperate determination whenever they had the chance."⁶²

6.

Some twelve million expellees entered the territory of postwar Germany which had been reduced in size by roughly one-quarter of its 1939 area: from 181,688 square miles (without the annexed territories) to 143,243 square miles. This discrepancy between the reduced territory and increased population had been repeatedly pointed out by political leaders and scholars who contended that rump-Germany could under no circumstances absorb and integrate this multimillion influx.

The French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault stressed at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (March–April, 1947) the “danger for peace that would be represented by the presence of a large German population living in a smaller Germany placed in the geographical center of Europe.” United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall “agreed with Mr. Bidault that there is danger in requiring an eventual German population of over sixty-six million to live within the confines of a smaller Germany.”⁶³ The group around the authoritative *Institut für Raumsforschung* came to the conclusion that West Germany’s “corrected population capacity” was roughly 44 million inhabitants.⁶⁴ The noted demographer, Prof. Eugene M. Kulischer, saw no other solution of Germany’s problem than a “drastic demographic policy” of “curtailing” the country’s population—“in the long run by encouraging birth control and meanwhile by promoting emigration.” While realizing that “an attempt to return the expelled Germans to lands occupied by millions of new settlers would but precipitate catastrophe,” Kulischer argued that birth control “should be assisted by emigration. . . . The displaced persons should first be removed. There is no room for them in the German economy.”⁶⁵

In regard to the Federal Republic of Germany—the largest segment of the former Reich and since 1950 the only one that had been in a position to determine its own economic policies—this prognosis proved to be manifestly erroneous. No birth control was introduced, and no sizable emigration took place. Professor P. J. Bouman noted in 1950 that among the expellees the “inclination to emigrate overseas seems only poorly developed: the strength of mind of the German emigrants who left the fatherland after 1871 is now very rare.”⁶⁶ According to data supplied in 1956 by the Federal Ministry of Expellees and Refugees, not more than 300,000 (out of a total of eight million) had emigrated to overseas

countries.⁶⁷ Of the 68,089 Germans who emigrated in 1956, expellees, together with the refugees from the Soviet zone, constituted 40.3 per cent (27,396 persons).⁶⁸

Nor did the presence of the millions of expellees and refugees prove to be a handicap to Germany's spectacular economic recovery which is often referred to as "the German miracle."

In 1946, the index of industrial production stood at 34 (1936 = 100); it regained prewar level in 1950, and by 1956 was twice the 1936 level. According to the Institute of German Industry, gross national product (the sum of all goods and services produced) rose from \$23.1 billion in 1950 to \$52.6 billion in 1958. Allowing for a 17 per cent inflation of the Deutsche mark, the Institute reckoned an absolute growth of the national product of 77 per cent in nine years. Industrial production tripled between 1949 and 1959 to the record rate of 249 per cent of the 1936 average. The labor force increased from 13,600,000 in 1949 to 19,600,000 ten years later. Unemployment fell in the same period from 8.8 per cent of available manpower to an almost irreducible 1 per cent in the summer of 1959. The average pay of an industrial worker increased by 75 per cent from the equivalent of \$14.80 a week to \$25.20. The effective work week—the regular work week plus overtime, and minus vacations and paid holidays—sank to 41.5 hours, the lowest among major Western European countries. The country returned to full employment, with a labor shortage in industrial sectors and some serious consideration of importing at least seasonal foreign workers (from Italy) to fill the gap. By the close of the Marshall Plan aid in 1952, West Germany had attained a balance-of-payments equilibrium and a sound economy. Foreign trade rose from a nominal figure in 1949 to a value of \$16,000,000,000 in 1958. It took 7.4 per cent of the world's imports in 1959 and accounted for 9.2 per cent of the world's export shipments. The mark, which a few years earlier had been one of Europe's weakest currencies, by 1959 was the hardest, with the possible exception of the Swiss frank, and the country's gold and dollar reserves were the largest in Europe; they actually exceeded by about one-third the volume of currency outstanding. The West German central banking institution, the Deutsche Bundesbank, in 1959 had net gold and foreign-exchange reserves of more than \$3,500,000,000; officials expected the reserves to exceed \$6,000,000,000 by the end of 1958. These reserves are twice as large as those of Britain, which is banker for the sterling area.⁶⁹

West Germany's postwar experience provided a compelling answer to

the *Lebensraum* theory so popular not only before but even after the war. The "Technical Assistance Commission on the Integration of the Refugees in the German Republic" under the chairmanship of H. Christian Sonne (later referred to as the "Sonne Commission") which was sent by the Economic Administration in response to the request of the Bonn government (September–December, 1950), came to the conclusion as early as 1950 that "there seems to be no absolute limitation of the size of population which a given area can support. . . . Comparison with other Western European countries shows, we feel, that the problems facing West Germany today are not necessarily impossible to solve. These problems are of an economic, social, and political nature."⁷⁰

It can be safely asserted that the expellees, who by 1956 (together with their children born in West Germany) numbered some 8.8 million or 17.5 per cent of the country's total population, played a considerable part in "the German miracle." At the Congress of the World Council of Churches on the "German Refugee Problem" at Hamburg, German speakers emphasized the great economic contribution made by the refugees. As early as 1950, Dr. G. Beijer pointed out that "thanks to the invasion of refugees, Western Germany today has a labor potential at its disposal which is as large as in 1936."⁷¹ The Sonne Commission vigorously stressed in its report (1951) "the potential value of the skill and ability of the refugees."⁷² The report continued:

During the first postwar years when many men were still prisoners of war, the working capacity of the refugees was of great assistance in the rebuilding of Germany. The refugees are still useful today. They have done fruitful work in all branches of the economy; their agricultural and industrial skills have contributed greatly to opening numerous bottlenecks which developed as a result of the war; there is ample evidence of many remarkable achievements by refugees in re-establishing their industrial enterprises; nor should their contribution to the increase of exports be underestimated.

Seven years later Dudley Kirk, summarizing the economic and demographic developments in Western Germany, came to similar conclusions:⁷³

The expellee population of course made positive contributions. Total economic output has certainly been larger in Western Germany because of their presence. In some instances the expellees supplemented the existing skills in the West, and on occasion succeeded in effectively re-establishing

industries in which they had earlier been employed in the East. An important, and sometimes unnoticed, contribution was the mobility and geographical flexibility of the expellees. Lacking the place roots of the native population, expellees were available to move to any point at which labor was needed.

It is true that "in the first postwar years . . . the presence of the expellees and refugees, while it contributed to a higher total output, almost certainly reduced the average per capita output and income." But this applies only to the first postwar years. Later developments largely eliminated this discrepancy. As Friedrich Edding put it, the expellee influx was for West Germany both "a burden and a challenge."⁷⁴ And this challenge was successfully met in the best interests of both the country and the expellees themselves. In a recent study, *Rehabilitation of Refugees in the Federal Republic of Germany*, Dr. S. P. Chablani admits that the expellees "constituted, no doubt, a stupendous burden at first," but "they have also been a source of strength to the general economy." Indeed, there is a school of thought which holds that the resurgence of Germany would scarcely have been possible without them. "The specialized training of Sudeten Germans, the skill of the *petit* craftsmen of Silesia, the industry of the peasants of Pomerania, East Prussia, and Hungary doubtless had a stimulating effect upon the economy, more so because the industrial potential at the end of the war was limited and the investment relatively small."⁷⁵ Professor Fritz Baade, editor of the authoritative *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv*, estimates that if the cost of technical training possessed by the expellees and refugees from East Germany alone were to be counted, Western Germany had gained, by their influx, a capital asset of the order of some 22.5 billion Deutsche marks: this human stream had played a decisively important part in the recovery of both the Eastern and Western sectors of Germany—a propulsive one in the West and a curbing one in the East.⁷⁶

7.

If these assets were somewhat slow to materialize, it was largely because in the early years of the "expellee era" the three determinative components of the situation—the German administration, the expellees themselves, and the autochthonous German population—showed remark-

ably little understanding, initiative, and goodwill, which were necessary to make the best of an admittedly difficult, often desperate state of affairs.

1. The administration and, in particular, those officials in charge of the expellee matters, lacked the sense of urgency called for by the critical situation, and were unwilling to tackle the problem in anything but a piecemeal manner. Peter Galliner rightly stressed in *The New Statesman and Nation* that they "tried to wash their hands of it by claiming that resettlement of the refugees is the job of the occupation powers, who, they held, have complicated the situation by the emphasis on federalism and the channeling of the newcomers into the countryside." In the light of accumulated experience it became increasingly clear that the original policy of spreading the expellees thinly over the country in order, *inter alia*, to prevent them from becoming "pressure groups," was hardly a wise one. Refugee families, isolated and at the mercy of those on whom they were billeted, were prone to grow hopeless or desperate, and to fall victim easily to any kind of political extremism. On the other hand it had been found that where groups of refugees, too small to constitute a "ghetto", within the local community, were brought together and enabled to start home industries, the results were entirely favorable. Their morale was lifted, output increased, and they were then accepted by the native population.⁷⁷

2. The morale of the expellees was, at the outset, understandably low.

Professor P. J. Bouman aptly defined the mass movement of the expellees as "a migration, started without hopes or illusions, without the will to adapt themselves. Passive, in dull resignation, they drifted with the stream." The components of this state of mind, as described by Prof. Bouman, were in substance:

- a. The shock-effect of the sudden catastrophe which showed up in many as a condition of lethargy. The sufferings experienced put many in a psychological and physical depression which at its best could be only slowly overcome.
- b. Nostalgia. The desire for the country of origin is likely, after a certain lapse of time, to affect even those who recovered from the experience of the flight and had their first efforts at adaptation crowned with reasonable success. The greater part of the refugees consisted of an agrarian population attached to its native soil. Many had never left their homes before. It was difficult for them to adapt themselves to different geographical surroundings.
- c. Hurt sense of pride. The formerly independent farmer who has become

an agricultural worker feels humiliated. Numerous formerly independent members of the middle classes have become wage earners. Many a well-to-do "renter" has to live from a small allowance granted him by the Poor Law Authorities.

- d. The inferiority complexes thus raised expressed themselves in one as a haughty silence and a proud, somewhat, sulky, attitude which aroused the mockery of the local population, in another as an inclination to boast loudly of old times when life was so good. In either case they drew dividing lines of suspicion and misunderstanding.

The aforementioned social-psychological factors made themselves felt especially in regard to the willingness to learn a new trade. Many were caught in the grip of deplorable conditions and preferred sticking to them rather than starting with fresh courage in new areas with more favorable prospects. Complaints were numerous about work-shyness among expellees, and the attempts at transfer from overpopulated Schleswig-Holstein to the French zone met with all kinds of protests on the part of the groups involved.⁷⁸ Jane Perry Clark Carey concisely summarized the early expellee mentality:

The severe psychological shock caused by expulsion in many cases has resulted in despair, disinclination to work, and lack of incentive. Recurring rumors of possible return home, unsettled political and economic conditions, lack of clearly defined regulations on nationality questions, misconceptions as regards emigration prospects, slow progress in public welfare, and uncertainty as to relief payments or settlement of other financial problems have retarded integration into the difficult conditions of German life today.⁷⁹

Leo W. Schwarz wrote in a recent (1957) study, *Refugees in Germany Today*:

The social displacement and economic deterioration of the refugees have served to increase their smoldering resentment against their German neighbors as well as against East and West states whom they consider responsible for their plight. The fire of Irredentism has thus been kept burning and thrown a smoky haze into the central question of assimilation and integration of the refugee population in the Federal Republic (p. 30).

3. During the first half of the ten-year period under review, a major obstacle to the integration of the expellees lay in the attitude of the resi-

dent German population, which received their expellee *Volksgenossen* without any friendship and did not conceal bad feelings towards the newcomers. Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of the expellees (those from behind the Oder-Neisse line) had been full-fledged citizens of the Reich prior to the end of World War II just as they are today; notwithstanding the affinity of cultural tradition and mores, as well as the absence of a language barrier, the expellees did not feel at home. The monthly report of the U.S. Military Government (No. 10, dated May 20, 1946), spoke of "discord between them [the expellees] and the native population" (p. 21). The report No. 11 (June 20, 1946) also stressed the "initial lack of mutual understanding between the expellees and the native population" (p. 26). October, 1946, reports of Labor Offices in Württemberg and Baden pointed out that

differences in mental attitude towards, and methods of work between, indigenous Germans and expellees lead to misunderstandings, arguments, and frequently permanent estrangement; many expellees are not accustomed to regular working hours and come and go as they please; the complete absorption of expellees into the population is the official policy, not shared, however, by the population as a whole.

Students of the German scene distinguish several ingredients of this popular animosity against the expellee.

The most common irritant was the necessity for the peasants to share their scant accommodation with the mass of newcomers and to find this new and unexpected complication superimposed upon their lives: "their resentment had the rigid quality which distinguishes rural from urban population."⁸⁰ Cardinal Frings, German Archbishop of Cologne, saw in the overcrowding of dwellings and the compulsory lodging of expellees in private homes a major cause of the ever growing hostility: "The point has been reached where there is scarcely a German family living alone: of course they quarrel, and homes are disrupted."⁸¹ Nor were the peasants pleased to find that in some of their villages the newcomers soon formed a majority. If the occupation policies carried out by the *Länder* governments and local authorities had not imposed on each town and village a quota of refugees, their presence would undoubtedly have precipitated disorders of major proportion.⁸² In fact, in many villages the police had to intervene, and even the constabulary occasionally were called upon for a show of force to stimulate the hospitality of reluctant householders.

On the other hand, in the Nazi or near-Nazi circles, who at that time were acutely aware that any denunciation of their political past was bound to affect their very livelihood, there was bitter envy for those among the expellees who in their homes had had a heavy pro-Hitler record, but who felt safe because they "arrived as it were, without their past, for it was difficult to muster the evidence necessary to indict them." An additional irritant was confessional antagonism. In a country which since the Reformation had been divided by confessional conflicts, mass influx of Catholics from Breslau to Lutheran villages around Hanover was bound to produce friction. But in Catholic Bavaria, too, where the arrival of Catholic Sudeten Germans was not expected to cause complication, the reception "was nevertheless a cool one": in regard to them there was, immediately after the war, "a certain not unintelligible feeling that the Bohemian Germans had helped to bring the war about." In Hesse, where the Sudetens were also settled in considerable numbers, "they were not very popular either."⁸³ The indigenous population felt that these newcomers "were all strangers, and many of them had never been German citizens," and that they therefore "had no right to expect equality of treatment."⁸⁴

This attitude did not change considerably even when further influx of expellees was stopped. In June, 1947, a report prepared by a committee of the *Länderrat* (Council of States) of the U.S. occupation zone stressed that there was still "much dangerous friction and that the expelled persons do not feel that they are treated as equals."⁸⁵ In October, 1948, a keen British observer found it hard to say that "any real integration has taken place" between the native German population and the newcomers, each party naturally blaming the other for this. The expellees accused the indigenous inhabitants of "selfishness and exploitation, of enjoying their own comfort and taking advantage of their brothers' helplessness. The local Germans retorted that the expellees were idlers and good-for-nothings, who preferred living on charity or the black market to honest work, and who did not even want to settle down because they were simply living for the day when they might return to their homes."⁸⁶ In September, 1949, Peter Galliner observed that expellee and refugee workers, other than specialists, were usually given the lowest or most uncongenial jobs, and they were frequently forced to take on occupations for which they had neither training nor aptitude. Thus, not only were their skills wasted, they were also unable in some cases to fill a particular job as well as a local man brought up to it. The result was that

expellees were the first to be sacked when workers had to be laid off. Many employers, perhaps understandably, preferred to retain a local man rather than to hire a newcomer, other things being equal. Discrimination was apparent, too, in the field of credit facilities. Quite a number of expellee producers set up small industries before currency reform. When sales began to decline and credit tightened in the autumn of 1948, they were least able to obtain help from local banks, and many of their enterprises had to close down.⁸⁷ As late as January, 1950, Theodore W. Knauth reported in the *New York Herald Tribune* that the expellees "still form an alien group in the native population." "No one is interested in us or what happens to us," a master blacksmith in camp Anzenbach, at Berchtesgaden, complained to Wolfe Frank. "We are strangers here in Bavaria and will always remain strangers."⁸⁸

This dire prediction, however, was largely disproved by further developments. A gradual process of assimilation, in particular among the younger generation, found its most significant expression in the increasing rate of intermarriage between the newcomers and the resident population. Such marriages, which had been almost taboo in the early postwar years, became highly fashionable. As Elisabeth Wiskemann put it, "the westerners have come to consider a Silesian or East Prussian husband or wife as a gauge of industry and *Tüchtigkeit*."⁸⁹ In 1950, 70 per cent, and in 1955, 77 per cent of the expellee marriages were "mixed" marriages in the sense of involving a non-expellee partner. The degree of integration indicated by this rising percentage may be suggested by comparing it with the percentage of marriages mixed according to religion. In 1955, less than a fourth of marriages involving a Protestant partner or a Roman Catholic partner were of mixed religion. Dudley Kirk believes that "the social barriers between the expellees and the native population are now much less than those between adherents of different religious faiths."⁹⁰

The mass influx of the expellees also seems to have greatly contributed to breaking down the existing barriers between Germany's religious groups. Twenty-five per cent of the 4,074,000 expellees of Protestant faith settled in predominantly Catholic regions, and 50 per cent of the 3,572,400 persons belonging to the Catholic faith are now living in predominantly Protestant districts. Many a Roman Catholic community became Protestant within a few months; various Protestant townships witnessed the emergence or spectacular growth of a Catholic minority. Staatsekretär Dr. Peter F. Nalun stresses that

There is today no district in Germany that does not have a considerable religious minority. Many thousands of Protestant and Catholic churches have opened their doors to adherents of other denominations. Out of the daily contact came knowledge, out of knowledge came understanding, and understanding brought far-reaching religious and civil tolerance.⁹¹

According to Dr. Nahm, one of the most significant consequences of the integration was the actual annulment of the four-centuries-old Interim of Augsburg (1555) with its principle of *cujus regio ejus religio*, which had turned Germany into a chessboard of confessions. The violent and painful reshuffling of *Reichsdeutsche* and *Volksdeutsche* from half a dozen countries cut recklessly through the traditional patterns, and the result might be to knit together the German nation more tightly and organically than it was in the times of Bismarck or Hitler.⁹²

A great role in the cultural and social integration was played by the school. In 1954, 1,508,935 expellee pupils were attending general and continuation schools. Their percentage among the school population (17.4) roughly corresponded to the percentage of school-age (6-18) expellees among the school-age youth in the country, which was 17.7.⁹³

8.

The economic integration of the expellees progressed remarkably, especially in industry.

Already at the end of 1954 there were in the Federal Republic 3,250 expellee enterprises with from one to nine workers and 2,867 enterprises with ten or more workers; 19,235 persons were employed in the first group and 172,254 in the second—a total of 191,489. Their combined turnover amounted to 310,195,000 Deutsche marks. At the same time, 62,638 independent craft enterprises were established by expellees and refugees.⁹⁴ Among the 2,967 expellee enterprises with more than ten persons employed, 599 (with 46,278 employees) belonged to the textile industry, 426 (with 27,156 workers) to the clothing industry, 241 (with 7,376 employees) to the stone and earth industry, 193 (with 10,697 employees) to the glass industry, 168 (8,427 employees) to the wood-working industry, 140 (10,376 employees) to mechanical engineering.⁹⁵

As a result of this development, unemployment among the expellees dropped considerably, both in absolute numbers and in percentage of

the country's total population. On September 30, 1949, the number of unemployed among the expellees was 452,483, constituting 35.9 per cent of the total unemployment and 6.1 per cent of the expellee population, as compared with 23.6 per cent unemployed among the non-expellee population. On September 30, 1955, only 120,098 expellees were unemployed—24.3 per cent of the total unemployment figure and 1.4 per cent of all the expellees—as compared with 0.9 per cent unemployed among the non-expellee population.⁹⁰

Less success was achieved in the integration of the 1,600,000 expellees with an agricultural background (nearly 40 per cent of the expellee labor force): about 300,000 had been independent farmers in the countries of their former residence and about 540,000 had been farm laborers and employees, while the remainder were family members helping in the work. Their resettlement made only limited progress because it was difficult to obtain land. In the years 1945–1949, 8,624 farms were taken over by expellees, and a further 63,295 farms in 1949–1955. By June 30, 1957, a total of 88,260 families of expellees and of refugees from the Soviet zone were settled on the land.⁹¹ Yet, only 2 per cent of the independent farm operators were expellees, while they supplied 38 per cent of the agricultural labor.⁹²

The housing of the expellees made spectacular progress. On September 13, 1950, 22 per cent of the 2.6 million expellee householders were quartered in "normal" dwellings; 68 per cent were still subtenants, and nearly 10 per cent were living in every kind of emergency quarters, as compared with two-thirds of the indigenous households located in "normal" dwellings. By the end of 1954, about 750,000 newly built dwellings had been taken over by the expellees and immigrants; they were also allotted an equal number of old dwellings. By September 25, 1956, 63 per cent of all expellee households, comprising 6.1 million persons, were owners or independent tenants of "normal" dwellings; 30 per cent were subtenants, and 7 per cent (200,000 persons) lived in camps, barracks, and the like. By July 1, 1957, the camp population was reduced to 165,000.⁹³

There was, of course still a considerable gap between the economic position of the expellees and that of the indigenous Germans. By autumn of 1955 the expellees constituted 17 per cent of the population of the Federal Republic, but 24.3 per cent of the unemployed. There were only 7 per cent of the expellees among the Republic's industrialists, and only 3 per cent among the full- or part-time farmers. Of every 10,000

inhabitants, 206 were craftsmen, while only 58.4 were craftsmen among 10,000 expellees. It was also a fact that the new occupations of the expellees were in many cases not in accordance with their training and capacities. As Dr. Peter F. Nahm put it in 1957:

To conclude that integration of the expellees has been achieved because 97 per cent of them are working, is a mistake. A job does not mean integration. According to European yardsticks, only those people in a society are enjoying full opportunity who are occupied according to their performance, their ability, and their inclination. Most of the expellees had to start working in poorly paid jobs and in areas that were less desirable. Many had to remain there without any real liking for their work, and many who had worked independently are now in a dependent position. It is especially the middle class that has had to accept a general social degrading.

. . . It is true that the general trend towards a weakening of the middle classes would also have affected middle-class economy in the territories from which they were expelled. It is also true that among the group of expellees, more people are starting a small business than giving it up, in contrast with the situation in general. Still, only slightly more than 50 per cent of the trading and farming middle classes have been really integrated.¹⁰⁰

9.

A major factor in blocking, or at least delaying, full integration of the expellees had been their failure to realize that their evacuation from the Sudetenland and the former German eastern provinces (not to speak of Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary) was a final one; that there could be no return to the old homes; that they would have to stay in Germany and build their lives anew in that country.

This feeling of finality was lacking. Far from having reconciled themselves to the new realities of their existence, the expellees were ardently hoping that some sudden and radical change in the international political situation would upset the postwar ethno-territorial *status quo* and enable them to return to their former abodes. This was, as Professor P. J. Bouman put it,

the straw to which practically all refugees cling: from somewhere salvation is bound to come. It is impossible to believe in the permanence of a condition

found to be so absurd that it cannot be squared with reason. In this case, however, it expresses itself in the shape of a completely irrational conviction which, firm as a rock, constitutes a serious obstacle to the adaptation to the new living conditions.

In that hope they were encouraged by the stand taken by German public opinion and the German government, which for years had unyieldingly refused to accept as final the postwar territorial settlement and to consider the expellees permanent, full-fledged citizens of the Federal Republic of Germany.

At the session of the Schleswig-Holstein *Landtag* on August 4, 1947, former Minister Dr. Ryba opposed the granting to the expellees of rights equal to those enjoyed by the local German population as, he argued, this might weaken the case of the return of the former eastern provinces to Germany.¹⁰¹ On June 1, 1950, the *Bundestag* of the Federal Republic of Germany rejected a resolution calling on the Federal Government to recognize the citizenship of German expellees from Poland as "an indirect attempt to force recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line as Germany's permanent eastern boundary."¹⁰² The preamble to the "refugee Law" (*Flüchtlingengesetz*) passed by the *Landtag* of North Rhine-Westphalia stated that "*Die Not der Flüchtlinge sich entscheidend nur durch die Rückkehr in die Deutschen Ostgebiete beheben lasse.*" ("The distress of the refugees can be decisively removed only by [their] return to the German eastern areas").¹⁰³ At the end of 1949 C. L. Sulzberger, a keen observer of European affairs, reported a "slowly mounting pressure within the German republic once again to expand. No Bonn official today will admit to an acceptance of Germany's eastern borders as they exist *de facto*. Not only is steam building up behind the aspiration to recover part of what has been given to Poland; for the first time responsible leaders again talk about the need some day for the Danube states to 'care for' Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia."¹⁰⁴ And in May, 1951, a White Paper compiled by the German Federal Government for presentation to the Allied High Commission and prefaced by Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, claimed Germany's right to her frontiers as of December 31, 1937, and flatly rejected all postwar border changes. Specifically, the Federal Government claimed East Prussia and the Oder-Neisse territories.¹⁰⁵

Western Allied officials in Frankfurt repeatedly "charged the Bonn government with procrastinating in attempts to solve the refugee prob-

lem." German officials were accused of "hoping that the surplus population in West Germany would bolster the argument for German 'living space' and return of the Oder-Neisse territories and the Sudetenland."¹⁰⁶ The Western Allies themselves, however, were largely instrumental in nurturing such hopes.

The speech made on September 6, 1946, at Stuttgart by James F. Byrnes, then U.S. Secretary of State, emphasized that "the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland must be determined when the final settlement is agreed upon."¹⁰⁷ In January, 1947, it was reported that the United States would "try to hand back to Germany almost all of Pomerania and that segment of Brandenburg Province tentatively assigned to Poland," plus "the valuable East Prussian port of Stettin."¹⁰⁸ At the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (March 10-April 24, 1947) U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall strongly opposed "the perpetuation of the present temporary line between Germany and Poland." He agreed that southern East Prussia as well as former German Upper Silesia should become Polish territory, but avoided mentioning the ultimate fate of other Polish-incorporated areas east of the Oder-Neisse line.¹⁰⁹ This was interpreted in the American press as a move to return to Germany "the greater part of the former German lands in the East . . . at the very least, the provinces of Pomerania and Lower Silesia."¹¹⁰

Irrespective of the accurateness of this interpretation and of the merits of the American intentions and suggestions, any mention of a prospective territorial reshaping was bound to create uncertainty among millions of German expellees, strengthening their hopes for the revision of the German boundaries and for their own return to their former residences. Under such circumstances, it was but natural that many expellees were inclined to consider their situation as transitory. They preferred to remain a "little longer" in the status of temporarily uprooted refugees awaiting repatriation to their former homes. Western Allied officials in Frankfurt admitted in January, 1950, that "Western policy on the Oder-Neisse line had contributed to the German [noncooperative] attitude" and that "they expected the Germans to be slow to integrate refugees in the economy as long as the Western powers denied the Russian claims that this line was the permanent eastern boundary of Germany."¹¹¹

The expellees themselves were naturally only too eager to nurture hopes for imminent return to their abandoned homes. They considered their dwelling in Germany as a temporary sojourn, and were psychologically

reluctant to make the necessary effort for long-range integration. Elisabeth Wiskemann points out that

a serious obstacle in the path of those who dealt with the east German or Sudeten German refugees was that the more fanatical among them believed their patriotic duty to be an avoidance of any kind of integration into Western Germany. This was in order that they might be able to start back at any moment to their former homes, having preserved their group integrity and thereby its claims. For several years people of this kind objected to their children's losing, say, their Silesian or Pomeranian *Mundart* (accent or dialect) by going to school in Lower Saxony, while they frowned on the possibility of their sons' marrying into local families—they regarded such *mésalliances* as *Mischehen*, mixed marriages. This inbred state of mind was particularly strong among the Sudeten Germans, but by no means monopolized by them.¹¹²

Several expellee associations were outspoken in voicing revisionist aspirations. The American-sponsored *Die Neue Zeitung* of Munich reported on September 15, 1947, that German expellees from Eastern Europe in the British zone had formed an "exile government" aiming at the restoration to Germany of its former eastern territories now incorporated by Poland and the Soviet Union. In the U.S. zone of occupation, German expellees from Danzig had established a "Danzig government-in-exile" which planned to appeal to the United Nations for an autonomous status for Danzig.¹¹³ At a rally of the expellees from both the American and British zones, organized in Braunschweig by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Socialist Union (CSU) under the name *Reichstagung der Landesflüchtlingsausschüsse der CDU/CSU*, the chairman, Dr. Linus Kather, said: "*Wir Flüchtlinge werden uns niemals mit dem Gedanken befreunden, dass uns die Heimkehr in die angestammte Heimat für immer verwehrt sein solle*" ("We refugees will never make peace with the idea that the return to our hereditary homeland shall be forever closed to us"). Another speaker, ex-Minister Dr. Gerecke, declared: "*Ich werde mich immer mehr als Gast im Westen fühlen*" ("I will always feel myself as a guest in the West"), and meaningfully added: "*Vielleicht ist die Zeit der Rückkehr doch nicht so fern, wie man sagt*" ("Perhaps, however, the time of our return is not as remote as we are being told").¹¹⁴ In August, 1950, sixteen thousand expellees from the former Free City of Danzig assembled in Hamburg and adopted a resolution to the United Nations declaring that the Free City status was still in effect and that they

were determined to return there.¹¹⁵ Six weeks later Jakob Kaiser, Minister for All-German Affairs in the German Federal Government, addressing in Berlin a convention of expellees of the Christian Democratic Party from the Soviet zone, greeted the cities of Königsberg, Breslau, and Stettin as symbols of the many Eastern towns and villages that "await the return of the diligent and careful hands of Germans."¹¹⁶ In November, 1950, an exhibition entitled "The German Homeland in the East" was opened in Berlin in the presence of German dignitaries from Bonn and Berlin and of Western Allied officials. "Created by and for exiles from the territories beyond the Oder and Neisse" and "designed to ease the homesickness" of the expellees, the exposition was sponsored by the Federal Ministry for All-German Affairs; Jakob Kaiser, the head of the Ministry, declared at the dedicatory program that Germany would not renounce these Eastern areas.¹¹⁷

Indicative of the German revisionist feelings was a public opinion poll organized by the *Institut für Demoskopie* in August, 1953. Two thousand people over 17 in West Germany and West Berlin were asked whether they believed that Pomerania, Silesia, and East Prussia would one day belong to Germany again: 77 per cent of the expellees and refugees (and 63 per cent of the native Germans) answered in the affirmative. The second question was: "Must we try by all means, in the worst case through war, to regain these provinces?" To this, 77 per cent said not through war; 12 per cent said through war if necessary; and 11 per cent did not know. To the last question, "Would you go back if the eastern territories were free again tomorrow?", 55 per cent answered, "Yes, certainly"; 17 per cent, "Yes, perhaps"; 20 per cent said, "No"; and 8 per cent were uncertain; among people under 45 only 47 per cent answered, "Yes, certainly."¹¹⁸ It can be safely assumed that among the rank and file the percentage of young people not eager to return has considerably increased since August, 1953.

The expellees' revisionist sentiment and hopes were being demagogically exploited by German political parties. The one-and-one-half million Sudeten Germans in the U.S. zone "have once again become pawns in the political struggle in Germany," the Frankfurt correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* reported on August 20, 1947. "In the last few months this group has been heavily propagandized from both the Left and the Right . . . Wenzel Jäksch, formerly the secretary of the prewar German Social Democratic Party in Czechoslovakia, has emerged in western Germany as the political sponsor of the expellees.

He has formed the East Sudeten German Patriots Association which has a reported organized membership of 20,000 people. A skilled propagandist, Mr. Jäksch holds out to them the hope of some day returning to their former homes on the perimeter of Czechoslovakia." An election poster published by the Allied-sponsored Christian Democratic Union showed a map of Germany with Polish-incorporated provinces especially marked, and appealed for the support of this party in order to avoid the loss of the German eastern lands on the Oder and Neisse.¹¹⁹ Dr. Kurt Schumacher, leader of the Social Democratic Party, was so ardently advocating the return of Polish-incorporated eastern provinces to the Reich, that a United States official in Berlin referred to his program as "not national socialism but rather a sort of socialist nationalism."¹²⁰ At an early stage, even the Soviet-sponsored Socialist Unity Party (Communists) in East Germany indulged occasionally in revisionist outbursts. In 1947 one of its leaders, Max Fechner, stated that the Party "will oppose any diminution of German territory; the eastern frontier is merely temporary and can be settled definitely only at a peace conference with the cooperation of all large victor nations."¹²¹

It was not before June, 1950, that the leaders of the Socialist Unity Party, who had in the meantime become the Government of the "East German Democratic Republic," concluded with the Communist-dominated Polish government an agreement stating that both governments "consider it imperative to delineate the established peace frontiers on the Oder and Neisse and to conclude an agreement of frontier traffic navigation on the Oder and Neisse."¹²² This agreement was bitterly assailed by the government and public opinion of Western Germany. Similarly, when, on June 23, 1950, the Eastern German and the Czechoslovak governments signed a joint declaration recognizing as "permanent and just" the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, a group of members of the Bonn Parliament declared that "our demand for the return of the Sudetenland into our German homeland is irrevocable."¹²³

In November, 1949, the U.S. Military Government law requiring licensing of political parties had been recalled for the U.S. zone. The report of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany for the quarter ending December 31, 1949, acknowledged that this repeal "opened the way for a more vociferous and definite demand on the part of the refugees for political expression. There is little doubt that they will press for amalgamation, with their common misfortunes as rallying point. . . . A

united stand by a refugee party could give the refugee party the balance of power in the Government" (p. 40). The report continued:

Amalgamation on a national scale may set in motion forces which could not easily be controlled. The refugees have not forgotten their homelands, and thus might strive for the return of the former German territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. This aim coincides with the desires of many Germans, some of prominence. One ramification of this situation is that Irredentists are reluctant to solve the refugee problem by assimilation, in the belief that, as long as the refugees remain discontented, there will be a continued and forceful demand for the return of former German areas. Because of their plight the refugees are susceptible to undesirable political influence and the stratagems of demagogic leadership. The refugee organizations are making a strong bid for support among all destitute classes. A united refugee political party, under the sway of a militant or demagogic leader, could become a strong force in any incipient nationalism.¹²⁴

In March, 1950, the Allied authorities revoked for the whole of West Germany their ban upon the formation of new political parties, and at the Schleswig-Holstein elections in July, 1950, there emerged the *Block der Heimatvertriebenen und Entrechteten* (League of the Exiled from Their Homeland and Those Deprived of Rights). Their slate polled 306,856 votes, 23 per cent of the total vote, and gained fifteen seats in the new state legislature, so that no government in Schleswig-Holstein could be formed without them.¹²⁵ In the Bavarian election in November, 1950, the "Refugee Bloc" finished a surprisingly strong fourth with 1,135,759 votes, or 13.5 per cent of the total vote.¹²⁶ Impressive expellee representation emerged from the elections in Hesse, Württemberg-Baden, and Lower Saxony.¹²⁷

Successful in five major state elections, the expellee leaders decided to form an all-German national party, slated to become a most formidable Irredentist force. Jack Raymond of the *New York Times* reported that in political campaign speeches during the elections and in private conversations with followers of the refugee party, the main theme was the desire of regaining their homes in Silesia, East Prussia, and Sudetenland. "If given the chance, most of us—excepting only the aged and very young who may have married and established families—would return to our homeland on foot, if necessary, yes, and by the sword if necessary," said one of them. Conservative and Socialist German officials expressed the fear that the new refugee party "may build up an un-

controllable desire for reclamation of Polish and Soviet-held territories by war if necessary." Western Allied officials in Germany, while favoring a security treaty with the Bonn government, were anxious to be assured that an independent German government "would not drag its allies into any adventure in the East." French officials in Germany, noting the recurrent agitation for recovery of the territories beyond the Oder-Neisse line, feared that "an independent and rearmed Germany might involve the other Western powers in war with Russia and Poland for recovery of these territories."¹²⁸

It was not before 1951 that, taking cognizance of this war danger, Professor Theodor Heuss, Federal President of the Western German Republic said in his New Year broadcast: "Germans whose homes have been taken from them hope to return. But they do not want to find the road back lined with fresh soldiers' graves."¹²⁹ Encouraging trends towards a peaceful and more constructive approach to their problems also began ripening in more responsible refugee circles. A "Charter of the Expelled Germans" drafted at a meeting of expellee leaders at Stuttgart on August 5, 1950, contained a solemn pledge to relinquish any ideas of force and retribution:

We, the expellees, renounce all thought of revenge and retaliation. Our resolution is a solemn and sacred one, in memory of the infinite suffering brought upon mankind, particularly during the past decade. . . . We have lost our homeland. . . . Homeless people are strangers in this world. . . . Therefore we feel called upon to demand that the *Right to a Homeland* be acknowledged and realized as a God-given, fundamental right of humanity.¹³⁰

The homeland, the charter claimed, was, however, not the "lost territories" in the East, but Germany. Its main demands were:

- a. Equal rights as state citizens not only before the law, but also in the realities of everyday life.
- b. Sensible integration of all the expellees into the life of the German nation.
- c. Active inclusion of the German expellees in the reconstruction of Europe.

Along similar lines there was formulated the "combined appeal, warning, and program" issued in March, 1951, at Geneva, in the name of several

organizations claiming to represent more than ten million refugees in Central Europe (among them, the Central Union of German Expellees which claimed two million members in Western Germany).¹³¹ Warning that "the German expellee-refugee problem has developed into a dangerously explosive state" with potential "catastrophic effects" on the entire Continent of Europe, the document insisted on the urgent need of starting the process of bringing these millions who now felt that they belonged nowhere and had no rights, into some kind of relation with the Western world that would restore their self-respect.

The program called for the establishment of an International Recovery Council which would have four principal objectives:

1. The development of an economic, legal, and social recovery program for the integration, self-support, and resettlement of the refugees in Central Europe.
2. The organization of self-help projects among refugees from the Soviet zone of Germany.
3. The organization of international migration for those who "of their own free will" desired settlement outside of German lands.
4. The development of a program for the "participation of the expellees in the economic recovery and in cooperation with their own homelands after the peaceful restoration of human rights has been achieved therein."

Not all of the objectives thus formulated are equally realistic. But the spirit behind them if genuine, is the right spirit. Dudley Kirk hopefully comments that

while it is difficult to provide a clear casual relationship, the diminished political activity of the expellees as a group would seem to be related to the fact that they are increasingly merging with the native population. It is not that Irredentism is weak in Germany, but that the individual expellee, at least the younger one, has long since given up hoping for an early return to his former home and has plunged himself into West German life with the idea of making good in that society.¹³²

Indicative of this new trend among the expellees is the progressive decline of the Refugee Party in the state of its birth and once greatest power, Schleswig-Holstein. In the 1950 state election the party polled nearly one-fourth of the total vote; in the 1954 state election, 20 per cent; in the 1957 federal election, 8.3 per cent; and in the 1958 state election

only 6.9 per cent. Political observers were unanimous in concluding that the party was "nearing the end of the trail" and that its "last-ditch battle for survival" was a convincing proof that "the refugees have been so thoroughly assimilated into West German society that they no longer regard themselves as refugees first and West Germans second."¹³³ This evolution must be largely attributed to West Germany's unprecedented economic boom. As long as this boom lasts, the mass of expellees, economically integrated and prosperous, are likely to have little incentive for acute longing for their former abodes or for regaining their lost positions there. "There are men and women from the Oder-Neisse territories," Sidney Gruson reported from Bonn in the *New York Times* of July 22, 1960, "who tell foreigners frankly that they would not go back under any circumstances." This new mentality apparently encouraged Herr Franz Thedieck, State Secretary of the Ministry of All-German Affairs to tell the Upper Silesian Association in Bonn that, while Germany's claim to the Oder-Neisse area was clear under international law, it clashed with present realities in Poland: the ten million German expellees, he said, "have been supplanted by millions of Poles, and this will have to be taken into account when a formal German peace treaty is ultimately written." The high government official called on the Silesian Association "to spare itself illusions and not to engage in unrealistic wishful thinking."¹³⁴

It would, however, be misleading to disregard the still smoldering Irredentist tendencies among the expellees. The London *Times* wrote editorially on December 20, 1950: "To a demagogue, refugees are what blood in water is to a shark, and the refugee problem is large enough to create a revolutionary situation." And the expellees' political leadership remained both determined and vocal. As late as April, 1957, Dr. Linus Kather, member of the West German Federal Parliament and President of the powerful League of Expelled Germans, declared that "Germany's frontiers should be re-established as they were September 1, 1939," including the Sudeten area and the former German eastern provinces. He did not mention Danzig and Memel.¹³⁵ But the election platform of the "All-German Bloc" published and distributed before the 1957 elections to West Germany's Parliament contained the specific demand for the restoration of Memel, along with the Sudetenland, to Germany's sovereignty.¹³⁶ Publications which do not demand the return to Germany of territories lost in 1945, nevertheless expect the return of the expellees to those lost territories. In the same year, 1957, Dr. Werner Middelmann,

Ministerialdirigent in the Federal Ministry of Expellees and Refugees, wrote in a semiofficial pamphlet *After Ten Years* (prefaced by Prof. Theodor Heuss, President, and Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany):

The refugees and expellees have tried to become integrated in order to be fit when the time for their return to their home provinces comes. They have never renounced their right to their homeland. . . . A Gallup poll taken in 1956 confirmed that a majority have the firm desire to return to the country they left in 1945, a small minority are yet undecided, and a negligible fraction want to stay where they are today.¹³⁷

As late as July 22, 1960, the *New York Times* Bonn correspondent reported that many of the expellees "say with conviction that, despite the new prosperity they would be willing to start again in their birthplaces." Friedrich Gehl, a 54-year-old Bonn hardware merchant who was expelled from Upper Silesia, said: "I'd go barefoot and without taking anything with me. And that goes for my wife, three sons and a daughter." A month later West Germany's Minister of Economy, Ludwig Ehrhard, while emphasizing the desire to settle the issue of the "lost territories" in a spirit of good will and mutual agreement, insisted that the expellees had "the right to their homes."¹³⁸ A similar demand was made in March, 1960, in regard to the Sudeten German expellees by Hans Christoph Seebohm, Minister of Transportation.¹³⁹

At least some of the expellees in West Germany still seem to be psychologically at the crossroads, though with a marked and increasing tendency to take roots. Given another decade of peaceful continuation of the present territorial-political status, they have a good chance of achieving full integration with the new order they have been pushed into.

NOTES

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- ³⁸ C.A.M., "Heirs to Potsdam," *The World Today*, October 1948.
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⁴³ *Statistical Annex*, No. XXVI, p. 27.

⁴⁴ *British Zone Review*, January 4, 1947.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, April 27, 1947. Also: *Monthly Report of the Control Commission for Germany* (British Element), May 1947, p. 39.

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⁴⁷ This claim is strikingly inaccurate. The population census of October 29, 1946, established that among the 3,632,484 expellees and refugees in the British zone 1,633,794 (45 per cent) were males; 50.05 per cent of the males (55.6 per cent of the females) were in the best working age from 15 to 50; only 13.1 per cent were over 55 years of age (14.5 per cent among the females); 31.1 per cent were children and youths up to 15 years of age (24.3 per cent among the females). *Statistical Annex*, No. XXVI, p. 29. Peter Galliner rightly stressed in *The New Statesman and Nation* of September 3, 1949, that "their [the expellees'] age composition is more favorable—i.e., the percentage of people of working age is larger—than that of the indigenous population, since only the hardy survived the track to the West."

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⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

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⁵² Peter Galliner, *op. cit.*

⁵³ *New York Times*, September 21, 1947.

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⁵⁶ *Care and Help*, p. 33; *Monthly Report of the Control Commission for Germany* (British Element), Vol. 4, No. 12, December 1949.

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⁶⁸ Dr. G. Beijer, "Positive Economic Influence of the Refugees in Western Germany," in Bouman, Beijer, and Oudegeest, *The Refugee Problem in Western Germany*, p. 26.

⁶⁹ *Sonne Report*, p. 6.

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- ⁷⁷ Galliner, *op. cit.*
- ⁷⁸ Bouman, *loc. cit.*, pp. 3-6.
- ⁷⁹ Jane Perry Clark Carey, *The Role of Uprooted People in European Recovery*, National Planning Association, Washington, D.C., October, 1948, p. 43.
- ⁸⁰ Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.
- ⁸¹ *New York Times*, August 22, 1946.
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- ⁸³ Wiskemann, *op. cit.*, pp. 141-142.
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THIRTEEN

Transfer of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria

I.

Reduced to her present demographic boundaries, modern Turkey has numerous Turkish minority splinters in the neighboring Balkan countries. Estimating their number at over two million, Sukru Kaya Bey, then Turkish Minister of the Interior, described them in 1934 as descendants of those Turks "who directly participated in the Turkish conquests of the last centuries, who installed themselves in the conquered regions and lived there for centuries as masters."¹

This master status came to an end with the establishment of independent Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The Turks in these states had become minorities ruled by the local Christian population, their former subjects. Not unlike other ethnic and religious minority groups, they had been exposed to varying degrees of discrimination in the countries of their residence, especially in Bulgaria and Rumania. With regard to them Turkey adopted a policy of wholesale, but gradual, repatriation.

At the session of the Turkish National Assembly on November 13, 1935, Minister Sukru Kaya Bey solemnly declared that repatriation of the Turkish minorities scattered through the Balkan countries was "one of the bases of Turkey's demographic policy, and it is necessary that all Turks living abroad be installed in this country. . . . We must hold our doors wide open for them."² A few months earlier, explaining the longing of the Turkish minorities to leave the countries of their residence, Sukru Kaya Bey stressed that "the basic trend of the Turkish character is not to be able to live as slave where the Turk previously was the master."³

An early manifestation of the Turkish repatriation policy was the Turko-Bulgarian Agreement signed in Ankara on October 18, 1925.

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria lived in compact settlements, mainly in the northeastern part of the country, in the districts of Sumen and Stara Zagora, and in Dobrudja. The proportion of Turks in some of these districts was as high as 90 per cent. The 1934 census gave their number as 618,268. When, on September 7, 1940, the Craiova treaty

returned Rumanian Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria, another 65,437 Turks living there became Bulgarian citizens.⁴

The 1925 Agreement provided for the "voluntary emigration of Turks from Bulgaria and Bulgarians from Turkey" to which the two governments "will place no obstacle," allowing the emigrants "to travel freely" between the two countries (Art. 1). Article 2 stipulated that all emigrants should have the right to take with them all their movable property—including all livestock and agricultural machinery—and savings, as well as to dispose of all their irremovable property "in complete freedom." Article 3 forbade the imposition of any special taxes or any financial restrictions, direct or indirect, on the emigrants, and Article 6 exempted them from military service or compulsory government labor service. Article 7 regulated the complex problem of transfer of business firms and industrial enterprises belonging to emigrants.⁵

Only during the first few years following the signature of the Agreement was the number of Turkish emigrants from Bulgaria considerable (there were only 18,245 Bulgarians in Turkey and they were mentioned in the Agreement merely in order to safeguard its bilateral character). In 1928 11,996 Turks left Bulgaria, and 11,568 in 1929—apparently people who were particularly intent on emigration.⁶ In 1930 the number of emigrants dropped to 1,684; in 1931, it was 2,141; in 1932, 1,452, and in 1933, 1,382.⁷ Enjoying a democratic parliamentary regime of government, the Turkish minority of Bulgaria felt no compulsion to emigrate.

Premier Georgiev's *coup d'état* of May, 1934, however, marked the end of the parliamentary system in Bulgaria. The constitution of 1879 was suspended and all political parties dissolved. Eight months later, in January, 1935, King Boris dismissed the Georgiev Cabinet and thereafter ruled as virtual dictator till his death in 1943. With each succeeding year the Bulgarian authoritarian regime became more oppressive. The position of the Turkish minority considerably worsened. The emigration trend increased accordingly.

In November, 1934, Sukru Kaya Bey stated in the Turkish National Assembly: "During the summer months an emigration movement manifested itself in Bulgaria and grew to the proportion of a mass emigration." In reply to remonstrances from the Turkish government, Bulgarian authorities did not deny that this movement was due to "local pressure."⁸ This administrative pressure resulted in a 1934 total of 8,682 Turkish emigrants. In 1935, the number of Turks who felt compelled to leave grew to a new high mark of 24,968.⁹

In an attempt to somehow regularize this chaotic movement, the Ankara government concluded in 1936 and 1937 additional agreements with the Bulgarian government providing for the repatriation of some 10,000 Turks each year. During the first year (1936) this quota was fairly well upheld (11,730 Turks left Bulgaria in this year for Turkey). Impatient to accelerate the emigration, the Bulgarian authorities took occasion to dispatch 1,500 Turks to Turkey as "tourists," but were obliged to deduct an equal number from the quota for the next year. Despite this agreed deduction, 13,490 emigrants arrived in Turkey in 1937, and the 1938 calculations were completely knocked out when 20,542 Turks were forced to move from Bulgaria to Turkey.¹⁰ The quota for 1939 was 11,290, but 15,458 Turks left Bulgaria during that year.¹¹ World War II interrupted further displacements.

Almost 125,000 Turks left Bulgaria for Turkey between 1928 and 1939. They were resettled mainly in Anatolia, in the districts of Izmir, Manisa, Aydin, Diyarbakir, Nigde, and Sivas.¹²

2.

World War II barred further emigration. The postwar Communist regime in Bulgaria discouraged migration of its Turkish subjects to Turkey. Only 631 exit visas were granted in 1945; in 1946 only 884 were permitted to leave, and only 1,500 were allowed to emigrate in 1947-49.¹³

Instead, the Communist-dominated Bulgarian government made a determined effort to "re-educate" the Turkish minority, to integrate it into the general pattern of the country. The Turks were given representation in Bulgaria's Grand National Assembly and in district and local people's councils. A number of Turkish schools, professional courses, newspapers, and radio programs were set up, and emancipation of women fostered.

But all these measures seem to have had little effect. The strongly religious and nationalistic Turkish minority, headed by *hodjas* (priests) and *muftis* (bishops) staunchly resisted attempts at assimilation, both cultural and social. The Communist regime began to tighten its grip on the Turkish institutions. In 1948, it took over the Turkish schools. In February, 1949, the Bulgarian National Assembly passed a law placing all mosques, as well as other Moslem religious institutions, under direct government control. The collectivization campaign was intensified.

While at the beginning of 1950 Bulgaria had only 1,600 collectives, with 1,400,000 acres occupied by 156,000 peasant families, in the fall of the same year the number of collective farms was increased to 2,566, with 5,000,000 acres operated by 570,000 peasant families; almost half of the nation's farmers had been forced to join the collective sector.¹⁴

The Turkish minority—peasants, merchants and workers alike—bitterly resented the Communist collectivization and assimilation policy.

Early in October 1950, A. T. Steele of the *New York Herald Tribune* visited the refugee camp in the Turkish frontier town of Edirne (Adrianople) and talked with some of the 1,100 refugees, mostly peasants with a sprinkling of small merchants and laborers, it held at that time.¹⁵ All told the story of gradual but inexorable pressure by the Bulgarian government to complete the communization of the country. All spoke of terror tactics and discrimination to spur compliance with state policies:

Nure, a farmer, had tried to resist Bulgarian pressure to incorporate his lands into a cooperative [collective] farm, but he ran into so much official discrimination because of his desire to be left alone that he decided it was not worth the struggle.

Koraloglu, a merchant and part-time farmer, abandoned two shops and a farm because, as he put it, "Life in Bulgaria is unbearable unless you come into the Communist apparatus, and I'd rather have my freedom than a cheaper loaf of bread without it." Recopoplu, an iron worker, got tired of being shifted from place to place at the whim of the State.

Faced with this opposition, the Sofia government apparently gave up hope of rallying the Turks. Following the familiar Communist pattern, it attempted to make the Turkish government responsible for the failure of its policies with regard to the Turkish minority. In a note delivered to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires in Sofia on August 10, 1950, the Bulgarian Communist regime accused Turkey of trying to "stir up" the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. It protested against "the hostile attitude of the Turkish government toward Bulgaria and the attempts of the Turkish government to create sentiments hostile to the People's Republic of Bulgaria among the Turkish minority in the country and among the Turkish people," and claimed that Turkey was using the minority issue "for intervention on a political plane in the internal affairs of Bulgaria."¹⁶

3.

Unable to "absorb" the Turks both socially and culturally, the Bulgarian Communist regime apparently made up its mind to get rid of them as quickly as possible, using both their land and houses for its own colonization schemes. During 1949, the number of Turks who left Bulgaria for Turkey reached 24,332.

At the beginning of 1950, the Bulgarian government officially announced that Turkish emigration would be resumed. Throughout the first seven months of the year it proceeded at a relatively modest rate. The number of Turks who crossed the Turkish-Bulgarian border at Svilengrad during this period was as follows.¹⁷

January	816	May.....	1,703
February	1,292	June.....	3,930
March	2,186	July	3,365
April	2,387		

Then, suddenly, the numbers rose to 6,028 in August and 7,508 in September.

This abrupt increase was preceded by the aforementioned Bulgarian note of August 10, which asserted that "malicious rumors" had been spread within the Bulgarian borders that Bulgaria was impeding Turks seeking to emigrate to Turkey. In fact, the note contended, Turkey was not seriously interested in assuring the entry of Bulgarian Turks: while applications for exit passports had been received from 250,000 members of the Turkish minority and the Sofia government had issued up to August over 54,000 such passports, only 15,835 passport-holders had been able to obtain entrance visas for Turkey. The Bulgarian government demanded that Turkey arrange within three months to admit all 250,000 Turks who had applied for repatriation.¹⁸ The official Bulgarian information agency ironically stressed that the reception of the repatriates in Turkey would be a test of the Turkish government's desire to keep the terms of the Bulgarian-Turkish emigration treaty and to actually help the Turkish minority in Bulgaria for whom it "is shedding crocodile tears."¹⁹

In reply to the Bulgarian note, the Turkish government stressed on August 28 that, while the 1925 Agreement stipulated that no obstacles

should be placed in the way of such nationals of the contracting parties as might voluntarily wish to emigrate, it set "no time-limit by which emigration must be completed, nor did it intend that such emigration should assume the form of mass deportations." Turkey therefore could not be compelled to accept 250,000 immigrants within 90 days. On the other hand, the Turkish note insisted, the agreement never implied that the receiving country "is bound unconditionally to admit every person who may wish to enter its territories."

The necessity for any country to refuse an entry visa to those would-be emigrants whose social and political allegiances would render their presence harmful to the country in question is too obvious to require debate. . . . Naturally, the Republic of Turkey, too, possesses the right to prevent the infiltration through its frontiers of such tendencies as constitute a threat to the principles which Turkey upholds along with the other democracies of the world.

The Ankara government pointed out that it was "conditions of life imposed on the Turkish minority in Bulgaria" and the Bulgarian Government's "failure to respect the [Bulgarian Turk's] economic, cultural, and human rights" that had created the emigration crisis. "The fact that 250,000 persons are alleged to desire to emigrate to Turkey can only be taken to indicate that they can no longer tolerate their present mode of life in Bulgaria. . . . The measures adopted by the Bulgarian government to increase the number of emigrants to such unprecedented levels are reminiscent of forced deportations."²⁰

In a second note, dated September 22, the Bulgarian government categorically denied Ankara's accusation that the desire of the Bulgarian Turks to immigrate to Turkey had been provoked by Bulgarian authorities' own action. A second note by the Turkish government (October 16) rejected Sofia's denial and reiterated the charge.²¹

4.

One of the most distressing aspects of the forced migration was its property aspects.

The 1925 Agreement, to which Bulgaria so insistently referred, had stipulated that prospective emigrants should have the right to dispose of all their irremovable property "in complete freedom" and to take with them all their savings and movable property (Art. 2).

The Turkish government's note of August 28 sternly reminded the Bulgarian government that the Agreement "is an international instrument which takes precedence over national regulations. Nevertheless," continued the note, "based on subsequent legislation, Bulgarian authorities do not permit emigrants to take with them anything other than their bedding and a few kitchen utensils. . . . Thus, instead of becoming productively self-supporting in a short time, these emigrants find themselves in a tragic plight on arrival in their new homeland: they urgently require aid out of State funds, and it becomes enormously more difficult to settle and house them. . . . The Turkish government demands that discussion be initiated immediately to determine the manner in which emigrants may take with them their monies and properties: though this is required by the existing emigration agreement, it has been impossible to actualize to date."²²

This demand remained unheeded, and the Bulgarian authorities continued to disregard the economic clauses of the Agreement. Refugees in the Edirne camp told A. T. Steele that they had been given only ten days to two weeks to liquidate their properties, which meant that they had to sell at sacrifice.²³ Their "major complaint was against the subtle technique of stripping them of their capital before they left the country." Moreover, they were allowed to take with them only secondhand personal effects equivalent to \$2 in Bulgarian money, and no valuables.²⁴

Another essential provision of the 1925 Agreement forbade the imposition of any special taxes or any financial restrictions, direct or indirect, on the emigrants (Art. 3). Article 6 exempted all prospective emigrants from military service. A *Time* magazine correspondent was told by emigrants who had reached Turkey how these provisions were being violated:

Said a refugee carpenter: "When I applied for a passport I was asked if I had overdue taxes. When I showed all receipts, I was informed that my grandfather Ahmet owed 4,000 leva on a house I'd sold. I told them this couldn't be so, and that my grandfather's name was not Ahmet but Osman. They answered: 'Then he must have changed his name.' I paid the overdue debt of grandfather's." Another refugee paid 4,200 leva, plus a 6,000-leva bribe for the "military exemption fee" of his four-year-old son.²⁵

Attempting to throw the blame for the sorry plight of the Turkish emigrants massed along the frontier, on the Turkish government,

Bulgarian propaganda in fact provided striking proof of the results of these spoilation methods. Radio Sofia reported that the emigrants were "without means, furniture, and shelter."²⁶ A pro-Communist letter from the Bulgarian frontier town of Svilingrad described the Turks as "living in tents and bivouacs of their own construction and in sheds. . . . They have little equipment."²⁷ There can hardly be any doubt that even the poorest peasant family in Bulgaria, Turks and Bulgarians alike, owned some household equipment and furniture, a horse- or ox-drawn cart, and some cattle. If they had avowedly arrived at the Turkish frontier stripped of all their possessions, it can be explained only by the Bulgarian government's policy of pauperizing the emigrants before dumping them into Turkey. Witnesses reported that a group of 1,670 persons who arrived at the Turkish border town of Edirne early in October, 1950, had almost nothing to wear. A second lot of 600 immigrants stated that all their money was confiscated by the Bulgarian officials.²⁸

Turkish authorities made it clear that they were ready and eager to admit immigrants of their own ethnic origin and faith if they were sent across in reasonable numbers. But they refused to allow this sudden and chaotic influx of people who were entering the country not as repatriates but as refugees, who had been stripped of all their possessions after having been forced to abandon their farms without any compensation and, in many cases, had left behind even their movable property and their meager funds. Such immigrants were bound to become a charge on the Turkish government at a time when winter was beginning, and the government felt unable to cope with the economic and financial problems of sheltering, feeding, and later resettling 250,000 persons within a few months.

With the obvious intention of making the situation unbearable, the Bulgarian authorities in October, 1950, rescinded the ration cards of the emigrants without making any arrangements to feed them during the period of their awaiting transportation to Turkey and thus virtually sentencing them to starvation.²⁹ Another aggravating circumstance was the weather. Refik Koraltan, President of the Turkish National Assembly, stressed that the Bulgarian government had deliberately chosen the winter season for the mass removal of the Turks in order to inflict utmost hardship upon all concerned.³⁰ Their plight during the severe winter months was particularly miserable. In January, 1951, Turkish sources estimated at more than 20,000 the number of emigrants left to face

freezing winter in open fields around Svilingrad. Radio Sofia admitted that such a concentration existed, but claimed that only 8,000 were actually living in the open.³¹

5.

The Turkish government had from the very beginning taken the position that the dispute over the manner in which the 1925 Agreement should be implemented must be settled by direct negotiations between Bulgaria and Turkey; only should the Bulgarian government refuse to negotiate would Turkey refer the matter to international bodies. The Sofia government for months avoided a definite answer to this alternative and merely intensified both anti-Turkish propaganda and expulsions. The Sofia Radio indignantly protested that "the doors of Turkey . . . open only to spies and murderers, to the hirelings of the imperialists and to the enemies of the people."³²

Turkey raised the issue between her and Bulgaria at the November, 1950, session of the sixteen-member Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe which met in Rome to sign the Convention on Human Rights and Basic Freedom. The Council adopted a resolution expressing strong condemnation of Bulgaria's action which was described as a tendency to create unrest in the affected areas. The condemnatory resolution of the Ministers' Committee, said Fuat Koprula, the Turkish Foreign Minister, "has turned what was previously a Turkish into a European cause."³³

Simultaneously, Nuri Birgi, Turkish delegate to the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, gave the Assembly's plenary session a complete résumé of violation by Bulgaria of contractual obligations and human rights and of the sufferings of Bulgarian citizens of Turkish ethnic origin. The Turkish delegate pointed out that Turkey had received, and continued to receive, as many immigrants as it was possible for her to resettle properly. But in this case, he said, the flagrant violation of human rights and dignity lay in the fact that Bulgaria was deliberately creating a situation arising out of the impossibility of receiving immigrants in such huge numbers within so short a time; the deportees whom the Bulgarians massed on the frontier arrived in a state of utter destitution, despite the fact that an immigration agreement to regulate this traffic already existed between Turkey and Bulgaria, and

it was quite possible for Bulgaria to cooperate with Turkey to arrive at a workable solution and arrangement. The Turkish delegate did not ask for immediate action by the United Nations. But President Celal Bayar announced in the Turkish National Assembly that his government "is already decided to submit this grave dispute to international jurisdiction."³⁴

6.

While these diplomatic moves were going on, mass emigration continued. Among the emigrants were many who possessed Bulgarian exit visas only and no Turkish entry visas. At the beginning, Turkish border authorities admitted such visaless emigrants without too much questioning. Encouraged by this attitude, the Bulgarian authorities started sending many thousands of Turkish emigrants to Svilingrad. A correspondent of the outspokenly pro-Soviet *New Central European Observer* (London) reported that "there were days when more than 1,000 people left and 80 per cent of them without [Turkish] visas."³⁵

Then, on September 5, the Turks closed the border. Moved by the desperate situation of the emigrants on the frontier, they reopened it on the eighth, and, reports the same correspondent, "between that day and the seventeenth there was a mass entry." The border was closed once more for four days, to be reopened on September 21. On October 6, flooded by visaless emigrants, the Turkish government again closed the border, so that by the end of the month some 6,000 Turkish emigrants had accumulated in the Svilingrad camp.³⁶ Turkish Foreign Minister Fuat Koprula announced that this time the frontier "will remain closed until the Bulgarian authorities realize that they will not succeed in their plan to smuggle into Turkey, persons who are not of Turkish origin."³⁷

This latter remark referred to Bulgarian attempts to dispatch to Turkey, along with ethnic Turks, also elements of Bulgaria's gypsy minority of 80,000, over four-fifths of whom were of Moslem faith. Despite repeated warnings by the Turkish authorities, the train which arrived from Bulgaria on October 6 brought a group of 97 gypsies to the Turkish border. They had no Turkish entry visas, nor could they claim Turkish ethnic origin, and they were returned to Bulgaria. Bulgarian authorities, however, sent the train and its passengers back again. To prevent repetition of such incidents, the Turkish government closed the

border to all traffic until the Sofia regime should see fit to permit the gypsies to return to Bulgaria.³⁸

Another ground for apprehension on the part of the Turkish authorities was the strong suspicion that the Communist Sofia regime would use the refugee stream to plant a number of Communist agents on Turkish territory. They asked for the opportunity to carefully screen the immigrants against infiltration by Communist agents.

The conflict lasted till the end of November, 1950, when the Bulgarian authorities unexpectedly yielded and informed the Ankara government that they were prepared to negotiate. Even more unexpected was the brevity of the discussion and the easy acceptance by the Bulgarian representatives of all the Turkish proposals. The agreement was signed on December 2 and covered four essential points.³⁹

1. The Bulgarian government shall issue exit visas only to those prospective Turkish emigrants who have already obtained entry visas from the Turkish consulates in Bulgaria. Applicants for such visas shall neither leave their homes, nor start to dispose of their properties before Turkish visas are issued to them.

2. The Turkish frontier authorities shall have the right to refuse acceptance and to return immigrants for security reasons. Bulgarian frontier authorities shall receive them without protest.

3. The Bulgarian authorities will readmit 360 gypsies, whom they have sent to Turkey without Turkish entry visas.

4. The Bulgarian authorities shall in the future observe Articles 2 and 3 of the 1925 Agreement safeguarding the property rights of the emigrants.

The first and the last paragraphs of the agreement had, from the very beginning, theoretical significances only. Almost all the Turkish emigrants—those who had already crossed the border as well as those who were still awaiting their turn—had in the meantime been deprived of their property. The Ankara newspaper *Zafer* reported early in January, 1951, that "the Bulgars are already violating their month-old agreement to permit emigrants to retain their homes and possessions, and their promise not to deport persons who are not yet in possession of visas. They continue to confiscate everything and to pile up masses of men, women, and children on our borders. Visa or no visa, Turkey feels bound to extend a helping hand to these unfortunate victims of Communism."⁴⁰

Paragraphs two and three, if observed, did have practical importance.

They gave the Turkish authorities the option of screening the arrivals and thus safeguarding Turkey against the infiltration of gypsies and Communist agents among the *bona fide* immigrants. Turkish officials dealing with the influx of these immigrants expressed confidence in their ability to deal with this problem. Ziyad Ebuzzia, of the propaganda committee of the Society for Aid to Refugees from Bulgaria, told the Reuter's correspondent that more than three-quarters of the Turks admitted between August, 1950, and March, 1951, were old folk and children; only 7,230 men and 8,000 women were between 18 and 45, which could be considered the potentially "dangerous" ages. On the other hand, Mr. Ebuzzia said, Turkish consulates in Bulgaria were extremely careful in issuing visas. And finally, since almost all the immigrants were peasants coming in compact village groups, "everyone knows everybody else" and it was relatively easy to obtain the opinion of the majority of the villagers about the reliability of individual members of the group.⁴¹

The Turkish border was reopened immediately after the signing of the agreement on December 2. Thereafter an average of 650 Turks in possession of entry visas entered Turkey daily. Of the 52,185 arrivals between January 1 and December 4, 1950, 21,143 were admitted after December 4, 1950. In 1951, the number of repatriates (102,208) almost doubled the 1950 figure. The International Refugee Organization Mission reported that Turkey would probably accept the rest of the 250,000 named in the original Bulgarian note.⁴² Earlier, the Istanbul correspondent of the *New York Times* even submitted that "a mass emigration of the rest of the 850,000 (in fact there were, in 1950, 705,000 Turks in Bulgaria) of Turkish heritage . . . is now indicated."⁴³ In the course of his inspection tour of the receiving centers, President Celal Bayar assured the immigrants that "everything would be done to receive and resettle in Turkey those other persons of Turkish descent who are still suffering persecution in Communist Bulgaria."⁴⁴ Above the old military barracks at Edirne through which all the repatriates passed, a sign read: "*Has Geldin Cocinen Cina Yurt Seni Sevgizle Kucaklar*" ("Welcome, immigrants, to your homeland; we take you back with love, back to our breast").

There are various explanations for the Bulgarian government's sudden decision to "dump" into Turkey a quarter of a million people. The argument advanced by the Bulgarian propaganda was that the non-conformist Turkish minority in the Dobrudja lived in a frontier zone and

thus constituted a security risk. However, the validity of this contention is greatly weakened by the simple fact that the Dobrudja is located on the Bulgarian-Rumanian and not on the Bulgarian-Turkish border. It appears more likely that the Sofia regime was hoping to at least embarrass, if not seriously jeopardize, the economy of Turkey by suddenly dumping upon her population a mass of destitute refugees. This latter calculation proved to be erroneous. In 1950, Turkey's economic position was very favorable. The country had managed to stay out of the Second World War. It was not only not exposed to the ravages of warfare, but actually profited from the competition between the Axis and Allied states: both sides contributed many millions to Turkish coffers in a grand splurge of "preclusive" buying, each seeking, at almost any cost, to prevent the other from getting access to Turkish goods. After the war, in 1948, Turkey began to receive substantial amounts from the United States under the Truman Doctrine of aid to Turkey and Greece: in 1948-1952, economic and military aid amounted to \$1,041,200. Later, the Korean war inflated the international prices of agricultural commodities, particularly of wheat and cotton. The cumulative effect of these developments equipped Turkey sufficiently to cope with the financial burden of receiving and resettling the repatriates.

Then, unexpectedly, the entire picture changed completely. The Bulgarian government, which in 1950 and 1951 had been so intent on enforcing Turkish mass evacuation, decided to halt it and to attempt again to "adjust" the Turkish minority in Bulgaria to the realities of the Communist regime. In January, 1952, the Bulgarian News Service announced that members of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria would henceforth be refused permission to leave the country.⁴⁶ Huey Louis Kostanick, who in 1950 and 1951 made a thorough and thoughtful study, *Turkish Resettlement of Bulgarian Turks*, frankly admitted that "it is not clear why this decision was made."⁴⁶ He believes that "part of the answer" may lie in the need to arrest both the loss of manpower and the decrease in grain production. Another consideration might have been the apparent satisfaction of the Turkish government and public with the repatriation of their blood brethren: everything that was popular with Turkey was objectionable to the Bulgarian regime. Whatever the reason, no further emigration of Bulgarian Turks occurred, and the problem of Bulgaria's large Turkish minority was not disposed of.

On the other hand, Turkey did not prove too eager to receive the remaining 100,000 Turks of the original 250,000 slated for expatriation

in August of 1950, much less the entire 700,000 members of the Turkish minority of Bulgaria. The government felt that the 150,000 already admitted had used the then available land and that in the future it would be much more difficult to provide land, housing, other facilities, and financial aid to new arrivals.⁴⁷

7.

Early in January, 1951, a top-level three-man mission of the International Refugee Organization, headed by Meyer Cohen, I.R.O. Assistant General Director, arrived in Turkey on the request of the Turkish government to study the question of immigrants from Bulgaria, and to suggest measures for their resettlement in the country.⁴⁸ The mission toured the areas where large reception centers had been established, and was expected to "prepare a report which will form the basis of probable monetary aid on the part of the I.R.O."⁴⁹ This latter expectation proved to be unfounded. J. Donald Kingsley, Director General of the I.R.O., made it clear that the mission's task in Turkey would be limited to the provision of technical assistance, since I.R.O. was scheduled to wind up its operations in the fall of 1951, and all of its resources were committed to the task of resettling as many as possible of the displaced persons already on its rolls.⁵⁰ The mission completed its investigation by the end of January. It came to the conclusion that the Turkish government "is doing pretty well under the circumstances" and that "Turkey would benefit in the end from this influx of a sturdy peasant population which could be resettled in the sparsely populated regions of eastern and southern Turkey."⁵¹

Earlier evidence fully supports this judgment. The approximately 125,000 Turkish repatriates from Bulgaria, Rumania, and Yugoslavia who had arrived between 1934 and 1939 and had been resettled on vacant land undoubtedly became a considerable asset in Turkey's economy. According to as objective and well-informed an observer as Donald Everest Webster, those repatriates "have the vigor and ambition generally characteristic of migrants, so they are making a genuine contribution to the country to which they thus show their affection. While the government is being strained to care for them, there is every reason to believe that the investment is sound."⁵² Capitalizing on this prewar experience, the Turkish government from the very inception realized the responsi-

bility it had to face. In January, 1951, addressing the National Assembly in Ankara, Vice Premier Samed Agaoglu declared that the problem of immigrants from Bulgaria was considered by the government to be of national importance and magnitude; the government, he said, was envisaging the establishment of a special department to coordinate immigration, housing, land distribution, and the like under a single administration. The newspaper *Zafer* reported that the government was enlisting the cooperation of experts from other countries which had had wide experience in immigration problems, and referred in particular to the invitation extended to experts of the U.S. Department of the Interior.⁵³ Mr. Faik Fanik, chairman of the committee for the absorption of the repatriates, made a study trip to Israel, inspecting transition camps, workers' villages, housing projects, and other institutions and facilities in the various stages of absorption and integration.⁵⁴

Leading Turkish circles insisted that the plight of the refugees from Bulgaria was, as Refik Koraltan, President of the Turkish National Assembly put, it, "a problem that requires the joint efforts of the whole civilized world, and we are confident that aid will not be withheld." In January, 1951, it was reported that approval had been secured from the Marshall Plan administration for a first installment of some \$10,500,000 of counterpart funds for relief and rehabilitation work. The Red Cross Societies in the United States, Britain, Canada, India, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Sweden promised speedy and effective aid.⁵⁵ At the same time, the Turkish Red Crescent Society, which had been operating the first four reception camps, started organizing several others to meet the needs of the increasing inflow of immigrants.⁵⁶ A special "Committee to Aid the Refugees" was created under the chairmanship of Refik Koraltan, with branch offices in almost every province. Large contributions to assistance were subscribed by national credit institutions, with the Central Bank (\$212,000), Agricultural Bank (\$212,000), and Ottoman Bank (\$177,000), heading the list.⁵⁷

The main responsibility, however, remained with the government. The reception, handling, and resettlement of the arriving repatriates was entrusted to a special agency, The Land and Settlement Administration *Toprak ve İskân İşleri Genel Müdürlüğü*. For a time, other ministries, such as Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Health, and Labor, were to aid in the task. But in 1952 the conclusion was reached that duplication of effort created confusion and conflict. The Land and Settlement Admini-

stration assumed sole responsibility and was placed under the jurisdiction of the Office of Prime Minister.⁵⁸

The reception procedure was as follows. Upon their arrival in Edirne from the Bulgarian concentration point in Svilingrad, the refugees were disinfected, given a medical examination, including x-rays, cleared by the immigration and police authorities, and housed in two-tier bunks in the military barracks. The Edirne camp had the capacity to handle up to 2,000 insofar as beds and meals were concerned. The accommodations were rough but warm and scrupulously clean. Within several days each family was interviewed as to its desires and skills and assigned to one or another province. Some were sent immediately to their new locations, where they reported to the governor of the province. Others went from Edirne to temporary transit centers until travel accommodations were available to their eventual destinations. Each province had a small reception center of its own for use until the refugees found work and housing.⁵⁹ Other reception centers were opened in Istanbul, Tekirdag, and Izmir.⁶⁰

Mainly for security reasons, the settlement of all refugees from Bulgaria was restricted to the western half of Turkey, in 44 of the 63 provinces. This also fitted the wishes of the newcomers themselves who were not attracted by the prospect of settling in remote, underpopulated eastern Anatolia (there were in 1945 only 62 persons per square mile in the whole of Anatolia). The original scheme provided for placement of the vast majority in rural areas, with only tradesmen and artisans being directed to the larger cities. The actual development, however, showed a marked trend toward the cities. According to the original plan, only 552 families had to be settled in Istanbul; in fact, 3,786 families (12,835 persons: 10,552 artisans and 471 farmers) had established themselves by 1952 in Istanbul and its suburbs, making it the largest single settlement area. On the Aegean coast, Izmir, which was scheduled to receive 638 families, had to accommodate 1,846, and Bursa received 3,189 families instead of the planned 762. Adana and Iskanderum on the Mediterranean coast also attracted many more settlers than originally planned. The movement toward the cities is a general trend in Turkey's demography, and it "would be even more accentuated," observes Huey Louis Kostanick, "were it not that crop prices are so high that most peasants are content to remain in the villages."⁶¹

The main settlement areas were Thrace (20,000 settlers), the Aegean coast (more than 50,000), the Anatolian Plateau (over 40,000), and the

region of Istanbul. The overpopulated Black Sea coast received about 5,000; very few settled in Eastern Anatolia. Regionally, there was a definite movement from the central plateau westward to the Aegean coast, to the Marmara area, and to Istanbul.

Rural settlement encountered considerable difficulties. The need of the newcomers competed with the long-standing demands for land by land-hungry native Turkish peasantry. Kostanick admits that⁶² "too often, the new immigrants were given totally inadequate land in order not to invoke the envy and anger of the native population." Even when, in 1953, a new scale of allotments, specifically designed to meet the needs of the repatriates, was tentatively introduced by the Land and Settlement Administration, "land awarded fell far short of the amounts indicated. . . . Some families received no arable land at all, and so were forced either to hire out as field workers or to seek some kind of employment in villages and farms." An additional difficulty arose in the initial stages of resettlement because the repatriates were permitted to choose either an allotment of farm land (and thus classification as farmers), or a lump sum of money to be used to establish a shop or office (and thus classification as artisans). In a number of instances, repatriate families chose to accept the monetary payment, and after they had spent the money, claimed that they were in actuality farmers and should be given a land allotment.

According to official Turkish statistics, by March of 1953, 16,542 farmer families from Bulgaria were settled on 853,812 decares (211,077 acres) of land, an average of 12.7 acres per family. They were supplied with standard farming implements and seed for the first harvest; some were given a pair of oxen, a wagon, and cows. Of the planned 21,964 village-type houses, 20,385 were built by the end of 1952. Less satisfactory were the achievements in urban housing: of the 5,849 houses planned for 1950-1952, only 4,332 were actually built.

The repatriates were directed primarily to existing communities, and only in exceptional instances, numbering less than fifty, were completely new villages built for them: this method prevented the emergence of group or clannish units and led to a smooth and painless integration into the native Turkish population. The newcomers spoke Turkish and practiced the Mussulman religion and its social customs; they could therefore be assimilated readily under ordinary conditions. A contributing factor was that many local Turks were themselves refugees who had arrived in Turkey during the previous forty years.

The resettlement of more than 150,000 Turkish repatriates from

Bulgaria strained Turkey's financial and administrative resources. Yet it has been successfully concluded, has strengthened her economy, and was worth the effort invested. Turkey achieved this result at a cost of \$74 million, with little assistance from outside sources. She received a total of some \$20 million in Marshall Plan counterpart funds. The Economic Cooperation Administration justified this grant by pointing out that the refugee settlement tied in well with Turkey's program of agricultural development. Most of the money, however, came from public funds and from private collections among the Turkish people.

Commenting on this achievement, *The Christian Science Monitor* (January 7, 1952) stressed that the situation of the Turkish refugees "compares favorably with that of the 875,000 Arab refugees from Palestine who continue to live in camps or 'tent cities' at the edge of the Arab countries where they sought refuge." The *Des Moines Iowa Register* (January 16, 1952) made a similar comparison: "Turkey has had a bigger refugee problem than either Syria or Lebanon and almost as big as Egypt has. . . . But you seldom hear about them, because the Turks have done such a good job of resettling them. . . . The big difference is in spirit. The Turks, reluctant as they were to take on the burden, accepted it as a responsibility and set to work to clean it up as fast as possible. . . . Turkey showed its love for the Turkish refugees by sharing a chance to make a living with them."

NOTES

¹ *Ankara*, June 27 and November 17, 1934.

² *Ibid.*, November 28, 1934.

³ *Ibid.*, November 17, 1934.

⁴ Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, *Les minorités ethniques en Europe Centrale et Balkanique*, Paris, 1946, pp. 22-23.

⁵ M.P., "The Expulsion of the Turkish Minority from Bulgaria," *The World Today*, January 1951.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Istatistik Yilligi*, 1937-1938, Vol. X, p. 89.

⁸ *Ankara*, November 17, 1934.

⁹ *Istatistik Yilligi*, *loc. cit.*

¹⁰ Peter Schischkoff and Heinz Wilsdorf, "Die zwischenstaatliche Lenkung der Türkenwanderung," *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, September 1938, p. 763; *Istatistik Yilligi*, *loc. cit.*

¹¹ *Ankara*, July 27, 1935; *Annuaire Statistique du Royaume de Bulgarie*, Sofia, 1940, p. 136.

¹² Schischkoff and Wilsdorf, *op. cit.*, p. 763.

¹³ Huey Louis Kostanick, *Turkish Resettlement of Bulgarian Turks 1950-1953*, University of California Publications in Geography, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1957, Vol. 8, No. 2, p. 105.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, January 3, 1951.

¹⁵ *New York Herald Tribune*, October 12, 1950.

- ¹⁶ *New York Herald Tribune*, August 17, 1950.
- ¹⁷ Kostanick, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
- ¹⁸ *New York Times*, August 11, 1950.
- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*
- ²⁰ *News from Turkey*, published by the Turkish Information Office, September 7, 1950.
- ²¹ *New York Times*, October 12, 1950.
- ²² *Ibid.*, September 7, 1950.
- ²³ The Turkish press reported that the Bulgarian government had instructed the militia to ensure that no Bulgar should purchase any property offered for sale by Bulgarian Turks who were planning to emigrate, and that prospective emigrants who did put up their property for sale were visited at night, taken to headquarters, tortured, and made to sign a document of renunciation of all rights to such property. *News from Turkey*, September 7, 1950.
- ²⁴ *New York Herald Tribune*, October 12, 1950.
- ²⁵ *Time*, December 4, 1950.
- ²⁶ *The World Today*, January 1951.
- ²⁷ *The Central European Observer*, November 11, 1950.
- ²⁸ *News from Turkey*, October 5, 1950.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, October 19, 1950.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, January 18, 1951.
- ³¹ *News from Turkey*, January 11, 1951.
- ³² *Time*, December 12, 1950.
- ³³ *News from Turkey*, November 9 and 16, 1950.
- ³⁴ United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, November 3, 1950, pp. 366-367.
- ³⁵ *The Central European Observer*, November 11, 1950.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*
- ³⁷ *News from Turkey*, October 12, 1950.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ *News from Turkey*, December 12, 1950; *The World Today*, January 1951.
- ⁴⁰ *News from Turkey*, January 18, 1951.
- ⁴¹ Gill Robb Wilson, "Turkey's Repatriation Effort," *New York Herald Tribune*, May 18, 1951.
- ⁴² *New York Times*, April 10, 1951.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, December 19, 1950.
- ⁴⁴ *News from Turkey*, January 18, 1951.
- ⁴⁵ *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 7, 1952.
- ⁴⁶ Kostanick, *op. cit.*, p. 131.
- ⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 134.
- ⁴⁸ *The Times* (London), January 6, 1951.
- ⁴⁹ *News from Turkey*, January 18, 1951.
- ⁵⁰ *Christian Science Monitor*, January 18, 1951.
- ⁵¹ *New York Times*, April 15, 1951.
- ⁵² Donald Everest Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation*, Philadelphia, 1939, p. 274.
- ⁵³ *News from Turkey*, January 11, 1951.
- ⁵⁴ *Israel Digest*, June 6, 1951.
- ⁵⁵ *News from Turkey*, January 18 and 25, 1951.
- ⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, January 21, 1951.
- ⁵⁷ *News from Turkey*, January 25, 1951.
- ⁵⁸ Kostanick, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
- ⁵⁹ Gill Robb Wilson, "Turkey's Repatriation Effort," *loc. cit.*
- ⁶⁰ *News from Turkey*, January 11, 1951. The following description of the working of the Turkish resettlement machinery is based on the valuable study by Huey Louis Kostanick already cited and on the "Report on the Problem of the Recent Immigration from Bulgaria to Turkey" by Orhand Tuna published in the *Revue de la Faculté des Sciences Économiques de l'Université D'Istanbul*, Vol. XIII, No. 1-4 (1954), pp. 208-219.
- ⁶¹ Kostanick, *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.
- ⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 112.

PART V

FOURTEEN

Problems of Population Transfer

I.

The sum total of persons who fled or were expelled, transferred, or exchanged in Europe within the general framework of sorting out ethnic groups during the decade 1945-1955 amounts to about twenty million. The major components of this total are as follows:

Various German groups	13,000,000
Poles resettled in the Recovered Territories (repatriates from the U.S.S.R. and the West, and resettlers from Central Poland)	4,300,000
Czechs and Slovaks resettled in the Border Regions ..	1,800,000
Ukrainians, White Russians, Lithuanians transferred from Poland to the U.S.S.R.	520,000
Hungarians and Slovaks exchanged under the agreement of February 27, 1946	100,000
Turks transferred from Bulgaria to Turkey	157,000

This tremendous redistribution of population produced revolutionary changes in the ethnic map of the European continent.

As an aggregate result of Hitler's "repatriation" policies (1939-44), German flight from the Red Army (1944-45), and outright expulsion and organized transfer (1944-50), almost all German enclaves in European countries were practically eliminated. On the whole, over thirteen million Germans were, in one way or another, removed from various European countries. The problems arising from the presence of this largest and most ramified ethnic minority in Central and South-eastern Europe, which had loomed so ominously during the interwar period, have virtually vanished. Displacements caused by German conquests, together with those which were the consequence of the German defeat, have combined in terminating and reversing a long era of progressive German advance and Slavonic retreat which had been inaugurated by Charlemagne's crushing victories. The remnants of German folk groups in Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia are economically uprooted and politically hopelessly broken. The only *Volksdeutsche*

splinter which still represents a political problem is the German minority of 200,000 in Italian South Tyrol.

The exchange of population between the Soviet Union and Poland and between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, involving over 2.5 million people, united all Ukrainian, White Russians and Lithuanian minorities with their main bodies, the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian Soviet Republics. On the other hand, Poland became a state inhabited almost entirely by Poles.¹

Still unsolved is the question of Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia (400,000), Rumania (1.6 million), and Yugoslavia (500,000), which now constitute Europe's largest minority bloc. The abortive Bulgarian attempt at a wholesale transfer of the Turkish minority also has remained inconclusive.

By no means all of the transfers dealt with in this study are equally justifiable, and some of them appear hardly justifiable at all. In several cases, forcible removals of minority populations seem to have been outright expulsions motivated not by the necessity of eliminating a minority group which represented a danger to the stability of the state and an inducement to revisionist aspirations by a neighboring country, but merely by deep resentment against the disloyal, sometimes treacherous role played by local German groups during the war. This feeling, psychologically understandable, and the much less defensible urge to "punish" the offenders, do not, however, offer sufficient justification for so drastic a measure as wholesale expulsion of entire minority entities.

The notion of guilt, as well as its corollary—retribution—cannot be applied to collectives. It constitutes a fundamentally individual category, which must in each specific case be established with regard to every single person involved. Even if the overwhelming majority of people belonging to an ethnic group are found guilty of a specific offense, the group in its totality may not be held morally or legally accountable, and be punished, for the offense committed by its members. The underlying idea of a compulsory transfer of entire population groups has, therefore, nothing in common with guilt and penalty, nor even with justice. It is not a chastening of an ethnic group for the misdemeanor of all or part of its members, while another ethnic group is rewarded for good behavior by the members, being permitted to remain in their homes. Compulsory population transfer is in its essence a *preventive* measure, not a retaliatory one. If large sections of an ethnic minority within a state consistently negate their very allegiance to this state; repeatedly create friction and

conflicts; neglect their elementary civic duties; look for guidance, and display allegiance to their co-national state abroad, nourish Irredentist tendencies and thus jeopardize the integrity of the state; and if all attempts at reconciling this minority and integrating it into the framework of common statehood fail—then, and only then, recourse may be taken to the “grim necessity of population transfer,” in the words of the late Dr. Beneš.

This does not mean that an entire minority group is being made responsible for the attitude of its intransigent fraction. But as the very existence of such a minority within the affected state represents a permanent source of jeopardy, only the elimination of this source in its totality, i.e. the removal of the entire ethnic group, is likely radically to dispose of this menace. Suppression or deportation of even a very great number of persons directly guilty of extreme nationalistic antistate activities cannot serve the purpose, because it does not eliminate the very roots of the problem—the presence of an ethnic entity whose mentality and objectives have proved to be incompatible with the survival or security of the state to which the members reluctantly belong. Unless the territory on which such a minority lives is detached from the state in question, there seems to be no other alternative but wholesale transfer of the disloyal population to the co-racial state to which it professes allegiance. This is not a punitive measure, but a prophylactic one: a matter of highest state expedience, not of retribution. One can have deepest respect for the indomitable spirit of a minority group which refuses to live under the state authority of another people and strives for unification with a neighboring co-national state. There is nothing morally reprehensible in such Irredentist tendencies. But when they become a manifest danger, which cannot be eliminated in any other way, the ethically neutral preventive measure of transfer offers the last resort.

This basic principle of any justifiable population transfer was not observed in the case of the compulsory removal of German minorities from Yugoslavia and Hungary. None of these German folk groups was a frontier minority, facing a German state over the border and looking towards a union with it. There was no tangible danger of Irredentist activities, no essential threat to the integrity of the state territory. German minorities in these countries had been, of course, a considerable source of friction and annoyance, and sometimes had acted as a fifth column; but they represented no imminent menace to the safety of Hungary or Yugoslavia, or to the peace in southeastern Europe. The

same reasoning largely applies to the German minority in Rumania. The compulsory mass removal of these three folk groups lacked the decisive preventive aspect of any genuine transfer scheme; it was in its essence a retaliatory measure, entailing a tremendous amount of hardship and suffering that was hardly warranted. The Potsdam Conference unexpectedly espoused the wholesale transfer of the German minority of 500,000 in Hungary, superficially associating this poorly substantiated measure with the ironclad cases of Czechoslovakia and Poland. Yugoslavia and Rumania did not even ask for international approval but summarily disposed of their German minorities by unilateral action.²

On the other hand, no serious attempt was made by Yugoslavia and Rumania to transfer their respective Magyar populations which were living on the very frontier with Hungary and had been, both before and during the war, most powerful factors in the Hungarian revisionist policy. The Magyar group of Transylvania, over a million strong, was actively instrumental in the annexation of the northern part of that province by Hungary in 1940; and the 350,000 Magyars in Yugoslav Backa and Baranya had offered a powerful inducement for the annexation of these provinces in the spring of 1941. The restoration of these areas to the respective sovereignty of Rumania and Yugoslavia by no means eliminated the revisionist potential of their Magyar minorities. At the Peace Conference, Yugoslavia introduced an amendment to the draft peace treaty with Hungary providing for a voluntary exchange of population between the two countries, but did not press for it in Paris and dropped the matter afterwards. The Rumanian government of Peter Groza, and even more so, the succeeding Communist regime, never mentioned the transfer scheme in application to Transylvania and went out of their way to appease the Hungarian minority by far-reaching concessions.

2.

The case of the transfer of German population from the Sudetenland and the Polish-incorporated eastern German provinces holds a peculiar place within the general scheme of population transfers. A "normal" transfer scheme originates in the impossibility of drawing state boundaries according to ethnic criteria, and in the ensuing necessity of eliminating ethnic minorities within the thus imperfectly drawn state frontiers in

order to prevent subversive Irredentist tendencies. This reasoning does not apply to the aforementioned areas. The Germans inhabiting them had formed an overwhelming majority of their population and were living as a compact mass along the border of the Reich. From a purely ethnic viewpoint, there would have been no difficulty in keeping Silesia or East Prussia within the main territory inhabited by the German people, or in adapting the political status of the Sudetenland to the linguistic frontier. The latter solution was in fact largely implemented in Munich by separating the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia. This was done very imperfectly, as large purely Czech border districts were annexed to the Reich. The Munich solution, however, could *per se* have offered a workable alternative to the transfer of Germans—if considerations of ethnic nature were accepted as the sole criterion for drawing state frontiers; so, for that matter, would the retention of Germany's eastern provinces within the Reich territory.

However, the framers of Europe's post-World War II political map reckoned with essential factors other than the purely ethnic. For reasons the discussion and appraisal of which do not belong within the framework of this study, they decided to restore the whole of Sudetenland to Czechoslovak sovereignty and to hand over Germany's provinces to the east of the Oder and Neisse rivers to Polish administration. By doing so they implicitly made unavoidable the wholesale transfer of the German populations from these territories. The experience of twenty interwar years and of the five years of the war had empirically established the utter impossibility that the German majority in the Sudetenland could live together with the Czech and Slovak majority within a common Czechoslovak state. There were only two possibilities: Munich or transfer. The Axis had tried out the Munich solution which divorced the Sudeten territory from Czechoslovakia. The victorious Allies abolished everything ensuing from the Munich settlement. There remained no other solution but to divorce the German majority population from the Sudetenland. This meant wholesale transfer.

The same reasoning fully applies to the Polish "Recovered Territories." They could have remained with the Reich together with their German majority population. But handing them over to Poland automatically implied compulsory transfer of this population. It would have been the greatest disservice to the Polish state to saddle it with a territory inhabited by millions of ardently nationalistic Germans; it would by the same token convert the area into a breeding ground for militant

Irredentism and a threat to the stability and peace of the European continent.

The organic interrelation between the post-World War II ethno-territorial arrangement in Europe and the wholesale transfer to Germany "of German populations, or elements thereof," in Czechoslovakia and Poland was firmly established by the Potsdam Conference of the Big Three—possibly without their fully realizing all the momentous implications of their decisions. But there was in them inescapable logic, which served as the very basis of the sweeping German transfers from these two countries. Initiated as unilateral operations by the respective governments, they became an internationally recognized scheme for stabilization of the new European territorial setup.

The conditions under which postwar population transfers were carried out differed widely. As a rule, those which were of an organized character proved to be considerably more humane and orderly than those which were not. Transfers conducted on the basis of interstate treaties or of agreements with the authorities of the receiving areas (American, British, and Soviet occupation authorities in Germany) caused less physical hardship and moral distress than unilateral actions by the governments of the transferring countries. Transfers involving resettlement of co-nationals in specific areas (of Czechs and Slovaks in the Border Region, of Poles in the Recovered Territories) were planned and implemented with the utmost care for the interests of the resettlers. Nevertheless, the grand total of suffering and hardship involved in the displacement—compulsory or voluntary—of millions of people was undoubtedly tremendous in scope and intensity.

Settlement of the property interests of the transferred persons can be discussed only in terms of transfers carried out on the basis of interstate treaties. The most liberal in this respect was the Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement of February 27, 1946, allowing the transferees to take along, tax and custom free, all their movable property; a special Mixed Commission had to assess the amount of indemnity to be paid for nonmovable property left behind. Only limited amounts of personal belongings (up to two tons per family) and money (up to 1,000 rubles or zlotys per person), could be exported by repatriates under the Soviet-Polish agreements on exchange of population; no compensation was provided for movable property exceeding the abovementioned limits, or for irremovable property left behind; the receiving countries undertook to allot to the respective repatriates plots of land not smaller than those they had

owned in their former residences. In cases of unilateral transfers, the transferees were allowed to take along only as much of their own baggage as they were able to carry in their hands (in Poland), or up to 70 kilograms (in Czechoslovakia) and 100 kilograms (in Hungary), plus 500 or 1,000 Reichsmarks, respectively, in cash; all remaining movable and the entire nonmovable property was forfeited to the state they had to leave. No provision whatsoever was made for ensuring any amount of property to be taken along by the expellees from Rumania and Yugoslavia.

The repopulation and economic reconstruction of the areas from which compact German populations were compulsorily transferred can be considered successful in the Polish Recovered Territories, and less so in the Border Regions of Czechoslovakia. The resettlement of the transferred Germans in reduced, ruined, and impoverished German territory was subject to great difficulties, which were successfully overcome.

3.

Experience of two world wars showed that it was patently impossible for any peace settlement to create a territorial order in which all states were ethnically homogeneous; impossible to adjust state frontiers exactly to the existing ethnic distribution of population. There was, thus, no other alternative but to apply the opposite method. Oskar I. Janowsky, a staunch opponent of the transfer idea, ironically formulated this alternative as follows: "If history and geography have created a Babel of tongues and peoples in east-central Europe, man is to step in and set things aright by sorting out and redistributing many millions of people according to national-cultural symptoms or labels."³ Advocates of population transfers can confidently endorse this polemically meant formula. There is nothing sacrosanct and eternal in conjunctures created by history and geography. Man has more than once stepped in to radically change long-established patterns which had for centuries been deemed immutable. A "Babel of tongues and peoples," even if historically created and no matter in what part of the world's area, can and must be disentangled if threatening the peace of the world. There is no life-and-death organic connection between land and people. Henry Morgenthau Jr. rightly stressed that it is no longer necessary to be bound by the old feudal conception that the people go with the land. Men are no longer *glebae adscripti*; they have ceased to be a mere function of territory.

And in all territorial adjustments that are deemed necessary, "the old-fashioned practice of handing over large groups of people to a government they do not like and a foreign one at that should be avoided."⁴

The idea of organized transfer of ethnic groups as a means of solving entangled and explosive territorial and national problems has, therefore, survived the end of the war and has proved its viability by having been invoked at every occasion where deeply rooted and intricate cases of this nature have come under discussion.

We have seen that less than five months after the end of the war the Potsdam conference of the Big Three agreed on the wholesale compulsory transfer to Germany of German populations from Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary—a total of about 6.5 million. Following the pattern of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement of February 27, 1946, which had provided for a partly voluntary, partly compulsory exchange of 100,000 Magyars in Slovakia against an equal number of Slovaks and Czechs living in Hungary, the Peace Conference in Paris inserted into the Peace Treaty with Hungary a special paragraph enjoining the Hungarian government to enter into negotiations with Czechoslovakia in order to solve the problem of those members of the Hungarian minority who would not be settled in Hungary within the scope of this agreement.

Before the question of Transylvania came up before the Paris Peace Conference, there had been among students of the Balkan situation an almost unanimous understanding that an extensive exchange of population offered the only solution to the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict over this hotly contested province. Bernard Newman insisted that "Transylvania above all the disputed areas of Europe needs an ethnic sorting out."⁵ Other supporters of this solution were Charles Upson Clark,⁶ a noted British student of the Balkan situation, and Jacob Robinson,⁷ an authority on the international protection of minorities. On the eve of the Peace Conference, Sumner Welles bluntly stated that the only practical solution to the Transylvania question "must be found in a surgical operation at the peace table." Transylvania, he suggested, should be divided between Hungary and Rumania by a line which recognized ethnic principles, but which was drawn principally for economic reasons. Thereafter, populations should be transferred by order of the United Nations "so that there will never again be heard the charge that Rumanians or Hungarians are living under a flag that is hateful to them and that this element or that is suffering oppression or discrimination, whether racial or religious. . . .

Any solution less drastic than this would merely perpetuate a danger spot which the United Nations are now at length given the chance to eradicate."⁸

The Peace Conference did not follow this advice. Transylvania as a whole was restored to Rumanian sovereignty and no provision for population transfer was made. The United States delegation for a certain time played with the idea that "a large-scale compulsory exchange of populations might create an ethnic line where none existed before," but was afraid that this expedient "might also create more problems than it solved" and "was not prepared to advocate a drastic solution of this sort."⁹

The Yugoslav delegation to the Peace Conference introduced an amendment to the peace treaty with Hungary providing for a voluntary exchange of the 470,000 members of the Magyar minority in Yugoslavia against some 350,000 Croats living in Hungary. The amendment was not approved by the Peace Conference, but it remains an eloquent testimony of Yugoslavia's desire to normalize her relations with Hungary by shifting their respective minorities.¹⁰

Several schemes for transferring minority groups did not reach the conference table. Some of them are worth mentioning.

In the course of the debate on the Austrian peace treaty at the April, 1947, session of the "Big Four" Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow, Mr. Edvard Kardelj, head of the Yugoslav delegation, explained that even if Yugoslavia's demands for incorporation of Austrian Carinthia and the Slovenian frontier districts of Styria were satisfied, over 70,000 Yugoslavs (the so-called Burgenland Croats) would still remain in Austria, while approximately 60,000 Austrian Germans would be living in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav delegation suggested that these 70,000 Croats in Burgenland "be exchanged for the Austrian national minority which would find itself in Yugoslav territory as a result of frontier changes." Mr. Vyacheslav Molotov supported the Yugoslav proposals on behalf of the Soviet government.¹¹ Another transfer scheme of "internal" character was offered by Dinko Tomašić, former Professor of Sociology at the University of Zagreb. It provided for a voluntary exchange of the Serb minority in Croatia (Bosnia) and of the Croat minority in Serbia proper, as the most promising way to eliminate "one of the main sources of mutual Croat-Serb fears and suspicions."¹²

Population transfer was suggested as a means of solving the Danish-German conflict in the former Danish provinces of Schleswig-Holstein,

which had been seized by Prussia after one of Bismarck's "made" wars. In a plebiscite held in 1920, the southern section voted overwhelmingly for Germany; the vote in the middle section was about half-and-half; the northern portion voted preponderantly Danish. Accordingly, the northern section was awarded to Denmark. It included a small German minority which enjoyed extensive political and cultural freedom, but acted treacherously towards the Danish state and actively contributed to Hitler's bloodless invasion of Denmark. During the German occupation, the Danish underground paper *Danskeren* energetically demanded that Denmark's postwar border be moved to the Ejder River and German population be transferred to Germany. In the issue of February 24, 1945, the paper wrote: "We must have a clearly defined border. Therefore, all Germans and their descendants who have immigrated over Dannevirke since 1864 must be moved back to Germany. They will be allowed to take their belongings, but all land and real estate will be confiscated by the Danish state as payment and compensation for the destruction and expense caused by Germany during the occupation. It is Germany's business to compensate repatriated Germans for loss of property and fortunes. Also all traitors will be expelled. If there are then Germans wishing to remain in Denmark, they must become Danish citizens so that their children are sent to Danish schools. No German schools must be allowed in Denmark." Bernard Newman argued that the exchange of the German minority in Denmark against the Danish minority in Germany could be carried out without harm to individuals and with permanent gain to both states.¹³ Even the British occupation authorities in Schleswig-Holstein, who were anything but particularly friendly towards the Danish folk group in South-Schleswig, invited the Danish government "to offer proposals for frontier rectification, with or without a plebiscite, or for an exchange of population."¹⁴

A commendable though abortive attempt at eliminating the very roots of the perennial ethnic conflicts in the Balkans through an internationally supervised exchange of population was made by the United Nations.

On December 19, 1946, the U.N. Security Council unanimously decided to establish a Commission of Investigation, composed of representatives of the eleven members of the Council, to examine the facts concerning the troubled situation along the northern Greek frontiers and to report to the Council. The Commission spent almost seven months investigating the situation, studying the evidence, and preparing its

report which was submitted to the Security Council on June 27, 1947.¹⁵ In this report, among other proposals intended to normalize the relations between Greece and her neighboring states of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, nine of the eleven members of the Investigation Commission suggested that the Security Council

recommend to the governments concerned that they study the practicability of concluding agreements for the voluntary transfer of minorities. In the meantime minorities in any of the countries concerned desiring to emigrate should be given all facilities to do so by the government of the State in which they at present reside. The arrangements of any such transfers could be supervised by the Commission or Commissioner who would act as registration authority for any person desiring to emigrate.

After having considered the report of the Commission, the United States representative in the Security Council on June 27 introduced a resolution incorporating this recommendation.¹⁶ On July 29, the resolution was voted paragraph by paragraph. The paragraph providing for transfer of minorities was approved 9-0, with the Soviet and Polish representatives abstaining. The resolution in its entirety was, however, vetoed by Mr. Andrei Gromyko on behalf of the Soviet Union.¹⁷

The attitude of the Soviet and Polish governments toward the proposal on transfer of population as a means to solve territorial and ethnic conflicts between the four Balkan states involved was the more surprising as the Soviet Union and Poland had only recently successfully carried out ambitious schemes of exchange of population involving over two million persons (see Chapter 8); in a joint communique dated May 8, 1947, they declared that this operation had "served for both countries as an important factor facilitating further consolidation of friendship, mutual understanding, and collaboration of both fraternal peoples."¹⁸ And yet, speaking on August 14, 1947, before the Security Council, Mr. Gromyko argued that transfer of the respective national minorities could not serve as a means of improving the relations between Greece on one hand and Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria on the other. "More than that," he claimed, "it would mean actually encouraging the impermissible policy and practice of the present Greek government, as expressed in the forced eviction of Albanian and Macedonian minorities to the territories of neighboring countries and the extermination of these minorities."¹⁹ These Soviet arguments were in full agreement with the stand taken by

Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, which had been charged by a qualified majority (nine of eleven members) of the Commission of Investigation with "supporting the guerrilla warfare in Greece." In June of 1947, Dmitar Vlachev, vice president of the Yugoslav National Assembly, claimed in an article in the Belgrade magazine *Slav Brotherhood* that an exchange of minorities between neighboring countries would be the greatest danger to peace in the Balkans. Vlachev charged the Greek government with "endeavoring, with the aid of certain members of the [United Nations] Investigation Commission, to request the expulsion of the Macedonian population from Aegean Macedonia and have the request placed on the agenda of the Security Council." Dr. Nissim Mevorah, the Bulgarian spokesman before the Security Council, unconditionally rejected the consideration of a voluntary exchange of minority groups. The Greek government's position was conciliatory but hardly cooperative. On April 15, 1948, the Greek liaison representative informed the U.N. Special Committee that his government considered the problem of the some 18,000 Chams, the Albanian-speaking Moslem minority in Greece, as largely settled by their emigration to Albania; a solution to the question of the Slavophones living in Greek territory (75,000 to 80,000 souls), and the question of Greek minorities in the neighboring countries, he declared, required the cooperation of those countries. The Greek government, therefore, could not, in the present circumstances, put forward a solution of this problem and reserved its rights to do so as circumstances permitted.²⁰

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It cannot be denied that the redistribution of ethnic groups is a painful operation for the persons concerned. It may also cause, at least for a time, serious disruption in the economic life of both the country of departure and the country of resettlement. These negative aspects of the operation should be neither overlooked nor underestimated. They must be ever present in the deliberation upon each envisaged transfer scheme, and there certainly may be situations in which considerations of this nature would appear strong enough to dissuade from such a course.

There are, however, situations when the alternative is bound to be not merely painful, but disastrous. And when this is the case, transfer remains the only solution. As the former director of the Pan-European

Union put it: "To cut the cancer from a sick body is not cruel, it is necessary."²¹

Fortunately, most diseases do not require surgical treatment. Any serious and responsible physician would consider every other possible means of effecting a cure and would have recourse to the scalpel only as a last resort. And so it is with the drastic remedy of population transfer. It is by no means a universal method of solving all minority problems, and should not be applied until all other avenues have been explored. In some cases, fair treatment of an ethnic minority by the state under an international Bill of Rights suffice. In others, interstate treaties securing the rights of the respective minorities may offer a way out, while in still others an improved and more effective machinery of international supervision along the lines of the defunct League of Nations formula may furnish a workable pattern. As long as there is a fair chance that any one of these or similar procedures might serve the purpose, it must be given an honest trial. The transfer of populations should be decided on only in the last instance, not as an ideal solution, but as a necessary evil. This author is wholeheartedly in agreement with the statement of Viscount Cranborne in the British House of Lords, made on behalf of the government, that "transfer of population is only one method of dealing with this [minority] problem, and a method which is so drastic that it may well seem to be one to be used only if all other methods are likely to fail and if the minority problem in question is likely seriously to endanger peace. The saving of peace is the crucial point."²² Speaking of objections of humanitarian nature against population transfers, Viscount Cranborne justly stressed that "the humanitarian case must be considered in relation to the causes of war. It can be fairly said, I think," he pointed out, "that the suffering caused by a week's war would be more than the suffering caused by the efficient resettlement of these populations whose present situation is liable to endanger future peace. If, therefore, transfer, and transfer alone, seemed likely to ensure peace, I should personally take the view that the humanitarian argument must not be given more than its proper weight in the balance of considerations."

The alternative offered by opponents of the transfer solution is the creation in multinational states of a political and economic climate such that ethnic conflicts, national rivalry, and animosity between racial and linguistic majorities would be irrelevant and obsolete; motives and feelings other than nationalism must be made prevalent, and the sentiment of belonging to a common state organism must replace the present

centrifugal tendencies. British Laborite Lord Strabolgi even questioned the very urgency of racial and national problems in the postwar world and asserted that experiences of the war had "a very unifying effect" on the European nationalities. "The truth is," he said, "that as this war progresses we can see in front of our eyes many of the old racial cleavages yielding to the far greater issue of Fascism against anti-Fascism."²³

A realistic appraisal of the postwar situation hardly augurs well for conjectures of this sort. The world has emerged from the war in a mood which is all but brotherly and is unlikely to unite peoples around common spiritual issues at the expense of dividing ethnic lines. Ours is a very uneasy, tense, envious world, full of mutual mistrust, unable and often unwilling to forget old national and territorial animosities. Even the most optimistic observers are not inclined to expect in the near future a noticeable betterment of the inter-racial climate now prevailing in the deeply disrupted central, eastern, and southeastern European areas, the traditional hotbed of nationalistic feelings and conflicts—or for that matter in India or in the Middle East, new storm centers of the world.

While opposing large-scale population transfers as inconsistent with the respect for the basic rights of the individual, some opponents of the transfer idea are, nevertheless, ready to accept them "in special areas and on a small scale."²⁴ It is difficult to see the logic of this argument. The ethics of the problem can certainly not be determined by the size of the area and the number of persons involved. Pushed to its logical conclusion, moral opposition to a compulsory removal of individuals from their residences in the interest of collectives automatically rules out any such operation, large or small. The issue is one of principle rather than of degree. In terms of moral categories, subordination of individual wishes to the demands of the community is acceptable or unacceptable irrespective of whether it applies to tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands, or millions of people.

On the other hand, small-scale population transfers very rarely offer even the advantage of expediency and efficacy. Usually, when tiny areas and small minority groups only are involved, the situation hardly justifies so drastic a measure as wholesale compulsory transfer. Problems of this kind can normally be solved by more conventional methods. Small-scale transfers appear to be unavoidable only in quite exceptional cases. But, then, their justification lies not in their numerical limitations, but in the urgency and explosiveness of the case. It is difficult to understand why the same criterion should not be applied to problems involving large

numbers of persons. Their explosiveness and urgency can only be increased by the size of population concerned, and the necessity of transfer can only be intensified.

Some authors question the finality of a territorial settlement ensuing from the transfer of one of the ethnic groups from an area. Professor Erich Hula considers such finality "more than doubtful in the light of the historical record of the age of nationalism."²⁵ Norman Hill, while ready to admit that such a settlement might prove to be a stable one when the transfer had been freely entered into, insists that when a population transfer had been unwillingly accepted, such a settlement "may be reopened at later date and in a particularly vicious form; national groups may be again transferred, those who have been absent returning to possession as their opponents are obliged to evacuate."²⁶

No evidence has been offered in support of Professor Hula's sweeping assertion of the inherent instability of ethno-territorial settlements based on transfer of minority groups. There appears to be more substantiation for Norman Hill's doubts as to the finality of their results. Hitler's war-time transfer of twelve German minorities to the incorporated Polish provinces (1939-1944), which was intended to stabilize the annexation of the area by the Reich, proved to be short-lived, and the hundreds of thousands of transplanted Germans had to run for their lives. There was also no permanency in the transfer of Hungarians to the annexed Yugoslav territory.

It would, however, be misleading to believe that only transfers that "had been freely entered into" possess a fair chance to produce final settlements. The exchange of population between Turkey and Greece (1923-1933) under the Convention of Lausanne had certainly not been "freely entered into" by Greece, which had consented to it under obvious duress. Nonetheless, its results, as we have seen, proved to be of surprising durability. Greco-Turkish relations have remained undisturbed in the course of the more than three decades that followed the Lausanne agreement. The same is true with regard to the Bulgarian-Rumanian exchange of population under the Craiova Agreement of September 7, 1940. It was under the pressure of the Axis that Rumania had consented to the cession of Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria and to subsequent compulsory interchange of population. But the settlement of the more than thirty-year-old Bulgaro-Rumanian conflict over Dobrudja after the completion of the painful transfer operation seems to be considered by both interested countries as a permanent one. At the Paris Peace Con-

ference, Rumania did not claim the return of Southern Dobrudja, and the Peace Treaty with Rumania, prepared in Paris, recognized the transfer of this territory to Bulgaria. As late as November, 1947, it was announced that a new Bulgarian-Rumanian agreement had settled some disputes arising from the Craiowa agreement of 1940.²⁷

On the other hand, the Greco-Bulgarian convention on exchange of population, which was signed on November 27, 1920, at Neuilly-Sur-Seine by Greek and Bulgarian plenipotentiaries with the most emphatic manifestations of goodwill, was ultimately entangled in the twisting fortunes of World War II. The results of the allegedly final adjustment between the two countries were largely upset by a change in their political relationship. Just as soon as the opportunity presented itself, following the collapse of Greek resistance in April, 1941, Bulgaria occupied Greek Macedonia and western Thrace and made a determined attempt to reverse the ethnic balance of these provinces as established by the implementation of the 1920 Convention. About 100,000 Greeks were pressured into leaving the area. On the other hand, many of the 53,000 Bulgarians who had left Greece between 1923 and 1928, and of the 70,000 who had departed before the Neuilly Convention came into effect, were encouraged to move back to Greek Macedonia and Thrace. After Bulgaria's surrender in September, 1944, the 122,000 Bulgarian settlers were sent back to their former residences, and the evicted Greeks were enabled to return.²⁸

5.

Of all the European transfers conducted in the postwar era, three involved exchange of population: the Polish-Soviet, the Soviet-Czechoslovak, and the Hungarian-Czechoslovak. Five other transfers were unilateral: the transfers of Germans from Czechoslovakia, the Polish Recovered Territories, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary. All three population exchanges took place on the basis of interstate treaties and provided for the right of option by the populations concerned. All one-way transfers involving German ethnic groups were compulsory and were initiated arbitrarily by the government ruling over the territory from which the transfer was made; the transfers from former Sudetenland, the Polish Recovered Territories, and Hungary were sanctioned by the Big Three at Potsdam. The transfers connected with the re-

settlement of the Czechoslovak Border Regions and the Polish Recovered Territories were voluntary.

Undoubtedly, the most far-reaching question posed by the scheme of population transfer is that of compulsion. This problem, touching as it does on the nature of individual rights, goes, of course, beyond mere procedure and becomes a matter of political philosophy. The subject of population transfer cannot be contemplated without regard for the fundamental question of authority versus individual rights.

By and large, leading jurists and students of minority problems agree that unconditionally compulsory transfer is as a rule inconsistent with democratic concepts of human rights.²⁹ There is something deeply shocking in the idea that human beings may be indiscriminately transferred or exchanged like goods or cattle, without having any legal right to protest or appeal. Among the prospective evacuees there are certain to be some for whom the abandonment of their homeland and resettlement in another country entail agonizing tragedy. In such cases, irrespective of their number, it would be needlessly cruel and a violation of the principle of individual self-determination to compel departure, withholding all legal means of obtaining exemption from the transfer.

On the other hand, the historically established conventional option clause, requiring that only those persons who desire to change their citizenship and to leave the country of their residence have to state their wishes explicitly, while those who remain silent are *ipso facto* regarded as intending and permitted to stay, constitutes a serious threat to the efficacy of any transfer operation. Even though the members of a minority group may suffer bitterly from the tensions imposed by their abnormal situation, for many of them resettlement appears to be too drastic a solution of their problems; and if they can evade the issue by sheer inaction, great numbers of them are likely to take that course. Confronted with a difficult choice, they would do nothing at all rather than take any initiative, even though inaction is in itself a decision. Only a fraction of the ethnic minority is likely to actively manifest a wish for resettlement.

Thus, since inertia is so dominant a factor in human life, the conventional method of opting actually favors the perpetuation of the *status quo*. It causes the scales to be heavily weighted in advance in favor of conservative no-transfer inclinations. The inert mass, merely by refraining from opting, would perpetuate the existence of the minority group in the disputed area, thus defeating the whole purpose of the transfer. This state of affairs can only add to the strained relations that

had motivated the transfer expedient in the first place, for it leads the interested governments to propaganda campaigns and pressure tactics. Such devices are of course likely to increase the vote for resettlement, but they are also bound to increase the tenseness of the conflict and, if pushed far enough to be wholly effective, make the "voluntary" character of the operation merely farcical.

These observations are amply corroborated by the evidence of past transfers. In the few cases where the affected populations were truly free to opt for transfer or not to vote at all, large sections refrained from expressing their intentions and thus thwarted the whole project. In other wartime transfers which formally provided for the right of option, the minorities were in actual practice subjected to such strong administrative pressures and to such powerful psychological, political, and economic stimuli that there was little genuine freedom of choice. Yet, even among these merely pseudo-voluntary operations there were some that only partially succeeded in overcoming the natural reaction to cling to the *status quo*, however unsatisfactory; thus, despite the pressures, the legal option clause made it possible for such sizeable minorities as 21 per cent of the Balts (1939-40 transfer) and 30 per cent of the South Tyrolean Germans to remain in their homelands. On the whole, wartime transfer treaties providing for option either ended in failure or in actual practice lost their voluntary character.

The evidence of postwar transfer operations is in this respect not uniform. The voluntary Polish-Soviet exchange of population resulted in an almost unanimous option for Soviet citizenship by the Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian minorities of Poland, leading to their wholesale transfer to the U.S.S.R., while slightly over 50 per cent of Poles in Soviet territory opted for resettlement in Poland; considerable Polish minority groups remained in the Soviet republics. The author is at a loss to offer a plausible explanation for these so different results. The manifest failure of the option clause in the Czechoslovak-Hungarian agreement on population exchange must be ascribed to pressure on the part of one of the interested governments; yet in this case pressure was applied not in the usual direction of enforcing option for transfer, but, paradoxically enough, with the view of preventing members of one of the involved minorities from registering for a change of their citizenship and subsequent transfer (see Chapter 7). There are no sufficient data on the working of the option clause in the Soviet-Czechoslovak agreement.

It is apparent that the voluntary or compulsory character of each transfer operation must be determined primarily by the *aim* it seeks to attain. Repatriation of co-national minorities from other countries, intended to reinforce the number and ethnic homogeneity of the majority population, can be but voluntary. The repatriating state is obviously interested only in immigrants who have freely chosen to follow the appeal of their future home country and are willing and eager to adapt themselves to the new ethnic and social environment. On the contrary, if the transfer is caused by the need to eliminate a minority group which represents a threat to the security of the state and to the peace of the world, the operation is normally bound to be a compulsory one.³⁰

It is granted that compulsory transfer must not become a total deportation, which ignores the individual situations that are properly exceptions to the main solution. But, equally, a measure of such importance must not be allowed to be doomed to failure by exclusive reliance on an irresponsible and, in practice, only specious "free expression of will." If it is decided upon to resort to transfer at all, it must be implemented with all the authority used in enforcing any other matter of major national interest.

The very principle of law in any organized human society is based on the assumption that considerations of over-all public interest should override—certainly within the limits of justice and fairness—any particular interest of persons or groups of persons, or whole communities, which are liable to be affected more than others. No organized society would survive should individuals or groups be given the power to frustrate arrangements made with a higher general purpose for the mere reason that such arrangements inconvenience them or affect them. In any state there are many demands in the interests of common welfare which are imposed on persons and groups regardless of their personal wishes. Vaccination is compulsory. Education of children is compulsory. Quarantine is compulsory when epidemics spread, and in cases of fire, flood, or military attack, evacuation is often compulsory. There can be no plebiscite for the hundreds or thousands of families in the trajectory of an avalanche. In all such cases the wishes or sentiments of the persons involved are simply ignored. The determinative factor in administrative action is the welfare of the community—which, in the long run, coincides with the best interests of the individuals.

The members of a minority group, just because they are so immédia-

ately concerned, are likely to lack the perspective needed for viewing the situation in its broader aspects and for choosing a constructive way out. They are therefore the last to be consulted on the matter, and the least qualified to make a sound decision. The question of war and peace between two neighboring countries, and perhaps of war and peace for the entire world, cannot be dependent on the vote, and the probable inertia, of so and so many individuals constituting a border minority.

On the other hand, no mass migration in human history was a truly voluntary movement, prompted exclusively by a free decision of the individuals involved. Bernard Newman aptly reminds those who consider decreed compulsory transfers of population as an intolerable tyranny that so-called "free" migrations of millions of people are in fact no less forced when the compelling agent is economic—when the emigrant is driven off his land by unemployment, poverty, or by a foreclosed mortgage.³¹ Over 52 million persons left Europe between 1846 and 1932. Between 1891 and 1915, 16,943,000 emigrants from all parts of the world entered the United States alone.³² This mass migration, caused mostly by economic circumstances, "produced heart-rending results, families broken up, folk driven from the homes of their fathers and regions full of dear associations—and in them there is no compensating gain in easing international frictions. . . . If millions of people can be transferred to the other side of the Atlantic, or even to the other side of the world, without serious hardship and certainly to the eventual benefit of themselves and the recipient countries, then it ought not to be impossible to work out similar schemes in Europe."³³

It is therefore essential to evolve a system for population transfers that would recognize the hard political exigencies of the problem and at the same time make due allowances for the inalienable rights of individuals.

The legal innovation of a reversed option clause is offered as a solution. It would operate in the following manner. In principle, the transfer of a minority group from one state to another, if agreed on by the interested governments or by an authorized international body, would be considered an all-inclusive measure. Every member of the affected minority, without exception, would be subject to transfer and would not be expected to make any specific option for resettlement. But if any individual should desire to be exempted from the transfer, and to be allowed to maintain his present legal status, he would be required to opt explicitly for the retention of his citizenship and residence. The exemption would be granted automatically, not as a privilege, but as of right, unless there were

specific charges of disloyalty against the claimant; it would, however, be regarded as an exception only, without prejudice to the sweeping character of the transfer. This right of reversed option would introduce an essential and salutary modification of the basically obligatory nature of the population transfer by leaving the way open for as many individual decisions against resettlement as desired.

For the persons who should choose to remain in the country of their residence, there would be no question of forcible transfer. Such persons, however, would remain as individuals only, not as members of an ethnic minority group. They would have to relinquish all the rights formerly contingent on their minority status, retaining only the rights and obligations of the state of which they decided to remain citizens. Irrespective of their number, they would never again be granted international or constitutional recognition as political and legal entities. They would forfeit the right to use their mother tongue in public life; their children would be taught at school in the language of the majority; no autonomous cultural or welfare institutions would be permitted. Complete and speedy assimilation would be the fate of the optants against the transfer. They would have to be made fully aware of these consequences and they would have to accept them in advance.

Such consequences were explicitly foreseen in the preamble to the German-Latvian treaty of October 30, 1939, which had stipulated that after the transfer of those Germans who opted for resettlement to the Reich "the German folk group will withdraw from the framework of the Latvian state."³⁴ They were implicitly contained in the German-Italian agreement on transfer of the German minority from South Tyrol concluded on October 21, 1939.³⁵ In an embryonic and very imperfect form they were implemented by the Czechoslovak and Polish transfer schemes. Article 2 of the Czechoslovak citizenship decree of August 2, 1945, exempted from the loss of citizenship and, accordingly, from the enforced transfer, all Germans and Hungarians who were able to prove their loyalty towards the Czechoslovak state; those who would qualify for permission to stay had, however, to reconcile themselves to being deprived of the right to organize and use German communal institutions and schools with German as the language of education, to publish German-language newspapers, and so on. A considerable number of German Social Democrats and anti-Fascists were allowed to remain in Czechoslovakia as full-fledged citizens, although without any special collective rights. Faced with the prospect of national loneliness and com-

plete assimilation, 125,586 Germans, the overwhelming majority of those exempted, chose to leave Czechoslovakia voluntarily (see Chapter 5). Similarly, the Polish authorities in the Recovered Territories exempted from compulsory transfer over a million former German citizens who—although often thoroughly Germanized—could establish their Polish origin even remotely, could prove that they did not belong to a Nazi organization, and who were ready to sign a declaration of intention to become a Polish citizen. There is abundant evidence to the effect that at least some of those who did sign such declarations did so exclusively in order to be exempted from compulsory transfer, and are now eager to leave for Germany (see Chapter 9).

Both the Czechoslovak and the Polish patterns are very poor and rudimentary implementations of the principle of a reversed option clause as formulated above. They are, however, a perhaps involuntary tribute to the vaguely felt need to introduce a wholesome corrective into the indiscriminately sweeping character of compulsory transfers.

Another less basic but still essential corrective would be permission to persons being transferred to choose freely the country of their destination. Most of them would in all probability select their co-national mother country; but there might be some individuals who, for political, religious, ideological, or other reasons, would dread the prospect of settling there and would prefer to go to such other countries as might permit them to enter. There is nothing in this decision likely to jeopardize the purpose of the transfer, and such persons should be allowed to go where they please.

The two correctives advocated above are intended to liberalize the obligatory character of population transfers and to avoid unnecessary hardships and moral distress. Basically, however, with the exception of repatriation which is logically bound to be voluntary only, compulsion has to remain the main feature of every transfer that purports not simply to remove a high percentage of a given minority group from the country, but to remove a minority problem, to eliminate a menace for the future.

There are only two realistic alternative solutions. In countries where there is reasonable hope for a peaceable coexistence with the minority groups and where a transfer is not absolutely essential, maximum security and rights must be guaranteed to the minorities. But if population transfer appears unavoidable, there must be no trace of the collective minority existence left, no stuff for the resurgence of the minority problem.

This is a bold and hard solution, but it is the only one worth trying. At this juncture of history it is unwise to think and act in conventional, short-term rather than imaginative long-term categories. Half-measures, palliatives, makeshift expedients simply will not do; they are definite errors in a period when the world is seeking to eliminate as many sources of future conflicts as possible.

NOTES

¹ According to the Main Statistical Office in Poland, national minorities at the end of 1956 comprised but 1.8 per cent of the country's total population of 27.5 million (*Tribuna Ludu*, December 18, 1956). A release of the Main Statistical Office, as cited by *Wiadomości o życiu w Polsce*, Vol. III (December 3, 1956), published weekly by the Free Europe Committee in New York, gives the following breakdown of the minority population (515,000): Ukrainians—150,000, Belorussians—some 100,000, Jews—90,000 (in 1957–1958 35,000 left for Israel), Germans—65,000, Slovaks—about 35,000, and some 30,000 Czechs and 20,000 Gypsies. The 1960 *Britannica Book of the Year* (p. 549) speaks (as of December 31, 1959) of 200,000 Ukrainians, 120,000 Belorussians, and 10,000 Lithuanians among Poland's estimated population of 29,600,000.

² It can hardly be doubted that motives of an economic nature also played a considerable role in the expulsion of the Germans from these countries. The Rumanian, Hungarian, and Serbo-Croat majority populations had always been deeply jealous of the prosperity of their German fellow-citizens and eagerly seized the opportunity of dispossessing them and getting hold of their properties.

³ Oscar J. Janowsky, *Nationalities and National Minorities*, New York, 1945, p. 136.

⁴ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany Is Our Problem*, New York, 1945, pp. 159–160.

⁵ Bernard Newman, *The New Europe*, New York, 1943, p. 270.

⁶ Charles Upson Clark, *Racial Aspects of Rumania's Case*, North Hatley, 1941, p. 19.

⁷ Jacob Robinson, "Minorities in a Free World," *Free World*, May 1943, p. 454.

⁸ Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* New York and London, 1945, pp. 129–30.

⁹ John C. Campbell, "The Territorial Settlement," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1947, p. 211.

¹⁰ *Conférence de Paris*, C. P. Gen. Doc. 1, U. 36.

¹¹ *Soviet News*, April 21 and 22, 1947.

¹² Dinko Tomašić, "Nationality Problems in Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, July 1946, pp. 121–122.

¹³ Newman, *The New Europe*, p. 519.

¹⁴ *New York Times*, September 11, 1946.

¹⁵ U.N. Doc. S/360, Vol. I, pp. 167 ff., May 27, 1947.

¹⁶ U.N. Doc. S/P. V. 170, 29, 1947.

¹⁷ *New York Herald Tribune*, July 29, 1947.

¹⁸ *Soviet News*, May 10, 1947. Oskar J. Janowsky wrongly asserts that "the Soviet Union has not resorted to the transfer or exchange of populations as the solution of the nationality problem." *Nationalities and National Minorities*, p. 103.

¹⁹ *Soviet News*, August 19, 1947.

²⁰ U.N. Doc. A/AC 16/223.

²¹ Leopold C. Klausner, "Danger Zones in Europe," *World Affairs Interpreter*, Summer 1944, p. 133.

²² *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Lords, March 8, 1944.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Janowsky, *op. cit.*, p. 141; Norman Hill, *Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations*, New York, 1945, p. 186.

²⁶ Erich Hula, "For Human Inhumanity," *America*, December 21, 1947.

²⁷ Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

²⁸ *New York Times*, November 4, 1947.

²⁹ Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 415-424.

³⁰ See Jacques Dupart, *La Protection des Minorités de race, de langue, et de religion*, Paris 1922, pp. 218 ff.; André Mandelstamm, "La protection des minorités," in *Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours 1923*, Vol I, p. 416; C. G. Tenckides, "Le statut des minorités et l'échange obligatoire des populations grecques et turques," *Revue Générale de Droit International Public*, Second Series, Vol. 6, p. 86; Werner Höxter, *Bevölkerungsaustausch als Institut des Völkerrechts*, Leipzig, 1922, pp. 52-54.

³¹ Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, *Les Transferts Internationaux de Populations*, Paris, 1946, p. 46.

³² Newman, *The New Europe*, pp. 21-22.

³³ Julius Isaak, *Economics of Migration*, New York, 1947, pp. 60-62.

³⁴ Newman, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

³⁵ Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 502.

³⁶ *Les Transferts Internationaux de Populations*, pp. 410-420.

ANNEX

ANNEX

Pro and Contra Population Transfer

I.

Since most of the wartime population transfers were conducted by the Third Reich, and Hitler had adopted large-scale transfer of national minorities as part of his "New Order" in Europe, there is in many quarters an inkling that the entire concept of transferring population is a spiritual child of Nazi totalitarianism. But Hitler did not invent the transfer or exchange of ethnic minorities. Its spiritual origin is of much nobler lineage.

It was in 1915 that George Montandon, a French scholar of Swiss origin and professor of ethnology at the Paris School of Anthropology, drew up a memorandum entitled *Frontières Nationales: Détermination objective de la condition primordiale nécessaire à l'obtention d'une paix durable*, which was published in connection with the first Conference des Nationalités held at Lausanne on June 27-29, 1918. The basic principle laid down in this memorandum was the delimitation of state frontiers according to the ethnic criterion and the transfer of certain ethnic minority groups within these frontiers to secure their stability. In an article published a quarter of a century later, Montandon claimed that his suggestion "had a success which is ignored by the public," namely that it inspired Fridtjof Nansen's proposal concerning the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey.¹ In certain circles Montandon is credited with having invented the transfer idea.²

Another early promoter of the transfer scheme was the noted Anglo-Jewish writer Israel Zangwill who in February, 1919, expressed the conviction that "race redistribution in the interests of the general world-happiness is, I take it, one of the functions of the League of Nations, and one that must be executed in many parts of Europe."³ In another article, Zangwill argued that "in some instances, where the chaos of populations is a menace to permanent settlement, there must be mutual adjustments, even (in the gravest cases) gradual measures of race redistribution."⁴ Among the early supporters of the transfer idea were also Professor Bernard Lavergne of the Lille University law faculty,⁵ Fridtjof Nansen, and the Greek Premier Eleutherios Venizelos; the latter two were

ideologically and politically coresponsible for the Greco-Turkish population exchange.

Lessons of the immediate prewar era and the experience of the war years have brought many statesmen, scholars, and writers to the conclusion that ethnic sifting of the minorities is the most constructive answer to many of the territorial and minorities problems in several European danger zones.

In the United States, former President Herbert Hoover and former Ambassador Hugh Gibson, discussing problems of lasting peace, averred that "in most cases the problem of mixed border people may have to be solved by the heroic remedy of transfer of populations. The hardship of moving is great, but it is less than the constant suffering of minorities and the constant recurrence of war."⁶ Sumner Welles, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and one of the leading American liberals, also expressed his belief that

the minority problems cannot be solved through frontier and territorial adjustment alone. Populations must be transferred under international control, even though in some cases such transfers may involve a million human beings. . . . If history, and especially European history, has taught us anything, it must have taught us that the minority questions of Europe have been an eternal menace to friendly relations between peoples, a constant stimulant of fanatical nationalism, and a frequent incentive to war. Isn't it better, considering the appalling tragedy in Europe which we now confront, to get through with all the heartaches in this generation, when they may be an immediate consequence of planning for a peaceful and happier world, and thus prevent new heartaches in the generations to come?

Sumner Welles saw in the transfer and exchange of population a constructive solution for the Polish-Soviet and Polish-German border problem, as well as for the problems of Sudetenland, Istria, and Transylvania.⁷ Another convinced advocate of population transfer is Henry Morgenthau, Jr., former Secretary of the Treasury.⁸

Warren Thompson, one of the leading demographers in the United States, stated in a letter to the author written on October 22, 1943: "As for myself, I have gradually come to feel that the resettlement of considerable populations in Europe is indispensable to the establishment of a peace which will have a chance to last for more than a few years." A few months later, Professor Thompson, gave public expression to this conviction, adding that "a regrouping of the minority 'islands' of Europe

with peoples whose language they speak, such as has been going on since 1939, may be the best way out."⁹

A similar opinion was voiced by Stephen B. Jones, associate professor of geography at the University of Hawaii, in a special study on *Boundary-Making*, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: "Where nationalities are so dovetailed that no acceptable boundary can be drawn, the drastic remedy of population transfer may be the only solution." While admitting that the "actual removal and resettlement [of minorities] is not so simple," and that "if accomplished in a humane fashion, resettlement is costly," Professor Jones insisted that "the trouble and cost are, however, vastly less than the trouble and cost of war."¹⁰

Among several non-American advocates of population transfers, Harold Butler, former Director of the International Labor Office in Geneva, is one of the most emphatic.¹¹ De Azcarate, former director of the Minorities Questions Section of the League of Nations, who has behind him extensive experience in this field, is also "not ignorant of the fact that the transfer or interchange of population may be a practical means of readjustment between nationalities and frontiers in certain specific and clearly defined cases"; yet, he refuses to consider it "as an expedient applicable to all minorities."¹² Bernard Newman, one of the best informed and most searching students of the European territorial and nationality problems, soberly stated as early as 1943 that "whether we like the idea or not, the system of transference of population has become a matter for European politics." Newman suggested the transfer and exchange device as an answer to the German-Polish, Polish-Soviet, and Soviet-Finnish border problems; an exchange of populations appeared to him as the only solution for the Hungarian-Rumanian conflict over Transylvania and the Yugoslav-Italian strife regarding Istria, as well as to the German problems in the Sudetenland, and to the question of the Magyar minority in Czechoslovakia.¹³ Leopold C. Klausner, former director of the Pan-European Union, expressed the conviction that population transfer must be considered the best solution for minority problems in danger zones,¹⁴ while Nicolas Politis, former Greek Ambassador to France and an authority on international law, urged widest application of the transfer method.¹⁵ Imre Ferenczi, former population expert of the International Labor Office, is explicit in his support of the transfer plan;¹⁶ so is Louis Dollot in his study on great human migrations.¹⁷ A report on international postwar settlement, submitted by the National Executive Committee of the British Labor Party

to the Party Conference in May, 1944, contained a definite statement to the effect that "national minorities in Central Europe, left outside the boundaries of their own nation, should be encouraged to rejoin it. . . . The organized transfer of population in the immediate postwar period may, indeed, be one of the foundations of better international relations in a later phase." In April, 1945, the British Commonwealth Party endorsed the transfer idea.¹⁸

2.

Many scholars and writers, however, have been emphatic in their rejection of the idea of population transfer. Some deny the very admissibility of this principle for western democratic thinking; others question the necessity for specific transfers or stress the disruption that they entail.

Professor Erich Hula of the New School of Social Research, while denouncing as futile "any attempt to base the political system of Europe on the ethnic units of her population," also rejected the idea from a moral standpoint. In his view, it involves the "recognition of collective rights as against individual rights by degrading man to an appurtenance of the race to which he is supposed to belong."¹⁹ In a lengthy review of this author's study, *European Population Transfers, 1939-1945*, Professor Hula strongly doubts whether "wholesale population transfer, even if carried out in a more or less humane manner . . . is consistent with the respect for the basic rights of the individual which the western democracies profess."²⁰ Fritz Epstein also stressed in *New Europe* (July-August 1944) "the utter disregard for human rights" inherent in population transfer; to him, "the whole transfer mania is an illusion."

Stellio Séferiades, who made an extensive study of pre-1939 transfers, emphasized that for the affected populations any transfer operation, even when carried out under the best conditions, was more than a misfortune; he himself does not hesitate to describe the system as criminal.²¹ Referring to the Greco-Turkish exchange, Stephen P. Ladas, expressed his doubts about whether it was the only possible solution of the problem: in his view, wise statesmanship and great foresight could have avoided the surgical operation.²²

Sir John Hope Simpson, who was vice president of the League of Nations Refugee Settlement Committee in Athens from 1926 to 1930, while admitting that only a compulsory population exchange offers an

adequate solution for hopelessly complicated minority problems, described it as an "inhumane, indeed, a cruel, remedy, entailing much suffering and hardship on the unfortunates to whom it is applied"; the conditions that might ensure the success of a population exchange could be found only in the rarest instances, and therefore the system cannot be regarded as a satisfactory general solution for minority population problems.²³ Joseph L. Kunz, an authority on questions of option, referring in January, 1945, to Czechoslovak and Polish schemes for the transfer of Germans from the Sudetenland and East Germany, also insisted that while "such proposed solution can very well be understood psychologically . . . it is certainly no solution in effect: apart from humane considerations, it will create an international problem of refugees; it is hardly conducive to an enduring peace in Europe."²⁴ The late Eugene M. Kulischer was explicit in his condemnation of compulsory population transfers which he considered "a flagrant degradation of human beings, making them a tool for political and ethnic goals."²⁵ Jean de la Robrie, a French specialist on population questions, rejected the transfer idea from both the moral and political viewpoints;²⁶ however, in a letter to this author dated August 12, 1947, he voiced his opposition to compulsory transfers only. Eduard Beneš' appeal for a wholesale transfer of European minority groups which was referred to with approval by the influential liberal English weekly, *Spectator*, was vigorously challenged by David Thomson, who claimed that nearly all historical evidence tended to prove that large-scale transfers of population involve enormous personal hardship and injustice, and that the creation of uninational states may well promote and intensify exclusive nationalism.²⁷

3.

Some scholars and writers, in America as well as in Europe, took a middle-of-the-road stand.

Professor Oskar J. Janowsky, a recognized American authority on questions of nationality, stressed the necessity "to reiterate that the mass transfer of minority populations cannot be regarded as a solution of the nationalities problem, and to insist that emphasis upon the idea of population transfer can result only in discouraging efforts to find a genuine solution." Yet, he admitted that "the exchange of minorities may be possible in special areas and on a small scale."²⁸ Norman Hill,

while agreeing that transfer of population "may, under appropriate conditions, be practicable," argued that such a system could perhaps be imposed upon small states, but large powers could scarcely be bound except by their own consent, unless they had suffered defeat in war; the imposition of a transfer would be most workable with regard to small minority groups whose presence would not in any case present considerable complication, so that the problem involved could be better solved in other ways; in really troublesome ethno-political disputes where the national groups approach equality in numbers (in areas like Alsace-Lorraine, Fiume, the Polish Corridor) "the problems are not likely to be simplified by proposals to transfer population."²⁹ A hesitant and inconclusive position is taken by the authors of the valuable extensive study on international population transfers published by the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies at the French Ministry of National Economy. Rejecting the idea of transferring populations from a moral viewpoint and refuting it as incompatible with the legal concept of justice, they admit that the transfer of population offers a constructive political contribution to securing a durable peace.³⁰

Such an attitude leads nowhere. In the last analysis, what counts is how the various aspects of the problem balance each other. The Turkish newspaper *Milliyet*, convincingly formulated this basic truth a quarter of a century ago (October 20, 1934): "Those who have studied the problem have found exchanges [of population] to be bad from the human viewpoint, economically disadvantageous, but politically indispensable. In our opinion, this question cannot be studied by subdividing it into various phases. No undertaking can be bad from a human viewpoint and good politics. An enterprise is either bad or good. To call it indispensable from a political viewpoint is to admit that it must be carried out at any cost."

An instructive discussion between supporters and opponents of the transfer scheme took place in March, 1944, in the British House of Lords. The Earl of Mansfield asked His Majesty's Government whether, when considering postwar territorial adjustments in Europe, they were "bearing in mind . . . the advisability of proposing that members of such minorities as are likely to be a future menace to the peace of Europe shall be compulsorily transferred to the land of their racial origin." Lord Mansfield warmly advocated such a solution. Laborite Lord Strabolgi strongly opposed Lord Mansfield's suggestion, contending that "by taking people whose ancestors hundreds of years ago lived in another country, uprooting them and their families, liquidating their property, and selling their

cattle, and sending them back to what was their country of origin," the initiators of the idea would be "only making more trouble." Viscount Cecil of Chelwood and Lord Noel-Buxton also criticized the transfer scheme as "quite impracticable and causing immense suffering." But even Viscount Cecil had "no doubt" that "some at any rate" of the "thoroughly disloyal" Sudeten Germans "will have to be removed" and that "there are many other cases of the same kind, unhappily, that have occurred in Europe." The Earl of Perth (better known as Sir Eric Drummond, the first Secretary General of the League of Nations) on the whole supported the transfer idea, and Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, winding up the debate on behalf of the Government, agreed that "in certain cases no other solution than that of transfer will eventually be found possible by the United Nations if the peace of Europe is to be secured."³¹

Of a less official character, but indicative of the attitude of wide circles of the European intellectual world, was the discussion (which this author attended) that followed a lecture on mass displacement of population by Jean de la Robrie before the Paris Academy of Moral and Political Sciences. Georges Duhamel, Jacques Rueff, and Jacques Bardoux strongly condemned forced removals of population as immoral and contrary to the rights of the individual, while Father Sertillanges stressed that the tendency of the modern world to discredit the individual who opposes the collectivity is a result of the weakening of belief in the principles of Christianity. On the other hand, Léon Noel, Germain Marain, François Charles-Roux, Louis Rivière, and Camille Rosier justified this measure in terms of political and social necessity.

NOTES

¹ George Montandon, "La Pologne Future," *Mercur de France*, February 1940.

² Michel Pierrac, "Les transferts des populations," *Voix de Peuples*, Geneva, October 16, 1940.

³ Israel Zangwill, *The Voice of Jerusalem*, New York, 1921, pp. 103-105.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁵ Bernard Lavergne, "L'aggression hitlérienne et la France: Les échanges de populations," *L'Année Politique Française et Étrangère*, November 1939.

⁶ Herbert Hoover and Hugh Gibson, *Problems of Lasting Peace*, New York, 1942, p. 238.

⁷ Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* New York and London, 1946, pp. 119, 125, 127.

⁸ Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany is Our Problem*, New York, 1945, pp. 159-160.

⁹ Warren S. Thompson, *Plenty of People*, Lancaster, Pa., 1944, p. 199. André Visson (*The Coming Struggle for Peace*, New York, 1944, p. 127) also considers "complete exchange of population" the best answer to several European minority problems.

¹⁰ Stephen B. Jones, *Boundary-Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors, and Boundary Commissioners*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, Washington, D.C., 1945.

¹¹ Harold Butler, *The Lost Peace*, New York, 1941, p. 229.

¹² Pablo De Azcarate y Flores, *Nationalities and National Minorities*, Washington, D.C., 1945, p. 139.

¹³ Bernard Newman, *The New Europe*, New York, 1943, pp. 21, 131-132, 176, 228, 229, 327, 416, 465.

¹⁴ Leopold C. Klausner, "Danger Zones in Europe," *World Affairs Interpreter*, Summer 1944.

¹⁵ Nicolas Politis, "Les transferts de populations," *Politique Étrangère*, April 1940.

¹⁶ Imre Ferenczi, "On Shifting Europe's Peoples," *New York Herald Tribune*, March 21, 1944.

¹⁷ Louis Dollot, *Les Grandes Migrations Humaines*, Paris, 1946, p. 93.

¹⁸ British Labor Party, *The International Post-War Settlement*, London 1945, p. 5; *The Jewish Standard*, April 13, 1945.

¹⁹ Erich Hula, "Exchange of Population," *New York Herald Tribune*, February 11, 1944.

²⁰ Erich Hula, "For Human Inhumanity," *America*, December 21, 1946.

²¹ Stello Séferiades, "L'échange des populations," *Académie de Droit International, Recueil des cours*, 1928, IV, p. 420.

²² Stephen P. Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, New York, 1932, pp. 724, 729, 730.

²³ John Hope Simpson, "The Exchange of Population," *The Spectator*, December 5, 1941.

²⁴ Joseph L. Kunz, "The Future of the International Law for the Protection of National Minorities," *The American Journal of International Law*, January 1945, Vol. 39, No. 1.

²⁵ Eugene M. Kulischer, "Population Transfer," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, October 1946.

²⁶ Jean de la Robrie, "Transferts de Populations en Europe," *Le Monde Français*, June 1946.

²⁷ "The Europe of Tomorrow," *The Spectator*, September 12, 1941; David Thomson, "Back to Minority Problems," *The Spectator*, September 19, 1941.

²⁸ Oscar J. Janowsky, *Nationalities and National Minorities*, New York, 1945, p. 139.

²⁹ Norman Hill, *Claims to Territory in International Law and Relations*, New York, 1945, pp. 185-186.

³⁰ Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques, *Les Transferts Internationaux de Populations*, Paris, 1946, pp. 36-39.

³¹ *Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords*, March 8, 1941.

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